Jackson v. Astrue

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ent. that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff benefits be affirmed. Signed by Magistrate Judge William E. Cassady on 12/27/2011. (mjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CEDRICK L. JACKSON,
Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.

:

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,

CA 11-0198-C

:
:

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking
judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his
claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The parties
have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c), for all proceedings in this Court. (Docs. 22 & 23 (“In accordance with the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties in this case consent to
have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all proceedings in this case, . . .
order the entry of a final judgment, and conduct all post-judgment proceedings.”).)
Upon consideration of the administrative record, plaintiff’s brief, the Commissioner’s
brief, and the arguments of the parties at the December 12, 2011 hearing before the

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Magistrate Judge, it is determined that the Commissioner’s decision denying plaintiff
benefits should be affirmed. 1
Plaintiff alleges disability due to post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). The
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made the following relevant findings:
1.
The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2010.
2.
The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
March 1, 2006, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and
416.971 et seq.).
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3.
The claimant has the following severe impairments:
depression/anxiety; post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), by history;
migraines; mild hearing loss in the right ear; and chronic knee and
ankle pain (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
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4.
The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
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5.
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
less than the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b)
and 416.967(b), in function by function terms (SSRs 83-10 and 06-8p),
with certain non-exertional restrictions associated with that level of
Any appeal taken from this memorandum opinion and order and judgment shall
be made to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (See Docs. 22 & 23 (“An appeal from a
judgment entered by a Magistrate Judge shall be taken directly to the United States Court of
Appeals for this judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of
this district court.”))
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exertion. The claimant’s specific physical capabilities during the period
of adjudication have been the ability to perform work at the light
exertional level. The claimant’s specific mental capabilities during the
period of adjudication have been the ability to perform unskilled work.
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The claimant testified that [he] has bad nerves, depression, and anxiety,
which results in [] limitations on his ability to perform unskilled work. He
is on medication that keeps him calm but it “lingers with him just like if he
drank alcohol the night before.”
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While the claimant was hospitalized at the VA from April 19-26, 2007, for
depression and thoughts of suicide, he underwent a mental health
evaluation on April 26, 2007. The results of this evaluation indicated that
the claimant does not have a diagnosis of severe and persistent mental
illness (examples given included schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major
affective disorder, or severe PTSD). The results also noted that the
claimant had not had high hospital use evidenced by over 30 days of
psychiatric hospital care during the previous year or three or more
episodes of psychiatric hospitalization in the previous year; he did not
have a severe functional impairment where he is neither capable of
successful and stable self-maintenance in a community living situation nor
able to participate in necessary treatments without intensive support; and
he will not be inadequately served by conventional clinic-based outpatient
treatment. During his hospital stay, the claimant was treated with
medications, and it was noted that his symptoms quickly started to
improve with resolution of vegetative symptoms, auditory hallucinations,
and paranoid ideation. His mood also improved, although some residual
anxiety remained. (Exhibit 6F). The claimant has continued to be followed
by various mental health care providers at the VA; and has been treated
with therapy and medication. Dr. Dansak noted on April 23, 2009, that the
claimant had a calm mood and was mildly to moderately depressed. He
had normal stream and content of thought, and his memory was grossly
intact. (Exhibit 16F).
The claimant underwent a consultative psychological evaluation on
November 23, 2009, with Nina E. Tocci, PhD, MSCP. . . . During the
mental status examination, Dr. Tocci noted . . . [h]e had good eye contact,
responsive facial expressions, and a cooperative attitude toward the
examiner. . . . His affect was appropriate, normal, and stable; although he
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described his mood as “depressed.” The claimant was oriented to time,
place, person, and situation. Dr. Tocci noted the claimant demonstrated
fair attention and concentration. . . . The claimant demonstrated thought
content appropriate to mood and circumstances and a logical thought
organization. Dr. Tocci wrote: “he ideates about suicide ‘not to my
knowledge (RQ) maybe I’ve taken something and didn’t take enough.’”
He was vague and circular. She stated that he finally stated that he took
too much Aleve in the past secondary to anxiety and panic attacks but
“that’s been so long.” He denied intent “but sometimes this depression
and anxiety it takes a toll on you.” He denied homicidal ideations, intent,
and gestures. The claimant told Dr. Tocci that he hears voices, but cannot
make out the words or content and see[s] shadows out of the corner of his
eyes. He denied delusions. He has a variable appetite with weight loss,
crying spells, and difficulty getting to and staying asleep. He experiences
anxiety and panic attacks (has increasing heart rate, is jumpy at sudden
noises, and [has] “trouble breathing sometimes like I’m being
smothered”). The claimant added that he has flashbacks to combat when
he hears loud noises. He demonstrated some insight into his behavior. He
evinced fair social judgment in his consideration of two social dilemmas.
Specifically, when asked what he would do if he found an envelope in the
street that had been sealed, addressed, and with a new stamp on it, he
stated, “take it to the post office I guess.” When asked what his actions
would be upon seeing smoke and fire in a theatre, he stated, “try to get
out or tell somebody.” He can make informed personal and financial
decisions. In general, he appeared to be functioning within the borderline
range of intellectual ability. During the day, the claimant reported that he
“stay[s] in my room, eat back in my room, may do a word puzzle, read
something, sometimes I come up and watch television.” He is able to
perform activities of daily living without assistance. . . . He does not have
friends or drive. . . . Dr. Tocci noted that the validity scales indicate that
the claimant became fatigued and/or lost interest in the questions over the
last half of the protocol. She added that the high F suggests that he is
making a plea for help or exaggerating symptoms. In general, the protocol
did not appear to be a valid representation of his personality. Throughout
testing, the claimant started subtests while the directions were still being
given and missed subtle cues to refrain from starting. It was necessary to
direct him several times. In general, he evinced fair effort. Dr. Tocci’s
diagnostic impression was that the claimant has Depression, not otherwise
specified (NOS), and a current and past year Global Assessment of
Functioning Score of 65. (Exhibit 18F).
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV), Fourth Edition, the GAF scale is used to report an individual’s
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overall level of functioning. A rating of 61-70 on the GAF scale would
indicate “some mild symptoms . . . OR some difficulty in social,
occupational, or school functioning . . . but generally functioning pretty
well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationships.”
Dr. Tocci also completed a Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do
Work-Related Activities (Mental) form, and found the claimant has the
following restrictions: no limitation in the ability to understand and
remember simple instructions; no limitation in the ability to carry out
simple instructions; no limitation in the ability to make judgments on
simple work-related decisions; moderate limitation in the ability to
understand and remember complex instructions; moderate limitation in
the ability to carry out complex instructions; moderate limitation in the
ability to make judgments on complex work-related decisions; no
limitation in the ability to interact appropriately with the public; mild
limitation in the ability to interact appropriately with supervisors; mild
limitation in the ability to interact appropriately with co-workers; and
moderate limitation in the ability to respond appropriately in usual work
situations and to changes in a routine work setting. (Exhibit 18F).
In terms of the claimant’s alleged mental impairments, the claimant has
described daily activities which are not limited to the extent one would
expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations. The
detailed VA records indicate that the claimant does not meet the PTSD
criteria and the other disorders of anxiety disorder, NOS, and major
depressive disorder pose only mild occupational limitations. (Exhibit 2F).
Although the claimant has alleged side effects from the use of
medications, the medical records, such as office treatment notes, do not
corroborate these allegations. The claimant is treated for
anxiety/depression, but lives with his girlfriend and attends church. He
testified that he does not go anywhere, but acknowledged that there is
“nowhere to go in Jackson.” The undersigned finds that he is capable of
performing unskilled work.
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The undersigned acknowledges that the claimant’s vocational
rehabilitation counselor noted on January 19, 2010, that it is currently not
feasible for the claimant to participate in training, education, and job
placement. (Exhibit 23F). However, the claimant testified that he has been
put into an extended program with vocational rehabilitation and he wants
to learn how to be a mortician.

