Shropshire v. Toney et al

Filing 96

ORDER adopting 92 Report and Recommendation. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 83 ) is, therefore, DENIED as to Shropshire's excessive force claim against Defendant Johnson, and GRANTED as to Shropshire's claim against both Defendants for deliberate indifference to serious medical need.; denying 91 Motion for Oral Argument. Signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr. on 11/10/2014. copies to parties. (sdb)

IN
 THE
 UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 COURT
 FOR
 THE

SOUTHERN
 DISTRICT
 OF
 ALABAMA

SOUTHERN
 DIVISION

DONNIE SHROPSHIRE,
Plaintiff
v.
DEBORAH TONEY and
CHANDRA JOHNSON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION NO.
10-00470-CB-N

Defendants,
ORDER

This
 matter
 is
 before
 the
 Court
 on
 the
 Magistrate
 Judge’s
 Report
 and

Recommendation
 (R
 &
 R)
 (Doc.
 92),
 Plaintiff’s
 objections
 thereto
 (Doc.
 93)
 and

Defendants’
 reply
 (Doc.
 95).

 After
 due
 consideration
 of
 all
 issues,
 the
 Court
 agrees

with
 the
 Magistrate
 Judge’s
 conclusion
 that
 the
 Defendants
 are
 entitled
 to
 qualified

immunity
 on
 Plaintiff’s
 claim
 that
 Defendants
 were
 deliberately
 indifferent
 to

Plaintiff’s
 serious
 medical
 needs.

Background1

Plaintiff
 Donnie
 Shropshire,
 an
 inmate
 at
 the
 Atmore
 Work
 Release
 Center,

an
 Alabama
 Department
 of
 Corrections
 (ADOC)
 facility,
 was
 injured
 after
 another

inmate
 accidentally
 splashed
 mop
 water
 on
 his
 right
 foot.

 At
 the
 time,
 Shropshire

did
 not
 know
 of
 any
 particular
 problem,
 other
 than
 his
 foot
 was
 drenched.

 He
 asked

1
 The
 following
 is
 a
 synopsis
 of
 the
 facts
 and
 procedural
 background
 of
 this

case,
 which
 are
 set
 out
 more
 fully
 in
 the
 Report
 and
 Recommendation.

2
 As
 detailed
 in
 the
 Report
 and
 Recommendation
 (Doc.
 32
 at
 2-­‐4),
 this
 litigation
 has

a
 lengthy
 history.

 The
 claims
 set
 forth
 above
 are
 the
 sole
 remaining
 claims.

3
 There
 is
 a
 second
 “obvious
 clarity”
 category,
 a
 very
 narrow
 exception,
 in

which
 “’the
 words
 of
 the
 pertinent
 federal
 statute
 or
 federal
 constitutional
 provision

in
 some
 cases
 will
 be
 specific
 enough
 to
 establish
 clearly
 the
 law
 applicable
 to

Sergeant
 Chandra
 Johnson,
 whom
 he
 was
 assisting
 at
 the
 time,
 for
 permission
 to

change
 his
 shoe.

 Johnson
 denied
 the
 request
 because
 she
 needed
 Shropshire’s
 help.

Shropshire
 took
 off
 his
 sock
 and
 put
 his
 wet
 shoe
 back
 on.

 Later
 that
 day,
 he
 told

Johnson
 his
 foot
 was
 burning
 and
 felt
 irritated.

 That
 afternoon
 Shropshire
 took
 a

shower
 and
 saw
 that
 his
 right
 foot
 was
 starting
 to
 turn
 red.

 The
 foot
 was
 also
 itchy

and
 burning
 and
 later
 began
 to
 swell.

The
 next
 morning
 Shropshire
 met
 Warden
 Deborah
 Toney
 as
 she
 arrived
 for

work.

 He
 told
 her
 about
 his
 foot
 getting
 wet,
 and
 showed
 her
 his
 injured
 foot.

 At

this
 point,
 his
 foot
 was
 sweating
 and
 swollen
 and
 was
 “getting
 ready”
 to
 develop
 a

blister.

 Shropshire
 told
 Toney
 he
 was
 in
 pain.

 Toney
 said
 there
 was
 nothing
 at
 the

facility
 that
 would
 cause
 that
 and
 went
 about
 her
 business.

