Hart v. Haley

Filing 49

OPINION and ORDER. The penalty phase claims as stated in the original petition are moot due to the resentencing. Some of Petitioner's guilt phase claims are procedurally defaulted and, therefore, due to be dismissed, as further set out. Within 30 days after the Supreme Court issues its opinion in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the parties shall submit a joint proposed briefing schedule for resolving the remaining claims. Signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr on 11/4/2015. copies to parties. (sdb)

Download PDF
IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  COURT  FOR  THE   SOUTHERN  DISTRICT  OF  ALABAMA   SOUTHERN  DIVISION     GARY DAVIS HART II,   Petitioner, v. JEFFERSON S. DUNN, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections,1 )   ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )     CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-00231-CB   Respondent.                OPINION  and  ORDER   At  the  Court’s  direction,  the  parties,  some  time  ago,  submitted  briefs   addressing  procedural  default  and  the  need  for  an  evidentiary  hearing.    This  order   addresses  procedural  default  and  other  grounds  for  dismissal  raised  by  Respondent.       Procedural  Background     In  1990,  Petitioner  Gary  Davis  Hart  II  was  convicted  of  capital  murder  in  the   Circuit  Court  of  Mobile  County,  Alabama  and  was  sentenced  to  death.    He  appealed,   and  both  his  sentence  and  conviction  were  affirmed  by  the  Alabama  Court  of   Criminal  Appeals.    Hart  v.  State,  612  So.2d  520  (Ala.  Crim.  App.  1992).    That  decision   was  affirmed  by  the  Alabama  Supreme  Court.  Ex  Parte  Hart,  612  So.2d  536  (Ala.   1992).    Hart’s  petition  for  certiorari  was  denied  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court.     Hart  v.  Alabama,  508  U.S.  953  (1993).    Following  the  conclusion  of  his  direct  appeal,   Hart  filed  a  petition  for  postconviction  relief  pursuant  to  Rule  32  of  the  Alabama   Rules  of  Criminal  Procedure.    After  a  hearing,  the  trial  court  denied  the  petition.                                                                                                                     1  Pursuant  to  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  25(d),  the  Court  has  substituted  Jefferson  S.  Dunn   Hart  appealed,  but  the  Alabama  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals  affirmed  the  lower  court’s   decision.    Hart  v.  State,  778  So.2d  869  (Ala.  Crim.  App.  1999)  (unpubl.),  cert.  denied,   800  So.2d  140  (Ala.  2000).     On  March  28,  2001,  Hart  filed  the  instant  petition  for  habeas  corpus  pursuant   to  28  U.S.C.  §  2254.    While  the  petition  was  pending,  the  United  States  Supreme   Court  decided  Roper  v.  Simmons,  543  U.S.  551(2005),  which  held  that  the  imposition   of  the  death  penalty  on  persons  under  18  when  the  crime  was  committed  violated   the  Eighth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments.    Thereafter,  the  Court  entered  an  order   directing  the  Respondent  to  show  cause  why  the  petition  should  not  be  granted  in   part,  “insofar  as  petitioner  seeks  to  vacate  the  sentence  imposed  on  the  ground  that   it  violates  the  Eighth  Amendment’s  prohibition  on  cruel  and  unusual  punishment.”     (Ord.,  Doc.  40.)    In  response,  Respondent  acknowledged  that  Petitioner,  who  was  16   years  old  at  the  time  the  murder  was  committed,  was  due  to  be  resentenced  to  life   imprisonment  without  the  possibility  of  parole  based  on  the  Supreme  Court’s  ruling   in  Simmons.    (Rsp.,  Doc.  41.)    The  parties  agreed  that  the  case  should  be  remanded  to   the  Circuit  Court  of  Mobile  County  for  resentencing.    Accordingly,  this  Court  granted   the  petition,  in  part,  and  remanded  the  matter  to  the  Circuit  Court  of  Mobile  County   for  resentencing,  but  retained  jurisdiction  to  decide  any  pending  guilt-­‐phase  claims   properly  raised  by  the  Petitioner.      (Remand  Ord.,  Doc.  43.)    On  August  16,  2005,   Petitioner  was  resentenced  to  life  in  prison  without  the  possibility  of  parole,  the   only  other  sentence  available  at  that  time  under  Alabama  law.2  (Doc.  45.)                                                                                                                   2  Subsequent  to  Roper,  the  Supreme  Court  held  in  Miller  v.  Alabama,  ____  U.S.  ____,  132   S.  Ct.  2455,  2469    (2012),  “that  the  Eighth  Amendment  forbids  a  sentencing  scheme   that  mandates  life  in  prison  without  possibility  of  parole  for  juvenile  offenders.”       2   Facts     The  Underlying  Offense     In  its  opinion  on  direct  appeal,  the  Alabama  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals   summarized  the  evidence  presented  at  trial  as  follows:   On  August  12,  1989,  the  appellant  and  his  accomplice,  who  were  each   armed  with  a  handgun,  entered  the  rear  door  of  the  L  &  N  Seafood   restaurant  in  Mobile,  Alabama.  Standing  near  the  rear  door  was  the   restaurant's  bartender,  Steve  Mason.  Upon  entering  the  restaurant,   the  appellant  grabbed  Steve  Mason  by  the  shirt,  prodded  him  in  the   back  with  a  .38  caliber  pistol,  and  announced  “this  is  a  hold  up,  take   me  to  the  safe.”  Mr.  Mason  led  the  appellant  to  the  office  where  the   victim,  Todd  Evans,  was  working.  Mr.  Mason  then  informed  the  victim   that  they  were  being  robbed  and  that  the  appellant  wanted  money.   The  victim  did  not  reply  but  met  the  demand  for  money  with  a  look  of   surprise.  The  appellant  then  shouted,  “This  ain't  no  bullshit,”  and   brought  the  pistol  within  two  feet  of  the  victim's  head  and  fired.  The   bullet  entered  the  left  side  of  the  victim's  face,  traveled  through  his   brain,  and  then  lodged  under  the  scalp  on  the  right  side  of  his  head.     Immediately  following  the  shooting,  Steve  Mason  retrieved  a  cash   drawer  from  a  filing  cabinet  in  the  victim's  office  and  gave  it  to  the   appellant.  The  appellant  and  his  partner  then  fled  the  scene  on  foot.   They  were  spotted  at  a  nearby  hotel  and  after  a  brief  chase  were   apprehended.  During  the  chase,  the  appellant  discarded  a  .38  caliber   pistol,  which  was  later  identified  as  the  murder  weapon.  At  the  time  of   the  appellant's  arrest,  he  was  in  possession  of  $499  in  cash.     Hart  v.  State,  612  So.2d  520,  523  (Ala.  Crim.  App.  1992).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               The  Eleventh  Circuit  has  held  that  Miller  does  not  apply  retroactively  to  cases  on   collateral  review.    In  re  Morgan,  713  F.3d  1365  (11th  Cir.  2013).    However,  there  is   disagreement  on  the  issue  of  retroactivity.    Compare  Johnson  v.  Ponton,  780  F.3d  219   (4th  Cir.  2015)  (Miller  not  retroactive);  Commonwealth  v.  Cunningham,  81  A.3d  1  (Pa.   2013)(same);  State  v.  Tate,  130  So.  3d  829  (La.  2013)    (same)  with  State  v.  Mantich,   842  N.W.  2d  716  (Neb.  2014)  (Miller  retroactive);  In  re  New  Hampshire,  103  A.  3d   227  (N.H.  2014)(same),  petition  for  cert.  filed,    sub  nom.  New  Hampshire  v.  Soto  (Dec.   1,  2014)  (No.  14-­‐639).    The  Supreme  Court  is  expected  to  resolve  the  issue  this  term,   having  recently  granted  heard  oral  argument  in  Montgomery  v.  Lousiana,  141  So.3d   264,  cert.  granted  (U.S.  March  20,  2015)  (No.  14-­‐280),  a  case  in  which  the  Louisiana   Court  of  Criminal  Appeals,  following  Tate,  supra,  denied  retroactive  application  of   Miller.     3     Pretrial  &  Trial  Proceedings     Attorneys  Arthur  Madden  and  Vader  A.  (Al)  Pennington  were  appointed  to   represent  Petitioner  Gary  Davis  Hart  following  his  indictment  on  a  charge  of  capital   murder.    (R.  Vol.  1,  Tab  R-­‐1  at  9-­‐10.  )  Shortly  thereafter,  counsel  filed  a  Request  to  be   Treated  as  a  Youthful  Offender.  Id.  11.    A  Youthful  Offender  Report,  including  a   psychological  evaluation,  was  submitted  by  the  Alabama  Department  of  Probation   and  Parole.  Id.  19.    After  a  hearing,  at  which  defense  counsel  called  two  character   witnesses,  the  trial  court  denied  Youthful  Offender  status.    (R.  Vol.  2,  Tab  R-­‐4.)     Thereafter,  defense  counsel  filed  a  motion  for  change  of  venue,  which  was  denied,  as   well  as  a  motion  for  funds  to  hire  experts,  which  was  granted  in  part  and  denied  in   part.    (R.  Vol.  1,  Tab  R-­‐1  at  33-­‐38;  R.  Vol.  2,  Tab  R-­‐7.)    Defense  counsel  filed  various   pretrial  motions  regarding  jury  selection  as  well  as  motions  in  limine.         Prior  to  appointment  of  counsel,  the  trial  court  entered  a  standard  discovery   order.    (R.  Vol.  1,  Tab  R-­‐1  at  12-­‐13.)    That  order  required  the  District  Attorney  to   turn  over  to  the  defendant’s  attorney  at  arraignment  various  forms  of  evidence,   including  all  statements  made  by  the  defendant  (both  written  and  oral);  any  and  all   exculpatory  evidence;  all  physical  evidence  to  be  offered  into  evidence  at  trial;  and   results  of  scientific  tests,  experiments  or  examinations.    (Id.  )  The  trial  court  also   granted  the  State’s  motion  for  discovery,  which  requested  “copies  of  photographs,   documents  and  all  other  tangible  documents”  defendant  intended  to  introduce  into   evidence  at  trial  as  well  as  “[c]opies  of  any  results  of  reports  of  physical  or  mental   examinations,  and  of  scientific  tests  or  experiments”  to  be  introduced  into  evidence     4   at  trial  or  which  were  prepared  by  a  witness  and  related  to  the  witness’s  testimony.     (Id.  49-­‐51.)3         At  trial,  the  State  presented  testimony  from  three  L&N  employees  who  had   witnessed  the  shooting  and  who  identified  Hart  as  the  shooter.    The  State  also   presented  testimony  from  other  employees  who  saw  Hart  and/or  his  accomplice  at   the  restaurant  shortly  before  or  shortly  after  the  shooting.    Other  witnesses   included  several  police  officers  who  located  the  two  nearby  within  a  few  hours  of   the  shooting  and  took  them  into  custody.    The  State  also  presented  the  testimony  of   the  state  medical  examiner  and  a  firearms  expert.         The  defense  did  not  deny  that  Hart  was  the  shooter  or  that  the  shooting  took   place  during  the  course  of  a  robbery.    The  defense  strategy  was  to  portray  the   shooting  as  accidental.    Hart  testified  in  his  own  defense  that  he  did  not  intend  to   shoot  anyone  and  that  he  did  not  pull  the  trigger.    Through  Hart’s  testimony,  the   defense  established  that  Hart  had  a  congenital  condition  that  caused  weakness  in   his  right  hand  and  arm.    The  defense  elicited  testimony  from  the  State’s  firearms   expert  that  the  firearm  Hart  used  was  of  inferior  quality  and,  when  cocked,  required   less  than  2  pounds  of  pressure  to  pull  the  trigger.     Direct  Appeal     Hart  raised  numerous  issues  on  direct  appeal.4    Among  the  issues  raised   were  the  state’s  use  of  peremptory  challenges,  the  denial  of  Youthful  Offender  status,                                                                                                                   3  At  jury  selection,  the  State’s  motion  for  discovery  was  determined  to  be  moot   because  the  defense  did  not  intend  to  offer  any  discoverable  evidence  at  trial.  R.  Vol.   2,  Tab  R-­‐8  at  196.   4  Hart  was  represented  on  direct  appeal  by  attorney  Ruth  Friedman.         5   restriction’s  on  voir  dire,  discovery  rulings,  prosecutorial  misconduct,  evidentiary   rulings,  the  trial  court’s  jury  instructions,  and  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence.  These   issues  were  raised  before  both  the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals  (R.  Vol.  5,  Tab  R-­‐32)   and  before  the  Alabama  Supreme  Court  (R.  Vol.  6,  Tab  R-­‐38).         State  Collateral  Proceedings     After  exhausting  his  direct  appeal,  Hart  filed  a  petition  for  relief  from   judgment  pursuant  to  Rule  32  of  the  Alabama  Rules  of  Criminal  Procedure  (“state   habeas”).5    The  petition  asserted  numerous  grounds  for  relief  from  the  conviction   and  sentence  based  on  both  Federal  and  state  constitutional  violations,  including   various  claims  of  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel.    Hart’s  petition  was  denied  after   an  evidentiary  hearing  before  the  trial  court,  and  he  appealed  to  the  Alabama  Court   of  Criminal  Appeals.    That  appeal  also  raised  a  number  of  issues  and  was  also   unsuccessful.     Federal  Habeas  Petition  &  Roper  v.  Simmons     Hart  filed  the  instant  habeas  petition  on  March  28,  2001.    As  noted  above,   supra  at  2-­‐3,  this  action  was  remanded  to  the  sentencing  court  by  agreement  for   resentencing  pursuant  to  Roper.    The  state  court  imposed  a  sentence  of  life  without   parole  on  August  16,  2005.    Petitioner’s  guilt-­‐phase  claims  are  ripe  for  review.   Petitioner’s  Habeas  Claims     The  following  twenty-­‐four  guilt-­‐phase  claims6  remain  pending:                                                                                                                   5  Hart  was  represented  in  the  state  habeas  proceedings  by  current  counsel.   6  The  Petition  raised  twenty-­‐one  claims  related  solely  to  sentencing  issues,  which   have  been  rendered  moot  by  subsequent  proceedings.  Some  of  the  remaining  claims   are  “hybrid”  claims  which  raised  both  guilt-­‐phase  and  sentencing-­‐phase  issues.     With  respect  to  such  claims,  only  guilt-­‐phase  issues  will  be  identified  and  addressed.     6   A.    Ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  based  on  the  following:     1.    Counsel’s  performance  at  the  pretrial  transfer  hearing;     2.    Counsel’s  performance  at  the  pretrial  transfer  hearing  insofar  as  that   performance  resulted  from  financial  limitations  placed  on  defense  counsel;     3.    Counsel’s  performance  at  the  youthful  offender  hearing;7     4.    Counsel’s  performance  at  the  youthful  offender  hearing  insofar  as  that   performance  resulted  from  financial  limitations  placed  on  defense  counsel;8     5.    Counsel’s  failure  to  protect  Hart  from  prejudicial  pretrial  publicity;     6.    Counsel’s  failure  to  protect  Hart  from  prejudicial  pretrial  publicity  due  to   financial  limitations  placed  on  defense  counsel;     7.    Counsel  performance  at  voir  dire;     9.    Counsel  failure  to  obtain  and  present  evidence  related  to  intent  which  was   the  result  of  financial  limitations  placed  on  defense  counsel;     10.  Errors  committed  by  counsel  during  trial;  and     13.    Cumulative  errors  of  counsel.     B.      Improper  denial  of  youthful  offender  status.     D.    The  jury  foreperson’s  misconduct  and  racial  bias  deprived  Hart  of  his  right  to   trial  by  an  impartial  tribunal.     E.    The  trial  court’s  discovery  rulings  violated  Hart’s  constitutional  rights  under  the   Sixth  Amendment.     F.    Prosecutorial  misconduct  violated  Hart’s  constitutional  right  to  a  fair  trial.     J.    Violations  of  the  Sixth,  Eighth  and  Fourteenth  Amendment  resulting  from  the   following  improper  jury  instructions:     1.    Failure  to  give  an  adequate  charge  of  the  less-­‐included  offense  of  felony   murder;     2.    Failure  to  give  a  reckless  murder  charge;  and     3.    Failure  to  give  a  reckless  manslaughter  charge.     K.    Constitutional  violations  occurred  during  voir  dire,  to  wit:     1-­‐3.  The  state  used  its  peremptory  challenges  in  a  racially  discriminatory   manner;9                                                                                                                   7The  caption  of  Claim  A3  relates  to  the  pretrial  transfer  hearing,  but  the  substance  of   the  claim  addresses  the  youthful  offender  hearing.       8  Similar  to  Claim  A3,  the  caption  of  this  claim  refers  to  the  pretrial  transfer  hearing,   but  the  body  of  the  claim  contains  references  to  the  youthful  offender  hearing.     9  Claims  K1-­‐K3  are  the  same  Batson  claim  broken  into  separate  steps.    Specifically,   K1  asserts  a  general  Batson  claim.    K2  addresses  Petitioner’s  prima  facie  case  of   discrimination.  K3  discusses  evidence  to  rebut  the  state’s  race  neutral  reasons  for   its  strikes.     7       4.    Violation  of  Hart’s  Sixth  and  Fourteenth  Amendment  Rights  by  the  trial   court’s  voir  dire;10     5.    The  trial  court  improperly  excluded  prospective  jurors  based  on  their   capital  punishment  beliefs;   6.    The  trial  court’s  method  for  conducting  voir  dire  was  prejudicial.       L.    The  evidence  was  constitutionally  insufficient  to  sustain  a  guilty  verdict  because:     1.    The  state  failed  to  prove  the  element  of  intent  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt;     2.    The  jury  applied  an  unconstitutional  standard  of  proof  due  to  court’s   confusing  jury  instructions.     N.    The  state  suppressed  favorable  evidence  in  violation  of  Brady  v.  Maryland.11     Issues  Presented     Due  to  the  number  and  complexity  of  the  claims  and  issues,  the  Court  divided   the  briefing  in  the  case  into  two  stages.  Stage  I  is  intended  to  address  procedural   default  and  the  need  for  an  evidentiary  hearing,  with  the  merits  of  all  remaining  to   be  addressed  at  Stage  II.    In  the  Stage  I  brief,  Respondent  has  asserted  an  additional   matter  for  resolution.    Respondent  argues  that  the  Court  should  dismiss  certain   claims  because  those  claims  raise  solely  issues  of  state  law  and  therefore  fail  to  state   a  claim  under  28  U.S.C.  §  2254.    Below,  the  Court  will  address  Respondent’s  “state   law  only”  argument,  then  proceed  to  a  review  of  the  claims  Respondent  argues  are   subject  to  procedural  default.   “State  Law  Only”  Claims       Respondent  argues  that  the  Court  should  dismiss  several  claims  (B,  D,  E.  G.  H,   J,  M,  O  and  P)  “because  they  present  only  questions  of  state  law”  and  therefore  fail  to                                                                                                                   10  There  are  no  facts  set  forth  in  support  of  this  claim,  which  also  invokes  the  Eighth   Amendment.    Because  the  Eighth  Amendment  deals  with  issues  of  punishment,  any   claim  arising  therefrom  is  moot.       11  This  claim  is  broken  into  3  subparts  (M1-­‐M3)  asserting  different  elements  of  the   same  Brady  claim.    The  underlying  factual  basis  is  the  state’s  alleged  failure  to   disclose  a  spontaneous  statement  made  by  Hart  on  the  night  of  his  arrest.         8   state  a  claim  for  relief  under  28  U.S.C.S  §  2254(a).    