The Denny Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Drops & Props, Inc.
Order GRANTING 107 request for a reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses filed by The Denny Manufacturing Co., Inc.. Denny is awarded a reasonable attorneys' fee in the total amount of $34,934.50, and costs andexpenses in the amount of $3,472.14, for a total award of $38,406.64. Signed by Judge Kristi K. DuBose on 6/1/2011. copies to parties. (sdb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
THE DENNY MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC., an Alabama
DROPS & PROPS, INC., an Illinois
Corporation d/b/a BACKDROP OUTLET
a/k/a BACKDROPOUTLET.COM, and
JAY GUPTA, an individual,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-0214-KD-M
This action is before the Court on the brief in support of attorneys’ fees filed by plaintiff The
Denny Manufacturing Company, Inc., (Denny) (doc. 107) and defendants Drop & Props, Inc and
Jay Gupta’s response (collectively DP) (doc. 108 ). Upon consideration, and for the reasons set
forth herein, Denny’s request for a reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses is GRANTED and
Denny is awarded a reasonable attorneys’ fee in the total amount of $34,934.50, and costs and
expenses in the amount of $3,472.14, for a total award of $38,406.64.
In 2008, counsel for Denny contacted DP and asked that DP stop using images of many of
Denny’s copyright protected works and works subject to trade name or trademark protection, on
DP’s websites or other social media cites. In general, Denny asserted that DP either offered for sale
its own works or works purchased from third parties which infringed Denny’s copyrights or trade
name protection, or used images of Denny’s works to market DP’s own products. DP stopped some
practices, but not all. Denny filed suit in this Court in April 2009 and the parties negotiated a
On August 2, 2010, a stipulated permanent injunction was entered which enjoined DP from
specific future activity involving all of Denny’s copyright and trademark protected works and
specifically identified twenty (20) individual copyrights of single works and two compilation
copyrights: VAu0-720063 and VAu0-720064 (doc. 84). Specifically, DP was enjoined from
imitating, reproducing, distributing, or making any other infringing use of the works
or any substantially similar likeness to them, or to other works now or hereafter
protected by” certain copyright registration numbers set out in the injunction, “and
any other works now or hereafter protected by any of Denny’s trademarks or
(doc. 84, p. 2-3), and
manufacturing, assembling, producing, distributing, offering for distribution,
circulating, selling, offering for sale, advertising, importing, promoting, or displaying
any backdrop, work of art, digital reproduction or other item bearing any simulation,
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of any of Denny’s registered
copyrights, including but not limited to the works identified in the injunction
(doc. 84, p. 3). DP was also enjoined from “directly or indirectly using the name FauxTex or any
other mark, word, or name similar to FlexTex which is likely to cause confusion, mistake or to
deceive” (doc. 84, p. 3) and from “using images of Denny’s products to advertise or solicit sales of
Backdrop Outlet’s products” (doc. 84, p. 3).
The injunction also required, inter alia, that DP not assist or aid any other business in any of
the enjoined activities and provided that the restrictions applied to all websites, social media, and
online stores. DP was also required to destroy all counterfeit or infringing copies of Denny’s
works, including the DP catalog available on its website and all digital images or CD collections, as
well as all documents and items such as labels and signs, bearing the FauxTex mark. An exception
was made for DP’s necessary business records retention. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce
the injunction. (doc. 84).
Both before and after the injunction was entered, the parties communicated in regard to
compliance with these agreed terms in the Court’s order. Denny’s attorneys contacted DP on many
occasions over several months after Denny’s officers continued to find DP’s use of images of
protected works on DP’s website, downloadable catalog, various electronic media cites, and
magazine advertisements which violated the injunction. Ultimately, Denny filed a motion for
contempt and sanctions alleging that DP was not in compliance with the injunction. Denny sought
enforcement of the injunction, damages in the amount of $1.3 million, and attorneys’ fees and costs
for the motion.
