Hart v. Haley

Filing 49

OPINION and ORDER. The penalty phase claims as stated in the original petition are moot due to the resentencing. Some of Petitioner's guilt phase claims are procedurally defaulted and, therefore, due to be dismissed, as further set out. Within 30 days after the Supreme Court issues its opinion in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the parties shall submit a joint proposed briefing schedule for resolving the remaining claims. Signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr on 11/4/2015. copies to parties. (sdb)

IN
 THE
 UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 COURT
 FOR
 THE

SOUTHERN
 DISTRICT
 OF
 ALABAMA

SOUTHERN
 DIVISION

GARY DAVIS HART II,

Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON S. DUNN,
Commissioner, Alabama
Department of Corrections,1

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION NO.
01-00231-CB

Respondent.

 OPINION
 and
 ORDER

At
 the
 Court’s
 direction,
 the
 parties,
 some
 time
 ago,
 submitted
 briefs

addressing
 procedural
 default
 and
 the
 need
 for
 an
 evidentiary
 hearing.

 This
 order

addresses
 procedural
 default
 and
 other
 grounds
 for
 dismissal
 raised
 by
 Respondent.

Procedural
 Background

In
 1990,
 Petitioner
 Gary
 Davis
 Hart
 II
 was
 convicted
 of
 capital
 murder
 in
 the

Circuit
 Court
 of
 Mobile
 County,
 Alabama
 and
 was
 sentenced
 to
 death.

 He
 appealed,

and
 both
 his
 sentence
 and
 conviction
 were
 affirmed
 by
 the
 Alabama
 Court
 of

Criminal
 Appeals.

 Hart
 v.
 State,
 612
 So.2d
 520
 (Ala.
 Crim.
 App.
 1992).

 That
 decision

was
 affirmed
 by
 the
 Alabama
 Supreme
 Court.
 Ex
 Parte
 Hart,
 612
 So.2d
 536
 (Ala.

1992).

 Hart’s
 petition
 for
 certiorari
 was
 denied
 by
 the
 United
 States
 Supreme
 Court.

Hart
 v.
 Alabama,
 508
 U.S.
 953
 (1993).

 Following
 the
 conclusion
 of
 his
 direct
 appeal,

Hart
 filed
 a
 petition
 for
 postconviction
 relief
 pursuant
 to
 Rule
 32
 of
 the
 Alabama

Rules
 of
 Criminal
 Procedure.

 After
 a
 hearing,
 the
 trial
 court
 denied
 the
 petition.

1
 Pursuant
 to
 Fed.
 R.
 Civ.
 P.
 25(d),
 the
 Court
 has
 substituted
 Jefferson
 S.
 Dunn

Hart
 appealed,
 but
 the
 Alabama
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals
 affirmed
 the
 lower
 court’s

decision.

 Hart
 v.
 State,
 778
 So.2d
 869
 (Ala.
 Crim.
 App.
 1999)
 (unpubl.),
 cert.
 denied,

800
 So.2d
 140
 (Ala.
 2000).

On
 March
 28,
 2001,
 Hart
 filed
 the
 instant
 petition
 for
 habeas
 corpus
 pursuant

to
 28
 U.S.C.
 §
 2254.

 While
 the
 petition
 was
 pending,
 the
 United
 States
 Supreme

Court
 decided
 Roper
 v.
 Simmons,
 543
 U.S.
 551(2005),
 which
 held
 that
 the
 imposition

of
 the
 death
 penalty
 on
 persons
 under
 18
 when
 the
 crime
 was
 committed
 violated

the
 Eighth
 and
 Fourteenth
 Amendments.

 Thereafter,
 the
 Court
 entered
 an
 order

directing
 the
 Respondent
 to
 show
 cause
 why
 the
 petition
 should
 not
 be
 granted
 in

part,
 “insofar
 as
 petitioner
 seeks
 to
 vacate
 the
 sentence
 imposed
 on
 the
 ground
 that

it
 violates
 the
 Eighth
 Amendment’s
 prohibition
 on
 cruel
 and
 unusual
 punishment.”

(Ord.,
 Doc.
 40.)

 In
 response,
 Respondent
 acknowledged
 that
 Petitioner,
 who
 was
 16

years
 old
 at
 the
 time
 the
 murder
 was
 committed,
 was
 due
 to
 be
 resentenced
 to
 life

imprisonment
 without
 the
 possibility
 of
 parole
 based
 on
 the
 Supreme
 Court’s
 ruling

in
 Simmons.

 (Rsp.,
 Doc.
 41.)

 The
 parties
 agreed
 that
 the
 case
 should
 be
 remanded
 to

the
 Circuit
 Court
 of
 Mobile
 County
 for
 resentencing.

 Accordingly,
 this
 Court
 granted

the
 petition,
 in
 part,
 and
 remanded
 the
 matter
 to
 the
 Circuit
 Court
 of
 Mobile
 County

for
 resentencing,
 but
 retained
 jurisdiction
 to
 decide
 any
 pending
 guilt-­‐phase
 claims

properly
 raised
 by
 the
 Petitioner.

 (Remand
 Ord.,
 Doc.
 43.)

 On
 August
 16,
 2005,

Petitioner
 was
 resentenced
 to
 life
 in
 prison
 without
 the
 possibility
 of
 parole,
 the

only
 other
 sentence
 available
 at
 that
 time
 under
 Alabama
 law.2
 (Doc.
 45.)

2
 Subsequent
 to
 Roper,
 the
 Supreme
 Court
 held
 in
 Miller
 v.
 Alabama,
 ____
 U.S.
 ____,
 132

S.
 Ct.
 2455,
 2469

 (2012),
 “that
 the
 Eighth
 Amendment
 forbids
 a
 sentencing
 scheme

that
 mandates
 life
 in
 prison
 without
 possibility
 of
 parole
 for
 juvenile
 offenders.”

2

Facts

The
 Underlying
 Offense

In
 its
 opinion
 on
 direct
 appeal,
 the
 Alabama
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals

summarized
 the
 evidence
 presented
 at
 trial
 as
 follows:

On
 August
 12,
 1989,
 the
 appellant
 and
 his
 accomplice,
 who
 were
 each

armed
 with
 a
 handgun,
 entered
 the
 rear
 door
 of
 the
 L
 &
 N
 Seafood

restaurant
 in
 Mobile,
 Alabama.
 Standing
 near
 the
 rear
 door
 was
 the

restaurant's
 bartender,
 Steve
 Mason.
 Upon
 entering
 the
 restaurant,

the
 appellant
 grabbed
 Steve
 Mason
 by
 the
 shirt,
 prodded
 him
 in
 the

back
 with
 a
 .38
 caliber
 pistol,
 and
 announced
 “this
 is
 a
 hold
 up,
 take

me
 to
 the
 safe.”
 Mr.
 Mason
 led
 the
 appellant
 to
 the
 office
 where
 the

victim,
 Todd
 Evans,
 was
 working.
 Mr.
 Mason
 then
 informed
 the
 victim

that
 they
 were
 being
 robbed
 and
 that
 the
 appellant
 wanted
 money.

The
 victim
 did
 not
 reply
 but
 met
 the
 demand
 for
 money
 with
 a
 look
 of

surprise.
 The
 appellant
 then
 shouted,
 “This
 ain't
 no
 bullshit,”
 and

brought
 the
 pistol
 within
 two
 feet
 of
 the
 victim's
 head
 and
 fired.
 The

bullet
 entered
 the
 left
 side
 of
 the
 victim's
 face,
 traveled
 through
 his

brain,
 and
 then
 lodged
 under
 the
 scalp
 on
 the
 right
 side
 of
 his
 head.

Immediately
 following
 the
 shooting,
 Steve
 Mason
 retrieved
 a
 cash

drawer
 from
 a
 filing
 cabinet
 in
 the
 victim's
 office
 and
 gave
 it
 to
 the

appellant.
 The
 appellant
 and
 his
 partner
 then
 fled
 the
 scene
 on
 foot.

They
 were
 spotted
 at
 a
 nearby
 hotel
 and
 after
 a
 brief
 chase
 were

apprehended.
 During
 the
 chase,
 the
 appellant
 discarded
 a
 .38
 caliber

pistol,
 which
 was
 later
 identified
 as
 the
 murder
 weapon.
 At
 the
 time
 of

the
 appellant's
 arrest,
 he
 was
 in
 possession
 of
 $499
 in
 cash.

Hart
 v.
 State,
 612
 So.2d
 520,
 523
 (Ala.
 Crim.
 App.
 1992).

The
 Eleventh
 Circuit
 has
 held
 that
 Miller
 does
 not
 apply
 retroactively
 to
 cases
 on

collateral
 review.

 In
 re
 Morgan,
 713
 F.3d
 1365
 (11th
 Cir.
 2013).

 However,
 there
 is

disagreement
 on
 the
 issue
 of
 retroactivity.

 Compare
 Johnson
 v.
 Ponton,
 780
 F.3d
 219

(4th
 Cir.
 2015)
 (Miller
 not
 retroactive);
 Commonwealth
 v.
 Cunningham,
 81
 A.3d
 1
 (Pa.

2013)(same);
 State
 v.
 Tate,
 130
 So.
 3d
 829
 (La.
 2013)

 (same)
 with
 State
 v.
 Mantich,

842
 N.W.
 2d
 716
 (Neb.
 2014)
 (Miller
 retroactive);
 In
 re
 New
 Hampshire,
 103
 A.
 3d

227
 (N.H.
 2014)(same),
 petition
 for
 cert.
 filed,

 sub
 nom.
 New
 Hampshire
 v.
 Soto
 (Dec.

1,
 2014)
 (No.
 14-­‐639).

 The
 Supreme
 Court
 is
 expected
 to
 resolve
 the
 issue
 this
 term,

having
 recently
 granted
 heard
 oral
 argument
 in
 Montgomery
 v.
 Lousiana,
 141
 So.3d

264,
 cert.
 granted
 (U.S.
 March
 20,
 2015)
 (No.
 14-­‐280),
 a
 case
 in
 which
 the
 Louisiana

Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals,
 following
 Tate,
 supra,
 denied
 retroactive
 application
 of

Miller.

3

Pretrial
 &
 Trial
 Proceedings

Attorneys
 Arthur
 Madden
 and
 Vader
 A.
 (Al)
 Pennington
 were
 appointed
 to

represent
 Petitioner
 Gary
 Davis
 Hart
 following
 his
 indictment
 on
 a
 charge
 of
 capital

murder.

 (R.
 Vol.
 1,
 Tab
 R-­‐1
 at
 9-­‐10.
 )
 Shortly
 thereafter,
 counsel
 filed
 a
 Request
 to
 be

Treated
 as
 a
 Youthful
 Offender.
 Id.
 11.

 A
 Youthful
 Offender
 Report,
 including
 a

psychological
 evaluation,
 was
 submitted
 by
 the
 Alabama
 Department
 of
 Probation

and
 Parole.
 Id.
 19.

 After
 a
 hearing,
 at
 which
 defense
 counsel
 called
 two
 character

witnesses,
 the
 trial
 court
 denied
 Youthful
 Offender
 status.

 (R.
 Vol.
 2,
 Tab
 R-­‐4.)

Thereafter,
 defense
 counsel
 filed
 a
 motion
 for
 change
 of
 venue,
 which
 was
 denied,
 as

well
 as
 a
 motion
 for
 funds
 to
 hire
 experts,
 which
 was
 granted
 in
 part
 and
 denied
 in

part.

 (R.
 Vol.
 1,
 Tab
 R-­‐1
 at
 33-­‐38;
 R.
 Vol.
 2,
 Tab
 R-­‐7.)

 Defense
 counsel
 filed
 various

pretrial
 motions
 regarding
 jury
 selection
 as
 well
 as
 motions
 in
 limine.

Prior
 to
 appointment
 of
 counsel,
 the
 trial
 court
 entered
 a
 standard
 discovery

order.

 (R.
 Vol.
 1,
 Tab
 R-­‐1
 at
 12-­‐13.)

 That
 order
 required
 the
 District
 Attorney
 to

turn
 over
 to
 the
 defendant’s
 attorney
 at
 arraignment
 various
 forms
 of
 evidence,

including
 all
 statements
 made
 by
 the
 defendant
 (both
 written
 and
 oral);
 any
 and
 all

exculpatory
 evidence;
 all
 physical
 evidence
 to
 be
 offered
 into
 evidence
 at
 trial;
 and

results
 of
 scientific
 tests,
 experiments
 or
 examinations.

 (Id.
 )
 The
 trial
 court
 also

granted
 the
 State’s
 motion
 for
 discovery,
 which
 requested
 “copies
 of
 photographs,

documents
 and
 all
 other
 tangible
 documents”
 defendant
 intended
 to
 introduce
 into

evidence
 at
 trial
 as
 well
 as
 “[c]opies
 of
 any
 results
 of
 reports
 of
 physical
 or
 mental

examinations,
 and
 of
 scientific
 tests
 or
 experiments”
 to
 be
 introduced
 into
 evidence

4

at
 trial
 or
 which
 were
 prepared
 by
 a
 witness
 and
 related
 to
 the
 witness’s
 testimony.