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As for the opinion evidence, the undersigned assigns significant weight to
Dr. Tocci’s findings in the consultative psychological evaluation report in
Exhibit 18F. As a psychologist, Dr. Tocci is well qualified to evaluate the
claimant’s impairments and form conclusions regarding his mental
symptoms, conditions, and resulting limitations; and her conclusions are
consistent with and supported by [] substantial evidence contained in the
record, as well as by her own objective clinical examination findings. The
claimant’s representative alleged that Dr. Tocci’s opinion should be given
less weight in part because it is internally inconsistent, inconsistent with
Dr. Dansak’s treatment records in Exhibit 15F, and contrary to Dr. Kidd’s
assessment in Exhibit 19F. (Exhibit 33E). However, the undersigned finds
that Dr. Tocci’s report is not internally inconsistent as alleged, because Dr.
Tocci explained why the results of testing appear to underestimate his
academic achievement and intellectual ability and why the personality
profile was invalid. Dr. Tocci indicated that the claimant reported that he
graduated from high school, obtained a truckers’ license, and was in the
Army and the Army Reserves. However, the scores obtained on the
WRAT-3 and WAIS-IV are not indicative of someone with those
accomplishments. (Exhibit 18F). Dr. Tocci further noted that the claimant
had difficulty concentrating, listening, and focusing on tasks; however, he
appears to have the cognitive ability to learn, complete, and perform
simple tasks. These findings are consistent with her responses in the
Medical Source Statement (Mental) form she completed. Specifically, she
found the claimant has no limitation in the ability to understand and
remember simple instructions; no limitation in the ability to carry out
simple instructions; no limitation in the ability to make judgments on
simple work-related decisions; moderate limitation in the ability to
understand and remember complex instructions; moderate limitation in
the ability to carry out complex instructions; and moderate limitation in
the ability to make judgments on complex work-related decisions. (Exhibit
18F). Dr. Dansak’s treatment records in Exhibit 15F consist of a Mental
Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire dated July 28, 2009, in which
he found that the claimant had marked restriction of activities of daily
living; marked difficulty in maintaining social functioning; frequent
deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in failure to
complete tasks in a timely manner (in a work setting or elsewhere); and
repeated (3) episodes of deterioration or decompensation in a work or
work-like setting which cause the claimant to withdraw from that
situation or to experience exacerbation of signs and symptoms. Based
upon his evaluation of the claimant’s psychiatric status, Dr. Dansak
opined that the claimant has moderate limitation [in his ability] to
understand, carry out, and remember instructions in a work setting;
marked limitation to respond appropriately to supervision in a work
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setting; marked limitation to respond appropriately to co-workers in a
work setting; and mild limitation to perform simple tasks in a work
setting. (Exhibit 15F). The undersigned finds that Dr. Dansak’s opinion in
Exhibit 15F is internally inconsistent in that, for example, he found that
the claimant would have frequent deficiencies of concentration that would
result in failure to complete tasks in a timely manner[,] yet, he only
assigned the claimant moderate limitation in the ability to understand,
carry out, and remember instructions. Additionally, Dr. Dansak’s opinion
is not supported by the substantial evidence of record. Dr. Dansak found
the claimant has repeated (3) episodes of decompensation lasting at least 2
weeks; however, there is no documentation of any such episodes in the
record. Finally, Dr. Dansak’s opinion in Exhibit 15F is not supported by
his own treatment records. Dr. Dansak’s treatment record from July 28,
2009, the date he completed the form in Exhibit 15F, does not reflect
objective findings on examination to support the limitations assigned. For
example, Dr. Dansak observed that the claimant was alert, cooperative,
oriented times four, casually dressed, and adequately groomed. He
reported the claimant had an appropriate affect and a calm and pleasant
mood. Dr. Dansak added that the stream and content of the claimant’s
thoughts were normal, memory and cognition were grossly intact, no
suicidal or homicidal ideas or plans were voiced, and insight and
judgment were good. Dr. Dansak also indicated that the claimant was
receptive to learning. (Exhibit 13F).
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6.
The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20
CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
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7.
The claimant was born on November 16, 1967 and was 38 years
old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged
disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
8.
The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to
communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
9.
Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination
of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a
framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,”
whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41
and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
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10.
Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR
404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).
In determining whether a successful adjustment to other work can be
made, the undersigned must consider the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience in conjunction with the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. If
the claimant can perform all or substantially all of the exertional demands
at a given level of exertion, the medical-vocational rules direct a
conclusion of either “disabled” or “not disabled” depending upon the
claimant’s specific vocational profile (SSR 83-11). When the claimant
cannot perform substantially all of the exertional demands of work at a
given level of exertion and/or has nonexertional limitations, the medicalvocational rules are used as a framework for decisionmaking unless there
is a rule that directs a conclusion of “disabled” without considering the
additional exertional and/or nonexertional limitations (SSRs 83-12 and 8314). If the claimant has solely nonexertional limitations, section 204.00 in
the Medical-Vocational Guidelines provides a framework for
decisionmaking (SSR 85-15).
If the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform the full
range of light work, a finding of “not disabled” would be directed by
Medical-Vocational Rule 202.21. However, the claimant’s ability to
perform all or substantially all of the requirements of this level of work
has been impeded by additional limitations. To determine the extent to
which these limitations erode the unskilled light occupational base, the
undersigned asked the vocational expert whether jobs exist in the national
economy for an individual with the claimant’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity. The vocational expert
testified that given all of these factors the individual would have be able to
perform the requirements of representative occupations such as
cleaner/housekeeper (DOT #323.687-014), with approximately 5,004
available positions in the state of Alabama and approximately 341,370
available positions in the national economy; children’s attendant (DOT
#349.677-018), with approximately 1,005 available positions in the state of
Alabama and approximately 96,123 available positions in the national
economy; [and] security guard (DOT #372.667-034), a semi-skilled job
with approximately 7,213 available positions in the state of Alabama and
approximately 527,680 available positions in the national economy.