In regard to the copyright protected works, the Court found that DP was not in contempt of
the injunction as to works identified in Exhibit 1-A and 1-B and Exhibit 1-G to the extent the works
from 1-G were in the downloadable catalog, but was in contempt as to certain works identified in
the injunction and certain new works identified in 1-G, which were displayed on the DP website or
other electronic media. The Court found that DP was not in contempt as to the alleged use of
images of Denny’s “Small Retaining Wall & Column Set” prop and “Aladdin’s Valley” backdrop to
market DP’s wall and column prop. The Court found that DP was in contempt of the injunction by
using the trade name FauxTex or FabTex. Denny withdrew its claim as to some works identified in
the motion for contempt.
The Court determined that Denny was due an equitable remedy to compensate it for DP’s
contempt of the injunction and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $10,000.00. The
Court also awarded Denny a reasonable attorneys’ fee and costs for bringing the motion. Denny has
now filed its motion for attorneys’ fee and costs and DP has filed its response.
Reasonable attorneys’ fee
“[I]n a civil contempt proceeding” attorney’s fees “are limited to those reasonably and
necessarily incurred in the attempt to enforce compliance.” Abbott Laboratories v. Unlimited
Beverages, Inc., 218 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) citing Rickard v. Auto Publisher, Inc., 735
F.2d 450, 458 (11th Cir.1984). To assess the reasonableness of an attorneys’ fee request, courts
generally apply the “lodestar” method - multiplying the hours reasonably expended by a reasonable
hourly rate. Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th
Cir.1988); Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 213 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2000) (the lodestar “is the
number of hours (tempered by billing judgment) spent in the legal work on the case, multiplied by a
reasonable market rate in the local area”); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (starting
point for determining a “reasonable” fee is the “number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”).
The party requesting attorney’s fees has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of
both the hourly rate and number of hours expended. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; American Civil
Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir.1999). Also, the court may use its
own “knowledge and expertise” to determine the reasonableness of the requested attorney's fees.
Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994).
As a reasonable and customary attorney’s fee in this District, Denny seeks the following
$350.00 (2010) $375.00 (2011) x 103.0 hours
And paralegal fees:
Denny argues that the following factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway, Exp.,
Inc., 488 F 2d 715, 717-20 (5th Cir. 1974), weigh in favor of awarding the fees requested: the time
and labor required; novelty and difficulty of the questions; skill requisite to perform the legal
In the motion, Sykes’ hours are not separated as to how many hours were charged at
$350.00 or $375.00.
services; customary fee; amount involved and results obtained; experience, reputation and ability of
the attorneys; and awards in similar cases.
Overall, Denny argues that these fees are reasonable because the contempt motion involved
complex and novel legal issues involving both copyright and trademark law applicable to a large
number of protected works as well as the law of civil contempt and damages and required a great
deal of time on the part of Denny’s counsel. Denny also argues that because of this complexity,
representation by counsel with skill, knowledge, and experience in intellectual property law was
required. Denny points out that to prove DP’s violation of the injunction and contempt by
infringing the copyrights and trademark required substantial briefing which rendered the contempt
motion more like a motion for summary judgment. Denny also argues that DP’s continued
violations of the injunction after Denny’s identification of infringing activities and numerous
requests to stop, contributed to the hours expended by counsel.
Reasonable hourly rate
“A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman v.
Housing Authority of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir.1988) (citing Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 n. 11).
Denny relies upon the affidavit of lead counsel Sykes to provide evidence of a reasonable
hourly rate (doc. 107, Exhibit 1). Sykes states that Denny was invoiced the amount of $350.00 per
hour in 2010 and $375.00 per hour in 2011 for his legal services as senior counsel, $220.00 per hour
for the legal services of associate Vines, and $185.00 per hour for the legal services of paralegal
McBride. Denny argues that these hourly rates are reasonable in this case because of the novelty,
complexity, and difficulty of the copyright and trademark law issues involved; the skill requisite to
perform the legal work in these areas of law as well as the skill necessary to prosecute a motion for
contempt; and that there is no local market rate for attorneys with comparable special knowledge,
experience and reputation to that of Sykes, and therefore an hourly rate on a statewide or regional
level should be awarded. Denny also argues that the hourly rates are reasonable because of
McBride’s experience as a paralegal for eighteen years and, although Vines was a two year
associate, he was Order of the Coif, served on the Law Review of his law school, and clerked for an
Eleventh Circuit Judge.