(Id.
 49-­‐51.)3

At
 trial,
 the
 State
 presented
 testimony
 from
 three
 L&N
 employees
 who
 had

witnessed
 the
 shooting
 and
 who
 identified
 Hart
 as
 the
 shooter.

 The
 State
 also

presented
 testimony
 from
 other
 employees
 who
 saw
 Hart
 and/or
 his
 accomplice
 at

the
 restaurant
 shortly
 before
 or
 shortly
 after
 the
 shooting.

 Other
 witnesses

included
 several
 police
 officers
 who
 located
 the
 two
 nearby
 within
 a
 few
 hours
 of

the
 shooting
 and
 took
 them
 into
 custody.

 The
 State
 also
 presented
 the
 testimony
 of

the
 state
 medical
 examiner
 and
 a
 firearms
 expert.

The
 defense
 did
 not
 deny
 that
 Hart
 was
 the
 shooter
 or
 that
 the
 shooting
 took

place
 during
 the
 course
 of
 a
 robbery.

 The
 defense
 strategy
 was
 to
 portray
 the

shooting
 as
 accidental.

 Hart
 testified
 in
 his
 own
 defense
 that
 he
 did
 not
 intend
 to

shoot
 anyone
 and
 that
 he
 did
 not
 pull
 the
 trigger.

 Through
 Hart’s
 testimony,
 the

defense
 established
 that
 Hart
 had
 a
 congenital
 condition
 that
 caused
 weakness
 in

his
 right
 hand
 and
 arm.

 The
 defense
 elicited
 testimony
 from
 the
 State’s
 firearms

expert
 that
 the
 firearm
 Hart
 used
 was
 of
 inferior
 quality
 and,
 when
 cocked,
 required

less
 than
 2
 pounds
 of
 pressure
 to
 pull
 the
 trigger.

Direct
 Appeal

Hart
 raised
 numerous
 issues
 on
 direct
 appeal.4

 Among
 the
 issues
 raised

were
 the
 state’s
 use
 of
 peremptory
 challenges,
 the
 denial
 of
 Youthful
 Offender
 status,

3
 At
 jury
 selection,
 the
 State’s
 motion
 for
 discovery
 was
 determined
 to
 be
 moot

because
 the
 defense
 did
 not
 intend
 to
 offer
 any
 discoverable
 evidence
 at
 trial.
 R.
 Vol.

2,
 Tab
 R-­‐8
 at
 196.

4
 Hart
 was
 represented
 on
 direct
 appeal
 by
 attorney
 Ruth
 Friedman.

5

restriction’s
 on
 voir
 dire,
 discovery
 rulings,
 prosecutorial
 misconduct,
 evidentiary

rulings,
 the
 trial
 court’s
 jury
 instructions,
 and
 the
 sufficiency
 of
 the
 evidence.
 These

issues
 were
 raised
 before
 both
 the
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals
 (R.
 Vol.
 5,
 Tab
 R-­‐32)

and
 before
 the
 Alabama
 Supreme
 Court
 (R.
 Vol.
 6,
 Tab
 R-­‐38).

State
 Collateral
 Proceedings

After
 exhausting
 his
 direct
 appeal,
 Hart
 filed
 a
 petition
 for
 relief
 from

judgment
 pursuant
 to
 Rule
 32
 of
 the
 Alabama
 Rules
 of
 Criminal
 Procedure
 (“state

habeas”).5

 The
 petition
 asserted
 numerous
 grounds
 for
 relief
 from
 the
 conviction

and
 sentence
 based
 on
 both
 Federal
 and
 state
 constitutional
 violations,
 including

various
 claims
 of
 ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel.

 Hart’s
 petition
 was
 denied
 after

an
 evidentiary
 hearing
 before
 the
 trial
 court,
 and
 he
 appealed
 to
 the
 Alabama
 Court

of
 Criminal
 Appeals.

 That
 appeal
 also
 raised
 a
 number
 of
 issues
 and
 was
 also

unsuccessful.

Federal
 Habeas
 Petition
 &
 Roper
 v.
 Simmons

Hart
 filed
 the
 instant
 habeas
 petition
 on
 March
 28,
 2001.

 As
 noted
 above,

supra
 at
 2-­‐3,
 this
 action
 was
 remanded
 to
 the
 sentencing
 court
 by
 agreement
 for

resentencing
 pursuant
 to
 Roper.

 The
 state
 court
 imposed
 a
 sentence
 of
 life
 without

parole
 on
 August
 16,
 2005.

 Petitioner’s
 guilt-­‐phase
 claims
 are
 ripe
 for
 review.

Petitioner’s
 Habeas
 Claims

The
 following
 twenty-­‐four
 guilt-­‐phase
 claims6
 remain
 pending:

5
 Hart
 was
 represented
 in
 the
 state
 habeas
 proceedings
 by
 current
 counsel.

6
 The
 Petition
 raised
 twenty-­‐one
 claims
 related
 solely
 to
 sentencing
 issues,
 which

have
 been
 rendered
 moot
 by
 subsequent
 proceedings.
 Some
 of
 the
 remaining
 claims

are
 “hybrid”
 claims
 which
 raised
 both
 guilt-­‐phase
 and
 sentencing-­‐phase
 issues.

With
 respect
 to
 such
 claims,
 only
 guilt-­‐phase
 issues
 will
 be
 identified
 and
 addressed.

6

A.

 Ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel
 based
 on
 the
 following:

1.

 Counsel’s
 performance
 at
 the
 pretrial
 transfer
 hearing;

2.

 Counsel’s
 performance
 at
 the
 pretrial
 transfer
 hearing
 insofar
 as
 that

performance
 resulted
 from
 financial
 limitations
 placed
 on
 defense
 counsel;

3.

 Counsel’s
 performance
 at
 the
 youthful
 offender
 hearing;7

4.

 Counsel’s
 performance
 at
 the
 youthful
 offender
 hearing
 insofar
 as
 that

performance
 resulted
 from
 financial
 limitations
 placed
 on
 defense
 counsel;8

5.

 Counsel’s
 failure
 to
 protect
 Hart
 from
 prejudicial
 pretrial
 publicity;

6.

 Counsel’s
 failure
 to
 protect
 Hart
 from
 prejudicial
 pretrial
 publicity
 due
 to

financial
 limitations
 placed
 on
 defense
 counsel;

7.

 Counsel
 performance
 at
 voir
 dire;

9.

 Counsel
 failure
 to
 obtain
 and
 present
 evidence
 related
 to
 intent
 which
 was

the
 result
 of
 financial
 limitations
 placed
 on
 defense
 counsel;

10.
 Errors
 committed
 by
 counsel
 during
 trial;
 and

13.

 Cumulative
 errors
 of
 counsel.

B.

 Improper
 denial
 of
 youthful
 offender
 status.

D.

 The
 jury
 foreperson’s
 misconduct
 and
 racial
 bias
 deprived
 Hart
 of
 his
 right
 to

trial
 by
 an
 impartial
 tribunal.

E.

 The
 trial
 court’s
 discovery
 rulings
 violated
 Hart’s
 constitutional
 rights
 under
 the

Sixth
 Amendment.

F.

 Prosecutorial
 misconduct
 violated
 Hart’s
 constitutional
 right
 to
 a
 fair
 trial.

J.

 Violations
 of
 the
 Sixth,
 Eighth
 and
 Fourteenth
 Amendment
 resulting
 from
 the

following
 improper
 jury
 instructions:

1.

 Failure
 to
 give
 an
 adequate
 charge
 of
 the
 less-­‐included
 offense
 of
 felony

murder;

2.

 Failure
 to
 give
 a
 reckless
 murder
 charge;
 and

3.

 Failure
 to
 give
 a
 reckless
 manslaughter
 charge.

K.

 Constitutional
 violations
 occurred
 during
 voir
 dire,
 to
 wit:

1-­‐3.
 The
 state
 used
 its
 peremptory
 challenges
 in
 a
 racially
 discriminatory

manner;9

7The
 caption
 of
 Claim
 A3
 relates
 to
 the
 pretrial
 transfer
 hearing,
 but
 the
 substance
 of

the
 claim
 addresses
 the
 youthful
 offender
 hearing.

8
 Similar
 to
 Claim
 A3,
 the
 caption
 of
 this
 claim
 refers
 to
 the
 pretrial
 transfer
 hearing,

but
 the
 body
 of
 the
 claim
 contains
 references
 to
 the
 youthful
 offender
 hearing.

9
 Claims
 K1-­‐K3
 are
 the
 same
 Batson
 claim
 broken
 into
 separate
 steps.

 Specifically,

K1
 asserts
 a
 general
 Batson
 claim.

 K2
 addresses
 Petitioner’s
 prima
 facie
 case
 of

discrimination.
 K3
 discusses
 evidence
 to
 rebut
 the
 state’s
 race
 neutral
 reasons
 for

its
 strikes.

7

4.

 Violation
 of
 Hart’s
 Sixth
 and
 Fourteenth
 Amendment
 Rights
 by
 the
 trial

court’s
 voir
 dire;10

5.

 The
 trial
 court
 improperly
 excluded
 prospective
 jurors
 based
 on
 their

capital
 punishment
 beliefs;

6.

 The
 trial
 court’s
 method
 for
 conducting
 voir
 dire
 was
 prejudicial.

L.

 The
 evidence
 was
 constitutionally
 insufficient
 to
 sustain
 a
 guilty
 verdict
 because:

1.

 The
 state
 failed
 to
 prove
 the
 element
 of
 intent
 beyond
 a
 reasonable
 doubt;

2.

 The
 jury
 applied
 an
 unconstitutional
 standard
 of
 proof
 due
 to
 court’s

confusing
 jury
 instructions.

N.

 The
 state
 suppressed
 favorable
 evidence
 in
 violation
 of
 Brady
 v.
 Maryland.11

Issues
 Presented

Due
 to
 the
 number
 and
 complexity
 of
 the
 claims
 and
 issues,
 the
 Court
 divided

the
 briefing
 in
 the
 case
 into
 two
 stages.
 Stage
 I
 is
 intended
 to
 address
 procedural

default
 and
 the
 need
 for
 an
 evidentiary
 hearing,
 with
 the
 merits
 of
 all
 remaining
 to

be
 addressed
 at
 Stage
 II.

 In
 the
 Stage
 I
 brief,
 Respondent
 has
 asserted
 an
 additional

matter
 for
 resolution.

 Respondent
 argues
 that
 the
 Court
 should
 dismiss
 certain

claims
 because
 those
 claims
 raise
 solely
 issues
 of
 state
 law
 and
 therefore
 fail
 to
 state

a
 claim
 under
 28
 U.S.C.
 §
 2254.

 Below,
 the
 Court
 will
 address
 Respondent’s
 “state

law
 only”
 argument,
 then
 proceed
 to
 a
 review
 of
 the
 claims
 Respondent
 argues
 are

subject
 to
 procedural
 default.

“State
 Law
 Only”
 Claims

Respondent
 argues
 that
 the
 Court
 should
 dismiss
 several
 claims
 (B,
 D,
 E.
 G.
 H,

J,
 M,
 O
 and
 P)
 “because
 they
 present
 only
 questions
 of
 state
 law”
 and
 therefore
 fail
 to

10
 There
 are
 no
 facts
 set
 forth
 in
 support
 of
 this
 claim,
 which
 also
 invokes
 the
 Eighth

Amendment.

 Because
 the
 Eighth
 Amendment
 deals
 with
 issues
 of
 punishment,
 any

claim
 arising
 therefrom
 is
 moot.

11
 This
 claim
 is
 broken
 into
 3
 subparts
 (M1-­‐M3)
 asserting
 different
 elements
 of
 the

same
 Brady
 claim.

 The
 underlying
 factual
 basis
 is
 the
 state’s
 alleged
 failure
 to

disclose
 a
 spontaneous
 statement
 made
 by
 Hart
 on
 the
 night
 of
 his
 arrest.

8

state
 a
 claim
 for
 relief
 under
 28
 U.S.C.S
 §
 2254(a).

 Respondent
 points
 out,
 correctly,

that
 “[f]ederal
 habeas
 corpus
 does
 not
 lie
 to
 review
 errors,
 if
 any,
 under
 state
 law.”

(Resp’t’s
 Br.
 35,
 Doc.
 38.)

 In
 support
 of
 this
 proposition,
 Respondent
 cites,
 first,

federal
 habeas
 cases
 in
 which
 the
 petition
 raised
 a
 claim
 that
 was
 based
 purely
 on

state
 law.

 See
 Pulley
 v.
 Harris,
 456
 U.S.
 37,
 41
 (1984);
 Carrizales
 v.
 Wainwright,
 699

F.2d
 1053,
 1055
 (1983).

