Shropshire v. Toney et al

Filing 106

Order re: Bench Trial. The Court finds in favor of the Plaintiff and awards compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000 plus punitive damages in the amount of $1,000. As the prevailing party, the Plaintiff may be entitled to "a rea sonable attorney's fees as part of the costs." Plaintiff shall file a motion for attorney's fee and costs by 2/13/2015. Response to Motion due by 2/27/2015. Signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr on 1/21/2015. copies to parties. (sdb)

IN
 THE
 UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 COURT
 FOR
 THE

SOUTHERN
 DISTRICT
 OF
 ALABAMA

SOUTHERN
 DIVISION

DONNIE
 SHROPSHIRE,

Plaintiff

v.

CHANDRA
 JOHNSON,

Defendants,

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CIVIL
 ACTION
 NO.

10-­‐00470-­‐CB-­‐N

ORDER

On
 January
 12,
 2015,
 this
 matter
 came
 before
 the
 Court
 for
 a
 bench
 trial
 on

the
 Plaintiff’s
 claim
 that
 Defendant
 used
 excessive
 force
 in
 violation
 of
 the
 Eighth

Amendment
 and
 42
 U.S.C.
 §
 1983.

 After
 due
 consideration
 of
 the
 witnesses
 and

evidence
 presented
 the
 Court
 enters
 the
 following
 findings
 of
 fact
 and
 conclusions
 of

law.

Findings
 of
 Fact

On
 July
 4,
 2010,
 Plaintiff
 Donnie
 Shropshire,
 an
 Alabama
 prison
 inmate,
 was

incarcerated
 at
 the
 Atmore
 Work
 Release
 Center,
 a
 correctional
 facility
 operated
 by

the
 Alabama
 Department
 of
 Corrections
 (ADOC).

 Shropshire
 was
 working
 as
 a

runner
 for
 the
 defendant,
 Sgt.
 Chandra
 Johnson,
 an
 ADOC
 correctional
 officer.

 Early

that
 morning
 Shropshire
 carried
 a
 computer
 to
 the
 dining
 hall
 to
 be
 used
 for

visitation.

 As
 Shropshire
 approached
 the
 entrance,
 another
 inmate
 opened
 the
 door

and
 squeezed
 liquid
 from
 a
 squeegee
 outside
 the
 door,
 soaking
 Shropshire’s
 right

foot.

 Immediately,
 his
 foot
 began
 to
 burn
 and
 itch.

 Shropshire
 went
 to
 Johnson
 and

told
 her
 that
 his
 foot
 was
 burning
 and
 itching.

 Johnson
 replied,
 “Bull
 [Shropshire’s

nickname],
 I
 need
 you.”

 Shropshire
 took
 off
 his
 sock
 but
 put
 his
 wet
 shoe
 back
 on

and
 continued
 with
 his
 duties.

 When
 his
 duties
 ended
 around
 2:00
 p.m.,
 Shropshire

took
 a
 shower.

 At
 that
 point
 the
 top
 of
 his
 right
 foot
 was
 very
 red
 and
 continued
 to

itch
 and
 burn.

The
 following
 morning,
 Monday,
 July
 5th,

 Shropshire’s
 foot
 was
 in
 pain
 and
 a

large
 blister
 “bigger
 than
 a
 50-­‐cent
 piece”
 had
 developed
 on
 the
 top
 of
 his
 foot.

 At

this
 point,
 Shropshire
 categorized
 his
 pain
 as
 an
 “8
 or
 9
 out
 of
 10.”

 The
 foot
 was
 so

swollen
 that
 Shropshire
 could
 not
 get
 his
 shoes
 on.

 Shropshire
 described
 his
 big
 toe

as
 being
 the
 “size
 of
 two
 thumbs.”

 Two
 blisters
 had
 developed
 on
 the
 top
 of
 his
 foot,

each
 the
 size
 of
 a
 50-­‐cent
 piece,
 about
 half
 an
 inch
 high,
 and
 filled
 with
 fluid.

Shropshire
 could
 not
 work
 that
 day
 because
 of
 the
 pain,
 which
 he
 described
 as

“pulsating”
 and
 as
 an
 “8
 or
 9”
 out
 of
 10.

 He
 put
 in
 a
 “sick
 call
 slip”
 requesting

medical
 treatment
 for
 his
 foot.

The
 primary
 factual
 dispute
 in
 this
 case
 centers
 on
 the
 events
 of
 July
 6th.