 Shropshire
 may
 or
 may

not
 have
 explicitly
 requested
 medical
 attention
 from
 Toney.

 Shortly
 thereafter,

Shropshire
 filled
 out
 a
 medical
 request
 form.

Inmates
 request
 medical
 care
 by
 filling
 out
 a
 medical
 care
 request
 slip
 and

placing
 them
 in
 a
 box.

 Nurses
 visit
 Atmore
 Work
 Release
 daily
 and
 review
 the

medical
 request
 slips.

 ADOC
 staff
 has
 no
 role
 in
 receiving
 or
 assessing
 these

requests.

One
 day
 later
 (two
 days
 after
 the
 incident),
 Shropshire
 was
 called
 to
 the

kitchen
 to
 do
 some
 cleaning.

 When
 he
 arrived,
 Shropshire
 told
 the
 steward,
 Kathy

Stonewall,
 that
 he
 could
 not
 do
 cleaning
 duties
 because
 of
 his
 foot.

 Shropshire
 told

her
 what
 had
 happened.

 According
 to
 Stonewall,
 the
 foot
 looked
 “awful”,
 “nasty”,

had
 blisters
 that
 had
 popped,
 and
 was
 “swollen”
 and
 “puss[ie]”.

 Shropshire
 was

having
 difficulty
 walking
 and
 was
 wearing
 shower
 slides.

 Johnson
 was
 standing

2

nearby
 and
 appeared
 to
 be
 listening.

 Stonewall

 told
 Shropshire
 to
 go
 lie
 down.

Johnson
 grabbed
 a
 squeegee
 and
 hit
 Johnson’s
 swollen
 foot.

 Shropshire
 said
 nothing

to
 Johnson
 at
 any
 time
 during
 this
 encounter.

The
 next
 day
 (three
 days
 after
 the
 incident)
 Johnson
 submitted
 another

medical
 request
 form
 stating
 that
 his
 foot
 was
 numb,
 swollen,
 and
 in
 pain.

 That

afternoon,
 blood
 and
 puss
 were
 running
 through
 his
 sock.

 Another
 inmate
 took
 him

to
 the
 shift
 office
 in
 a
 wheelchair.

 Johnson,
 who
 was
 in
 the
 office,
 directed
 another

officer
 to
 take
 Shropshire
 to
 another
 facility
 for
 medical
 attention.

According
 to
 the
 doctor
 who
 treated
 Shropshire,
 his
 injury
 was
 consistent

with
 a
 chemical
 burn.

 In
 addition,
 Shropshire
 had
 developed
 a
 staph
 infection
 in
 his

foot.

 Both
 injuries
 were
 serious,
 could
 cause
 further
 damage
 if
 not
 treated
 and,
 in

the
 case
 of
 the
 staph
 infection,
 could
 result
 in
 death
 or
 loss
 of
 the
 foot.

Shropshire
 asserts
 claims
 against
 Johnson
 and
 Toney
 under
 42
 U.S.C.
 §
 1983

for
 violation
 of
 her
 constitutional
 rights.2

 Specifically,
 Shropshire
 claims
 that

Defendants’
 refusal
 to
 provide
 medical
 treatment
 for
 his
 foot
 amounted
 to

deliberate
 indifference
 to
 a
 serious
 medical
 need.
 In
 addition,
 Shropshire
 assets
 that

Johnson
 used
 unconstitutionally
 excessive
 force
 by
 hitting
 his
 injured
 foot.

Defendants
 filed
 a
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment
 on
 all
 claims.

The
 R
 &
 R
 and
 Plaintiff’s
 Objections

The
 Magistrate
 Judge
 has
 recommended
 that
 summary
 judgment
 be:
 (1)

granted
 in
 favor
 of
 both
 Defendants
 on
 the
 deliberate
 indifference
 claim
 but
 (2)

denied
 as
 to
 the
 excessive
 force
 claim
 against
 Defendant
 Johnson.

 Shropshire’s

2
 As
 detailed
 in
 the
 Report
 and
 Recommendation
 (Doc.
 32
 at
 2-­‐4),
 this
 litigation
 has

a
 lengthy
 history.

 The
 claims
 set
 forth
 above
 are
 the
 sole
 remaining
 claims.

3

objection
 is
 directed
 at
 the
 former.