 That
 is
 not
 the
 case
 here.

 Each
 of
 the
 claims
 identified
 by

the
 Respondent
 is
 framed
 as
 a
 federal
 constitutional
 violation.

 Respondent
 asserts

that
 the
 claims
 are
 purely
 issues
 of
 state
 law
 because
 the
 state
 court,
 either
 on
 direct

appeal
 or
 collateral
 review,
 resolved
 these
 or
 similar
 claims
 based
 solely
 on
 state

law.

 But
 it
 is
 the
 federal
 habeas
 petition,
 not
 a
 state
 court
 opinion,
 that
 determines

the
 nature
 of
 the
 claim
 and
 whether
 it
 raises
 a
 federal
 constitutional
 issue.

 Cf.
 Dye
 v.

Hofbauer,
 546
 U.S.
 2
 (2005)
 (per
 curiam)
 (state
 court’s
 failure
 to
 mention
 a
 federal

claim
 does
 not
 mean
 federal
 claim
 was
 not
 presented
 to
 it).

Each
 of
 the
 challenged
 claims
 raises
 one
 or
 more
 issues
 of
 federal

constitutional
 law.

 Claim
 B
 asserts
 that
 Petitioner
 was
 “improperly
 denied
 Youthful

Offender
 treatment”
 because
 the
 hearing
 violated
 Petitioner’s
 constitutional
 rights

to
 confrontation
 and
 to
 avoid
 self-­‐incrimination.

 (Pet.
 ¶¶
 128-­‐131,
 Doc.
 1.)
 Claim

D(1)
 alleges
 that
 the
 jury
 foreperson’s
 racial
 bias
 deprived
 Petitioner
 of
 his

constitutional
 right
 to
 a
 fair
 trial.
 (Id.
 ¶¶
 146-­‐47).

 Claim
 J
 asserts
 that
 the
 trial

court’s
 failure
 to
 properly
 instruct
 the
 jury
 on
 lesser-­‐included
 offenses
 violated
 the

Sixth,
 Eighth
 and
 Fourteenth
 Amendments.

 (Id.
 subheading
 J.)

 Finally,
 Claim
 P

alleges
 that
 the
 introduction
 of
 autopsy
 photographs
 violated
 Petitioner’s
 rights
 to

due
 process
 and
 to
 a
 fair
 trial
 guaranteed
 by
 the
 Sixth
 and
 Fourteenth
 Amendments.

9

(Id.
 subheading
 P.)

 Because
 the
 claims,
 as
 presented
 in
 the
 Petition,
 are
 not
 based

solely
 on
 state
 law,
 Respondent’s
 argument
 for
 dismissal
 fails.

Procedural
 Default

Introduction

Respondent
 argues
 that
 the
 doctrine
 of
 procedural
 default
 should
 prevent

the
 Court
 from
 reaching
 the
 merits
 of
 all
 or
 part
 the
 following
 guilt-­‐phase
 claims:

 A2,

A4,
 A5,
 A6,
 A7,
 A8,
 A9,
 A10,
 A13,
 F,
 J,
 K1,
 K2,
 K4,
 K5,
 L,
 and
 N.

 Petitioner
 counters

that
 all
 of
 the
 claims
 were
 raised
 in
 state
 court
 and
 were
 fully
 exhausted.

 Therefore,

Petitioner
 asserts
 that
 none
 are
 procedurally
 defaulted.

 Before
 addressing
 the

applicability
 of
 procedural
 default
 as
 to
 each
 claim,
 the
 Court
 sets
 out
 the
 law
 of

procedural
 default
 and
 related
 principles.

Applicable
 Law

The
 doctrine
 of
 procedural
 default,
 as
 it
 relates
 to
 petitions
 filed
 under
 28

U.S.C.
 §
 2254,
 arises
 from
 principles
 of
 comity
 and
 federalism.

 Francis
 v.
 Henderson,

425
 U.S.
 536,
 541
 (1976).

 A
 federal
 court

will
 not
 consider
 an
 issue
 of
 federal
 law
 on
 direct
 review
 from
 a

judgment
 of
 a
 state
 court
 if
 that
 judgment
 rests
 on
 a
 state-­‐law
 ground

that
 is
 both
 “independent”
 of
 the
 merits
 of
 the
 federal
 claim
 and
 an

“adequate
 basis
 for
 the
 court’s
 decision.

 Although
 this
 doctrine

originated
 in
 the
 context
 of
 state-­‐court
 judgments
 for
 which
 the

alternative
 state
 and
 federal
 grounds
 were
 both
 “substantive”
 in

nature,
 the
 doctrine“
 has
 been
 applied
 routinely
 to
 state
 decisions

forfeiting
 federal
 claims
 for
 violation
 of
 state
 procedural
 rules.

Harris
 v.
 Reed,
 489
 U.S.
 255,
 260-­‐61
 (1989)
 (internal
 citations
 and
 quotations

omitted).

 Generally,
 violation
 of
 a
 state
 procedural
 rule
 is
 adequate
 to
 foreclose

federal
 review
 if
 the
 rule
 is
 “firmly
 established
 and
 regularly
 followed.”

 Lee
 v.

Kemna,
 534
 U.S.
 362,
 376
 (2002).

 A
 state
 court’s
 decision
 is
 independent
 unless
 the

10

resolution
 of
 the
 state-­‐law
 issue
 depends
 on
 a
 federal
 constitutional
 ruling.

 Stewart

v.
 Smith,
 536
 U.S.
 856,
 860
 (2002).

 While
 a
 federal
 court
 is
 generally
 precluded
 from

reviewing
 the
 merits
 of
 a
 procedurally
 defaulted
 claim,
 there
 are
 exceptions
 to
 the

rule.

Procedural
 default
 may
 be
 overcome
 in
 one
 of
 two
 ways.

 First
 the
 claim
 may

be
 considered
 on
 the
 merits
 if
 the
 petitioner
 and
 show
 both
 cause
 for
 this
 failure
 to

comply
 with
 the
 state
 procedural
 rule
 and
 prejudice
 resulting
 from
 the
 default.

Murray
 v.
 Carrier,
 477
 U.S.
 478
 (1986).

 “[C]ause
 for
 a
 procedural
 default
 must

ordinarily
 turn
 on
 whether
 the
 prisoner
 can
 show
 that
 some
 objective
 factor

external
 to
 the
 defense
 impeded
 counsel’s
 efforts
 to
 comply
 with
 the
 State’s

procedural
 rule.”

 Id.
 at
 488.

 Prejudice,
 in
 this
 context,
 means
 a
 reasonable

probability
 that
 the
 outcome
 would
 have
 been
 different.

 Strickler
 v.
 Greene,
 527
 U.S.

263
 (1999).

 The
 second
 circumstance
 under
 which
 a
 procedurally
 defaulted
 claim

may
 be
 considered
 is
 if
 the
 failure
 to
 review
 the
 claim
 would
 result
 in
 a
 fundamental

miscarriage
 of
 justice.”

 Dugger
 v.
 Adams,
 489
 U.S.
 401,
 415
 (1989).

While
 procedural
 default
 obviously
 applies
 to
 federal
 constitutional
 claims

that
 were
 denied
 by
 the
 state
 court
 on
 procedural
 grounds,
 it
 may
 also
 apply
 to

federal
 constitutional
 claims
 that
 were
 never
 raised
 at
 all
 in
 state
 court.

 In
 the
 latter

instance,
 the
 doctrines
 of
 procedural
 default
 and
 exhaustion
 converge.

 “Exhaustion

of
 state
 remedies
 requires
 that
 the
 state
 prisoner
 ‘fairly
 present[t]
 federal
 claims
 to

the
 state
 court
 in
 order
 to
 give
 the
 State
 the
 opportunity
 to
 pass
 upon
 and
 correct

alleged
 violations
 of
 its
 prisoners’
 federal
 rights.’”

 Snowden
 v.
 Singletary,
 135
 F.3d

732,
 735
 (1998)
 (quoting
 Duncan
 v.
 Henry,
 513
 U.S.
 364,
 365
 (1995)).

 Generally,

11

unexhausted
 claims
 must
 be
 returned
 to
 the
 state
 court
 for
 consideration
 on
 the

merits
 unless
 the
 federal
 court
 determines
 that
 exhaustion
 would
 be
 futile.

 Id.
 at

736.

 If
 state
 procedural
 rules
 would
 preclude
 review
 of
 the
 claim
 on
 the
 merits,

then
 exhaustion
 would
 be
 futile.

 Id.

 Thus,
 a
 federal
 court
 may
 conclude
 that
 an

unexhausted
 claim
 would
 be
 procedurally
 barred
 because
 of
 the
 petitioner’s
 failure

to
 comply
 with
 state
 procedure.

 Id.
 at
 737.

 In
 that
 instance,
 the
 doctrine
 of

procedural
 default
 would
 apply
 even
 though
 the
 state
 court
 had
 never
 specifically

invoked
 the
 state
 procedural
 rule.

To
 summarize,
 a
 federal
 court
 will
 not
 consider
 the
 merits
 of
 a
 federal

constitutional
 claim
 on
 habeas
 review
 if
 that
 claim
 has
 been
 procedurally
 defaulted.

If
 the
 constitutional
 claim
 asserted
 by
 the
 petition
 was
 presented
 and
 denied
 by
 the

state
 court
 on
 adequate
 and
 independent
 state-­‐law
 grounds,
 then
 procedural
 default

applies.

 If
 the
 claim
 was
 never
 raised
 in
 state
 court
 but
 now
 would
 be
 barred
 from

consideration
 by
 state
 procedural
 rules,
 the
 procedural
 default
 also
 applies.

 A

procedurally
 defaulted
 claim
 may
 nonetheless
 be
 considered
 on
 the
 merits
 if

petitioner
 can
 demonstrate
 either
 (1)
 cause
 for
 and
 prejudice
 from
 his
 failure
 to

raise
 the
 issue
 in
 state
 court
 or
 (2)
 that
 failure
 to
 consider
 the
 merits
 would
 result
 in

a
 fundamental
 miscarriage
 of
 justice.

Claim
 A2:

 Ineffective
 Assistance
 of
 Counsel
 at
 Pretrial
 Transfer
 Hearing

Due
 to
 Financial
 Limitations

Respondent
 argues
 that
 this
 claim
 was
 not
 exhausted
 in
 state
 court
 because
 it

was
 not
 raised
 on
 appeal
 either
 on
 direct
 appeal
 or
 collateral
 attack.

 Because

consideration
 would
 be
 barred
 by
 state
 procedural
 rules,
 Respondent
 asserts,
 the

claim
 is
 procedurally
 defaulted.

 Petitioner’s
 sole
 response
 is
 that
 the
 claim
 was

12

exhausted
 because
 it
 was
 raised
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 appeal
 and,
 for
 that
 reason,
 is
 not

procedurally
 barred.12

 The
 claim
 asserted
 in
 this
 Court
 is
 that
 “[d]efense
 counsel

did
 not
 have
 the
 funds
 and
 therefore
 did
 not
 investigate
 and
 discover
 any
 evidence…”

to
 present
 on
 behalf
 of
 Petitioner
 at
 the
 pretrial
 transfer
 hearing
 (Pet.
 ¶
 34)
 and

“[Petitioner]
 was
 tried
 as
 an
 adult
 as
 a
 result
 of
 counsel’s
 deficient
 representation.
 .
 .

due
 to

 inadequate
 access
 to
 funds.”

 (Id.
 ¶
 35).

 As
 evidence
 that
 he
 exhausted
 this

claim,
 Petitioner
 points
 to
 his
 Rule
 32
 appellate
 brief.

The
 Eleventh
 Circuit
 has
 explained
 what
 the
 exhaustion
 requirement
 entails

as
 follows:

In
 order
 to
 be
 exhausted,
 a
 federal
 claim
 must
 be
 fairly
 presented
 to

the
 state
 courts.
 It
 is
 not
 sufficient
 merely
 that
 the
 federal
 habeas

petitioner
 has
 been
 through
 the
 state
 courts
 ...
 nor
 is
 it
 sufficient
 that

all
 the
 facts
 necessary
 to
 support
 the
 claim
 were
 before
 the
 state

courts
 or
 that
 a
 somewhat
 similar
 state-­‐law
 claim
 was
 made.

 Rather,

in
 order
 to
 ensure
 that
 state
 courts
 have
 the
 first
 opportunity
 to
 hear

all
 claims,
 federal
 courts
 have
 required
 a
 state
 prisoner
 to
 present
 the

state
 courts
 with
 the
 same
 claim
 he
 urges
 upon
 the
 federal
 courts.

While
 we
 do
 not
 require
 a
 verbatim
 restatement
 of
 the
 claims
 brought

in
 state
 court,
 we
 do
 require
 that
 a
 petitioner
 presented
 his
 claims
 to

the
 state
 court
 such
 that
 a
 reasonable
 reader
 would
 understand
 each

claim's
 particular
 legal
 basis
 and
 specific
 factual
 foundation.