Denny also relies upon the affidavit of David Quittmeyer, an intellectual property attorney
who practices in the Southern District of Alabama and familiar with the customary hourly rates in
this District (doc. 107, Exhibit 2). Quittmeyer testified in support of the reasonableness of the
hourly rates requested under the facts of this intellectual property litigation. Quittmeyer also
testified that although there were intellectual property attorneys practicing in the Southern District,
he had had occasion to refer cases to intellectual property attorneys outside the district.
DP argues that the prevailing market hourly rate in the Southern District of Alabama is the
reasonable hourly rate and that Denny could have retained intellectual property counsel in this
District. DP also argues that in determining a reasonable hourly rate based on the Johnson factors,2
specifically time and labor, novelty and difficulty of the issues, and skill, the Court should recall
that this was a motion for contempt which “could have been handled by any competent litigator”
and that the intellectual property issues presented were not complex or difficult. DP also argues that
Denny has not provided any evidence of rates actually billed and paid in similar trademark and
copyright injunction cases. DP also argues that the best evidence of a reasonable hourly rate is the
Court’s prior decisions and based thereon, DP estimates that a reasonable hourly rate for Sykes is no
DP points out that in Norman, the Eleventh Circuit explained that the lodestar analysis
“presumptively includes all twelve of the [Johnson] factors,  except on rare occasions the factor of
results obtained and, perhaps enhancement for contingency.” Norman, 836 F. 2d at 1298-1299
(doc. 108, n. 1). DP also points out that several of the Johnson factors were neutral.
more than $250.00, for Vines is no more than $150.00 per hour, and for McBride is no more than
$85.00 per hour.
Upon consideration of the affidavits and the relevant factors set forth, the Court finds that
the hourly rates requested for Sykes, Vines, and McBride exceed the hourly rate previously found
reasonable for attorneys of comparable skill and experience in their respective areas of expertise
and comparable years of practice. This Court has previously awarded attorneys with skill and
experience comparable to Sykes, an hourly rate between $225.00 and $250.00 per hour, attorneys
with skill and experience comparable to Vines an hourly rate $150.00 and $175.00, and comparable
paralegals an hourly rate of $75.00 to $100.00.
Therefore, relying upon its own expertise as to the reasonable hourly rates in this market and
review of prior hourly rate awards, the Court finds that a reasonable hourly rate for the work
performed by Sykes is $250.00. Although Sykes has not practiced for as many years as the
attorneys for which this Court has generally awarded $250.00, Sykes has provided evidence of his
skill and expertise in the area of intellectual property law including his appointment as Special
Master and court-appointed expert to U.S. District Judge David Proctor in the Northern District of
Alabama. See Smith v. First Continental Mortgage, Inc., Civil Action No. 09-0381-KD-N
(S.D.Ala., Nov. 1, 2010) (Doc. 93) (awarding $250.00 as a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney
with twenty-two years of experience who was a founding partner in his firm); Dempsey v. Palisades
Collection, Inc., 2010 WL 923473, at *3 (S.D.Ala., Mar. 11, 2010) (slip op) (awarding $250 as a
reasonable hourly rate for an attorney with over nineteen years of experience); Mitchell Co. v.
Campus, slip op., 2009 WL 2567889 at *1 & *17-18 (S.D.Ala. Aug. 18, 2009) (finding $275.00
was a reasonable rate for an attorney with approximately 34 years of experience); Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. v. Williamson, 2011 WL 382799, 4 (S.D.Ala., Jan. 3, 2011) (awarding $225.00 as a
reasonable hourly rate for an attorney with ten years of experience).