 At
 issue
 is
 the
 Magistrate
 Judge’s
 conclusion
 that

the
 Defendants
 are
 entitled
 to
 qualified
 immunity
 on
 the
 deliberate
 indifference

claim.

Discussion

The
 Report
 and
 Recommendation
 sets
 out
 the
 applicable
 law,
 which
 will
 be

restated
 here
 only
 to
 the
 extent
 necessary
 to
 address
 Shropshire’s
 objections.

 First,

the
 Supreme
 Court
 has
 held
 that
 “deliberate
 indifference
 to
 serious
 medical
 needs
 of

prisoners
 constitutes
 the
 ‘unnecessary
 and
 wanton
 infliction’
 proscribed
 by
 the

Eighth
 Amendment.”

 Estelle
 v.
 Gamble,
 429
 U.S.
 97,
 104
 (1996)
 (quoting
 Gregg
 v.

Georgia,
 428
 U.S.
 153,
 173
 (1976)).

 Deliberate
 indifference
 involves
 both
 an

objective
 component
 (i.e.,
 a
 serious
 medical
 need)
 and
 a
 subjective
 component
 (i.e.,

deliberate
 indifference
 to
 that
 need).

 Bozeman
 v.
 Orum,
 422
 F.3d
 1265,
 1272
 (11th

Cir.
 2005).

 To
 satisfy
 the
 subjective
 element
 a
 plaintiff
 must
 prove:
 “(1)
 subjective

knowledge
 of
 a
 risk
 of
 serious
 harm;
 (2)
 disregard
 of
 that
 risk;
 (3)
 by
 conduct
 that
 is

more
 than
 [gross]
 negligence.”

 Id.
 (quoting
 Brown
 v.
 Johnson,
 387
 F.3d
 1344,
 1351

(11th
 Cir.
 2004).

 However,
 a
 prison
 official
 may
 be
 immune
 from
 liability
 for
 money

damages
 based
 on
 the
 doctrine
 of
 qualified
 immunity
 even
 though
 his
 conduct

amounted
 to
 a
 constitutional
 violation
 under
 the
 foregoing
 standards.

The
 Eleventh
 Circuit
 has
 explained
 qualified
 immunity
 as
 follows:

Qualified
 immunity
 is
 a
 guarantee
 of
 fair
 warning.
 Under
 the

doctrine
 of
 qualified
 immunity,
 a
 government
 official
 sued
 for

damages
 for
 injuries
 arising
 out
 of
 the
 performance
 of
 discretionary

functions
 must
 be
 “shown
 to
 have
 violated
 ‘clearly
 established

statutory
 or
 constitutional
 rights
 of
 which
 a
 reasonable
 person
 would

have
 known.’
 ”
 As
 the
 Supreme
 Court
 has
 explained,
 “qualified

immunity
 seeks
 to
 ensure
 that
 defendants
 ‘reasonably
 can
 anticipate

4

when
 their
 conduct
 may
 give
 rise
 to
 liability,’
 by
 attaching
 liability

only
 if
 ‘[t]he
 contours
 of
 the
 right
 [violated
 are]
 sufficiently
 clear
 that

a
 reasonable
 official
 would
 understand
 that
 what
 he
 is
 doing
 violates

that
 right.’
 ”
 “This
 is
 not
 to
 say
 that
 an
 official
 action
 is
 protected
 by

qualified
 immunity
 unless
 the
 very
 action
 in
 question
 has
 been
 held

unlawful;
 but
 it
 is
 to
 say
 that
 in
 the
 light
 of
 preexisting
 law
 the

unlawfulness
 must
 be
 apparent.”

McElligott
 v.
 Foley,
 182
 F.3d
 1248,
 1260
 (11th
 Cir.
 1999)
 (internal
 citations
 omitted).

The
 Magistrate
 Judge
 found
 the
 Defendants
 were
 entitled
 to
 qualified
 immunity
 on

the
 deliberate
 indifference
 claim
 because
 the
 law
 was
 not
 clearly
 established.

Shropshire
 takes
 issue
 with
 this
 conclusion.

For
 our
 purposes,
 a
 right
 may
 be
 clearly
 established
 in
 a
 manner
 sufficient
 to

provide
 fair
 warning
 in
 one
 of
 two
 ways.