Respondent  points  out,  correctly,   that  “[f]ederal  habeas  corpus  does  not  lie  to  review  errors,  if  any,  under  state  law.”     (Resp’t’s  Br.  35,  Doc.  38.)    In  support  of  this  proposition,  Respondent  cites,  first,   federal  habeas  cases  in  which  the  petition  raised  a  claim  that  was  based  purely  on   state  law.    See  Pulley  v.  Harris,  456  U.S.  37,  41  (1984);  Carrizales  v.  Wainwright,  699   F.2d  1053,  1055  (1983).    That  is  not  the  case  here.    Each  of  the  claims  identified  by   the  Respondent  is  framed  as  a  federal  constitutional  violation.    Respondent  asserts   that  the  claims  are  purely  issues  of  state  law  because  the  state  court,  either  on  direct   appeal  or  collateral  review,  resolved  these  or  similar  claims  based  solely  on  state   law.    But  it  is  the  federal  habeas  petition,  not  a  state  court  opinion,  that  determines   the  nature  of  the  claim  and  whether  it  raises  a  federal  constitutional  issue.    Cf.  Dye  v.   Hofbauer,  546  U.S.  2  (2005)  (per  curiam)  (state  court’s  failure  to  mention  a  federal   claim  does  not  mean  federal  claim  was  not  presented  to  it).           Each  of  the  challenged  claims  raises  one  or  more  issues  of  federal   constitutional  law.    Claim  B  asserts  that  Petitioner  was  “improperly  denied  Youthful   Offender  treatment”  because  the  hearing  violated  Petitioner’s  constitutional  rights   to  confrontation  and  to  avoid  self-­‐incrimination.    (Pet.  ¶¶  128-­‐131,  Doc.  1.)  Claim   D(1)  alleges  that  the  jury  foreperson’s  racial  bias  deprived  Petitioner  of  his   constitutional  right  to  a  fair  trial.  (Id.  ¶¶  146-­‐47).    Claim  J  asserts  that  the  trial   court’s  failure  to  properly  instruct  the  jury  on  lesser-­‐included  offenses  violated  the   Sixth,  Eighth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments.    (Id.  subheading  J.)      Finally,  Claim  P   alleges  that  the  introduction  of  autopsy  photographs  violated  Petitioner’s  rights  to   due  process  and  to  a  fair  trial  guaranteed  by  the  Sixth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments.       9   (Id.  subheading  P.)    Because  the  claims,  as  presented  in  the  Petition,  are  not  based   solely  on  state  law,  Respondent’s  argument  for  dismissal  fails.       Procedural  Default       Introduction     Respondent  argues  that  the  doctrine  of  procedural  default  should  prevent   the  Court  from  reaching  the  merits  of  all  or  part  the  following  guilt-­‐phase  claims:    A2,   A4,  A5,  A6,  A7,  A8,  A9,  A10,  A13,  F,  J,  K1,  K2,  K4,  K5,  L,  and  N.    Petitioner  counters   that  all  of  the  claims  were  raised  in  state  court  and  were  fully  exhausted.    Therefore,   Petitioner  asserts  that  none  are  procedurally  defaulted.    Before  addressing  the   applicability  of  procedural  default  as  to  each  claim,  the  Court  sets  out  the  law  of   procedural  default  and  related  principles.         Applicable  Law     The  doctrine  of  procedural  default,  as  it  relates  to  petitions  filed  under  28   U.S.C.  §  2254,  arises  from  principles  of  comity  and  federalism.    Francis  v.  Henderson,   425  U.S.  536,  541  (1976).    A  federal  court   will  not  consider  an  issue  of  federal  law  on  direct  review  from  a   judgment  of  a  state  court  if  that  judgment  rests  on  a  state-­‐law  ground   that  is  both  “independent”  of  the  merits  of  the  federal  claim  and  an   “adequate  basis  for  the  court’s  decision.    Although  this  doctrine   originated  in  the  context  of  state-­‐court  judgments  for  which  the   alternative  state  and  federal  grounds  were  both  “substantive”  in   nature,  the  doctrine“  has  been  applied  routinely  to  state  decisions   forfeiting  federal  claims  for  violation  of  state  procedural  rules.     Harris  v.  Reed,  489  U.S.  255,  260-­‐61  (1989)  (internal  citations  and  quotations   omitted).    Generally,  violation  of  a  state  procedural  rule  is  adequate  to  foreclose   federal  review  if  the  rule  is  “firmly  established  and  regularly  followed.”    Lee  v.   Kemna,  534  U.S.  362,  376  (2002).    A  state  court’s  decision  is  independent  unless  the     10   resolution  of  the  state-­‐law  issue  depends  on  a  federal  constitutional  ruling.    Stewart   v.  Smith,  536  U.S.  856,  860  (2002).    While  a  federal  court  is  generally  precluded  from   reviewing  the  merits  of  a  procedurally  defaulted  claim,  there  are  exceptions  to  the   rule.     Procedural  default  may  be  overcome  in  one  of  two  ways.    First  the  claim  may   be  considered  on  the  merits  if  the  petitioner  and  show  both  cause  for  this  failure  to   comply  with  the  state  procedural  rule  and  prejudice  resulting  from  the  default.       Murray  v.  Carrier,  477  U.S.  478  (1986).    “[C]ause  for  a  procedural  default  must   ordinarily  turn  on  whether  the  prisoner  can  show  that  some  objective  factor   external  to  the  defense  impeded  counsel’s  efforts  to  comply  with  the  State’s   procedural  rule.”    Id.  at  488.    Prejudice,  in  this  context,  means  a  reasonable   probability  that  the  outcome  would  have  been  different.    Strickler  v.  Greene,  527  U.S.   263  (1999).    The  second  circumstance  under  which  a  procedurally  defaulted  claim   may  be  considered  is  if  the  failure  to  review  the  claim  would  result  in  a  fundamental   miscarriage  of  justice.”    Dugger  v.  Adams,  489  U.S.  401,  415  (1989).     While  procedural  default  obviously  applies  to  federal  constitutional  claims   that  were  denied  by  the  state  court  on  procedural  grounds,  it  may  also  apply  to   federal  constitutional  claims  that  were  never  raised  at  all  in  state  court.    In  the  latter   instance,  the  doctrines  of  procedural  default  and  exhaustion  converge.    “Exhaustion   of  state  remedies  requires  that  the  state  prisoner  ‘fairly  present[t]  federal  claims  to   the  state  court  in  order  to  give  the  State  the  opportunity  to  pass  upon  and  correct   alleged  violations  of  its  prisoners’  federal  rights.’”    Snowden  v.  Singletary,  135  F.3d   732,  735  (1998)  (quoting  Duncan  v.  Henry,  513  U.S.  364,  365  (1995)).    Generally,     11   unexhausted  claims  must  be  returned  to  the  state  court  for  consideration  on  the   merits  unless  the  federal  court  determines  that  exhaustion  would  be  futile.    Id.  at   736.    If  state  procedural  rules  would  preclude  review  of  the  claim  on  the  merits,   then  exhaustion  would  be  futile.    Id.    Thus,  a  federal  court  may  conclude  that  an   unexhausted  claim  would  be  procedurally  barred  because  of  the  petitioner’s  failure   to  comply  with  state  procedure.    Id.  at  737.    In  that  instance,  the  doctrine  of   procedural  default  would  apply  even  though  the  state  court  had  never  specifically   invoked  the  state  procedural  rule.     To  summarize,  a  federal  court  will  not  consider  the  merits  of  a  federal   constitutional  claim  on  habeas  review  if  that  claim  has  been  procedurally  defaulted.     If  the  constitutional  claim  asserted  by  the  petition  was  presented  and  denied  by  the   state  court  on  adequate  and  independent  state-­‐law  grounds,  then  procedural  default   applies.    If  the  claim  was  never  raised  in  state  court  but  now  would  be  barred  from   consideration  by  state  procedural  rules,  the  procedural  default  also  applies.    A   procedurally  defaulted  claim  may  nonetheless  be  considered  on  the  merits  if   petitioner  can  demonstrate  either  (1)  cause  for  and  prejudice  from  his  failure  to   raise  the  issue  in  state  court  or  (2)  that  failure  to  consider  the  merits  would  result  in   a  fundamental  miscarriage  of  justice.         Claim  A2:    Ineffective  Assistance  of  Counsel  at  Pretrial  Transfer  Hearing   Due  to  Financial  Limitations   Respondent  argues  that  this  claim  was  not  exhausted  in  state  court  because  it   was  not  raised  on  appeal  either  on  direct  appeal  or  collateral  attack.    Because   consideration  would  be  barred  by  state  procedural  rules,  Respondent  asserts,  the   claim  is  procedurally  defaulted.    Petitioner’s  sole  response  is  that  the  claim  was     12   exhausted  because  it  was  raised  in  the  Rule  32  appeal  and,  for  that  reason,  is  not   procedurally  barred.12    The  claim  asserted  in  this  Court  is  that  “[d]efense  counsel   did  not  have  the  funds  and  therefore  did  not  investigate  and  discover  any  evidence…”   to  present  on  behalf  of  Petitioner  at  the  pretrial  transfer  hearing  (Pet.  ¶  34)  and   “[Petitioner]  was  tried  as  an  adult  as  a  result  of  counsel’s  deficient  representation.  .  .   due  to    inadequate  access  to  funds.”    (Id.  ¶  35).      As  evidence  that  he  exhausted  this   claim,  Petitioner  points  to  his  Rule  32  appellate  brief.         The  Eleventh  Circuit  has  explained  what  the  exhaustion  requirement  entails   as  follows:   In  order  to  be  exhausted,  a  federal  claim  must  be  fairly  presented  to   the  state  courts.  It  is  not  sufficient  merely  that  the  federal  habeas   petitioner  has  been  through  the  state  courts  ...  nor  is  it  sufficient  that   all  the  facts  necessary  to  support  the  claim  were  before  the  state   courts  or  that  a  somewhat  similar  state-­‐law  claim  was  made.    Rather,   in  order  to  ensure  that  state  courts  have  the  first  opportunity  to  hear   all  claims,  federal  courts  have  required  a  state  prisoner  to  present  the   state  courts  with  the  same  claim  he  urges  upon  the  federal  courts.   