McNair
 v.
 Campbell,
 416
 F.3d
 1291,
 1302
 (11th
 Cir.
 2005)
 (internal
 citations
 and

quotations
 omitted).

Petitioner
 cites
 two
 separate
 ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel
 claims

presented
 to
 the
 state
 appellate
 court.

 The
 first
 claim
 was
 asserted
 under

subheading
 A:

 “Hart
 was
 deprived
 of
 his
 right
 to
 a
 fair
 trial
 by
 Counsel’s
 failure
 to

effectively
 represent
 him
 at
 the
 pre-­‐trial
 transfer
 hearing.”

 (R.
 Vol.
 22
 Tab
 R-­‐55
 at

12
 Petitioner
 does
 not
 dispute
 that
 state
 procedural
 rules
 would
 bar
 consideration
 of

the
 claim,
 nor
 does
 Petitioner
 invoke
 any
 exception
 to
 procedural
 default
 rule.

13

6.)
 On
 pages
 6-­‐9
 of
 his
 Rule
 32
 brief,
 he
 argued
 that
 counsel
 rendered

constitutionally
 ineffective
 assistance
 at
 the
 pretrial
 transfer
 hearing
 because
 his

failure
 to
 investigate
 or
 to
 introduce
 any
 evidence
 at
 the
 transfer
 hearing
 was
 the

result
 of
 counsel’s
 incompetence
 as
 opposed
 to
 a
 strategic
 decision.
 (Id.
 at
 6-­‐9.)

 The

only
 mention
 of
 inadequate
 funding
 was
 made
 under
 subheading
 F,
 which
 can
 best

be
 described
 as
 a
 catch-­‐all
 subheading:
 “Gary
 Hart
 was
 deprived
 of
 a
 fair
 trial
 by

counsel’s
 failure
 to
 otherwise
 protect
 his
 interests
 before
 and
 during
 the
 trial.”

 (Id.

21.)

 Petitioner’s
 entire
 argument
 regarding
 insufficient
 funding
 was
 as
 follows:

(Id.)

Gary
 was
 also
 denied
 effective
 assistance
 of
 counsel
 at
 trial
 and

on
 appeal
 by
 the
 insufficient
 funding
 provided
 by
 the
 State
 for
 the

compensation
 of
 capital
 defense
 attorneys
 for
 their
 expenses.
 (v.5
 at

pp.
 40-­‐42).

 In
 this
 regard
 Pennington’s
 affidavit
 reflects
 that
 the
 funds

provided
 by
 the
 State
 of
 Alabama
 were
 wholly
 inadequate
 to
 provide
 a

proper
 defense.

 (v.6
 at
 p.
 532).
 The
 available
 funds
 “did
 not
 begin
 to

cover
 the
 fees
 and
 costs
 which
 are
 necessary
 to
 effectively
 defend
 any

one
 charged
 with
 capital
 murder”.
 Id.

Petitioner
 cannot
 satisfy
 the
 exhaustion
 requirement
 by
 cherry-­‐picking

portions
 of
 separate
 and
 distinct
 state
 court
 claims.

 “[T]o
 preserve
 a
 claim
 of

ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel
 for
 federal
 review,
 the
 habeas
 petitioner
 must

assert
 this
 theory
 of
 relief
 and
 transparently
 present
 the
 state
 courts
 with
 the

specific
 acts
 or
 omissions
 of
 his
 lawyers
 that
 resulted
 in
 prejudice.”
 Kelley
 v.
 Sect’y

for
 the
 Dept.
 of
 Corrections,
 377
 F.3d
 1317,
 1344
 (11th
 Cir.
 2004).

 The
 legal
 theories

raised
 in
 state
 court
 must
 have
 been
 supported
 by
 the
 same
 “specific”
 facts
 asserted

in
 the
 federal
 habeas
 petition.

 Id.

 “[H]abeas
 petitioners
 may
 not
 present
 particular

factual
 instances
 of
 ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel
 in
 their
 federal
 petitions
 that

were
 not
 first
 presented
 to
 the
 state
 courts.”

 Id.

 Petitioner
 did
 not
 assert
 in
 his
 Rule

14

32
 appeal
 a
 claim
 that
 counsel
 rendered
 ineffective
 assistance
 at
 the
 pretrial

transfer
 hearing
 based
 on
 inadequate
 funds.

 Therefore,
 that
 claim
 did
 not
 get
 one

full
 round
 of
 review
 in
 state
 court
 and
 was
 not
 exhausted.

 See
 Ala.
 R.
 Crim.
 P.

32.2(a)(5)
 (precluding
 post-­‐conviction
 relief
 for
 non-­‐jurisdictional
 claims
 that
 could

have
 been
 raised
 on
 direct
 appeal).

Claim
 A4:

 Ineffective
 Assistance
 of
 Counsel
 at
 Youthful
 Offender

Hearing
 Due
 to
 Inadequate
 Funding

This
 claim
 is
 similar
 to
 the
 claim
 above,
 except
 that
 it
 based
 on
 counsel’s

performance
 at
 the
 Youthful
 Offender
 hearing,
 rather
 than
 the
 pretrial
 transfer

hearing.

 As
 with
 he
 did
 with
 that
 claim,
 Petitioner
 has
 pulled
 together
 unrelated

portions
 of
 his
 Rule
 32
 appellate
 brief
 in
 an
 effort
 to
 demonstrate
 exhaustion.

Petitioner
 cites
 his
 claim
 of
 ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel
 at
 the
 youthful
 offender

hearing
 on
 pages
 14-­‐16
 of
 that
 brief
 along
 with
 his
 generalized
 ineffective

assistance/insufficient
 funding
 claim
 asserted
 separately
 on
 page
 21.
 (R.
 Vol.
 22
 Tab

R-­‐55
 at
 14-­‐16
 &
 21.)

 For
 the
 same
 reasons
 cited
 supra
 at
 12-­‐15,
 this
 claim
 is
 not

exhausted
 and,
 therefore,
 is
 procedurally
 defaulted.

 Claim
 A5:

 Counsel
 Failed
 to
 Protect
 Petitioner
 from
 Pretrial
 Publicity

In
 this
 claim,
 Petitioner
 asserts
 that
 counsel
 failed
 to
 subpoena
 members
 of

the
 media
 to
 testify
 regarding
 the
 extent
 of
 pretrial
 publicity,
 failed
 to
 properly

question
 jurors
 about
 their
 exposure
 to
 publicity,
 and
 failed
 to
 obtain
 a
 change
 of

venue.

 Respondent
 argues
 that
 this
 is
 not
 the
 same
 ineffective
 assistance/pretrial

publicity
 claim
 asserted
 in
 the
 amended
 Rule
 32
 petition
 and
 on
 appeal.

 Petitioner,

on
 the
 other
 hand,
 points
 out
 that
 the
 claim
 was
 “made
 on
 page
 10
 of
 [his]
 Rule
 32

Brief.
 .
 .
 to
 the
 Alabama
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals.”

 (Pet’r’s
 Br.
 25,
 Doc.
 37.)

 As

15

Petitioner
 acknowledges,
 claims
 raised
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 petition
 and
 on
 appeal
 from

the
 denial
 of
 the
 Rule
 32
 petition
 are
 preserved
 for
 habeas
 review.

 Pruitt
 v.
 Jones,

348
 F.3d
 1355,
 1358
 (11th
 Cir.
 2003)
 (to
 exhaust
 constitutional
 claim
 prisoner
 must

invoke
 one
 full
 round
 of
 state
 appellate
 review).

Only
 one
 factual
 basis
 supporting
 this
 claim
 was
 raised
 in
 both
 the
 amended

Rule
 32
 petition
 and
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 appeal.

 On
 appeal,
 Petitioner’s
 ineffective

assistance/pretrial
 publicity
 argument
 was
 asserted
 under
 a
 claim
 of
 ineffective

assistance
 in
 “empaneling
 the
 jury.”

 (R.
 Vol.
 22
 Tab
 R-­‐55
 at
 10.)

 Therein,
 Petitioner

asserted
 that
 counsel’s
 “failure
 to
 protect
 [Petitioner]
 from
 the
 effects
 of
 pre-­‐trial

publicity
 constituted
 ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel
 [in
 empaneling
 the
 jury].”

(Id.)

 Broadly
 construed,
 the
 claim
 asserted
 on
 appeal
 (i.e.,
 ineffective

assistance/empaneling
 the
 jury/pretrial
 publicity)
 can
 be
 considered
 to
 encompass

failure
 to
 properly
 question
 jurors
 about
 their
 exposure
 to
 pretrial
 publicity.

Therefore,
 that
 portion
 of
 the
 claim
 is
 exhausted
 and
 is
 not
 procedurally
 barred.

However,
 both
 failure
 to
 obtain
 media
 testimony
 and
 failure
 to
 obtain
 a
 change
 of

venue
 are
 completely
 unrelated
 to
 the
 ineffective
 assistance/empaneling
 the
 jury

claim
 asserted
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 appeal.

 Consequently,
 Petitioner’s
 claim
 is
 not

exhausted,
 and
 is
 procedurally
 barred,
 to
 the
 extent
 it
 relies
 on
 those
 underlying

factual
 bases.

Claim
 A6:

 Financial
 Limitations
 Placed
 on
 Defense
 Counsel
 did
 not

Provide
 Defense
 Counsel
 with
 Sufficient
 Resources
 to
 Effectively
 Protect

Petitioner
 from
 Adverse
 Pretrial
 Publicity

Petitioner
 alleges
 that
 counsel
 rendered
 ineffective
 assistance
 because
 “the

trial
 court
 refused
 to
 grant
 him
 funds
 to
 conduct
 a
 survey
 of
 the
 community”
 thus

16

rendering
 counsel
 unable
 to
 protect
 Petitioner
 from
 prejudicial
 pretrial
 publicity.

(Pet.
 ¶¶
 68-­‐69.)

 According
 to
 the
 petition,
 counsel’s
 deficient
 performance
 in
 this

regard
 made
 it
 impossible
 for
 Petitioner
 to
 receive
 a
 fair
 trial
 and
 resulted
 in
 his

conviction.

 (Id.
 ¶
 69.)

 Respondent
 argues
 that
 this
 claim
 was
 not
 raised
 in

Petitioner’s
 Rule
 32
 appeal.

 Petitioner
 counters
 that
 “the
 substance
 of
 the
 claim”

was
 raised
 on
 appeal,
 but
 once
 again
 Petitioner
 pulls
 language
 from
 two
 disparate

claims
 and
 attempts
 to
 pass
 them
 off
 as
 the
 claim
 now
 asserted.

 First,
 he
 cites
 his

claim
 that
 counsel
 failed
 to
 protect
 him
 from
 pretrial
 publicity
 on
 page
 10
 of
 his
 Rule

32
 brief,
 which
 makes
 no
 mention
 of
 financial
 limitations.

 (R.
 Vol.
 22
 Tab
 R-­‐55
 at

10.)

 Next,
 he
 cites
 his
 argument
 on
 page
 66
 of
 the
 same
 brief,
 in
 support
 of
 his
 claim

that
 the
 trial
 court’s
 discovery
 rulings
 deprived
 him
 of
 the
 fair
 trial.

 (Id.
 at
 66.)
 One

of
 the
 rulings
 cited
 was
 the
 Court’s
 denial
 of
 his
 motion
 for
 funds
 to
 conduct
 a

survey
 regarding
 the
 effects
 of
 pretrial
 publicity.

 No
 powers
 of
 legal
 intuition
 are

strong
 enough
 to
 decipher
 one
 claim
 from
 these
 two
 wholly
 unrelated
 assertions
 set

apart
 by
 more
 than
 50
 pages.

 This
 claim
 was
 not
 exhausted
 and
 is,
 therefore,

procedurally
 defaulted.

Claim
 A7:

 Petitioner
 was
 Deprived
 of
 his
 Right
 to
 a
 Fair
 Trial
 by
 an

Impartial
 Jury
 by
 Defense
 Counsel’s
 Failure
 to
 Conduct
 a
 Proper
 Voir

Dire
 and
 by
 Defense
 Counsel’s
 Failure
 to
 Question
 Prospective
 Jurors

About
 Racial
 Bias

Respondent
 argues
 that
 this
 claims
 is
 partially
 defaulted
 in
 that
 certain

factual
 averments
 set
 forth
 in
 support
 of
 this
 claim
 were
 not
 raised
 fully
 exhausted.

Specifically,
 Respondent
 asserts
 that
 the
 facts
 asserted
 in
 paragraphs
 73
 and
 74

were
 not
 raised
 in
 either
 Amended
 Rule
 32
 Petition
 or
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 appeal
 and

that
 the
 facts
 asserted
 in
 paragraph
 76
 were
 not
 asserted
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 appeal.

17

Respondent
 is
 partially
 correct.