The Court further finds that $150.00 is a reasonable hourly rate for the work performed by
Vines. See Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 2010 WL 2496396, 6 (S.D. Ala. June 16, 2010)
(awarding $150.00 per hour for an associate with three years experience); Gulf Coast Asphalt Co.,
L.L.C. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2011 WL 612737, 3 -4 (S.D.Ala., Feb. 11, 2011) (awarding
$145.00 for an associate with two years experience); cf. Williamson, 2011 WL 382799 at 4
(awarding $150 per hour for associates' time when their expertise is “indeterminate.”).
The Court further finds that $75.00 is a reasonable hourly rate for the work performed by
McBride. Zuffa, LLC v. Al-Shaikh, 2011 WL 1539878, 9 (S.D. Ala., April 21, 2011) (DuBose, J.)
(slip op) (awarding $75.00 per hour for paralegal fees); Williamson, 2011 WL 382799 at 5 (same).
Reasonable hours expended
“The next step in the attorney's fee analysis is to determine whether the hours billed were
reasonable.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301. To do so, the Court must exclude hours which are
“excessive, redundant3 or otherwise unnecessary”. Id., citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S. Ct.
at 1939-40. As explained in Norman, the Supreme Court calls upon “fee applicants to exercise
‘billing judgment’” and that “[t]his must necessarily mean that the hours excluded are those that
would be unreasonable to bill to a client and therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of the skill,
reputation or experience of counsel.” Id. (italics in original). However, “[i]n the final analysis,
exclusions for excessive or unnecessary work on given tasks must be left to the discretion of the
district court.” Id.
Denny relies upon the affidavit of lead counsel Sykes and the attached billing statements
showing the hours expended and the work performed (doc. 107, Exhibit 1). In this affidavit, Sykes
The circuit court in Norman stated that “[r]edundant hours generally occur where more
than one attorney represents a client” and “they may all be compensated if they are not
unreasonably doing the same work and are being compensated for the distinct contribution of each
lawyer.” Id. at 1301 -1302.
states that the fee statements begin with the entry of work related to the August 2, 2010 injunction
and that unrelated work entries have been redacted and not counted, or not included. Sykes states
that the remainder of the entries are for work that was reasonably necessary to the contempt motion.
Denny also relies upon Quittmeyer’s affidavit, (doc. 107, Exhibit 2), as support of the
reasonableness of the time expended and work performed under the facts of this intellectual
property litigation and its procedural status. Quittmeyer testified that he reviewed the record,
focused on the work performed for the motion for contempt, and analyzed the relevant factors under
Eleventh Circuit case law, to conclude that the time expended was reasonable.
DP responds that the time spent is unreasonable because the hours were excessive,
redundant, or unnecessary. DP raises several specific objections which the Court will next address.
DP argues that defense counsel’s practice of billing in .25 hour increments (fifteen minutes)
is excessive, that most attorneys bill in .10 hour increments (six minutes), and that this Court should
deduct .25 hour from each of defense counsels’ time entries which remain after the Court
determines which are reasonable.
DP points to this Court’s decision in Mitchell Co., Inc. v. Campus, 2009 WL 2567889
(S.D.Ala., Aug. 18, 2009), wherein the Court reduced many time entries by one-half hour because
counsel billed in one-half hour increments as opposed to six minute increments. Id. at 19. The
Court finds that billing in .25 hour increments is not reasonable in that it occludes the time truly
spent on work which may generally take much less time than fifteen minutes. Accordingly, each
time entry for Vines and Sykes shall be reduced by .25 hours.
DP also argues that “block” or “group” billing makes it difficult to determine reasonable
time expended because it is difficult to determine how much time was spent on each type of work in
the “block” entry. DP argues that the Court should reduce the entries by half or place its own
estimate on the reasonableness of the tasks performed. The Court disagrees that the block billed
entries should be reduced by half, but finds that a ten percent (10%) reduction in counsels’ hours
“adequately addresses the block billing issue”. Ceres Environmental Services, Inc. v. Colonel
McCrary Trucking, LLC, 2011 WL 1883009, 4 (S.D.Ala. May 17, 2011).