While  we  do  not  require  a  verbatim  restatement  of  the  claims  brought   in  state  court,  we  do  require  that  a  petitioner  presented  his  claims  to   the  state  court  such  that  a  reasonable  reader  would  understand  each   claim's  particular  legal  basis  and  specific  factual  foundation.     McNair  v.  Campbell,  416  F.3d  1291,  1302  (11th  Cir.  2005)  (internal  citations  and   quotations  omitted).         Petitioner  cites  two  separate  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  claims   presented  to  the  state  appellate  court.    The  first  claim  was  asserted  under   subheading  A:    “Hart  was  deprived  of  his  right  to  a  fair  trial  by  Counsel’s  failure  to   effectively  represent  him  at  the  pre-­‐trial  transfer  hearing.”    (R.  Vol.  22  Tab  R-­‐55  at                                                                                                                   12  Petitioner  does  not  dispute  that  state  procedural  rules  would  bar  consideration  of   the  claim,  nor  does  Petitioner  invoke  any  exception  to  procedural  default  rule.       13   6.)  On  pages  6-­‐9  of  his  Rule  32  brief,  he  argued  that  counsel  rendered   constitutionally  ineffective  assistance  at  the  pretrial  transfer  hearing  because  his   failure  to  investigate  or  to  introduce  any  evidence  at  the  transfer  hearing  was  the   result  of  counsel’s  incompetence  as  opposed  to  a  strategic  decision.  (Id.  at  6-­‐9.)    The   only  mention  of  inadequate  funding  was  made  under  subheading  F,  which  can  best   be  described  as  a  catch-­‐all  subheading:  “Gary  Hart  was  deprived  of  a  fair  trial  by   counsel’s  failure  to  otherwise  protect  his  interests  before  and  during  the  trial.”    (Id.   21.)    Petitioner’s  entire  argument  regarding  insufficient  funding  was  as  follows:   (Id.)         Gary  was  also  denied  effective  assistance  of  counsel  at  trial  and   on  appeal  by  the  insufficient  funding  provided  by  the  State  for  the   compensation  of  capital  defense  attorneys  for  their  expenses.  (v.5  at   pp.  40-­‐42).    In  this  regard  Pennington’s  affidavit  reflects  that  the  funds   provided  by  the  State  of  Alabama  were  wholly  inadequate  to  provide  a   proper  defense.    (v.6  at  p.  532).  The  available  funds  “did  not  begin  to   cover  the  fees  and  costs  which  are  necessary  to  effectively  defend  any   one  charged  with  capital  murder”.  Id.     Petitioner  cannot  satisfy  the  exhaustion  requirement  by  cherry-­‐picking     portions  of  separate  and  distinct  state  court  claims.    “[T]o  preserve  a  claim  of   ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  for  federal  review,  the  habeas  petitioner  must   assert  this  theory  of  relief  and  transparently  present  the  state  courts  with  the   specific  acts  or  omissions  of  his  lawyers  that  resulted  in  prejudice.”  Kelley  v.  Sect’y   for  the  Dept.  of  Corrections,  377  F.3d  1317,  1344  (11th  Cir.  2004).    The  legal  theories   raised  in  state  court  must  have  been  supported  by  the  same  “specific”  facts  asserted   in  the  federal  habeas  petition.      Id.    “[H]abeas  petitioners  may  not  present  particular   factual  instances  of  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  in  their  federal  petitions  that   were  not  first  presented  to  the  state  courts.”    Id.      Petitioner  did  not  assert  in  his  Rule     14   32  appeal  a  claim  that  counsel  rendered  ineffective  assistance  at  the  pretrial   transfer  hearing  based  on  inadequate  funds.    Therefore,  that  claim  did  not  get  one   full  round  of  review  in  state  court  and  was  not  exhausted.    See  Ala.  R.  Crim.  P.   32.2(a)(5)  (precluding  post-­‐conviction  relief  for  non-­‐jurisdictional  claims  that  could   have  been  raised  on  direct  appeal).         Claim  A4:    Ineffective  Assistance  of  Counsel  at  Youthful  Offender   Hearing  Due  to  Inadequate  Funding   This  claim  is  similar  to  the  claim  above,  except  that  it  based  on  counsel’s   performance  at  the  Youthful  Offender  hearing,  rather  than  the  pretrial  transfer   hearing.    As  with  he  did  with  that  claim,  Petitioner  has  pulled  together  unrelated   portions  of  his  Rule  32  appellate  brief  in  an  effort  to  demonstrate  exhaustion.     Petitioner  cites  his  claim  of  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  at  the  youthful  offender   hearing  on  pages  14-­‐16  of  that  brief  along  with  his  generalized  ineffective   assistance/insufficient  funding  claim  asserted  separately  on  page  21.  (R.  Vol.  22  Tab   R-­‐55  at  14-­‐16  &  21.)    For  the  same  reasons  cited  supra  at  12-­‐15,  this  claim  is  not   exhausted  and,  therefore,  is  procedurally  defaulted.      Claim  A5:    Counsel  Failed  to  Protect  Petitioner  from  Pretrial  Publicity     In  this  claim,  Petitioner  asserts  that  counsel  failed  to  subpoena  members  of   the  media  to  testify  regarding  the  extent  of  pretrial  publicity,  failed  to  properly   question  jurors  about  their  exposure  to  publicity,  and  failed  to  obtain  a  change  of   venue.    Respondent  argues  that  this  is  not  the  same  ineffective  assistance/pretrial   publicity  claim  asserted  in  the  amended  Rule  32  petition  and  on  appeal.    Petitioner,   on  the  other  hand,  points  out  that  the  claim  was  “made  on  page  10  of  [his]  Rule  32   Brief.  .  .  to  the  Alabama  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals.”      (Pet’r’s  Br.  25,  Doc.  37.)    As     15   Petitioner  acknowledges,  claims  raised  in  the  Rule  32  petition  and  on  appeal  from   the  denial  of  the  Rule  32  petition  are  preserved  for  habeas  review.    Pruitt  v.  Jones,   348  F.3d  1355,  1358  (11th  Cir.  2003)  (to  exhaust  constitutional  claim  prisoner  must   invoke  one  full  round  of  state  appellate  review).     Only  one  factual  basis  supporting  this  claim  was  raised  in  both  the  amended   Rule  32  petition  and  in  the  Rule  32  appeal.    On  appeal,  Petitioner’s  ineffective   assistance/pretrial  publicity  argument  was  asserted  under  a  claim  of  ineffective   assistance  in  “empaneling  the  jury.”    (R.  Vol.  22  Tab  R-­‐55  at  10.)    Therein,  Petitioner   asserted  that  counsel’s  “failure  to  protect  [Petitioner]  from  the  effects  of  pre-­‐trial   publicity  constituted  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  [in  empaneling  the  jury].”     (Id.)    Broadly  construed,  the  claim  asserted  on  appeal  (i.e.,  ineffective   assistance/empaneling  the  jury/pretrial  publicity)  can  be  considered  to  encompass   failure  to  properly  question  jurors  about  their  exposure  to  pretrial  publicity.     Therefore,  that  portion  of  the  claim  is  exhausted  and  is  not  procedurally  barred.     However,  both  failure  to  obtain  media  testimony  and  failure  to  obtain  a  change  of   venue  are  completely  unrelated  to  the  ineffective  assistance/empaneling  the  jury   claim  asserted  in  the  Rule  32  appeal.    Consequently,  Petitioner’s  claim  is  not   exhausted,  and  is  procedurally  barred,  to  the  extent  it  relies  on  those  underlying   factual  bases.         Claim  A6:    Financial  Limitations  Placed  on  Defense  Counsel  did  not   Provide  Defense  Counsel  with  Sufficient  Resources  to  Effectively  Protect   Petitioner  from  Adverse  Pretrial  Publicity     Petitioner  alleges  that  counsel  rendered  ineffective  assistance  because  “the   trial  court  refused  to  grant  him  funds  to  conduct  a  survey  of  the  community”  thus     16   rendering  counsel  unable  to  protect  Petitioner  from  prejudicial  pretrial  publicity.     (Pet.  ¶¶  68-­‐69.)    According  to  the  petition,  counsel’s  deficient  performance  in  this   regard  made  it  impossible  for  Petitioner  to  receive  a  fair  trial  and  resulted  in  his   conviction.    (Id.  ¶  69.)    Respondent  argues  that  this  claim  was  not  raised  in   Petitioner’s  Rule  32  appeal.    Petitioner  counters  that  “the  substance  of  the  claim”   was  raised  on  appeal,  but  once  again  Petitioner  pulls  language  from  two  disparate   claims  and  attempts  to  pass  them  off  as  the  claim  now  asserted.    First,  he  cites  his   claim  that  counsel  failed  to  protect  him  from  pretrial  publicity  on  page  10  of  his  Rule   32  brief,  which  makes  no  mention  of  financial  limitations.    (R.  Vol.  22  Tab  R-­‐55  at   10.)    Next,  he  cites  his  argument  on  page  66  of  the  same  brief,  in  support  of  his  claim   that  the  trial  court’s  discovery  rulings  deprived  him  of  the  fair  trial.    (Id.  at  66.)  One   of  the  rulings  cited  was  the  Court’s  denial  of  his  motion  for  funds  to  conduct  a   survey  regarding  the  effects  of  pretrial  publicity.    No  powers  of  legal  intuition  are   strong  enough  to  decipher  one  claim  from  these  two  wholly  unrelated  assertions  set   apart  by  more  than  50  pages.    This  claim  was  not  exhausted  and  is,  therefore,   procedurally  defaulted.     Claim  A7:    Petitioner  was  Deprived  of  his  Right  to  a  Fair  Trial  by  an   Impartial  Jury  by  Defense  Counsel’s  Failure  to  Conduct  a  Proper  Voir   Dire  and  by  Defense  Counsel’s  Failure  to  Question  Prospective  Jurors   About  Racial  Bias     Respondent  argues  that  this  claims  is  partially  defaulted  in  that  certain   factual  averments  set  forth  in  support  of  this  claim  were  not  raised  fully  exhausted.     