 In
 paragraph
 73,
 Petitioner
 asserts
 that
 counsel
 was

ineffective
 because
 he
 failed
 “to
 make
 a
 diligent
 examination
 of
 the
 venire
 pool
 prior

to
 jury
 selection
 in
 support
 of
 a
 Batson
 challenge”
 and
 was
 unable
 to
 ask

particularized
 questions
 related
 to
 the
 state’s
 proffered
 explanations
 for
 striking

jurors.

 Both
 of
 these
 assertions
 were
 raised
 in
 the
 Amended
 Rule
 32
 Petition
 (R.
 Vol.

8
 Tab
 R-­‐48
 ¶¶
 48
 &
 49)
 and
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 appeal
 (R.
 Vol.
 22
 Tab
 R-­‐55
 at
 11-­‐12)
 and

are
 therefore
 preserved
 for
 review.

However,
 paragraphs
 74
 and
 76,
 have
 not
 been
 exhausted
 and
 are

procedurally
 defaulted.

 First,
 Petitioner
 does
 not
 dispute
 Respondent’s
 claim
 that

Paragraph
 76
 is
 procedurally
 defaulted.13
 Respondent
 argues
 that
 the
 substance
 of

paragraph
 74
 was
 raised
 in
 the
 Amended
 Rule
 32
 Petition
 and
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 appeal.

In
 that
 paragraph,
 Petitioner
 assets
 that
 defense
 counsel
 was
 unable
 to
 effectively

empanel
 an
 impartial
 jury
 due
 to
 the
 trial
 court’s
 unreasonable
 time
 limitations
 on

voir
 dire
 and
 the
 court’s
 refusal
 to
 allow
 sequestered
 questioning
 of
 prospective

jurors.

 But
 those
 factual
 assertions
 were
 not
 related
 to
 any
 ineffective
 assistance
 of

counsel
 claim
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 proceedings.

 Although
 included
 in
 both
 the
 Amended

Rule
 32
 Petition
 and
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 appellate
 brief,
 these
 assertions
 were
 raised
 in

support
 of
 Petitioner’s
 claim
 that
 the
 trial
 court
 violated
 his
 right
 to
 a
 fair
 trial.

 (R.

Vol.
 8
 Tab
 R-­‐48
 ¶¶
 114-­‐16;
 R.
 Vol.
 22
 Tab
 R-­‐55
 at
 58-­‐59.)

Claim
 A9:
 Financial
 Limitations
 placed
 on
 Defense
 Counsel
 Denied

Defense
 Counsel
 Sufficient
 Resources
 to
 Effectively
 Represent

Petitioner
 Before
 Trial

13
 That
 paragraph
 alleges
 that
 “[d]efense
 counsel
 allowed
 a
 juror
 with
 fixed
 opinions

about
 the
 case
 to
 remain
 on
 the
 panel.”

18

The
 question
 presented
 is
 whether
 paragraph
 85-­‐-­‐which
 asserts
 that
 defense

counsel,
 due
 to
 lack
 of
 funds,
 was
 “unable
 to
 investigate
 [Petitioner’s]
 background
 to

discover
 and
 offer
 evidence
 of
 [his]
 drug
 and
 alcohol
 use
 on
 the
 night
 of
 the
 crime

[to
 negate
 intent]”-­‐-­‐is
 procedurally
 defaulted.

 Petitioner
 admits
 that
 this
 factual

basis
 was
 never
 specifically
 raised
 in
 state
 court
 but,
 citing
 Vasquez
 v.
 Hillery,
 474

U.S.
 254
 (1986),
 argues
 that
 the
 inclusion
 of
 additional
 facts
 in
 support
 of
 an

otherwise
 exhausted
 claim
 does
 not
 preclude
 habeas
 review.

 In
 that
 case,
 however,

the
 federal
 court
 had
 requested
 additional
 evidence
 regarding
 the
 grand
 jury’s
 racial

makeup
 which,
 in
 turn,
 was
 related
 to
 the
 prisoner’s
 “equal
 protection
 challenge
 to

the
 grand
 jury
 that
 indicted
 him.”

 Id.
 474
 U.S.
 at
 256.

 The
 Supreme
 Court
 rejected

the
 state’s
 objection
 on
 exhaustion
 grounds,
 stating:
 “We
 have
 never
 held
 that

presentation
 of
 additional
 facts
 to
 the
 district
 court,
 pursuant
 to
 that
 court's

directions,
 evades
 the
 exhaustion
 requirement
 when
 the
 prisoner
 has
 presented
 the

substance
 of
 his
 claim
 to
 the
 state
 courts.”

 Id.
 474
 U.S.,
 257-­‐58.

These
 are
 not
 merely
 new
 facts
 supporting
 a
 claim
 presented
 to
 the
 state

court.

 This
 is
 an
 entirely
 new
 claim.

 The
 basis
 of
 Petitioner’s
 financial

limitations/ineffective
 assistance
 before
 trial
 claim
 in
 state
 court
 was
 counsel’s

failure
 to
 obtain
 and
 present
 a
 firearms
 expert
 (regarding
 the
 sensitivity
 of
 the

trigger)
 and
 a
 medical
 expert
 (regarding
 the
 medical
 condition
 of
 his
 arm)
 both
 of

which
 were
 relevant
 to
 his
 claim
 that
 the
 gun
 discharged
 accidentally.

 (R.
 Vol.
 Tab

R-­‐55
 at
 13-­‐16.)

 Counsel’s
 alleged
 failure
 to
 discover
 and
 present
 evidence
 of
 drug

and
 alcohol
 abuse
 on
 the
 night
 of
 the
 crime
 does
 not
 constitute
 “additional
 facts”
 in

support
 of
 counsel’s
 alleged
 failure
 to
 obtain
 expert
 testimony.

 The
 state
 court
 did

19

not
 have
 a
 full
 and
 fair
 opportunity
 to
 consider
 this
 new
 rendition
 of
 Petitioner’s

ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel
 claim.

 Thus,
 Petitioner’s
 claim
 that
 counsel’s
 failure

to
 discover
 and
 present
 evidence
 of
 Petitioner’s
 drug
 and
 alcohol
 use
 amounted
 to

ineffective
 assistance
 is
 unexhausted
 and
 is
 procedurally
 barred.

 The
 remainder
 of

Claim
 A9
 has
 been
 exhausted
 and
 is
 not
 procedurally
 barred.

Claim
 A10:

 Petitioner
 was
 Deprived
 of
 his
 Right
 to
 a
 Fair
 Trial
 by
 an

Impartial
 Jury
 by
 Defense
 Counsel’s
 Failure
 to
 Protect
 his
 Constitutional

Rights
 During
 the
 Trial

Within
 this
 claim,
 the
 Petition
 alleges
 a
 laundry
 list-­‐-­‐twenty-­‐four
 separate

instances-­‐-­‐of
 ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel
 at
 trial.

 Respondent
 asserts
 that
 none

of
 these
 specific
 instances
 are
 exhausted
 because
 they
 were
 not
 fully
 presented
 for

review
 at
 the
 Rule
 32
 stage—some
 because
 they
 were
 not
 raised
 in
 the
 either
 the

Amended
 Rule
 32
 Petition
 or
 on
 appeal
 and
 others
 because
 they
 were
 not
 raised
 on

appeal.

 Petitioner
 insists
 that
 the
 issues
 were
 raised
 and
 exhausted
 and
 points
 to

his
 Rule
 32
 appellate
 brief.

 But,
 once
 again,
 Petitioner
 attempts
 to
 satisfy
 the

exhaustion
 requirement
 by
 pointing
 to
 general
 legal
 principles
 asserted
 in
 state

court
 along
 with
 “’makeshift
 needles
 in
 the
 haystack
 of
 the
 state
 court
 record.’”

Kelley,
 377
 F.3d
 at
 1345
 (quoting
 Martens
 v.
 Shannon,
 836
 F.2d
 715,
 717
 (1st
 Cir.

1988)).

Upon
 careful
 review
 of
 the
 pleadings,
 the
 Court
 concludes
 that
 two
 of
 these

subclaims
 have
 been
 exhausted
 and
 are,
 therefore,
 preserved
 for
 review.

 Petitioner

did
 argue
 in
 his
 Rule
 32
 appeal
 that
 “[d]efense
 counsel
 failed
 to
 timely
 interject

appropriate
 objections
 at
 trial,
 thereby
 resulting
 in
 prejudicial
 and
 improper

statements
 by
 the
 prosecution
 to
 the
 jury.”
 (R.
 Vol.
 22
 Tab
 R-­‐55
 at
 21.)

 Although
 no

20

supporting
 evidence
 was
 discussed,
 the
 brief
 noted
 that
 “[t]hese
 omissions
 were

described
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 Petition
 at
 v1
 pp.
 34-­‐38.”

 In
 other
 words,
 the
 appellate

brief
 incorporated
 by
 specific
 reference
 certain
 claims
 asserted
 in
 the
 Amended
 Rule

32
 Petition.

 However,
 only
 three
 guilt-­‐phase
 omissions
 by
 counsel
 were
 asserted
 in

the
 cited
 pages
 of
 the
 Amended
 Rule
 32
 Petition,
 and
 only
 two
 of
 those
 are

reasserted
 in
 the
 federal
 petition.

 The
 first
 is
 counsel’s
 failure
 to
 object
 to
 the
 State’s

misstatement
 of
 the
 law,
 implying
 that
 the
 burden
 of
 proof
 was
 on
 the
 Defendant
 by

stating
 that
 intent
 was
 inferred.

 (R.
 Vol.
 8
 Tab
 R-­‐48
 at
 35.)

 This
 claim
 is
 equivalent

to
 the
 subclaim
 asserted
 in
 paragraph
 95
 of
 the
 federal
 petition,
 which
 alleges
 that

counsel
 rendered
 ineffective
 assistance
 by
 “fail[ing]
 to
 object
 to
 the
 State’s

mischaracterization
 of.
 .
 .
 the
 law
 regarding
 intent.”14

 (Pet.
 ¶
 95.)

 The
 second

omission
 incorporated
 by
 reference
 into
 the
 Rule
 32
 appellate
 brief
 was
 counsel’s

failure
 to
 object
 to
 Biblical
 quotations
 made
 by
 the
 prosecutor.

 This
 claim
 is
 nearly

identical
 to
 paragraph
 102
 of
 the
 federal
 petition
 which
 alleges
 that
 “[d]efense

counsel
 failed
 to
 object
 to
 the
 State’s
 citation
 to
 biblical
 authority
 or
 religious
 duty.”

(Pet.
 ¶
 102.)

The
 Court
 finds
 that
 the
 two
 subclaims
 cited
 above,
 found
 in
 paragraphs
 95

and
 102
 of
 the
 federal
 petition,
 are
 exhausted
 and
 are
 not
 procedurally
 barred.

 The

remaining
 guilt-­‐phase
 subclaims
 set
 forth
 in
 section
 A10
 have
 not
 been
 exhausted

and
 are,
 therefore,
 procedurally
 barred.

14
 This
 paragraph
 also
 asserts
 that
 counsel
 “failed
 to
 object
 to
 the
 State’s

mischaracterization
 of
 [Petitioner’s]
 testimony.”

 (Id.)

 That
 aspect
 of
 this
 subclaim

was
 not
 a
 part
 of
 the
 state
 record
 cited
 and
 is,
 therefore,
 not
 exhausted
 and
 is

procedurally
 barred.

21

CLAIM
 A13:

 Petitioner
 was
 Deprived
 of
 his
 Right
 to
 a
 Fair
 Trial
 by
 an

Impartial
 Jury
 by
 the
 Cumulative
 Effect
 of
 Defense
 Counsel’s
 Errors

Petitioner
 sets
 forth
 two
 alternative
 responses
 to
 Respondent’s
 argument

that
 this
 claim
 is
 unexhausted.

 First,
 Petitioner
 argues
 that
 an
 assertion
 of

cumulative
 error
 is
 a
 legal
 argument,
 not
 an
 independent
 claim,15
 and
 therefore

exhaustion
 is
 not
 required.

 Numerous
 courts
 have
 rejected
 this
 argument.

 See,
 e.g.,

Wooten
 v.
 Kirkland,
 540
 F.3d
 1019,
 1025
 (9th
 Cir.
 2008)
 (raising
 a
 number
 of
 errors

“does
 not
 automatically
 require
 the
 court
 to
 consider
 whether
 the
 cumulative
 effect

of
 the
 alleged
 errors
 prejudiced
 the
 petitioner”);
 Harris
 v.
 Estelle,
 487
 F.2d
 1293,

1298
 (5th
 Cir.
 1974)
 (dismissing,
 for
 failure
 to
 exhaust,
 claim
 that
 cumulative
 effect

of
 cumulative
 effect
 of
 all
 constitutional
 errors
 denied
 him
 due
 process);
 accord

Greene
 v.
 Cooper,
 2013
 WL
 1567444,
 *8
 n.8
 (W.D.
 La.
 Feb.
 20,
 2013)
 (applying

exhaustion
 requirement
 to
 aggregate
 effect
 of
 ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel

claim);
 Moore
 v.
 Quarterman,
 526
 F.Supp.2d
 654,
 710
 (W.D.
 Tex.
 2007)
 (applying

exhaustion
 requirement
 to
 ineffective
 assistance/cumulative
 errors
 claim);
 cf.