 First,
 Shropshire
 “may
 establish
 that
 the

right
 was
 clearly
 established
 by
 pointing
 to
 a
 ‘materially
 similar
 case’”
 decided
 by

the
 Supreme
 Court,
 the
 Eleventh
 Circuit,
 or
 the
 Alabama
 supreme
 court.

 Terrell
 v.

Smith,
 668
 F.3d
 1244,
 1256
 (11th
 Cir.
 2012).

 A
 materially
 similar
 case
 is
 one
 that

“is
 [not]
 fairly
 distinguishable”
 from
 the
 circumstances
 in
 this
 case.

 Id.
 The

Magistrate
 Judge
 noted
 that
 Shropshire
 had
 failed
 to
 point
 to
 any
 materially
 similar

case
 that
 would
 have
 put
 Defendants
 on
 notice
 that
 their
 conduct
 amounted
 to

deliberate
 indifference.

 Shropshire
 insists
 that
 his
 summary
 judgment
 response

relied
 on
 similar
 prior
 precedent,
 but
 he
 has
 failed
 to
 articulate—either
 in
 his

summary
 judgment
 response
 or
 in
 his
 objection-­‐-­‐any
 material
 factual
 similarity

between
 the
 cases
 cited
 and
 the
 case
 at
 hand.

Alternatively,
 Shropshire
 may
 be
 able
 to
 demonstrate
 that
 the
 law
 was

clearly
 established
 by
 pointing
 to
 “broad
 statements
 of
 principle
 in
 case
 law
 are
 not

tied
 to
 particularized
 facts
 .
 .
 .
 [that]
 clearly
 establish
 law
 applicable
 in
 the
 future
 to

5

different
 sets
 of
 detailed
 facts.’”

 Id.

 (quoting
 Vinyard
 v.
 Wilson,
 311
 F.3d
 1340,
 1351

(11th
 Cir.
 2002)).

 This
 method
 is
 referred
 to
 as
 “obvious
 clarity”
 because
 “the

principle
 must
 be
 established
 with
 ‘obvious
 clarity’
 by
 the
 case
 law
 so
 that
 ‘every

objectively
 reasonable
 government
 official
 facing
 the
 circumstances
 would
 know
 that

the
 official’s
 conduct
 [
 ]
 violate[d]
 federal
 law
 when
 the
 official
 acted.”

 Id.
 (emphasis

added)
 (quoting
 Anderson
 v.
 Creighton,
 483
 U.S.
 635,
 640
 (1987)).3

 This
 is
 a
 difficult

hurdle
 in
 a
 deliberate
 indifference
 case,
 most
 of
 which
 “are
 far
 from
 obvious

violations
 of
 the
 constitution.”

 Bozeman
 422
 F.3d
 at
 1275.

 “Obvious
 clarity
 cases

are
 ‘rare,’
 and
 present
 a
 ‘narrow
 exception’
 to
 the
 general
 rule
 of
 qualified
 immunity.”

Gilmore
 v.
 Hodges,
 738
 F.3d
 266,
 279
 (11th
 Cir.
 2013)
 (internal
 citations
 omitted).

Furthermore,
 they
 are
 rarer
 still
 in
 deliberate
 indifference
 cases
 which
 ‘are
 highly

fact-­‐specific.
 .
 .

 Most
 cases
 in
 which
 deliberate
 indifference
 is
 asserted
 are
 far
 from

obvious
 violations
 of
 the
 Constitution.”

 Id.
 at
 280.

The
 broad
 statement
 of
 principle
 here
 is
 this:

 A
 government
 official
 acts
 with

deliberate
 indifference
 by
 intentionally
 delaying
 medical
 care
 to
 an
 inmate
 knowing

that
 the
 inmate
 has
 a
 serious
 medical
 condition.

 The
 question
 is
 whether
 every

reasonable
 official
 in
 Johnson’s
 position
 or
 in
 Toney’s
 position
 would
 have
 known

that
 failure
 to
 act
 immediately
 would
 amount
 to
 deliberate
 indifference.