Specifically,  Respondent  asserts  that  the  facts  asserted  in  paragraphs  73  and  74   were  not  raised  in  either  Amended  Rule  32  Petition  or  in  the  Rule  32  appeal  and   that  the  facts  asserted  in  paragraph  76  were  not  asserted  in  the  Rule  32  appeal.       17   Respondent  is  partially  correct.    In  paragraph  73,  Petitioner  asserts  that  counsel  was   ineffective  because  he  failed  “to  make  a  diligent  examination  of  the  venire  pool  prior   to  jury  selection  in  support  of  a  Batson  challenge”  and  was  unable  to  ask   particularized  questions  related  to  the  state’s  proffered  explanations  for  striking   jurors.    Both  of  these  assertions  were  raised  in  the  Amended  Rule  32  Petition  (R.  Vol.   8  Tab  R-­‐48  ¶¶  48  &  49)  and  in  the  Rule  32  appeal  (R.  Vol.  22  Tab  R-­‐55  at  11-­‐12)  and   are  therefore  preserved  for  review.         However,  paragraphs  74  and  76,  have  not  been  exhausted  and  are   procedurally  defaulted.    First,  Petitioner  does  not  dispute  Respondent’s  claim  that   Paragraph  76  is  procedurally  defaulted.13  Respondent  argues  that  the  substance  of   paragraph  74  was  raised  in  the  Amended  Rule  32  Petition  and  in  the  Rule  32  appeal.       In  that  paragraph,  Petitioner  assets  that  defense  counsel  was  unable  to  effectively   empanel  an  impartial  jury  due  to  the  trial  court’s  unreasonable  time  limitations  on   voir  dire  and  the  court’s  refusal  to  allow  sequestered  questioning  of  prospective   jurors.    But  those  factual  assertions  were  not  related  to  any  ineffective  assistance  of   counsel  claim  in  the  Rule  32  proceedings.    Although  included  in  both  the  Amended   Rule  32  Petition  and  in  the  Rule  32  appellate  brief,  these  assertions  were  raised  in   support  of  Petitioner’s  claim  that  the  trial  court  violated  his  right  to  a  fair  trial.    (R.   Vol.  8  Tab  R-­‐48  ¶¶  114-­‐16;  R.  Vol.  22  Tab  R-­‐55  at  58-­‐59.)       Claim  A9:  Financial  Limitations  placed  on  Defense  Counsel  Denied   Defense  Counsel  Sufficient  Resources  to  Effectively  Represent   Petitioner  Before  Trial                                                                                                                     13  That  paragraph  alleges  that  “[d]efense  counsel  allowed  a  juror  with  fixed  opinions   about  the  case  to  remain  on  the  panel.”     18     The  question  presented  is  whether  paragraph  85-­‐-­‐which  asserts  that  defense   counsel,  due  to  lack  of  funds,  was  “unable  to  investigate  [Petitioner’s]  background  to   discover  and  offer  evidence  of  [his]  drug  and  alcohol  use  on  the  night  of  the  crime   [to  negate  intent]”-­‐-­‐is  procedurally  defaulted.    Petitioner  admits  that  this  factual   basis  was  never  specifically  raised  in  state  court  but,  citing  Vasquez  v.  Hillery,  474   U.S.  254  (1986),  argues  that  the  inclusion  of  additional  facts  in  support  of  an   otherwise  exhausted  claim  does  not  preclude  habeas  review.    In  that  case,  however,   the  federal  court  had  requested  additional  evidence  regarding  the  grand  jury’s  racial   makeup  which,  in  turn,  was  related  to  the  prisoner’s  “equal  protection  challenge  to   the  grand  jury  that  indicted  him.”    Id.  474  U.S.  at  256.    The  Supreme  Court  rejected   the  state’s  objection  on  exhaustion  grounds,  stating:  “We  have  never  held  that   presentation  of  additional  facts  to  the  district  court,  pursuant  to  that  court's   directions,  evades  the  exhaustion  requirement  when  the  prisoner  has  presented  the   substance  of  his  claim  to  the  state  courts.”    Id.  474  U.S.,  257-­‐58.       These  are  not  merely  new  facts  supporting  a  claim  presented  to  the  state   court.    This  is  an  entirely  new  claim.    The  basis  of  Petitioner’s  financial   limitations/ineffective  assistance  before  trial  claim  in  state  court  was  counsel’s   failure  to  obtain  and  present  a  firearms  expert  (regarding  the  sensitivity  of  the   trigger)  and  a  medical  expert  (regarding  the  medical  condition  of  his  arm)  both  of   which  were  relevant  to  his  claim  that  the  gun  discharged  accidentally.    (R.  Vol.  Tab   R-­‐55  at  13-­‐16.)    Counsel’s  alleged  failure  to  discover  and  present  evidence  of  drug   and  alcohol  abuse  on  the  night  of  the  crime  does  not  constitute  “additional  facts”  in   support  of  counsel’s  alleged  failure  to  obtain  expert  testimony.    The  state  court  did     19   not  have  a  full  and  fair  opportunity  to  consider  this  new  rendition  of  Petitioner’s   ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  claim.    Thus,  Petitioner’s  claim  that  counsel’s  failure   to  discover  and  present  evidence  of  Petitioner’s  drug  and  alcohol  use  amounted  to   ineffective  assistance  is  unexhausted  and  is  procedurally  barred.    The  remainder  of   Claim  A9  has  been  exhausted  and  is  not  procedurally  barred.       Claim  A10:    Petitioner  was  Deprived  of  his  Right  to  a  Fair  Trial  by  an   Impartial  Jury  by  Defense  Counsel’s  Failure  to  Protect  his  Constitutional   Rights  During  the  Trial     Within  this  claim,  the  Petition  alleges  a  laundry  list-­‐-­‐twenty-­‐four  separate   instances-­‐-­‐of  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  at  trial.    Respondent  asserts  that  none   of  these  specific  instances  are  exhausted  because  they  were  not  fully  presented  for   review  at  the  Rule  32  stage—some  because  they  were  not  raised  in  the  either  the   Amended  Rule  32  Petition  or  on  appeal  and  others  because  they  were  not  raised  on   appeal.    Petitioner  insists  that  the  issues  were  raised  and  exhausted  and  points  to   his  Rule  32  appellate  brief.    But,  once  again,  Petitioner  attempts  to  satisfy  the   exhaustion  requirement  by  pointing  to  general  legal  principles  asserted  in  state   court  along  with  “’makeshift  needles  in  the  haystack  of  the  state  court  record.’”   Kelley,  377  F.3d  at  1345  (quoting  Martens  v.  Shannon,  836  F.2d  715,  717  (1st  Cir.   1988)).         Upon  careful  review  of  the  pleadings,  the  Court  concludes  that  two  of  these   subclaims  have  been  exhausted  and  are,  therefore,  preserved  for  review.    Petitioner   did  argue  in  his  Rule  32  appeal  that  “[d]efense  counsel  failed  to  timely  interject   appropriate  objections  at  trial,  thereby  resulting  in  prejudicial  and  improper   statements  by  the  prosecution  to  the  jury.”  (R.  Vol.  22  Tab  R-­‐55  at  21.)    Although  no     20   supporting  evidence  was  discussed,  the  brief  noted  that  “[t]hese  omissions  were   described  in  the  Rule  32  Petition  at  v1  pp.  34-­‐38.”    In  other  words,  the  appellate   brief  incorporated  by  specific  reference  certain  claims  asserted  in  the  Amended  Rule   32  Petition.    However,  only  three  guilt-­‐phase  omissions  by  counsel  were  asserted  in   the  cited  pages  of  the  Amended  Rule  32  Petition,  and  only  two  of  those  are   reasserted  in  the  federal  petition.    The  first  is  counsel’s  failure  to  object  to  the  State’s   misstatement  of  the  law,  implying  that  the  burden  of  proof  was  on  the  Defendant  by   stating  that  intent  was  inferred.    (R.  Vol.  8  Tab  R-­‐48  at  35.)    This  claim  is  equivalent   to  the  subclaim  asserted  in  paragraph  95  of  the  federal  petition,  which  alleges  that   counsel  rendered  ineffective  assistance  by  “fail[ing]  to  object  to  the  State’s   mischaracterization  of.  .  .  the  law  regarding  intent.”14    (Pet.  ¶  95.)    The  second   omission  incorporated  by  reference  into  the  Rule  32  appellate  brief  was  counsel’s   failure  to  object  to  Biblical  quotations  made  by  the  prosecutor.    This  claim  is  nearly   identical  to  paragraph  102  of  the  federal  petition  which  alleges  that  “[d]efense   counsel  failed  to  object  to  the  State’s  citation  to  biblical  authority  or  religious  duty.”     (Pet.  ¶  102.)       The  Court  finds  that  the  two  subclaims  cited  above,  found  in  paragraphs  95   and  102  of  the  federal  petition,  are  exhausted  and  are  not  procedurally  barred.    The   remaining  guilt-­‐phase  subclaims  set  forth  in  section  A10  have  not  been  exhausted   and  are,  therefore,  procedurally  barred.                                                                                                                   14  This  paragraph  also  asserts  that  counsel  “failed  to  object  to  the  State’s   mischaracterization  of  [Petitioner’s]  testimony.”    (Id.)    That  aspect  of  this  subclaim   was  not  a  part  of  the  state  record  cited  and  is,  therefore,  not  exhausted  and  is   procedurally  barred.     21     CLAIM  A13:    Petitioner  was  Deprived  of  his  Right  to  a  Fair  Trial  by  an   Impartial  Jury  by  the  Cumulative  Effect  of  Defense  Counsel’s  Errors     Petitioner  sets  forth  two  alternative  responses  to  Respondent’s  argument   that  this  claim  is  unexhausted.    First,  Petitioner  argues  that  an  assertion  of   cumulative  error  is  a  legal  argument,  not  an  independent  claim,15  and  therefore   exhaustion  is  not  required.    Numerous  courts  have  rejected  this  argument.    See,  e.g.,   Wooten  v.  Kirkland,  540  F.3d  1019,  1025  (9th  Cir.  2008)  (raising  a  number  of  errors   “does  not  automatically  require  the  court  to  consider  whether  the  cumulative  effect   of  the  alleged  errors  prejudiced  the  petitioner”);  Harris  v.  