McCormick
 v.
 Six,
 306
 Fed.Appx.
 424
 (10th
 Cir.
 2009)
 (denying
 COA
 and
 discerning

no
 error
 in
 trial
 court’s
 finding
 that
 petitioner
 failed
 to
 exhaust
 claim
 of
 cumulative

error
 of
 trial
 counsel
 claim).

 This
 Court,
 too,
 finds
 that
 an
 ineffective
 assistance

claim
 based
 on
 cumulative
 error
 is
 a
 separate
 claim
 that
 must
 be
 presented
 to
 the

state
 court
 for
 one
 full
 round
 of
 review.

Petitioner
 argues,
 alternatively,
 that
 he
 did
 present
 this
 claim
 to
 the
 state

court
 for
 review
 and
 points
 to
 the
 following
 statement
 in
 his
 Rule
 32
 appellate
 brief:

15
 This
 argument
 begs
 the
 question:

 If
 it
 is
 not
 a
 separate
 claim,
 why
 was
 it

presented
 as
 one
 in
 the
 Petition?

22

When
 the
 record
 in
 this
 case
 is
 viewed
 in
 its
 entirety
 –
 from
 the
 pre-­‐
trial
 transfer
 and
 youthful
 offender
 hearings,
 through
 the
 trial,
 and

finally
 the
 penalty
 phase
 –
 the
 conclusion
 is
 in
 escapable:

 counsel’s

abysmal
 representation
 of
 Gary
 Hart
 denied
 him
 of
 his
 constitutional

right
 to
 counsel
 during
 trial.

(R.
 Vol.
 22
 Tab
 R-­‐55
 at
 6.)

 Even
 assuming
 the
 inclusion
 of
 that
 argument
 could
 be

considered
 an
 ineffective
 assistance
 claim
 based
 on
 cumulative
 errors,16
 it
 does
 not

satisfy
 the
 exhaustion
 requirement.

 The
 issue
 was
 not
 raised
 in
 the
 Amended
 Rule

32
 petition
 and,
 therefore,
 was
 not
 preserved
 for
 state
 appellate
 review.

 Moody
 v.

State,
 95
 So.
 3d
 827,
 854
 (Ala.
 Crim.
 App.
 2011)
 (Rule
 32
 argument
 not
 raised
 in

state
 circuit
 court
 “not
 properly
 before
 [appellate
 court]
 for
 review”).

 In
 conclusion,

Petitioner’s
 ineffective
 assistance
 claim
 based
 on
 the
 cumulative
 effect
 of
 defense

counsel’s
 errors
 is
 a
 claim,
 not
 merely
 a
 legal
 argument.

 As
 such,
 it
 is
 procedurally

barred
 because
 Petitioner
 failed
 to
 exhaust
 this
 claim
 in
 state
 court.

Claim
 B:

 Mr.
 Hart
 Was
 Improperly
 Denied
 Treatment
 as
 a
 Youthful

Offender

Respondent
 argues
 that
 this
 claim
 is
 partially
 defaulted.
 Specifically,

Respondent
 argues
 that
 Petitioner
 failed
 to
 exhaust
 that
 portion
 of
 the
 claim
 found

in
 paragraph
 128,
 which
 states:

The
 admission
 of
 prejudicial
 hearsay
 testimony
 at
 [the

Youthful
 Offender]
 hearing
 unfairly
 deprived
 [Petitioner]
 [of]
 a

meaningful
 opportunity
 to
 avail
 himself
 of
 Alabama’s
 youthful

offender
 laws
 and
 violated
 [his]
 Constitutional
 rights
 to
 confrontation

and
 to
 avoid
 self-­‐incrimination.

 The
 trial
 court
 improperly
 denied

[Petitioner’s]
 challenge
 to
 the
 propriety
 of
 the
 court’s
 use
 of
 two

pieces
 of
 unreliable
 hearsay
 testimony
 contained
 in
 Gary’s
 youthful

offender
 report
 admitted
 at
 his
 youthful
 offender
 hearing.

 [T]his

16
 Whether
 it
 was
 transparently
 presented
 to
 the
 state
 appellate
 court
 as
 a
 separate

claim
 is
 arguable.

 The
 state
 court
 did
 not
 interpret
 it
 as
 such.

 Moreover,
 the

statement
 reads
 more
 like
 a
 dramatic
 introductory
 paragraph
 rather
 than
 a
 separate

ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel
 claim.

23

report
 included
 the
 double
 hearsay
 statement
 of
 Dr.
 Catlin,
 Gary’s

former
 school
 principal…

 Dr.
 Catlin
 expressly
 testified
 at
 the
 Rule
 32

hearing
 that
 he
 had
 no
 recollection
 of
 [this
 statement]
 and
 that
 [the

statement]
 was
 inconsistent
 with
 his
 opinion
 of
 [Petitioner].

(Pet.,
 Doc.
 1,
 ¶
 128.)

 Petitioner
 argues
 that
 this
 claim
 was
 raised
 on
 direct
 appeal,

before
 both
 the
 Alabama
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals
 and
 the
 Alabama
 Supreme
 Court

and
 cites
 to
 portions
 of
 briefs
 submitted
 to
 each
 court.

 However,
 the
 cited
 portions

of
 these
 briefs
 cited
 do
 not
 support
 Petitioner’s
 claim.

 Neither
 mentions
 hearsay

testimony
 introduced
 at
 the
 Youthful
 Offender
 hearing.

 Both
 appellate
 briefs
 do

make
 an
 argument
 regarding
 hearsay
 in
 the
 Youthful
 Offender
 report,
 but
 the

evidence
 cited
 as
 hearsay
 is
 not
 the
 same
 evidence
 that
 Petitioner
 relies
 on
 here.

 On

appeal,
 Petitioner
 argued
 that
 the
 psychological
 evaluation
 appended
 to
 the
 report

amounted
 to
 inadmissible
 hearsay.
 (R.
 Vol.
 5
 Tab
 R-­‐32
 at
 63-­‐65;
 Vol.
 6
 Tab
 R-­‐32
 at

98.)

 Here,
 Petitioner
 argues
 that
 the
 statement
 of
 his
 former
 high
 school
 principal

amounted
 to
 hearsay.

 The
 legal
 argument
 may
 be
 the
 same,
 but
 the
 factual
 basis

clearly
 is
 not.

 Consequently,
 Petitioner
 has
 failed
 to
 exhaust
 the
 portion
 of
 Claim
 B

found
 in
 paragraph
 128,
 and
 that
 claim
 is
 procedurally
 defaulted.

 The
 remainder
 of

Claim
 B
 is
 ripe
 for
 review
 on
 the
 merits.

Claim
 F:

 Prosecutorial
 Misconduct
 Deprived
 Petitioner
 of
 a
 Fair
 Trial
 in

Violation
 of
 the
 United
 States
 Constitution

Respondent
 initially
 argued
 that
 this
 claim
 was
 partially
 defaulted
 in
 that

three
 of
 the
 factual
 or
 legal
 bases
 asserted
 in
 support
 of
 this
 claim—found
 in

paragraphs
 158,
 163
 &
 167-­‐-­‐have
 not
 been
 exhausted
 because
 they
 were
 not
 raised

on
 direct
 appeal.

 However,
 Respondent
 subsequently
 abandoned
 some
 of
 those

arguments
 after
 Petitioner
 cited
 portions
 of
 the
 record
 that
 contradicted

24

Respondent’s
 assertions.

 First,
 Petitioner’s
 prosecutorial
 misconduct
 claim
 in

paragraph
 158
 of
 the
 Petition-­‐-­‐
 that
 he
 was
 deprived
 of
 a
 fair
 trial
 because
 “[t]he

State
 used
 its
 peremptory
 challenges
 in
 a
 discriminatory
 manner,
 depriving
 [Hart]

of
 his
 right
 to
 be
 tried
 by
 a
 jury
 of
 his
 peers”-­‐-­‐
 was
 raised
 on
 direct
 appeal
 as
 a

prosecutorial
 misconduct
 claim.
 (R.
 Vol.
 5,
 Tab
 R-­‐32
 at
 83.)

 Respondent
 now
 admits

as
 much.17

 Similarly,
 Respondent
 concedes
 that
 the
 prosecutorial
 misconduct
 claim

asserted
 in
 paragraph
 163—that
 the
 State
 participated
 in
 the
 investigation—was

also
 raised
 on
 direct
 appeal.

Finally,
 Respondent
 argues
 that
 the
 claim
 in
 paragraph
 167—that
 “[t]he

State’s
 repeated
 remarks
 regarding
 the
 age
 of
 the
 victim
 were
 an
 attempt
 to

prejudice
 the
 jury
 and
 ‘infect
 the
 trial
 with
 unfairness’”-­‐-­‐has
 not
 been
 exhausted

because
 it
 was
 not
 raised
 in
 an
 identical
 manner
 in
 state
 court.

 When
 a
 claim
 is

presented
 in
 such
 a
 way
 that
 “a
 reasonable
 reader
 would
 have
 understood”
 the

substance
 of
 that
 claim,
 the
 exhaustion
 requirement
 is
 satisfied.

 Williams
 v.
 Allen,

542
 F.3d
 1326,
 1346
 (11th
 Cir.
 2008).

 On
 direct
 appeal,
 Petitioner
 cited
 the

prosecutor’s
 repeated
 remarks
 about
 the
 age
 of
 the
 victim
 as
 evidence
 of

prosecutorial
 misconduct
 in
 violation
 of
 the
 United
 States
 Constitution.

 (R.
 Vol.
 5

Tab
 R-­‐32
 at
 85;
 Vol.
 6,
 R-­‐38
 at
 120.)

 That
 was
 more
 than
 sufficient
 to
 raise
 the

substance
 of
 the
 claim.

17
 However,
 in
 his
 reply
 brief,
 Respondent
 argues
 that
 the
 citation
 to
 Trevino
 v.
 Texas,

503
 U.S.
 562
 (1992)
 should
 be
 disregarded
 because
 it
 was
 not
 cited
 in
 the
 direct

appeal.

 A
 case
 citation,
 standing
 alone,
 is
 not
 a
 claim.

 The
 claim
 itself—that
 the
 use

of
 peremptory
 challenges
 amounted
 to
 prosecutorial
 misconduct
 in
 violation
 of
 the

United
 States
 Constitution—was
 raised
 on
 direct
 appeal.

25

Claim
 J:

 The
 Trial
 Court’s
 Failure
 to
 Properly
 Instruct
 the
 Jury
 on
 Lesser

Included
 Offenses
 at
 the
 Guilt/Innocent
 Phase
 Violated
 the
 Sixth,
 Eight

and
 Fourteenth
 Amendments
 of
 the
 United
 States
 Constitution

Initially,
 Respondent
 argued
 that
 five
 subclaims
 were
 partially
 defaulted,
 but

that
 number
 has
 been
 reduced
 to
 two.

 The
 first,
 found
 in
 paragraph
 215,
 is
 that
 the

trail
 court’s
 “failure
 to
 explain
 the
 difference
 between
 felony
 murder
 and
 a
 capital

offense
 with
 regard
 to
 the
 issue
 of
 intent”
 resulted
 in
 an
 ambiguous
 instruction.

 (Pet.

¶
 215.)
 This
 ambiguous
 instruction,
 according
 to
 the
 Petition,
 violated
 Petitioner’s

due
 process
 rights
 because
 there
 was
 a
 reasonable
 likelihood
 that
 the
 jury
 applied

the
 challenged
 instruction
 in
 a
 way
 the
 violates
 the
 Constitution.

 (Id.)

 The
 second,

found
 in
 paragraph
 223,
 is
 that
 the
 trial
 court’s
 failure
 to
 instruct
 the
 jury
 on

reckless
 manslaughter
 violated
 Petitioner’s
 constitutional
 rights.

 (Id.
 ¶
 223.)

While
 the
 facts
 underlying
 both
 claims
 were
 set
 out
 in
 Petitioner’s
 direct

appeal,
 neither
 was
 asserted
 as
 a
 federal
 constitutional
 violation
 and
 no
 such
 claims

reasonably
 could
 be
 gleaned
 from
 the
 state
 court
 record.

 Petitioner’s
 direct
 appeal

brief
 to
 the
 Alabama
 Supreme
 Court
 cited
 only
 state
 law
 in
 support
 of
 the
 claim
 that

Petitioner
 was
 entitled
 to
 a
 reckless
 manslaughter
 instruction.