 Before

examining
 that
 question,
 it
 is
 helpful
 to
 consider
 the
 types
 of
 actions
 that
 have

3
 There
 is
 a
 second
 “obvious
 clarity”
 category,
 a
 very
 narrow
 exception,
 in

which
 “’the
 words
 of
 the
 pertinent
 federal
 statute
 or
 federal
 constitutional
 provision

in
 some
 cases
 will
 be
 specific
 enough
 to
 establish
 clearly
 the
 law
 applicable
 to

particular
 conduct
 and
 circumstances
 and
 to
 overcome
 qualified
 immunity,
 even
 in

the
 total
 absence
 of
 case
 law.’”

 Id.
 at
 1257
 (quoting
 Vinyard,
 311
 F.3d
 at
 1350

(emphasis
 omitted)).

 Shropshire
 does
 not
 contend
 that
 this
 type
 of
 “obvious
 clarity”

applies.

6

amounted
 to
 “obvious
 violations”
 under
 the
 deliberate
 indifference
 standard.

 In

Bozeman,
 422
 F.3d
 at
 1275-­‐76,
 the
 Eleventh
 Circuit
 held
 qualified
 immunity
 did
 not

protect
 jail
 guards
 who
 did
 not
 administer
 treatment
 or
 summon
 help
 for
 14

minutes
 for
 inmate
 they
 knew
 was
 unconscious
 and
 not
 breathing.

 In
 Danley
 v.
 Allen,

540
 F.3d
 1298
 (11th
 Cir.
 2008),
 jail
 guards
 sprayed
 an
 inmate
 with
 pepper
 spray

then
 refused
 to
 allow
 appropriate
 decontamination
 procedures
 resulting
 in
 pain,

conjunctivitis
 and
 respiratory
 problems
 to
 the
 inmate.

 In
 both
 McElligott
 v.
 Foley,

supra,
 a
 case
 involving
 six
 months
 of
 cursory
 medical
 treatment
 for
 an
 inmate’s

seriously
 deteriorating
 condition,
 and
 Lancaster
 v.
 Monroe
 County,
 116
 F3d
 1419

(11th
 Cir.
 1997),
 a
 case
 involving
 the
 death
 of
 an
 inmate
 due
 to
 acute
 alcohol

withdrawal,
 the
 appellate
 court
 found
 the
 law
 to
 be
 clearly
 established
 by
 pre-­‐
existing
 case
 law
 involving
 similar
 circumstances.

In
 this
 case,
 Defendant
 Toney
 was
 confronted
 by
 an
 inmate
 with
 a
 red,

swollen
 foot
 that
 had
 not
 yet
 developed
 blisters
 and
 was
 informed
 that
 the

condition
 had
 occurred
 after
 his
 foot
 had
 been
 drenched
 by
 mop
 water
 the
 previous

day.

 Would
 every
 reasonable
 prison
 official
 have
 known
 that
 failure
 to
 obtain

immediate
 medical
 care
 for
 Shropshire
 result
 in
 a
 constitutional
 violation?

 The

answer
 is
 no.

 The
 seriousness
 of
 the
 injury
 was
 not
 apparent
 at
 that
 point.

 The

request
 for
 medical
 attention,
 if
 made,
 was
 outside
 the
 established
 channels
 for

seeking
 medical
 treatment.

 Unlike
 the
 situation
 in
 Danley,
 Toney
 did
 not
 know
 that

a
 chemical
 was
 the
 source
 of
 the
 injury.

 Unlike
 the
 jail
 guards
 in
 Bozeman,
 Toney

was
 not
 presented
 with
 an
 injury
 that
 appeared
 to
 be
 life-­‐threatening
 or
 even

serious.

 Finally,
 unlike
 Lancaster
 and
 McElligott,
 there
 was
 no
 similar
 case
 law
 to

7

provide
 guidance.

 In
 sum,
 this
 is
 not
 an
 obvious
 case,
 and
 Toney
 is
 entitled
 to

qualified
 immunity.

The
 issue
 is
 more
 complex
 with
 respect
 to
 Defendant
 Johnson.

 She
 knew

how
 and
 when
 the
 injury
 occurred
 and
 was,
 apparently,
 aware
 of
 its
 progression.

According
 to
 Shropshire,
 Johnson
 was
 listening
 when
 he
 told
 Stonewall
 he
 could
 not

work
 because
 of
 his
 foot,
 and
 Johnson
 saw
 his
 red,
 swollen,
 pussie,
 nasty-­‐looking

foot.

 But
 Shropshire
 did
 not
 ask
 for
 help
 and
 never
 even
 spoke
 directly
 to
 Johnson.