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The undersigned notes that the claimant’s representative asked the
vocational expert whether the hypothetical individual could perform any
of the claimant’s past relevant work or any other work that exists in
significant numbers in the national economy with the limitations set forth
in Dr. Dansak’s mental residual functional capacity assessment in Exhibit
15F. The vocational expert responded that the limitations set forth in this
exhibit [would] restrict the individual to less than sedentary work.
However, the undersigned gave little weight to Dr. Dansak’s evaluation,
as discussed above.
Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the vocational expert’s testimony is consistent with
the information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.
Based on the testimony of the vocational expert, the undersigned
concludes that, considering the claimant’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, the claimant is capable of
making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy. A finding of “not disabled” is therefore
appropriate under the framework of the above-cited rule.
11.
The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from March 1, 2006, through the date of this
decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
(Tr. 17, 19, 20, 20-21, 22, 22-23, 25-27, 27 & 28-29 (some emphasis supplied).) The
Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s decision (Tr. 1-3) and thus, the hearing decision
became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.
DISCUSSION
In all Social Security cases, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is
unable to perform his previous work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1986). In
evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden, the examiner must consider the
following four factors: (1) objective medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of
examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age, education and
work history. Id. at 1005. Once the claimant meets this burden, as here, it becomes the
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Commissioner’s burden to prove that the claimant is capable, given his age, education
and work history, of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment which
exists in the national economy. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985).
The task for the Magistrate Judge is to determine whether the Commissioner’s
decision to deny claimant benefits, on the basis that, within the framework of the grids,
he can perform those unskilled light jobs identified by the vocational expert, is
supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as more than a
scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28
L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we must view
the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to
the [Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). 2
In this case, the plaintiff’s sole contention is that the ALJ erred in according more
weight to the opinion of the consulting psychologist than plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist
and by failing to articulate what weight, if any, he was assigning to the opinion of
plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist. (See Doc. 15.)
The Commissioner=s regulations define medical opinions as “statements from
physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments
about the nature and severity of [a claimant=s] impairment(s), including [a claimant=s]