Estelle,  487  F.2d  1293,   1298  (5th  Cir.  1974)  (dismissing,  for  failure  to  exhaust,  claim  that  cumulative  effect   of  cumulative  effect  of  all  constitutional  errors  denied  him  due  process);  accord   Greene  v.  Cooper,  2013  WL  1567444,  *8  n.8  (W.D.  La.  Feb.  20,  2013)  (applying   exhaustion  requirement  to  aggregate  effect  of  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel   claim);  Moore  v.  Quarterman,  526  F.Supp.2d  654,  710  (W.D.  Tex.  2007)  (applying   exhaustion  requirement  to  ineffective  assistance/cumulative  errors  claim);  cf.   McCormick  v.  Six,  306  Fed.Appx.  424  (10th  Cir.  2009)  (denying  COA  and  discerning   no  error  in  trial  court’s  finding  that  petitioner  failed  to  exhaust  claim  of  cumulative   error  of  trial  counsel  claim).    This  Court,  too,  finds  that  an  ineffective  assistance   claim  based  on  cumulative  error  is  a  separate  claim  that  must  be  presented  to  the   state  court  for  one  full  round  of  review.     Petitioner  argues,  alternatively,  that  he  did  present  this  claim  to  the  state   court  for  review  and  points  to  the  following  statement  in  his  Rule  32  appellate  brief:                                                                                                                   15  This  argument  begs  the  question:    If  it  is  not  a  separate  claim,  why  was  it   presented  as  one  in  the  Petition?     22   When  the  record  in  this  case  is  viewed  in  its  entirety  –  from  the  pre-­‐ trial  transfer  and  youthful  offender  hearings,  through  the  trial,  and   finally  the  penalty  phase  –  the  conclusion  is  in  escapable:    counsel’s   abysmal  representation  of  Gary  Hart  denied  him  of  his  constitutional   right  to  counsel  during  trial.     (R.  Vol.  22  Tab  R-­‐55  at  6.)    Even  assuming  the  inclusion  of  that  argument  could  be   considered  an  ineffective  assistance  claim  based  on  cumulative  errors,16  it  does  not   satisfy  the  exhaustion  requirement.      The  issue  was  not  raised  in  the  Amended  Rule   32  petition  and,  therefore,  was  not  preserved  for  state  appellate  review.    Moody  v.   State,  95  So.  3d  827,  854  (Ala.  Crim.  App.  2011)  (Rule  32  argument  not  raised  in   state  circuit  court  “not  properly  before  [appellate  court]  for  review”).    In  conclusion,   Petitioner’s  ineffective  assistance  claim  based  on  the  cumulative  effect  of  defense   counsel’s  errors  is  a  claim,  not  merely  a  legal  argument.    As  such,  it  is  procedurally   barred  because  Petitioner  failed  to  exhaust  this  claim  in  state  court.     Claim  B:    Mr.  Hart  Was  Improperly  Denied  Treatment  as  a  Youthful   Offender     Respondent  argues  that  this  claim  is  partially  defaulted.  Specifically,   Respondent  argues  that  Petitioner  failed  to  exhaust  that  portion  of  the  claim  found   in  paragraph  128,  which  states:     The  admission  of  prejudicial  hearsay  testimony  at  [the   Youthful  Offender]  hearing  unfairly  deprived  [Petitioner]  [of]  a   meaningful  opportunity  to  avail  himself  of  Alabama’s  youthful   offender  laws  and  violated  [his]  Constitutional  rights  to  confrontation   and  to  avoid  self-­‐incrimination.      The  trial  court  improperly  denied   [Petitioner’s]  challenge  to  the  propriety  of  the  court’s  use  of  two   pieces  of  unreliable  hearsay  testimony  contained  in  Gary’s  youthful   offender  report  admitted  at  his  youthful  offender  hearing.    [T]his                                                                                                                   16  Whether  it  was  transparently  presented  to  the  state  appellate  court  as  a  separate   claim  is  arguable.    The  state  court  did  not  interpret  it  as  such.    Moreover,  the   statement  reads  more  like  a  dramatic  introductory  paragraph  rather  than  a  separate   ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  claim.       23   report  included  the  double  hearsay  statement  of  Dr.  Catlin,  Gary’s   former  school  principal…    Dr.  Catlin  expressly  testified  at  the  Rule  32   hearing  that  he  had  no  recollection  of  [this  statement]  and  that  [the   statement]  was  inconsistent  with  his  opinion  of  [Petitioner].     (Pet.,  Doc.  1,  ¶  128.)    Petitioner  argues  that  this  claim  was  raised  on  direct  appeal,   before  both  the  Alabama  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals  and  the  Alabama  Supreme  Court   and  cites  to  portions  of  briefs  submitted  to  each  court.    However,  the  cited  portions   of  these  briefs  cited  do  not  support  Petitioner’s  claim.    Neither  mentions  hearsay   testimony  introduced  at  the  Youthful  Offender  hearing.    Both  appellate  briefs  do   make  an  argument  regarding  hearsay  in  the  Youthful  Offender  report,  but  the   evidence  cited  as  hearsay  is  not  the  same  evidence  that  Petitioner  relies  on  here.    On   appeal,  Petitioner  argued  that  the  psychological  evaluation  appended  to  the  report   amounted  to  inadmissible  hearsay.  (R.  Vol.  5  Tab  R-­‐32  at  63-­‐65;  Vol.  6  Tab  R-­‐32  at   98.)    Here,  Petitioner  argues  that  the  statement  of  his  former  high  school  principal   amounted  to  hearsay.    The  legal  argument  may  be  the  same,  but  the  factual  basis   clearly  is  not.    Consequently,  Petitioner  has  failed  to  exhaust  the  portion  of  Claim  B   found  in  paragraph  128,  and  that  claim  is  procedurally  defaulted.    The  remainder  of   Claim  B  is  ripe  for  review  on  the  merits.     Claim  F:    Prosecutorial  Misconduct  Deprived  Petitioner  of  a  Fair  Trial  in   Violation  of  the  United  States  Constitution     Respondent  initially  argued  that  this  claim  was  partially  defaulted  in  that   three  of  the  factual  or  legal  bases  asserted  in  support  of  this  claim—found  in   paragraphs  158,  163  &  167-­‐-­‐have  not  been  exhausted  because  they  were  not  raised   on  direct  appeal.    However,  Respondent  subsequently  abandoned  some  of  those   arguments  after  Petitioner  cited  portions  of  the  record  that  contradicted     24   Respondent’s  assertions.    First,  Petitioner’s  prosecutorial  misconduct  claim  in   paragraph  158  of  the  Petition-­‐-­‐  that  he  was  deprived  of  a  fair  trial  because  “[t]he   State  used  its  peremptory  challenges  in  a  discriminatory  manner,  depriving  [Hart]   of  his  right  to  be  tried  by  a  jury  of  his  peers”-­‐-­‐  was  raised  on  direct  appeal  as  a   prosecutorial  misconduct  claim.  (R.  Vol.  5,  Tab  R-­‐32  at  83.)    Respondent  now  admits   as  much.17      Similarly,  Respondent  concedes  that  the  prosecutorial  misconduct  claim   asserted  in  paragraph  163—that  the  State  participated  in  the  investigation—was   also  raised  on  direct  appeal.         Finally,  Respondent  argues  that  the  claim  in  paragraph  167—that  “[t]he   State’s  repeated  remarks  regarding  the  age  of  the  victim  were  an  attempt  to   prejudice  the  jury  and  ‘infect  the  trial  with  unfairness’”-­‐-­‐has  not  been  exhausted   because  it  was  not  raised  in  an  identical  manner  in  state  court.    When  a  claim  is   presented  in  such  a  way  that  “a  reasonable  reader  would  have  understood”  the   substance  of  that  claim,  the  exhaustion  requirement  is  satisfied.    Williams  v.  Allen,   542  F.3d  1326,  1346  (11th  Cir.  2008).      On  direct  appeal,  Petitioner  cited  the   prosecutor’s  repeated  remarks  about  the  age  of  the  victim  as  evidence  of   prosecutorial  misconduct  in  violation  of  the  United  States  Constitution.    (R.  Vol.  5   Tab  R-­‐32  at  85;  Vol.  6,  R-­‐38  at  120.)    That  was  more  than  sufficient  to  raise  the   substance  of  the  claim.                                                                                                                   17  However,  in  his  reply  brief,  Respondent  argues  that  the  citation  to  Trevino  v.  Texas,   503  U.S.  562  (1992)  should  be  disregarded  because  it  was  not  cited  in  the  direct   appeal.    A  case  citation,  standing  alone,  is  not  a  claim.    The  claim  itself—that  the  use   of  peremptory  challenges  amounted  to  prosecutorial  misconduct  in  violation  of  the   United  States  Constitution—was  raised  on  direct  appeal.     25     Claim  J:    The  Trial  Court’s  Failure  to  Properly  Instruct  the  Jury  on  Lesser   Included  Offenses  at  the  Guilt/Innocent  Phase  Violated  the  Sixth,  Eight   and  Fourteenth  Amendments  of  the  United  States  Constitution     Initially,  Respondent  argued  that  five  subclaims  were  partially  defaulted,  but   that  number  has  been  reduced  to  two.    The  first,  found  in  paragraph  215,  is  that  the   trail  court’s  “failure  to  explain  the  difference  between  felony  murder  and  a  capital   offense  with  regard  to  the  issue  of  intent”  resulted  in  an  ambiguous  instruction.    (Pet.   ¶  215.)  This  ambiguous  instruction,  according  to  the  Petition,  violated  Petitioner’s   due  process  rights  because  there  was  a  reasonable  likelihood  that  the  jury  applied   the  challenged  instruction  in  a  way  the  violates  the  Constitution.    (Id.)    The  second,   found  in  paragraph  223,  is  that  the  trial  court’s  failure  to  instruct  the  jury  on   reckless  manslaughter  violated  Petitioner’s  constitutional  rights.    (Id.  ¶  223.)     While  the  facts  underlying  both  claims  were  set  out  in  Petitioner’s  direct   appeal,  neither  was  asserted  as  a  federal  constitutional  violation  and  no  such  claims   reasonably  could  be  gleaned  from  the  state  court  record.    