Would
 every
 reasonable
 officer
 in
 Johnson’s
 place
 have
 known,
 despite
 the
 lack
 of

request,
 that
 failure
 to
 provide
 immediate
 medical
 attention
 for
 Shropshire
 would

result
 in
 a
 constitutional
 violation?

 While
 the
 answer
 here
 is
 less
 emphatic
 than
 it

was
 with
 Toney,
 it
 is
 still
 no.

 Unlike
 the
 inmate
 in
 Bozeman,
 Shropshire
 could
 have

asked
 for
 help
 but
 did
 not.

 Unlike
 the
 inmate
 in
 Danley,
 Shropshire
 did
 not
 ask
 for

help
 from
 this
 Defendant.

 Moreover,
 Shropshire
 had
 another
 avenue
 for
 obtaining

medical
 attention—the
 sick
 call
 system.

 A
 reasonable
 official
 in
 Johnson’s

position—to
 whom
 no
 request
 for
 medical
 assistance
 was
 made—could
 reasonably

assume
 that
 Johnson
 would
 obtain
 medical
 attention
 through
 the
 sick
 call
 system.

Finally,
 while
 the
 Court
 agrees
 with
 the
 Magistrate
 Judge’s
 conclusion,
 one

statement
 in
 the
 Report
 and
 Recommendation
 bears
 further
 clarification.

 The

concluding
 paragraph
 of
 the
 qualified
 immunity
 discussion
 states,
 in
 part:

 “In
 sum

the
 undersigned
 finds
 persuasive
 the
 Defendants’
 argument
 that,
 under
 the
 specific

facts
 of
 this
 case,
 they
 were
 reasonably
 entitled
 to
 rely
 on
 a
 belief
 that
 Shropshire

was
 pursuing
 and
 would
 obtain
 medical
 aid
 through
 normal
 prison
 channels.”

 (R
 &

R
 at
 26,
 Doc.
 92.)

 Shropshire
 objects
 to
 this
 conclusion
 because,
 as
 he
 points
 out,

8

there
 is
 no
 evidence
 that
 either
 Defendant
 had
 such
 a
 belief.

 (Pl.’s
 Objection
 9,
 Doc.

93.)

 The
 question,
 though,
 is
 whether
 every
 reasonable
 official
 with
 all
 of
 the

knowledge
 Defendants
 had
 (including
 the
 existence
 of
 the
 sick
 call
 system)
 would

have
 felt
 compelled
 to
 obtain
 immediate
 medical
 treatment
 for
 Shropshire.

Defendants’
 reliance
 is
 irrelevant.

 A
 reasonable
 official
 in
 either
 Defendant’s

position
 could
 have
 taken
 that
 system
 into
 account
 in
 deciding
 whether
 to
 act.

Stated
 differently,
 in
 light
 of
 the
 sick
 call
 system
 and
 the
 apparent
 minor
 injury
 (in

Toney’s
 case)
 or
 the
 lack
 of
 any
 specific
 request
 for
 medical
 assistance
 (in
 Johnson’s

case),
 the
 law
 was
 not
 so
 obviously
 clear
 that
 every
 reasonable
 prison
 official
 in

their
 respective
 circumstances
 would
 have
 known
 that
 their
 conduct
 amounted
 to

deliberate
 indifference.

Conclusion

For
 the
 foregoing
 reasons,
 the
 Court
 overrules
 the
 Plaintiff’s
 objections
 and

ADOPTS
 the
 Magistrate
 Judge’s
 Report
 and
 Recommendation
 (Doc.
 92).

 Defendants’

motion
 for
 summary
 judgment
 (Doc.
 83)
 is,
 therefore,
 DENIED
 as
 to
 Shropshire’s

excessive
 force
 claim
 against
 Defendant
 Johnson,
 and
 GRANTED
 as
 to
 Shropshire’s

claim
 against
 both
 Defendants
 for
 deliberate
 indifference
 to
 serious
 medical
 need.

The
 Defendant’s
 motion
 for
 oral
 argument
 (Doc.
 91)
 is
 DENIED.

DONE
 and
 ORDERED
 this
 the
 10th
 day
 of
 November,
 2014.

s/Charles
 R.
 Butler,
 Jr.

Senior
 United
 States
 District
 Judge

9