This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal principles,
however, is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).
2

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symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite [the]
impairment(s), and [the claimant=s] physical or mental restrictions.” See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. '
404.1527(a)(2) (2011). The regulations provide that regardless of the source of the
medical opinion, the Commissioner will evaluate every opinion it receives. See, e.g., 20
C.F.R. ' 404.1527(d). In general, the Commissioner will give more weight to the opinion
of a medical source who has examined the claimant than the opinion of a nonexamining source. 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1527(d)(1); see Syrock, supra, 764 F.2d at 835 (“‘The law
is clear that, although the opinion of an examining physician is generally entitled to
more weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician, the ALJ is free to reject the
opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.’”).
In recognition of the Commissioner=s regulations, the Eleventh Circuit has
determined that “the testimony of a treating physician must be given substantial or
considerable weight unless >good cause= is shown to the contrary.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125
F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997).
The ALJ must clearly articulate the reasons for giving less weight to the
opinion of the treating physician, and the failure to do so is reversible
error. We have found “good cause” to exist where the doctor=s opinion
was not bolstered by the evidence, or where the evidence supported a
contrary finding. We have also found good cause where the doctors=
opinions were conclusory or inconsistent with their own medical records.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit requires an ALJ to
“‘state specifically the weight accorded to each item of evidence and why he reached
that decision.’” Reese v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1395, 1397 (11th Cir. 1991), quoting Cowart v.
Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981). Stated differently, in assessing the medical