 (R.
 Vol.
 6
 Tab
 R-­‐38
 at

97-­‐98.)

 With
 respect
 to
 the
 felony
 murder/capital
 murder
 charges
 and
 the
 issue
 of

intent,
 Petitioner
 argued
 on
 direct
 appeal
 that
 the
 felony
 murder
 charge
 was
 infirm

because
 it
 did
 not
 “explicitly
 explain”
 that
 the
 difference
 between
 felony
 murder
 and

capital
 murder
 was
 intent.

 That
 argument
 was
 contained
 in
 a
 footnote
 to
 an

argument
 that
 the
 trial
 court
 should
 have
 given
 a
 lesser
 included
 instruction
 on

reckless
 murder.
 Neither
 an
 objection
 to
 jury
 instructions
 on
 state
 law
 ground
 nor
 a

potential
 claim
 hidden
 in
 a
 footnote
 and
 citing
 no
 law
 could
 have
 put
 the
 state
 court

26

on
 notice
 that
 Petitioner
 was
 attempting
 to
 raise
 a
 federal
 constitutional
 violation.

As
 the
 Eleventh
 Circuit
 has
 held
 that
 “[t]he
 exhaustion
 doctrine
 requires
 a
 habeas

applicant
 to
 do
 more
 than
 scatter
 some
 makeshift
 needles
 in
 the
 haystack
 of
 the

state
 court
 record.”

 McNair
 v.
 Campbell,
 416
 F.3d
 1291,
 1303
 (11th
 Cir.
 2005).

 The

subclaims
 found
 in
 paragraphs
 215
 and
 223
 are
 procedurally
 defaulted;
 the

remaining
 subclaims
 are
 ripe
 for
 review.

Claim
 K:

 Petitioner
 Was
 Denied
 a
 Fair
 Trial
 By
 an
 Impartial
 Jury
 Due
 to

Constitutional
 Violations
 During
 Voir
 Dire

The
 Petition
 asserts
 several
 subclaims
 under
 this
 heading.

 Respondent

argues
 that
 some
 of
 these
 subclaims
 are,
 in
 part,
 procedurally
 defaulted
 because

those
 claims
 were
 not
 exhausted.

 Each
 of
 these
 is
 discussed
 below.

Subclaim
 1:

 Improper
 and
 Prejudicial
 Use
 of
 Peremptory
 Challenges

Respondent
 asserts
 that
 the
 following
 two
 sentences
 of
 one
 paragraph
 of
 this

subclaim
 is
 procedurally
 barred:

Without
 an
 adequate
 voir
 dire,
 the
 trial
 court’s
 responsibility
 to

remove
 prospective
 jurors
 who
 will
 not
 be
 able
 to
 impartially
 follow

instructions
 and
 evaluate
 evidence
 cannot
 be
 fulfilled.

 See
 Conners
 v.

United
 States,
 158
 U.S.
 408,
 413
 (1895).

 Yet,
 despite
 these
 prevailing

Constitutional
 interpretations,
 Gary
 was
 still
 denied
 the
 opportunity

to
 be
 tried
 in
 front
 of
 an
 impartial
 jury.

(Pet.
 ¶
 224.)
 18

 This
 is
 a
 broad
 statement,
 and
 the
 specific
 factual
 basis
 for
 the
 claim

is
 not
 clear.

 However,
 the
 direct
 appeal
 did
 raise
 a
 constitutional
 challenge
 based
 on

restrictions
 placed
 on
 voir
 dire
 by
 the
 trial
 judge.

 (R.
 Vol.
 5
 Tab
 R-­‐32
 at
 76-­‐77;
 Vol.
 6

18
 Respondent
 initially
 argued
 that
 the
 entire
 subclaim
 was
 procedurally
 barred
 but

subsequently
 limited
 his
 argument
 to
 the
 above-­‐quoted
 sentences.

27

Tab
 R-­‐38
 at
 11-­‐112.)

 To
 the
 extent
 this
 subclaim
 encompasses
 that
 challenge,
 it
 has

been
 exhausted
 and,
 therefore,
 is
 not
 procedurally
 barred.

Subclaim
 3:
 State’s
 Proffered
 Race
 Neutral
 Explanations
 for
 Strikes

In
 order
 to
 understand
 the
 exhaustion
 issue
 with
 respect
 to
 this
 claim,
 a
 brief

review
 of
 Batson
 v.
 Kentucky,
 476
 U.S.
 79
 (1986),
 is
 necessary.

 Batson
 set
 forth
 the

framework
 for
 determining
 whether
 a
 prosecutor’s
 exercise
 of
 a
 peremptory

challenge
 violates
 the
 Equal
 Protection
 Clause.

 This
 is
 a
 three-­‐step
 process.

 First,

the
 defendant
 bears
 the
 burden
 of
 establishing
 a
 prima
 facie
 case
 of
 purposeful

discrimination.

 Id.
 at
 94.
 Next,
 the
 burden
 shifts
 to
 the
 state
 to
 proffer
 a
 race
 neutral

explanation
 for
 his
 strikes.

 Id.
 at
 97.

 Finally,
 the
 court
 must
 determine
 whether
 the

defendant
 has
 met
 his
 burden
 of
 proving
 purposeful
 discrimination.

 Id.
 at
 98.

 The

second
 step
 of
 the
 inquiry
 requires
 the
 trial
 court
 to
 determine
 only
 whether
 the

explanation
 offered
 is,
 on
 its
 face,
 racially
 neutral.

 Hightower
 v.
 Terry,
 459
 F.3d
 1066,

1073
 (11th
 Cir.
 2006).

 In
 contrast,
 the
 final
 step
 (step
 three)
 involves
 evaluating
 the

“the
 plausibility
 of
 that
 reason
 in
 light
 of
 all
 evidence
 bearing
 on
 it.”
 Id.

Respondent
 contends
 that
 Petitioner’s
 Batson
 argument
 in
 the
 last
 half
 of

paragraph
 233
 has
 not
 been
 exhausted.

 The
 beginning
 of
 that
 paragraph
 asserts

that
 there
 is
 no
 evidence
 to
 support
 the
 state’s
 assertion
 that
 it
 struck
 two

prospective
 jurors—Haygood
 and
 Thompson—“because
 of
 the
 former’s
 demeanor

and
 the
 latter’s
 unemployment.”

 There
 is
 no
 dispute
 that
 this
 portion
 of
 the
 claim
 is

exhausted;
 it
 was
 asserted
 on
 direct
 appeal
 as
 a
 Batson
 step
 three
 claim.

 The
 issue

arises
 with
 the
 second
 half
 of
 paragraph
 233,
 which
 turn
 this
 into
 a
 different
 claim-­‐-­‐
a
 Batson
 step
 two
 claim.

 It
 does
 so
 by
 citing
 cites
 United
 States
 v.
 Horsley,
 864
 F.2d

28

1543,
 1546
 (11th
 Cir.
 1989),
 for
 the
 proposition
 that
 vague
 general
 assertions
 do
 not

suffice
 as
 race
 neutral
 explanations
 to
 rebut
 a
 defendant’s
 prima
 facie
 case
 of

discrimination.

 In
 state
 court,
 Petitioner
 argued
 only
 that
 the
 reasons
 for
 striking

Haygood
 and
 Thompson
 amounted
 to
 a
 Batson
 step
 three
 claim
 (because
 the

reasons
 were
 not
 plausible)
 and
 never
 asserted
 a
 Batson
 step
 two
 claim
 (that
 the

reasons
 were
 insufficient
 to
 rebut
 a
 prima
 facie
 case)
 based
 on
 these
 facts.

Consequently,
 the
 Court
 finds
 that
 the
 Batson
 step
 two
 claim
 asserted
 in
 the
 last
 two

sentences
 of
 paragraph
 233
 has
 not
 been
 exhausted
 and
 is
 procedurally
 defaulted.

In
 paragraphs
 235
 through
 238
 (also
 part
 of
 subclaim
 3),
 Petitioner
 asserts

constitutional
 claims
 arising
 from
 the
 alleged
 underrepresentation
 of
 African-­‐
Americans
 and
 women
 on
 the
 jury
 venire.

 Petitioner
 does
 not
 contest
 Respondent’s

assertion
 that
 these
 claims
 were
 not
 presented
 to
 the
 state
 court
 for
 review.

 The

claims
 asserted
 in
 these
 paragraphs
 are
 procedurally
 barred
 for
 failure
 to
 exhaust.

Subclaim
 4:

 Improper
 &
 Prejudicial
 Voir
 Dire/Right
 to
 Trial
 by
 Impartial

Jury

This
 claim
 consists
 of
 one
 sentence
 (paragraph
 240).

 Petitioner
 does
 not

contest
 Respondent’s
 assertion
 that
 this
 claim
 was
 not
 presented
 to
 the
 state
 court

for
 review.

 It
 is,
 therefore,
 procedurally
 barred.

Subclaim
 5:

 Exclusion
 of
 Prospective
 Jurors
 Based
 on
 Capital
 Punishment

Beliefs

In
 this
 subclaim,
 Petitioner
 asserts
 that
 the
 prosecution
 improperly

questioned
 jurors
 regarding
 their
 views
 on
 capital
 punishment,
 then
 used
 the

answers
 to
 exclude
 prospective
 jurors
 for
 cause.

 Respondent
 argues
 that
 Petitioner

failed
 to
 exhaust
 a
 portion
 of
 this
 subclaim
 set
 forth
 in
 paragraphs
 241-­‐43.

 Contrary

29

to
 Respondent’s
 argument,
 the
 substance
 of
 these
 paragraphs
 was
 raised
 on
 direct

appeal.19

 (Vol.
 6,
 R.
 38
 at
 112-­‐15;
 Vol.
 5,
 R.
 32
 at
 78-­‐79.)

 The
 challenged
 portions
 of

this
 subclaim
 are
 not
 procedurally
 defaulted.

Claim
 L:

 Sufficiency
 of
 the
 Evidence

Respondent
 asserts
 that
 three
 portions
 of
 this
 claim
 are
 procedurally
 barred

because
 “[t]he
 factual
 and
 legal
 averments
 contained
 in
 paragraphs
 254
 (third

Sentence),
 257
 (second
 sentence),
 and
 258-­‐59
 (to
 the
 extent
 that
 Hart
 argues

anything
 other
 than
 because
 the
 instructions
 violated
 Cage
 v.
 Louisiana,
 498
 U.S.
 39

(1990),
 it
 violated
 Winship)
 were
 not
 presented
 to
 the
 state
 courts.
 .
 .
 on
 direct

appeal.”

 (Resp’t’s
 Br.
 22,
 Doc.
 28.)

 To
 be
 clear,
 paragraphs
 258-­‐59
 have
 been

exhausted
 and
 are
 not
 procedurally
 barred.20

 The
 third
 sentence
 of
 paragraph
 254

is
 not
 procedurally
 barred
 because
 it
 was
 asserted
 verbatim
 on
 direct
 appeal.21

Finally,
 the
 substance
 of
 the
 claim
 asserted
 in
 the
 second
 sentence
 of
 paragraph
 257

is
 merely
 a
 more
 specific
 description
 of
 the
 shortcomings
 of
 the
 trial
 court’s

instruction
 on
 the
 element
 of
 intent.

 That
 claim
 was
 presented
 to
 the
 state
 court
 on

19
 Respondent’s
 primary
 objection
 is
 that
 Petitioner
 did
 not
 rely
 on
 Morgan
 v.
 Illinois,

504
 U.S.
 719
 (1992),
 in
 his
 direct
 appeal.

 This
 omission
 is
 quite
 understandable

since
 Morgan
 was
 decided
 while
 this
 case
 was
 on
 direct
 appeal
 and
 after
 after
 the

briefs
 was
 filed.

20
 If
 Petitioner
 attempts
 to
 argue
 the
 assertions
 made
 in
 these
 paragraphs
 to

support
 a
 claim
 that
 has
 not
 been
 exhausted,
 then
 Respondent
 may
 reassert
 the

exhaustion/procedural
 bar
 defense
 as
 to
 this
 claim.

21
 Confusion
 has
 arisen
 because
 Respondent
 identified
 the
 alleged
 unexhausted

claim
 as
 “the
 third
 sentence”
 of
 paragraph
 254
 without
 any
 reference
 to
 the

substance
 of
 the
 sentence.

 Petitioner
 responded
 by
 quoting
 the
 third
 sentence
 of

paragraph
 254
 and
 pointing
 to
 the
 portions
 of
 the
 direct
 appeal
 containing
 that

sentence.

 In
 his
 reply
 brief,
 Respondent
 asserts
 that
 the
 Petitioner
 has
 actually

quoted
 the
 second
 sentence
 of
 paragraph
 254.

 It
 is
 Respondent
 who
 is
 mistaken.

30

direct
 appeal
 and
 is,
 therefore,
 exhausted.

 (R.
 Vol.
 5
 Tab
 R-­‐32
 at
 107;
 R.
 Vol.
 6
 Tab

R-­‐28
 at
 142.)