Preparation of exhibits
DP objects to the time spent by paralegal McBride for preparing, revising and indexing the
exhibits on basis that the work was clerical work for which no fee should be given. The Court
agrees. In Allen v. McClain EZ Pack of Alabama, Inc., 2005 WL 1926636, *3 (S.D. Ala., Aug. 8,
2005), the court explained that "[P]urely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a
paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them." (citation omitted). The Court gave as examples
such work as “copying documents, updating pleading and correspondence binders, applying Bates
numbers to documents, mailing and telefaxing correspondence” Id. The Court also explained that
Work that may appropriately be performed by paralegals and billed to a client or a
losing party includes “factual investigation, including locating and interviewing
witnesses; assistance with depositions, interrogatories, and document production;
compilation of statistical and financial data; checking legal citations; and drafting
Id. quoting Missouri v. Jenkins ex rel. Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2463 (1989).
Arguably, preparing exhibits for a hearing does include some element of document
production and compilation of data but in this action, the work performed by McBride appears to
have been clerical. Also, her work may have been redundant to that of Vines. Accordingly,
Denny’s claim for paralegal hours is disallowed.
DP also objects to the time spent by Vines for preparation of the exhibits. In general,
deciding which exhibits to use at a hearing and how to use them requires legal analysis. Also, the
time entries indicate that Vines worked on the declarations as well as the exhibits. Therefore, to the
extent that Vines participated in preparing the exhibits and the declarations, his 17.5 hours are found
to be reasonable.
Reasonableness of hours spent in preparing the motion for contempt, the reply, and
preparing for the contempt hearing
DP argues that the hours expended for preparing the brief (74 hours), preparing the reply
(27.75 hours), and in preparation for the hearing (20.5 hours), are unreasonable because of the
nature of the motion as a contempt motion and because the Court advised the parties that only a half
day would be afforded for the hearing. The Court disagrees. Although the hours may appear
unreasonable to DP, the motion for contempt involved more than just the issue of contempt and as
Denny pointed out, was more like a motion for summary judgment and required briefing the Court
in the area of intellectual property law as well as contempt. This objection is overruled.
DP argues that certain time entries by Sykes were either entered before work began on the
contempt motion or are unrelated. The Court reviewed the time entries and finds that they are
reasonable. DP argues that the entries for August 2 and August 10, 2010 were made before the first
mention of filing a contempt motion found in an August 12, 2010 entry. However, the entry for
August 2, begins with “Review injunction as entered by Court. . .”. (doc. 107-1, p. 8). Time spent
reviewing an injunction before moving the Court to enforce it, is not unrelated. The time entry for
August 10, covers email correspondence with another attorney including, among other items,
“compliance with injunction”. (doc. 107-1, p. 9). Time spent discussing compliance before
moving the Court to enforce an injunction, is not unrelated.4
The Court notes that these .75 minute and .25 minute entries contains other items which
arguably may be unrelated to enforcement of the injunction, but that time will be adequately
addressed by the deduction for block-billing and incremental billing as previously discussed.
DP argues that the time entries for August 17 (.25 hours), August 30 (.75 hours), and
September 17, 2010 (4.0 hours) are unrelated to the motion for contempt. However, each entry
specifically mentions either enforcement of the injunction or infringement: “Review and respond to
email from A. Cassity regarding enforcement of copyright in new catalogs . . . .”; “Review
materials and website of Backdrop Outlet in view of terms of injunction; outline issues for motion
to enforce . . . “; and “Review and respond to email from A. Cassity regarding new infringement by
[Back Drop Outlet]. . .”. (doc. 107-1, pp. 9, 15).