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evidence in a particular case, an ALJ is “required to state with particularity the weight
he gave the different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825
F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted); see also McNamee v. Social Security
Administration, 164 Fed.Appx. 919, 2006 WL 227586, *3 (11th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006) (“Finally,
‘[i]n assessing the medical evidence the ALJ [is] required to state with particularity the
weight [given] the different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.’”); see Wiggins v.
Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 & 1390 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he opinion of the ALJ in the
present case does not mention Dr. Mracek, let alone reveal what weight, if any, the ALJ
gave to the treating physician=s evidence. . . . The ALJ=s opinion, thus, not only fails to
mention the appellant=s treating physician and the weight, if any, the ALJ gave to the
treating physician=s evidence and opinion, but also strongly suggests that the ALJ did
not accord the opinion of the appellant=s treating physician the weight required by law.
At the very least, we are unable to determine whether the ALJ applied the proper legal
standard and gave the treating physician=s evidence substantial or considerable weight
or found good cause not to do so. If we are to provide the parties with any sort of
meaningful judicial review, we must be able to ascertain whether the ALJ correctly
followed the law. Unable to divine this from the ALJ=s opinion, we must reverse the
district court and remand the case for reconsideration by the ALJ, who should evaluate
all the evidence according to the respective weight required by law and should render a
decision that will provide reviewing courts with the basis for determining that he
applied the correct legal standards.”); cf. Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 872, 880 (11th Cir.

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1986) (“The ALJ must articulate his reasons for not giving weight to the diagnoses
accompanying the test results.”).
In this case, the Court cannot agree with plaintiff that the ALJ erred either in
according more weight to the opinion of the examining psychologist, Dr. Tocci, than to
the opinion of plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Dansak, or in failing to articulate
what weight, if any, he was assigning to Dr. Dansak’s opinion. In this latter regard, it is
certainly implicit in the ALJ’s decision, in rejecting Dr. Dansak’s opinion regarding
plaintiff’s mental RFC in favor of Dr. Tocci’s mental RFC opinion (see Tr. 26-27), that the
ALJ was according Dr. Dansak’s mental RFC assessment little weight (see id.).
Moreover, later in his decision, the ALJ made his implicit determination quite explicit.
(Id. at 28-29 (“The undersigned notes that the claimant’s representative asked the
vocational expert whether the hypothetical individual could perform any of the
claimant’s past relevant work or any other work that exists in significant numbers in the
national economy with the limitations set forth in Dr. Dansak’s mental residual
functional capacity assessment in Exhibit 15F. The vocational expert responded that the
limitations set forth in this exhibit [would] restrict the individual to less than sedentary
work. However, the undersigned gave little weight to Dr. Dansak’s evaluation, as
discussed above.” (emphasis supplied).) In other words, the ALJ stated with the
particularity required of him by the Eleventh Circuit that he was according little weight
to Dr. Dansak’s mental RFC assessment (Tr. 29; see also Tr. 26-27) and, furthermore,
stated that he was assigning significant weight to Dr. Tocci’s mental RFC findings (Tr.
26).
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As for the first prong of plaintiff’s “two-headed” argument, the Court finds that
the ALJ articulated good cause for giving Dr. Dansak’s opinion regarding plaintiff’s
mental RFC less weight than the mental RFC opinion of Dr. Tocci. (See Tr. 26-27.) The
ALJ correctly noted that neither the evidence of record as a whole or Dr. Dansak’s own
findings in his treatment notes support the severity of limitations found by plaintiff’s
treating psychiatrist. (Compare Tr. 948 (Dansak’s July 28, 2009 findings that plaintiff
would have marked limitations in responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers,
and customary work pressures and marked limitations in performing repetitive tasks
and completing work related activities in a normal workday or workweek) with Tr. 1022
(July 29, 2009 medical treatment findings by Dansak included the following objective
findings: “Alert, cooperative, oriented x 4, casually dressed, adequately groomed, affect
appropriate, mood calm and pleasant, stream and content of thought are normal,
memory and cognition are grossly intact, no s/h ideas or plans voiced, insight and
judgment are good.”) and, e.g., Tr. 534-577, 586-590, 593-739, 924-935, 938, 993-997 &
1028-1035.) Accordingly, the Court finds no error in this regard. See Lewis, supra, 125
F.3d at 1440 (“We have found ‘good cause’ to exist where the doctor=s opinion was not
bolstered by the evidence, or where the evidence supported a contrary finding. We have
also found good cause where the doctors= opinions were conclusory or inconsistent with
their own medical records.”).
Because plaintiff raises no other arguments and substantial evidence of record
(see, e.g., Tr. 534-577, 586-590, 593-739, 924-935, 938, 993-997 & 1028-1035) supports the
ALJ's determination that plaintiff can perform those unskilled light jobs identified by
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the vocational expert, the Court finds the ALJ’s fifth-step denial of benefits is due to be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
It is ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying
plaintiff benefits be affirmed.
DONE and ORDERED this the 27th day of December, 2011.
s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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