Claim
 N:

 The
 State
 Suppressed
 Evidence
 in
 Violation
 of
 Brady
 v.

Maryland

Petitioner
 claims
 that
 the
 state
 violated
 Brady
 v.
 Maryland
 by
 failing
 to

disclose
 a
 post-­‐arrest
 statement
 made
 by
 Petitioner
 on
 the
 night
 of
 the
 shooting.

 At

the
 Rule
 32
 hearing,
 Major
 Lester
 Hargrove
 of
 the
 Mobile
 Police
 Department

testified
 that
 he
 was
 in
 charge
 of
 the
 criminal
 investigation.

 On
 the
 night
 Petitioner

was
 arrested,
 Hargrove
 went
 into
 the
 holding
 room
 at
 police
 headquarters
 to
 take

Petitioner
 a
 pair
 of
 shoes
 that
 he
 had
 requested.

 Hargrove’s
 testimony
 regarding
 his

interaction
 with
 Petitioner
 was
 as
 follows:

MR.
 JASKOWIAK:

 Did
 Gary
 tell
 you
 anything
 about
 the
 crime
 as

far
 as
 his
 intent
 to
 shoot
 or
 pull
 the
 trigger
 on
 the
 weapon?

MAJOR
 HARGROVE:

 Only
 that:

 I
 didn’t
 mean
 to
 shoot
 that
 guy.

That’s
 all
 he
 said.

(R.
 Vol.
 13
 at
 187.)

Respondent
 argues
 that
 this
 claim
 is
 procedurally
 barred
 because
 it
 was
 not

raised
 on
 direct
 appeal
 or
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 petition.

 Further,
 Respondent
 points
 out

that
 the
 claim
 was
 raised
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 appeal
 but
 was
 denied
 based
 on
 procedural

default.

The
 Alabama
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals
 addressed
 the
 Brady
 claim
 as

follows:

The
 appellant
 contends
 that
 the
 State’s
 suppression
 of

favorable
 and
 material
 evidence,
 in
 violation
 of
 Brady
 v.
 Maryland,
 373

U.S.
 83
 (1963),
 violated
 his
 federal
 and
 state
 constitutionals
 rights.

 He

argues
 that
 the
 State
 suppressed
 evidence
 of
 his
 statement
 to
 a
 police

31

officer
 on
 the
 night
 of
 the
 murder
 acknowledging
 that
 he
 did
 not

intend
 to
 kill
 the
 victim.

This
 argument,
 however,
 has
 been
 raised
 for
 the
 first
 time
 on

appellate
 review.

 Because
 the
 argument
 was
 never
 before
 the
 trial

court,
 it
 is
 procedurally
 precluded
 from
 appellate
 review.

 McNair
 v.

State,
 supra;
 Thompson
 v.
 State,
 supra.

V.
 22,
 R.
 59
 at
 13.

The
 state
 appellate
 court’s
 ruling
 on
 procedural
 default
 is
 conclusive.
 22

“[F]ederal
 habeas
 corpus
 principles
 [are]
 designed
 to
 prevent
 federal
 courts
 from

interfering
 with
 a
 State's
 application
 of
 its
 own
 firmly
 established,
 consistently

followed,
 constitutionally
 proper
 procedural
 rules.
 .
 .
 .
 Those
 principles
 have
 long

made
 clear
 that
 a
 conviction
 that
 rests
 upon
 a
 defendant's
 state
 law
 ‘procedural

default’
 (for
 example,
 the
 defendant's
 failure
 to
 raise
 a
 claim
 of
 error
 at
 the
 time
 or

in
 the
 place
 that
 state
 law
 requires),
 normally
 rests
 upon
 ‘an
 independent
 and

adequate
 state
 ground.’”

 Trevino
 v.
 Thaler,
 ___
 U.S.
 ___133
 S.
 Ct.
 1911,
 1917,
 185
 L.
 Ed.

2d
 1044
 (2013).

Petitioner
 alternatively
 argues
 that
 he
 can
 overcome
 the
 procedural
 default

by
 demonstrating
 cause
 for
 and
 prejudice
 from
 his
 failure
 to
 raise
 the
 Brady

violation
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 petition.

 He
 contends
 that
 “the
 ‘cause’
 of
 not
 including
 the

claim
 in
 his
 original
 petition
 was
 the
 State’s
 illegal
 withholding
 of
 evidence”
 and
 that

“[t]he
 prejudice.
 .
 .,
 the
 absence
 of
 [a]
 Brady
 claim
 is
 obvious.”

 (Pet’r’s
 Br.
 at
 37
 n.
 6,

Doc.
 37.)

 The
 Court
 need
 not
 consider
 whether
 Petitioner
 has
 demonstrated
 cause

22
 In
 disagreement
 with
 the
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals,
 Petitioner
 argues
 that
 the

Brady
 claim
 was
 added
 to
 the
 Rule
 32
 petition
 after
 the
 hearing
 and
 has
 attached
 a

copy
 of
 a
 letter
 mailed
 to
 the
 trial
 court
 along
 with
 a
 copy
 of
 the
 proposed

amendment
 adding
 the
 Brady
 claim.
 (Exs.
 A
 &
 B
 to
 Pet’r’s
 Br.,
 Doc.
 37.)

 Apparently,

the
 proposed
 amendment
 did
 not
 become
 part
 of
 the
 record.
 In
 any
 event,

Petitioner’s
 argument
 is
 a
 challenge
 to
 the
 state
 law’s
 procedural
 default
 ruling,
 a

ruling
 this
 Court
 cannot
 disturb.

 See
 Trevino,
 133
 S.Ct
 at
 1917.

32

because
 he
 clearly
 cannot
 prove
 that
 he
 was
 prejudiced
 by
 the
 state’s
 failure
 to

disclose
 the
 statement.

 A
 habeas
 petitioner
 establishes
 prejudice
 for
 failing
 to
 raise

a
 defaulted
 Brady
 claim
 by
 convincing
 the
 court
 “that
 there
 is
 a
 ‘reasonable

probability’
 that
 the
 result
 of
 the
 trial
 would
 have
 been
 different
 if
 the
 suppressed

[evidence]
 had
 been
 disclosed
 to
 the
 defense.”

 Crawford
 v.
 Head,
 311
 F.3d
 1288,

1328
 (11th
 Cir.
 2002).

There
 is
 no
 reasonable
 probability
 of
 a
 different
 result
 here
 because
 the

undisclosed
 statement
 would
 not
 have
 been
 admissible
 at
 trial.

 “The
 law
 is
 well

settled
 in
 [Alabama]
 that
 [the]
 self-­‐serving
 declarations
 of
 an
 accused,
 made
 before

or
 after
 the
 offense
 are
 not
 admissible
 for
 him
 unless
 they
 are
 part
 of
 the
 res
 gestae.”

Harrell
 v.
 State,
 470
 So.
 2d
 1303,
 1306
 (Ala.
 Crim.
 App.
 1984).

 Petitioner’s

statement
 would
 not
 qualify
 as
 part
 of
 the
 res
 gestae,
 which
 is
 “broadly
 [
 ]defined
 as

matter
 incidental
 to
 the
 main
 fact
 and
 explanatory
 thereof,
 and
 includes
 acts
 and

words
 which
 are
 so
 closely
 connected
 therewith
 as
 to
 constitute
 a
 part
 of
 the

transaction.”

 Moore
 v.
 State,
 697
 So.2d
 800,
 804.
 (Ala.
 Crim.
 App.
 1996)
 (quoting
 R.

Williams,
 Williams
 Alabama
 Evidence
 §
 139
 (1967)(footnotes
 omitted)).

Res
 gestae
 statements
 are
 admissible
 as
 an
 exception
 to
 the
 hearsay
 rule
 and
 are

considered
 reliable
 because
 they
 arise
 from
 “a
 situation
 which
 presents
 a
 startling

or
 unusual
 occurrence
 sufficient
 to
 produce
 a
 spontaneous
 and
 instinctive

reaction
 .
 .
 .
 made
 under
 such
 circumstances
 as
 to
 show
 lack
 of
 forethought
 or

deliberate
 design
 in
 the
 formulation
 of
 their
 content.”

 Id.

 An
 accused’s
 post-­‐arrest

exculpatory
 statement
 does
 not
 fall
 within
 this
 exception,
 as
 demonstrated
 by
 a

number
 of
 Alabama
 cases.

 See,
 e.g.,
 Kennedy
 v.
 State,
 469
 So.
 2d
 1333
 (Ala.
 Crim.
 App.

33

1985)
 (defendant’s
 self-­‐serving
 statement
 to
 investigator
 after
 arrest
 not

admissible);
 Miller
 v.
 State,
 441
 So.2d
 1038
 (Ala.
 Crim
 App.
 1983)
 (same).

 Indeed,

the
 Alabama
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals
 found
 a
 statement
 to
 be
 inadmissible
 under

nearly
 identical
 circumstances.

 In
 Harrell
 the
 defendant
 was
 charged
 with
 capital

murder
 but
 claimed
 that
 the
 shooting
 was
 not
 intentional.

 The
 trial
 court
 refused
 to

allow
 into
 evidence
 the
 defendant’s
 post-­‐arrest
 statement
 that
 the
 gun
 accidentally

discharged.

 The
 appellate
 court
 upheld
 the
 trial
 court’s
 ruling,
 noting
 the
 statement

“fit
 the
 classic
 definition
 of
 hearsay.”

 Harrell,
 470
 So.2d
 at
 1306.

 This
 claim
 is

procedurally
 defaulted,
 and
 Petitioner
 cannot
 establish
 prejudice
 to
 overcome
 the

procedural
 default.

Conclusion

In
 summary,
 the
 penalty
 phase
 claims
 as
 stated
 in
 the
 original
 petition
 are

moot
 due
 to
 the
 resentencing.

 Some
 of
 Petitioner’s
 guilt
 phase
 claims
 are

procedurally
 defaulted
 and,
 therefore,
 due
 to
 be
 dismissed.

1. The
 following
 claims
 are
 dismissed
 in
 their
 entirety:

• A2-­‐-­‐Ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel/pretrial
 transfer

hearing/financial
 limitations

• A4-­‐-­‐Ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel/youthful
 offender

hearing/financial
 limitations

• A6-­‐-­‐Ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel/insufficient
 resources
 to
 protect

petitioner
 from
 pretrial
 publicity;

• A13-­‐-­‐Ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel/cumulative
 errors

• K4-­‐-­‐Improper
 and
 prejudicial
 voir
 dire/right
 to
 trial
 by
 impartial
 jury

• N-­‐-­‐Brady
 violation

2. The
 following
 claims
 are
 dismissed
 in
 part:

• A7-­‐-­‐Paragraphs
 74
 &
 76

• A9—Paragraph
 85

• A10—Paragraphs
 90-­‐94,
 96-­‐101,
 and
 103-­‐113

• B—Paragraph
 128

• J—Paragraphs
 215
 &
 223

34

•

K3—Paragraphs
 233
 (last
 two
 sentences)
 &
 235-­‐38

3. The
 following
 claims
 remain
 to
 be
 resolved
 on
 the
 merits:

• A5

• A7—Paragraphs
 70-­‐73,
 75-­‐78

• A9—Paragraphs
 86-­‐89

• A10—Paragraphs
 95
 &
 102

• B—Paragraphs
 129-­‐131

• D1

• E

• F

• J—Paragraphs
 213-­‐14
 and
 216-­‐22

• K1

• K2

• K3-­‐-­‐Paragraphs
 230-­‐32,
 233
 (first
 two
 sentences)
 234
 &
 239

• K5

• K6

• L1-­‐3

Finally,
 the
 Court
 recognizes
 that
 the
 Supreme
 Court’s
 decision
 in

Montgomery
 v.
 Louisiana,
 141
 So.3d
 264,
 cert.
 granted
 (U.S.
 March
 20,
 2015)
 (No.
 14-­‐
280)
 regarding
 the
 retroactive
 application
 of
 Miller
 v.
 Alabama,
 ____
 U.S.
 ____,
 132
 S.

Ct.
 2455,
 2469
 (2012),
 could
 have
 an
 impact
 on
 this
 petition
 for
 habeas
 relief.

Therefore,
 Stage
 2
 briefing
 will
 not
 commence
 until
 that
 decision
 is
 rendered.

Within
 30
 days
 after
 the
 Supreme
 Court
 issues
 its
 opinion
 in
 Montgomery,
 the

parties
 shall
 submit
 a
 joint
 proposed
 briefing
 schedule
 for
 resolving
 the
 remaining

claims,
 including,
 if
 applicable,
 any
 claims
 to
 be
 raised
 based
 on
 Miller
 and

Montgomery.

DONE
 and
 ORDERED
 this
 the
 4th
 day
 of
 November,
 2015.

s/Charles
 R.
 Butler,
 Jr.

Senior
 United
 States
 District
 Judge

35