That
 morning

 Shropshire
 was
 called
 to
 the
 kitchen.

 At
 this
 point,
 his
 foot
 was
 even

more
 swollen
 than
 the
 day
 before.

 He
 had
 to
 drag
 his
 foot
 when
 he
 walked
 because

could
 not
 bend
 it.

 He
 was
 wearing
 shower
 slides,
 and
 had
 cut
 the
 top
 so
 that
 he

could
 get
 it
 on
 his
 swollen
 foot.

 Shropshire
 went
 to
 the
 kitchen
 and
 reported
 to

Steward
 Stonewall,
 who
 was
 in
 charge.

 He
 told
 her
 he
 could
 not
 work
 and
 showed

her
 his
 foot.

 Stonewall
 asked,
 “What’s
 wrong
 with
 your
 foot?

 You
 got
 gout?”

 Also

2

present
 in
 the
 kitchen,
 according
 to
 Shropshire,
 were
 Steward
 English,
 Inmate

Jerome
 Fletcher,
 and
 Sgt.
 Johnson.

 Shropshire
 was
 standing
 just
 a
 few
 feet
 from

Stonewall
 as
 he
 was
 talking
 with
 her
 and
 showing
 her
 his
 foot.

 Stonewall
 told

Johnson
 to
 go
 back
 to
 his
 bunk.

According
 to
 Shropshire’s
 testimony,
 when
 he
 started
 to
 leave,
 Sgt.
 Johnson,

who
 had
 been
 standing
 a
 couple
 of
 feet
 behind
 Stonewall,
 took
 a
 squeegee
 from

Inmate
 Fletcher,
 who
 was
 mopping
 the
 floor.

 Johnson
 took
 the
 squeegee
 in
 both

hands
 and
 intentionally
 “bammed”
 it
 down
 on
 Shropshire’s
 injured
 foot.

 The
 impact

caused
 the
 blisters
 to
 burst,
 oozing
 blood
 and
 fluid.

 Shropshire
 described
 the
 pain

he
 felt
 at
 that
 time
 as
 “excruciating.”

 The
 pain
 was
 so
 bad
 that
 it
 made
 him
 cry,
 and

he
 hurried
 out
 the
 door
 so
 that
 he
 would
 not
 react
 in
 front
 of
 Johnson.

 After
 the

blow,
 Shropshire’s
 foot
 hurt
 worse
 than
 before.

 According
 to
 Shropshire
 his
 pain

level
 was
 “at
 least”
 10
 out
 of
 10.

 Shropshire
 further
 testified
 that
 when
 Johnson

struck
 his
 foot,
 she
 had
 a
 look
 on
 her
 fact
 that
 said
 “Obey.”

Johnson
 testified
 that
 that
 she
 did
 not
 remember
 how
 Shropshire’s
 foot
 was

injured,
 that
 she
 never
 had
 a
 conversation
 with
 Shropshire
 on
 July
 4th
 about
 his

burning
 foot
 and
 his
 wet
 shoe,
 and
 denied
 ever
 striking
 Shropshire
 with
 a
 squeegee.

She
 did
 admit
 to
 being
 in
 the
 kitchen
 in
 the
 course
 of
 her
 duties
 on
 July
 6th.

According
 to
 Johnson,
 the
 first
 time
 Shropshire’s
 injury
 came
 to
 her
 attention
 was

on
 the
 morning
 of
 July
 7th
 when
 Shropshire
 was
 brought
 to
 the
 duty
 office
 in
 a

wheelchair
 by
 Inmate
 McGaster.

 Johnson
 called
 the
 medical
 office
 at
 nearby

Fountain
 Correctional
 and
 spoke
 with
 a
 nurse
 about
 Shropshire,
 then
 had
 another

officer
 take
 Shropshire
 to
 the
 infirmary
 at
 Fountain.

3

Shropshire’s
 injury
 was
 a
 serious
 one.

 He
 was
 admitted
 to
 the
 infirmary

ward
 at
 Fountain,
 where
 he
 stayed
 for
 approximately
 two
 to
 three
 weeks.

 He
 was

diagnosed
 with
 a
 chemical
 burn
 and
 a
 penicillin-­‐resistant
 strain
 of
 staph
 infection

known
 as
 MRSA.

