Crouch et al v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc.

Filing 273

ORDER denying 205 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as set out. Signed by Judge Kristi K. DuBose on 6/16/2011. (cmj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LARRY DALE CROUCH,
RHONDA MAE CROUCH,
TEDDY LEE HUDSON, and
CAROLYN SUE HUDSON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL MOTORS,
INC.,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-00072-KD-N

ORDER
This action is before the Court on the motion for partial summary judgment filed by
Plaintiffs Larry Dale Crouch, Rhonda Mae Crouch, Teddy Lee Hudson, and Carolyn Sue
Hudson (Plaintiffs) and supporting documents (docs. 205, ), the response and supporting
documents filed by defendant Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc. (TCM) (doc. 217), and
Plaintiffs’ reply (doc. 220). Upon consideration and for the reasons set forth herein, the
motion is DENIED
In general, summary judgment should be granted only “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991)
quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986). Once the
moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party
has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility
determination of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr
GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-159,
90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608-1609 (1970). Overall, the court must “resolve all issues of material fact
in favor of the [non-movant], and then determine the legal question of whether the [movant] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law under that version of the facts.” McDowell v. Brown,
392 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004) citing Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th
Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11th Cir. 2005) (the
court is obligated to construe the record, including all evidence and draw “all reasonable
inferences, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs assert that there is “overwhelming physical evidence” that the magneto
separated mid-flight because of fatigue fractures in the magneto flange, and that the
separation caused the loss of engine power and consequent crash. TCM asserts, and has
presented evidence in support, that the magneto remained attached until breaking off from
impact of the crash. Thus, TCM concludes that the magneto or flange fractures were not the
cause of the crash. Therefore, Plaintiffs assertion that there is “no evidence to support TCM’s
affirmative defense theory of the case” is without merit.

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Upon review of the parties’ submissions, it is clear that a genuine dispute of material
fact exists. Specifically, there is a factual dispute as to whether the magneto disengaged inflight or detached on impact which is material. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial
summary judgment is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of June, 2011.

s / Kristi K DuBose
KRISTI K. DuBOSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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