Calculation of hours reasonably expended
Less .25 per entry x 55 entries
Less 10% for block billing
Less .25 per entry x 24 entries
Less 10% for block billing
Calculating the lodestar
“The Supreme Court elected the lodestar approach because it produces a more objective
estimate and ought to be a better assurance of more even results.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. In
Norman, the Eleventh Circuit explained that the Supreme Court “has declared that the lodestar as
calculated in [Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983)], presumptively includes
all of the twelve [Johnson] factors . . . except on rare occasions the factor of results obtained and,
perhaps, enhancement for contingency.” Norman, 836 F. 2d at 1299 citing Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3098-3100 (1986).
Multiplying the reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable hours expended, yields the
following lodestar amount:
x 80.33 hours
x 45.68 hours
Adjustments to the lodestar
DP argues that this Court should adjust the lodestar downward because Denny obtained a
“very limited degree of success” and points out that Denny sought $1.3 million but was awarded
only $10,000.00, or as DP calculates “only .00769%” of the damages requested (doc. 108, p. 2021). DP argues that the Court found that DP had made all reasonable efforts in good faith to
comply with the injunction in regard to most of the images of the Denny’s protected works. DP
argues that it was found in contempt as to only one copyright registration and one trademark. DP
also argues that Denny proved no actual damages. DP argues that the fee award should be reduced
by a large percentage even up to 90%.
DP distinguishes the cases cited by Denny and asserts that nearly all involved either conduct
warranting larger money damage awards or involved full litigation rather than a contempt
proceeding. Overall, DP argues that since it consistently and quickly complied with each of
Denny’s requests to remove infringing material from its websites, the large attorneys’ fee was
avoidable. DP also asserts that Denny’s own zealous pursuit of a large damage award caused its
expenditure of a large amount of attorneys’ fees.
The Court finds that no adjustment to the lodestar is appropriate in this action. As to a
downward adjustment, the Court is not persuaded by DP’s argument that comparing the monetary
relief obtained by Denny to the amount of damages claimed - the $10,000 awarded as opposed to
the $1.3 million sought - merits a substantial reduction in fees. In copyright and trademark
litigation, intangibles such as Denny’s goodwill and trade names have significant value which is
difficult to quantify. Additionally, as was addressed in this contempt action, it is difficult for Denny
to establish actual loss as a result of DP’s violation and DP’s evidence of the amount of the sales
made in violation of the injunction is not evidence, of itself, of Denny’s actual loss. Moreover, and
importantly, the motion before the Court was for contempt for violation of an injunction entered by
Denny also seeks costs in the amount of
Copying and printing
Postage and express mail
Denny argues that these costs were reasonably incurred as necessary to the motion for
contempt. DP seeks a reduction by half of the copy and printing costs because the charges are not
clear as to whether they are for the contempt motion or other work for Denny. As to the Westlaw
charges, DP seeks a reduction of $503.25 on basis that it was made after filing the motion for
contempt and reply, and should be disallowed.
Denny’s counsel states by affidavit that Denny “requests its costs, except where redacted”
and invoiced the copying and printing costs “necessary in this case”. (doc. 107-1, p. 6). Previously,
Denny’s counsel explained that entries not related to the motion for contempt would be redacted.
However, stating that the copying and printing costs were “necessary in this case” instead of
necessary for the motion for contempt, does not clarify that the charges are related to this motion.
However, relying upon counsel to have exercised billing judgment, and having seen many of the
copies provided in this action, the copy and printing costs in the amount of $739.30 are allowed.
As to the Westlaw charge, DP appears to argue that because these charges were incurred
after the motion and reply were filed, they were not incurred for the preparation of the motion and
reply. However, the Westlaw charges were incurred before the hearing on the motion for contempt
and appear in an invoice along with time entries for preparation for the hearing. Accordingly, the
disputed Westlaw charge of $503.25 is allowed.
Upon consideration of the foregoing, Denny’s request for attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses
is GRANTED in part as set forth herein, and the following award is made:
x 80.33 hours
x 45.68 hours
Costs and expenses
DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of June, 2011.
s / Kristi K DuBose
KRISTI K. DuBOSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?