 After
 a
 month
 of
 treatment
 consisting
 of
 intravenous
 and/or

intramuscular
 antibiotics,
 pain
 medication,
 and
 wound
 care,
 Shropshire’s
 foot
 was

healed,
 according
 to
 his
 medical
 records
 and
 the
 testimony
 of
 his
 health
 care

providers.1

 There
 is
 no
 medical
 evidence
 that
 the
 single
 blow
 to
 Shropshire’s
 foot

caused
 either
 the
 staph
 infection
 or
 any
 other
 injury
 that
 necessitated
 the
 treatment

Shropshire
 received
 or
 his
 stay
 in
 the
 infirmary.

Ultimately,
 the
 Court
 finds
 Shropshire’s
 testimony
 regarding
 the
 incident
 to

be
 more
 credible.

 First,
 Johnson’s
 memory
 was
 very
 selective.

 She
 clearly

remembered
 events
 that
 showed
 her
 in
 a
 favorable
 light,
 such
 as
 helping
 Shropshire

earn
 him
 extra
 benefits
 because
 he
 had
 no
 family
 support
 and
 moving
 him
 to
 a

bottom
 bunk
 when
 one
 became
 available.2

 Yet,
 she
 did
 not
 recall
 anything
 about

Shropshire’s
 injury,
 even
 though
 she
 admitted
 (and
 others
 similarly
 testified)
 that

Shropshire
 was
 not
 one
 to
 remain
 quiet
 when
 he
 had
 a
 problem.

 In
 addition,

Johnson
 was
 less
 than
 forthcoming
 when
 her
 attitude
 about
 Shropshire’s

homosexuality
 was
 questioned.

 From
 Shropshire’s
 testimony,
 it
 appeared
 that

Johnson
 was
 morally
 opposed
 to
 homosexuality
 and
 that
 her
 opposition
 affected
 her

1
 Dr.
 Oscar
 Lopez
 and
 Nurse
 Practitioner
 Barry
 Gaston
 testified
 by

deposition.

2
 Johnson
 also
 insisted
 that
 she
 called
 a
 nurse
 “every
 time”
 a
 prisoner

complained
 to
 her
 about
 a
 medical
 problem.

 Yet
 when
 questioned
 further
 by
 the

Court,
 Johnson
 admitted
 that
 she
 called
 a
 nurse
 “every
 time
 “
 if
 something
 serious
 is

involved,
 like
 shortness
 of
 breath
 or
 bleeding.

4

attitude
 toward
 Shropshire.3

 Johnson,
 who
 is
 a
 lay
 minister,
 insisted
 that
 she
 had
 no

religious
 problem
 with
 homosexuality,
 but
 when
 questioned
 further
 she
 admitted

that
 her
 church
 “believe[s]
 that
 sin
 is
 morally
 wrong”
 and
 that
 “homosexuality
 is
 a

sin.”

 Finally,
 Johnson
 was
 unduly
 evasive
 when
 it
 came
 to
 admitting
 knowledge
 of

Shropshire’s
 injury.

 First,
 she
 said
 that
 when
 he
 was
 brought
 to
 the
 duty
 office
 of

July
 7th
 he
 was
 wearing
 a
 sock,
 that
 she
 did
 not
 see
 his
 foot,
 and
 that
 she
 was
 told

that
 there
 was
 “blood
 and
 stuff.”

 On
 cross
 examination,
 Johnson
 admitted
 that

Shropshire’s
 foot
 was
 not
 in
 a
 sock
 but
 was
 wrapped
 (which
 was
 consistent
 with
 the

makeshift
 bandage
 Shropshire
 described).

The
 Court
 also
 finds
 Shropshire’s
 version
 more
 credible
 for
 other
 reasons.

Shropshire,
 who
 is
 a
 57-­‐year-­‐old
 inmate
 serving
 life,
 testified
 that
 he
 had
 never

before
 filed
 a
 lawsuit
 and
 thus
 has
 no
 history
 of
 frivolous
 actions.

 Furthermore,

there
 is
 little
 motivation
 to
 lie
 about
 the
 incident,
 which
 was
 never
 the
 primary

focus
 of
 this
 lawsuit.4

 Moreover,
 defense
 counsel’s
 attempts
 to
 discredit
 Shropshire

were
 not
 successful.

 Shropshire
 was
 disciplined
 once
 by
 Johnson,
 but
 he
 admitted

to
 the
 infraction,
 which
 was
 minor,
 and
 the
 discipline
 imposed
 had
 little
 effect
 on

Shropshire.