Petitioner’s  direct  appeal   brief  to  the  Alabama  Supreme  Court  cited  only  state  law  in  support  of  the  claim  that   Petitioner  was  entitled  to  a  reckless  manslaughter  instruction.    (R.  Vol.  6  Tab  R-­‐38  at   97-­‐98.)    With  respect  to  the  felony  murder/capital  murder  charges  and  the  issue  of   intent,  Petitioner  argued  on  direct  appeal  that  the  felony  murder  charge  was  infirm   because  it  did  not  “explicitly  explain”  that  the  difference  between  felony  murder  and   capital  murder  was  intent.    That  argument  was  contained  in  a  footnote  to  an   argument  that  the  trial  court  should  have  given  a  lesser  included  instruction  on   reckless  murder.  Neither  an  objection  to  jury  instructions  on  state  law  ground  nor  a   potential  claim  hidden  in  a  footnote  and  citing  no  law  could  have  put  the  state  court     26   on  notice  that  Petitioner  was  attempting  to  raise  a  federal  constitutional  violation.   As  the  Eleventh  Circuit  has  held  that  “[t]he  exhaustion  doctrine  requires  a  habeas   applicant  to  do  more  than  scatter  some  makeshift  needles  in  the  haystack  of  the   state  court  record.”    McNair  v.  Campbell,  416  F.3d  1291,  1303  (11th  Cir.  2005).    The   subclaims  found  in  paragraphs  215  and  223  are  procedurally  defaulted;  the   remaining  subclaims  are  ripe  for  review.         Claim  K:    Petitioner  Was  Denied  a  Fair  Trial  By  an  Impartial  Jury  Due  to   Constitutional  Violations  During  Voir  Dire   The  Petition  asserts  several  subclaims  under  this  heading.    Respondent   argues  that  some  of  these  subclaims  are,  in  part,  procedurally  defaulted  because   those  claims  were  not  exhausted.    Each  of  these  is  discussed  below.     Subclaim  1:    Improper  and  Prejudicial  Use  of  Peremptory  Challenges     Respondent  asserts  that  the  following  two  sentences  of  one  paragraph  of  this   subclaim  is  procedurally  barred:     Without  an  adequate  voir  dire,  the  trial  court’s  responsibility  to   remove  prospective  jurors  who  will  not  be  able  to  impartially  follow   instructions  and  evaluate  evidence  cannot  be  fulfilled.    See  Conners  v.   United  States,  158  U.S.  408,  413  (1895).    Yet,  despite  these  prevailing   Constitutional  interpretations,  Gary  was  still  denied  the  opportunity   to  be  tried  in  front  of  an  impartial  jury.       (Pet.  ¶  224.)  18    This  is  a  broad  statement,  and  the  specific  factual  basis  for  the  claim   is  not  clear.    However,  the  direct  appeal  did  raise  a  constitutional  challenge  based  on   restrictions  placed  on  voir  dire  by  the  trial  judge.    (R.  Vol.  5  Tab  R-­‐32  at  76-­‐77;  Vol.  6                                                                                                                   18  Respondent  initially  argued  that  the  entire  subclaim  was  procedurally  barred  but   subsequently  limited  his  argument  to  the  above-­‐quoted  sentences.     27   Tab  R-­‐38  at  11-­‐112.)    To  the  extent  this  subclaim  encompasses  that  challenge,  it  has   been  exhausted  and,  therefore,  is  not  procedurally  barred.     Subclaim  3:  State’s  Proffered  Race  Neutral  Explanations  for  Strikes     In  order  to  understand  the  exhaustion  issue  with  respect  to  this  claim,  a  brief   review  of  Batson  v.  Kentucky,  476  U.S.  79  (1986),  is  necessary.    Batson  set  forth  the   framework  for  determining  whether  a  prosecutor’s  exercise  of  a  peremptory   challenge  violates  the  Equal  Protection  Clause.      This  is  a  three-­‐step  process.    First,   the  defendant  bears  the  burden  of  establishing  a  prima  facie  case  of  purposeful   discrimination.    Id.  at  94.  Next,  the  burden  shifts  to  the  state  to  proffer  a  race  neutral   explanation  for  his  strikes.    Id.  at  97.      Finally,  the  court  must  determine  whether  the   defendant  has  met  his  burden  of  proving  purposeful  discrimination.    Id.  at  98.    The   second  step  of  the  inquiry  requires  the  trial  court  to  determine  only  whether  the   explanation  offered  is,  on  its  face,  racially  neutral.    Hightower  v.  Terry,  459  F.3d  1066,   1073  (11th  Cir.  2006).    In  contrast,  the  final  step  (step  three)  involves  evaluating  the   “the  plausibility  of  that  reason  in  light  of  all  evidence  bearing  on  it.”  Id.           Respondent  contends  that  Petitioner’s  Batson  argument  in  the  last  half  of   paragraph  233  has  not  been  exhausted.    The  beginning  of  that  paragraph  asserts   that  there  is  no  evidence  to  support  the  state’s  assertion  that  it  struck  two   prospective  jurors—Haygood  and  Thompson—“because  of  the  former’s  demeanor   and  the  latter’s  unemployment.”    There  is  no  dispute  that  this  portion  of  the  claim  is   exhausted;  it  was  asserted  on  direct  appeal  as  a  Batson  step  three  claim.      The  issue   arises  with  the  second  half  of  paragraph  233,  which  turn  this  into  a  different  claim-­‐-­‐ a  Batson  step  two  claim.    It  does  so  by  citing  cites  United  States  v.  Horsley,  864  F.2d     28   1543,  1546  (11th  Cir.  1989),  for  the  proposition  that  vague  general  assertions  do  not   suffice  as  race  neutral  explanations  to  rebut  a  defendant’s  prima  facie  case  of   discrimination.    In  state  court,  Petitioner  argued  only  that  the  reasons  for  striking   Haygood  and  Thompson  amounted  to  a  Batson  step  three  claim  (because  the   reasons  were  not  plausible)  and  never  asserted  a  Batson  step  two  claim  (that  the   reasons  were  insufficient  to  rebut  a  prima  facie  case)  based  on  these  facts.   Consequently,  the  Court  finds  that  the  Batson  step  two  claim  asserted  in  the  last  two   sentences  of  paragraph  233  has  not  been  exhausted  and  is  procedurally  defaulted.     In  paragraphs  235  through  238  (also  part  of  subclaim  3),  Petitioner  asserts   constitutional  claims  arising  from  the  alleged  underrepresentation  of  African-­‐ Americans  and  women  on  the  jury  venire.    Petitioner  does  not  contest  Respondent’s   assertion  that  these  claims  were  not  presented  to  the  state  court  for  review.    The   claims  asserted  in  these  paragraphs  are  procedurally  barred  for  failure  to  exhaust.         Subclaim  4:    Improper  &  Prejudicial  Voir  Dire/Right  to  Trial  by  Impartial   Jury   This  claim  consists  of  one  sentence  (paragraph  240).    Petitioner  does  not   contest  Respondent’s  assertion  that  this  claim  was  not  presented  to  the  state  court   for  review.    It  is,  therefore,  procedurally  barred.     Subclaim  5:    Exclusion  of  Prospective  Jurors  Based  on  Capital  Punishment   Beliefs     In  this  subclaim,  Petitioner  asserts  that  the  prosecution  improperly   questioned  jurors  regarding  their  views  on  capital  punishment,  then  used  the   answers  to  exclude  prospective  jurors  for  cause.    Respondent  argues  that  Petitioner   failed  to  exhaust  a  portion  of  this  subclaim  set  forth  in  paragraphs  241-­‐43.    Contrary     29   to  Respondent’s  argument,  the  substance  of  these  paragraphs  was  raised  on  direct   appeal.19    (Vol.  6,  R.  38  at  112-­‐15;  Vol.  5,  R.  32  at  78-­‐79.)    The  challenged  portions  of   this  subclaim  are  not  procedurally  defaulted.     Claim  L:    Sufficiency  of  the  Evidence     Respondent  asserts  that  three  portions  of  this  claim  are  procedurally  barred   because  “[t]he  factual  and  legal  averments  contained  in  paragraphs  254  (third   Sentence),  257  (second  sentence),  and  258-­‐59  (to  the  extent  that  Hart  argues   anything  other  than  because  the  instructions  violated  Cage  v.  Louisiana,  498  U.S.  39   (1990),  it  violated  Winship)  were  not  presented  to  the  state  courts.  .  .  on  direct   appeal.”    (Resp’t’s  Br.  22,  Doc.  28.)        To  be  clear,  paragraphs  258-­‐59  have  been   exhausted  and  are  not  procedurally  barred.20    The  third  sentence  of  paragraph  254   is  not  procedurally  barred  because  it  was  asserted  verbatim  on  direct  appeal.21     Finally,  the  substance  of  the  claim  asserted  in  the  second  sentence  of  paragraph  257   is  merely  a  more  specific  description  of  the  shortcomings  of  the  trial  court’s   instruction  on  the  element  of  intent.    That  claim  was  presented  to  the  state  court  on                                                                                                                   19  Respondent’s  primary  objection  is  that  Petitioner  did  not  rely  on  Morgan  v.  Illinois,   504  U.S.  719  (1992),  in  his  direct  appeal.      This  omission  is  quite  understandable   since  Morgan  was  decided  while  this  case  was  on  direct  appeal  and  after  after  the   briefs  was  filed.       20  If  Petitioner  attempts  to  argue  the  assertions  made  in  these  paragraphs  to   support  a  claim  that  has  not  been  exhausted,  then  Respondent  may  reassert  the   exhaustion/procedural  bar  defense  as  to  this  claim.   21  Confusion  has  arisen  because  Respondent  identified  the  alleged  unexhausted   claim  as  “the  third  sentence”  of  paragraph  254  without  any  reference  to  the   substance  of  the  sentence.    Petitioner  responded  by  quoting  the  third  sentence  of   paragraph  254  and  pointing  to  the  portions  of  the  direct  appeal  containing  that   sentence.    In  his  reply  brief,  Respondent  asserts  that  the  Petitioner  has  actually   quoted  the  second  sentence  of  paragraph  254.    It  is  Respondent  who  is  mistaken.         30   direct  appeal  and  is,  therefore,  exhausted.    (R.  Vol.  5  Tab  R-­‐32  at  107;  R.  