 Shropshire
 may
 not
 have
 told
 medical
 staff
 that
 Johnson
 hit
 him

(although
 he
 claimed
 to
 have
 secretly
 told
 Dr.
 Lopez).

 However,
 as
 he
 explained,

3
 Shropshire
 testified
 Johnson
 did
 not
 like
 other
 inmates
 calling
 him
 “Mama

Bull”
 in
 reference
 to
 his
 homosexuality,
 that
 she
 once
 put
 holy
 oil
 on
 his
 head
 and

said
 “The
 devil
 is
 alive,”
 that
 she
 “got
 on
 him”
 about
 his
 voice
 (because
 it
 was
 not

manly
 enough),
 and
 told
 him
 to
 be
 a
 man
 because
 God
 did
 not
 put
 him
 on
 the
 earth

to
 be
 like
 he
 was.

 Furthermore,
 both
 Johnson
 and
 J.
 C.
 McGaster
 testified
 that

Johnson
 put
 the
 homosexual
 prisoners
 in
 a
 separate
 dormitory
 during
 the
 time
 they

were
 at
 Atmore
 Work
 Release
 Center.

4
 Shropshire’s
 predominant
 complaint
 was
 the
 delay
 in
 medical
 care.

Summary
 judgment
 was
 granted
 in
 favor
 of
 the
 defendants
 on
 that
 claim.

5

there
 are
 guards
 in
 the
 infirmary.

 Therefore,
 is
 understandable
 that
 Shropshire

would
 not
 have
 publicly
 accused
 a
 guard
 of
 misconduct.

 Finally,
 why
 would

Shropshire
 fabricate
 an
 incident
 with
 two
 prison
 employees
 (Steward
 Stonewall
 and

Steward
 English)
 as
 witnesses?

Conclusions
 of
 Law

Based
 on
 the
 foregoing
 facts,
 the
 Court
 finds
 by
 a
 preponderance
 of
 evidence

that
 Johnson
 has
 violated
 Shropshire’s
 constitutional
 right,
 guaranteed
 by
 the
 Eighth

Amendment,
 to
 be
 free
 from
 cruel
 and
 unusual
 punishment
 and
 is
 liable
 for

damages
 under
 42
 U.S.C.
 §
 1983.

To
 establish
 an
 Eighth
 Amendment
 violation
 a
 prisoner
 must
 prove

that
 his
 injury
 was
 caused
 by
 an
 “unnecessary
 and
 wanton
 infliction
 of

pain.”
 The
 Supreme
 Court
 has
 admonished
 that
 in
 such
 cases
 “the
 core

judicial
 inquiry
 is
 ...
 whether
 force
 was
 applied
 in
 a
 good-­‐faith
 effort
 to

maintain
 or
 restore
 discipline,
 or
 maliciously
 and
 sadistically
 to
 cause

harm.”

 The
 absence
 of
 “serious
 injury”
 alone
 is
 insufficient
 to
 dismiss

a
 prisoner's
 Eight
 Amendment
 claim.
 Id.
 Instead,
 analysis
 of
 an
 Eighth

Amendment
 excessive
 force
 claim
 is
 contextual
 and
 requires
 that

many
 factors
 be
 considered:
 “the
 need
 for
 the
 application
 of
 force,
 the

relationship
 between
 that
 need
 and
 the
 amount
 of
 force
 used,
 the

threat
 reasonably
 perceived
 by
 the
 responsible
 officials,
 and
 any

efforts
 made
 to
 temper
 the
 severity
 of
 a
 forceful
 response.”

Harris
 v.
 Chapman,
 97
 F.3d
 499,
 505
 (11th
 Cir.
 1996)
 (quoting
 Hudson
 v.
 McMillian,

503
 U.S.
 1,
 5,
 7
 (1992)).

 However,
 “[not]
 every
 malevolent
 touch
 by
 a
 prison
 guard

gives
 rise
 to
 a
 federal
 cause
 of
 action.”

 Hudson,
 503
 U.S.
 at
 9.

 Thus,
 “de
 minimis

uses
 of
 physical
 force”
 are
 not
 prohibited
 “’provided
 that
 the
 use
 of
 force
 is
 not
 of
 a

sort
 repugnant
 to
 the
 conscience
 of
 mankind.’”