Vol.  6  Tab   R-­‐28  at  142.)     Claim  N:    The  State  Suppressed  Evidence  in  Violation  of  Brady  v.   Maryland     Petitioner  claims  that  the  state  violated  Brady  v.  Maryland  by  failing  to   disclose  a  post-­‐arrest  statement  made  by  Petitioner  on  the  night  of  the  shooting.    At   the  Rule  32  hearing,  Major  Lester  Hargrove  of  the  Mobile  Police  Department   testified  that  he  was  in  charge  of  the  criminal  investigation.    On  the  night  Petitioner   was  arrested,  Hargrove  went  into  the  holding  room  at  police  headquarters  to  take   Petitioner  a  pair  of  shoes  that  he  had  requested.    Hargrove’s  testimony  regarding  his   interaction  with  Petitioner  was  as  follows:     MR.  JASKOWIAK:    Did  Gary  tell  you  anything  about  the  crime  as   far  as  his  intent  to  shoot  or  pull  the  trigger  on  the  weapon?       MAJOR  HARGROVE:    Only  that:    I  didn’t  mean  to  shoot  that  guy.     That’s  all  he  said.     (R.  Vol.  13  at  187.)     Respondent  argues  that  this  claim  is  procedurally  barred  because  it  was  not   raised  on  direct  appeal  or  in  the  Rule  32  petition.    Further,  Respondent  points  out   that  the  claim  was  raised  in  the  Rule  32  appeal  but  was  denied  based  on  procedural   default.         The  Alabama  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals  addressed  the  Brady  claim  as   follows:     The  appellant  contends  that  the  State’s  suppression  of   favorable  and  material  evidence,  in  violation  of  Brady  v.  Maryland,  373   U.S.  83  (1963),  violated  his  federal  and  state  constitutionals  rights.    He   argues  that  the  State  suppressed  evidence  of  his  statement  to  a  police     31   officer  on  the  night  of  the  murder  acknowledging  that  he  did  not   intend  to  kill  the  victim.     This  argument,  however,  has  been  raised  for  the  first  time  on   appellate  review.    Because  the  argument  was  never  before  the  trial   court,  it  is  procedurally  precluded  from  appellate  review.    McNair  v.   State,  supra;  Thompson  v.  State,  supra.     V.  22,  R.  59  at  13.         The  state  appellate  court’s  ruling  on  procedural  default  is  conclusive.  22   “[F]ederal  habeas  corpus  principles  [are]  designed  to  prevent  federal  courts  from   interfering  with  a  State's  application  of  its  own  firmly  established,  consistently   followed,  constitutionally  proper  procedural  rules.  .  .  .  Those  principles  have  long   made  clear  that  a  conviction  that  rests  upon  a  defendant's  state  law  ‘procedural   default’  (for  example,  the  defendant's  failure  to  raise  a  claim  of  error  at  the  time  or   in  the  place  that  state  law  requires),  normally  rests  upon  ‘an  independent  and   adequate  state  ground.’”    Trevino  v.  Thaler,  ___  U.S.  ___133  S.  Ct.  1911,  1917,  185  L.  Ed.   2d  1044  (2013).     Petitioner  alternatively  argues  that  he  can  overcome  the  procedural  default   by  demonstrating  cause  for  and  prejudice  from  his  failure  to  raise  the  Brady   violation  in  the  Rule  32  petition.    He  contends  that  “the  ‘cause’  of  not  including  the   claim  in  his  original  petition  was  the  State’s  illegal  withholding  of  evidence”  and  that   “[t]he  prejudice.  .  .,  the  absence  of  [a]  Brady  claim  is  obvious.”    (Pet’r’s  Br.  at  37  n.  6,   Doc.  37.)    The  Court  need  not  consider  whether  Petitioner  has  demonstrated  cause                                                                                                                   22  In  disagreement  with  the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals,  Petitioner  argues  that  the   Brady  claim  was  added  to  the  Rule  32  petition  after  the  hearing  and  has  attached  a   copy  of  a  letter  mailed  to  the  trial  court  along  with  a  copy  of  the  proposed   amendment  adding  the  Brady  claim.  (Exs.  A  &  B  to  Pet’r’s  Br.,  Doc.  37.)    Apparently,   the  proposed  amendment  did  not  become  part  of  the  record.  In  any  event,   Petitioner’s  argument  is  a  challenge  to  the  state  law’s  procedural  default  ruling,  a   ruling  this  Court  cannot  disturb.    See  Trevino,  133  S.Ct  at  1917.     32   because  he  clearly  cannot  prove  that  he  was  prejudiced  by  the  state’s  failure  to   disclose  the  statement.    A  habeas  petitioner  establishes  prejudice  for  failing  to  raise   a  defaulted  Brady  claim  by  convincing  the  court  “that  there  is  a  ‘reasonable   probability’  that  the  result  of  the  trial  would  have  been  different  if  the  suppressed   [evidence]  had  been  disclosed  to  the  defense.”    Crawford  v.  Head,  311  F.3d  1288,   1328  (11th  Cir.  2002).     There  is  no  reasonable  probability  of  a  different  result  here  because  the   undisclosed  statement  would  not  have  been  admissible  at  trial.    “The  law  is  well   settled  in  [Alabama]  that  [the]  self-­‐serving  declarations  of  an  accused,  made  before   or  after  the  offense  are  not  admissible  for  him  unless  they  are  part  of  the  res  gestae.”     Harrell  v.  State,  470  So.  2d  1303,  1306  (Ala.  Crim.  App.  1984).      Petitioner’s   statement  would  not  qualify  as  part  of  the  res  gestae,  which  is  “broadly  [  ]defined  as   matter  incidental  to  the  main  fact  and  explanatory  thereof,  and  includes  acts  and   words  which  are  so  closely  connected  therewith  as  to  constitute  a  part  of  the   transaction.”    Moore  v.  State,  697  So.2d  800,  804.  (Ala.  Crim.  App.  1996)  (quoting  R.   Williams,  Williams  Alabama  Evidence  §  139  (1967)(footnotes  omitted)).   Res  gestae  statements  are  admissible  as  an  exception  to  the  hearsay  rule  and  are   considered  reliable  because  they  arise  from  “a  situation  which  presents  a  startling   or  unusual  occurrence  sufficient  to  produce  a  spontaneous  and  instinctive   reaction  .  .  .  made  under  such  circumstances  as  to  show  lack  of  forethought  or   deliberate  design  in  the  formulation  of  their  content.”    Id.    An  accused’s  post-­‐arrest   exculpatory  statement  does  not  fall  within  this  exception,  as  demonstrated  by  a   number  of  Alabama  cases.    See,  e.g.,  Kennedy  v.  State,  469  So.  2d  1333  (Ala.  Crim.  App.     33   1985)  (defendant’s  self-­‐serving  statement  to  investigator  after  arrest  not   admissible);  Miller  v.  State,  441  So.2d  1038  (Ala.  Crim  App.  1983)  (same).    Indeed,   the  Alabama  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals  found  a  statement  to  be  inadmissible  under   nearly  identical  circumstances.    In  Harrell  the  defendant  was  charged  with  capital   murder  but  claimed  that  the  shooting  was  not  intentional.    The  trial  court  refused  to   allow  into  evidence  the  defendant’s  post-­‐arrest  statement  that  the  gun  accidentally   discharged.    The  appellate  court  upheld  the  trial  court’s  ruling,  noting  the  statement   “fit  the  classic  definition  of  hearsay.”    Harrell,  470  So.2d  at  1306.    This  claim  is   procedurally  defaulted,  and  Petitioner  cannot  establish  prejudice  to  overcome  the   procedural  default.   Conclusion     In  summary,  the  penalty  phase  claims  as  stated  in  the  original  petition  are   moot  due  to  the  resentencing.    Some  of  Petitioner’s  guilt  phase  claims  are   procedurally  defaulted  and,  therefore,  due  to  be  dismissed.         1. The  following  claims  are  dismissed  in  their  entirety:   • A2-­‐-­‐Ineffective  assistance  of  counsel/pretrial  transfer   hearing/financial  limitations   • A4-­‐-­‐Ineffective  assistance  of  counsel/youthful  offender   hearing/financial  limitations   • A6-­‐-­‐Ineffective  assistance  of  counsel/insufficient  resources  to  protect   petitioner  from  pretrial  publicity;     • A13-­‐-­‐Ineffective  assistance  of  counsel/cumulative  errors   • K4-­‐-­‐Improper  and  prejudicial  voir  dire/right  to  trial  by  impartial  jury   • N-­‐-­‐Brady  violation   2. The  following  claims  are  dismissed  in  part:   • A7-­‐-­‐Paragraphs  74  &  76   • A9—Paragraph  85   • A10—Paragraphs  90-­‐94,  96-­‐101,  and  103-­‐113   • B—Paragraph  128   • J—Paragraphs  215  &  223     34   •       K3—Paragraphs  233  (last  two  sentences)  &  235-­‐38   3. The  following  claims  remain  to  be  resolved  on  the  merits:     • A5   • A7—Paragraphs  70-­‐73,  75-­‐78   • A9—Paragraphs  86-­‐89   • A10—Paragraphs  95  &  102   • B—Paragraphs  129-­‐131   • D1   • E   • F   • J—Paragraphs  213-­‐14  and  216-­‐22   • K1   • K2   • K3-­‐-­‐Paragraphs  230-­‐32,  233  (first  two  sentences)  234  &  239   • K5   • K6   • L1-­‐3   Finally,  the  Court  recognizes  that  the  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in   Montgomery  v.  Louisiana,  141  So.3d  264,  cert.  granted  (U.S.  March  20,  2015)  (No.  14-­‐ 280)  regarding  the  retroactive  application  of  Miller  v.  Alabama,  ____  U.S.  ____,  132  S.   Ct.  2455,  2469  (2012),  could  have  an  impact  on  this  petition  for  habeas  relief.     Therefore,  Stage  2  briefing  will  not  commence  until  that  decision  is  rendered.     Within  30  days  after  the  Supreme  Court  issues  its  opinion  in  Montgomery,  the   parties  shall  submit  a  joint  proposed  briefing  schedule  for  resolving  the  remaining   claims,  including,  if  applicable,  any  claims  to  be  raised  based  on  Miller  and   Montgomery.     DONE  and  ORDERED  this  the  4th  day  of  November,  2015.                               s/Charles  R.  Butler,  Jr.       Senior  United  States  District  Judge   35  

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.

Why Is My Information Online?