 Id.
 at
 10
 (quoting
 Whitley
 v.
 Albers,

475
 U.S.
 312,
 327
 (1986)).

6

Viewed
 in
 context,
 Johnson’s
 use
 of
 force
 was
 excessive
 because
 striking

Shropshire’s
 obviously
 injured
 and
 painful
 foot
 was
 malicious,
 gratuitous,
 and

without
 justification
 or
 provocation.

 As
 the
 Supreme
 Court
 stated
 in
 Hudson
 v.

McMillian,
 503
 U.S.
 at
 9,
 “[w]hen
 prison
 official
 maliciously
 and
 sadistically
 use
 force

to
 cause
 harm,
 contemporary
 standards
 of
 decency
 always
 are
 violated.

 This
 is
 true

whether
 or
 not
 significant
 injury
 is
 evident.”

 Even
 if
 the
 force
 used
 to
 strike

Shropshire
 might
 be
 considered
 minor
 in
 other
 circumstances,
 the
 act
 of

deliberately
 striking
 a
 prisoner’s
 injury
 solely
 for
 the
 purpose
 of
 inflicting
 pain
 is

nothing
 short
 of
 malicious.

 The
 Court
 has
 no
 doubt
 Johnson
 was
 aware
 of
 the
 injury

to
 Shropshire’s
 foot
 when
 she
 hit
 him.

 Shropshire
 complained
 to
 her
 when
 his
 foot

was
 first
 injured,
 and
 she
 overheard
 the
 conversation
 between
 Shropshire
 and

Steward
 Stonewall
 immediately
 before
 she
 struck
 Shropshire.

 Furthermore,

Johnson’s
 blow
 caused
 significant
 pain
 and
 contributed
 to
 the
 severity
 of
 the
 injury.

Shropshire
 testified
 that
 the
 pain
 was
 a
 10
 out
 of
 10
 and
 that
 he
 had
 to
 leave
 the

area
 so
 that
 he
 would
 not
 react
 against
 Johnson.
 The
 blow
 caused
 an
 open
 wound,

and,
 according
 to
 medical
 testimony,
 open
 wounds
 increase
 the
 risk
 of
 infection.
 In

sum,
 Johnson’s
 wanton
 and
 unnecessary
 infliction
 of
 pain
 amounts
 to
 cruel
 and

unusual
 punishment.

Having
 decided
 the
 issue
 of
 liability,
 the
 Court
 must
 determine
 damages.

 In
 a

§
 1983
 lawsuit,
 a
 plaintiff
 may
 be
 entitled
 to
 recover
 both
 compensatory
 and

punitive
 damages.

 Compensatory
 damages
 include
 “damages
 based
 on
 monetary

loss,
 physical
 pain
 and
 suffering
 or
 demonstrable
 mental
 and
 emotional
 distress.”

Slicker
 v.
 Jackson,
 215
 F.3d
 1225,
 1233
 (11th
 Cir.
 2000).

 Shropshire
 undoubtedly

7

suffered
 mental
 and
 emotional
 distress
 due
 to
 the
 chemical
 burn,
 MRSA
 infection,

and
 subsequent
 treatment.

 But
 these
 are
 not
 attributable
 to
 the
 squeegee
 incident

and,
 therefore,
 are
 not
 compensable.

 Damages
 will,
 however,
 be
 awarded
 for
 the

increase
 in
 pain
 and
 suffering
 and
 emotional
 distress
 resulting
 from
 the
 incident.

Shropshire
 testified
 that
 the
 pain
 was
 worse
 after
 the
 blow,
 was
 “excruciating,”
 and

was
 “at
 least”
 a
 10
 out
 of
 10.

 In
 addition,
 Shropshire
 testified
 that
 blow
 caused
 an

emotional
 reaction
 strong
 enough
 to
 make
 him
 cry.

 Altogether,
 the
 Court
 finds
 that

$1,000
 is
 an
 adequate
 and
 appropriate
 award
 for
 physical
 pain
 and
 suffering
 and

mental
 and
 emotional
 distress.

Next,
 the
 Court
 turns
 to
 punitive
 damages.

 In
 general,
 punitive
 damages
 may

be
 awarded
 for
 a
 violation
 of
 §
 1983
 ”when
 when
 the
 defendant's
 conduct
 is
 shown

to
 be
 motivated
 by
 evil
 motive
 or
 intent,”
 i.e.,
 is
 malicious,
 or
 “when
 it
 involves

reckless
 or
 callous
 indifference
 to
 the
 federally
 protected
 rights
 of
 others.”

 Smith
 v.

Wade,
 461
 U.S.
 30,
 56
 (1983).

 Having
 determined
 that
 Johnson’s
 conduct
 was

malicious,
 the
 Court
 has
 no
 difficulty
 concluding
 that
 Shropshire
 has
 met
 the

threshold
 necessary
 for
 an
 award
 of
 punitive
 damages.

 However,
 the
 inquiry
 is

more
 complicated
 here.

 In
 an
 Eighth
 Amendment
 excessive
 force
 case,
 an
 award
 of
 punitive
 damages

is
 governed
 by
 the
 Prison
 Litigation
 Reform
 Act
 (PLRA),
 18
 U.S.C.
 §
 3626(a)(1)(A).

Johnson
 v.
 Breeden,
 280
 F.3d
 1308,
 1323-­‐24.

 The
 PLRA
 strictly
 limits
 the
 availability

of
 “prospective
 relief”
 which
 it
 defines
 as
 “’all
 relief
 other
 than
 compensatory
 money

damages.’”

 Id.
 at
 1324
 (quoting
 18
 U.S.C.
 §
 3626(g)(7)).

 Thus,
 for
 PLRA
 purposes,

punitive
 damages
 are
 considered
 prospective
 relief
 and
 must
 be
 “narrowly
 drawn,

8

extend[
 ]
 no
 further
 than
 necessary
 to
 correct
 the
 violation
 of
 the
 Federal
 right,
 and

must
 be
 the
 “least
 intrusive
 means
 necessary
 to
 correct
 the
 violation.”

 Id.

 18
 U.S.C.
 §

3626(a)(1)(A).

 Furthermore,
 “[t]he
 court
 shall
 give
 substantial
 weight
 to
 any

adverse
 impact
 on
 public
 safety
 or
 the
 operation
 of
 a
 criminal
 justice
 system
 caused

by
 the
 relief.”

 Id.

 The
 district
 court
 is
 required
 to
 discuss
 and
 enter
 findings
 with

respect
 to
 these
 factors,
 even
 though
 “there
 may
 not
 be
 much
 to
 say
 about
 the[m].”

Johnson,
 280
 F.3d
 at
 1326.

The
 Court
 finds
 that
 a
 punitive
 damages
 award
 in
 the
 amount
 of
 $1,000
 is

appropriate
 and
 satisfies
 the
 foregoing
 criteria.

 Punitive
 damages
 serve
 the
 dual

aims
 of
 punishment
 and
 deterrence.

 State
 Farm
 Mut.
 Auto
 Ins.
 Co.
 v.
 Campbell,
 538

U.S.
 408
 (2003).

 This
 modest
 award
 goes
 no
 further
 than
 is
 necessary
 to
 serve
 those

goals
 and
 could
 not
 be
 more
 narrowly
 drawn
 or
 less
 intrusive.

 Moreover
 requiring

an
 officer
 who
 intentionally
 violated
 a
 prisoner’s
 constitutional
 rights
 to
 pay
 a
 small

punitive
 damages
 award
 should
 not
 have
 a
 significant
 adverse
 impact
 on
 public

safety
 or
 the
 operation
 of
 a
 criminal
 justice
 system.

Conclusion

For
 the
 foregoing
 reasons,
 the
 Court
 finds
 in
 favor
 of
 the
 Plaintiff
 and
 awards

compensatory
 damages
 in
 the
 amount
 of
 $1,000
 plus
 punitive
 damages
 in
 the

amount
 of
 $1,000.

 Judgment
 will
 be
 entered
 by
 separate
 order.

As
 the
 prevailing
 party,
 the
 Plaintiff

 may
 be
 entitled
 to
 “a
 reasonable

attorney’s
 fees
 as
 part
 of
 the
 costs.”

 42
 U.S.C.
 §
 1988(b).

 Plaintiff
 shall
 file
 a

properly
 supported
 motion
 for
 attorney’s
 fee
 and
 costs
 on
 or
 before
 February
 13,

9

2015.

 Defendant
 must
 file
 its
 opposition
 to
 the
 motion
 on
 or
 before
 February
 27,

2015.

DONE
 and
 ORDERED
 this
 the
 21st
 day
 of
 January,
 2015.

s/Charles
 R.
 Butler,
 Jr.

Senior
 United
 States
 District
 Judge

10