M.R. et al v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County et al

Filing 94

ORDER denying 72 Motion Abstain and Dismiss. Signed by Chief Judge William H. Steele on 8/30/2012. (tgw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
M.R., et al.,

)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS )
OF MOBILE COUNTY,
)
)
Defendant.
)

CIVIL ACTION 11-0245-WS-C

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s Motion to Abstain and Dismiss (doc.
72). The Motion has been briefed and is now ripe for disposition.
I.

Relevant Background.
This putative class action was brought by eight Mobile County Public School System

students against the Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County (the “Board”). Plaintiffs
allege infringement of their procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In particular, the Amended Complaint alleges that plaintiffs were
“long-term suspended without proper notice or a hearing for minor infractions.” (Doc. 91, ¶ 1.)
The Amended Complaint purports to “challenge[] the custom and practice of many school
administrators in the MCPSS of long-term suspending students without first providing notice …
and hearings so that students and parents can challenge those suspensions, and the Board’s
policy of turning a blind eye to that custom.” (Id., ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs also challenge the Board’s
“supervision, training and monitoring policies and practices” (id.), on the theory that such
policies and practices caused the alleged constitutional deprivation to occur. Plaintiffs seek
injunctive and declaratory relief, but no monetary damages.
On June 19, 2012, more than a year after it filed an Answer (doc. 6), the Board filed its
Motion to Abstain and Dismiss (doc. 72). In that Motion, the Board asks this Court to abstain
from hearing this case and to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to the Younger
abstention doctrine. The Board’s Motion centers on the availability of judicial review of the

challenged disciplinary suspensions in Alabama juvenile courts. In that regard, Alabama law
provides that “[a] juvenile court … shall have original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any
child … [w]here it is alleged that the rights of a child are improperly denied or infringed in
proceedings resulting in suspension, expulsion, or exclusion from a public school.” Ala. Code §
12-15-115(b)(2). There is no question that, pursuant to this statute, an Alabama juvenile court
would have had jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ constitutional claims had they chosen to raise them
in that forum. See, e.g., Dothan City Bd. of Educ. v. V.M.H., 660 So.2d 1328, 1330
(Ala.Civ.App. 1995) (rejecting school board’s challenge to juvenile court jurisdiction where
student was suspended for 10 days, finding that predecessor statute provided for jurisdiction in
such circumstances, and concluding that “[t]o argue otherwise is to engage in sophistry”). There
is likewise no debate that plaintiffs in this case never did seek judicial review in Alabama’s
juvenile courts pursuant to § 12-15-115(b)(2), but instead bypassed that procedure in favor of
initiating judicial proceedings under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge their suspensions in federal
court. The Board maintains that, under these circumstances, the Younger doctrine counsels in
favor of abstention and dismissal of the Amended Complaint with prejudice. Plaintiffs disagree.
II.

Analysis.
A.

Timeliness of Defendant’s Younger Objection.

As a threshold matter, plaintiffs assert that the Motion to Abstain and Dismiss should be
summarily denied because the Board tarried too long before filing it. Plaintiffs correctly note
that considerable discovery (including numerous depositions and extensive document
production) took place and this federal lawsuit proceeded for more than a year before the Board
raised the Younger abstention issue that is the cornerstone of its Motion. Moreover, there is no
question that this argument was available to the Board from the outset of this case. Certainly, the
Board could have raised its Younger abstention argument far sooner than it did. Defendant has
proffered neither explanation nor excuse for this omission.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs’ timeliness objection fails because the Court is aware of no
authority (and plaintiffs cite none) holding or suggesting that Younger abstention is barred on a
timeliness / waiver / laches theory unless it is invoked at the earliest possible moment. This is
not a Rule 12(b)(2) – (5) motion, and plaintiffs have not explained why it should be treated as if
it were. To be sure, plaintiffs state that “abstention under Younger is inappropriate where
‘proceedings of substance on the merits’ have taken place in the federal court.” (Doc. 77, at 2.)
-2-

But this construction skews the correct legal standard. From a timing standpoint, what matters is
whether state court proceedings began before “proceedings of substance on the merits” took
place in federal court, not whether the motion to abstain was filed before such “proceedings of
substance on the merits” occurred in federal court. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) (“Younger abstention is
required … only when state court proceedings are initiated before any proceedings of substance
on the merits have taken place in the federal court.”) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); Old Republic Union Ins. Co. v. Tillis Trucking Co., 124 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.
1997) (similar). Plaintiffs have identified no legal authority extending and importing the Hawaii
Housing standard into the context of evaluating the timeliness of a motion to abstain. Thus,
plaintiffs’ stance that a Younger abstention request is untimely if it is filed after proceedings of
substance on the merits have occurred in federal court appears to be devoid of legal support. For
that reason, the Court rejects plaintiffs’ procedural objection to defendant’s invocation of the
Younger doctrine at this time.1 Just because the Board could have invoked Younger abstention
before now does not mean that it was required to do so, or that its delay in that regard is
tantamount to a waiver.
B.

Merits of Defendant’s Younger Objection.
1.

Overview of Younger Abstention Doctrine.

1

To avoid confusion, the Court notes that the Hawaii Housing standard is satisfied
here, with regard to the relative timing of the state and federal proceedings. As discussed infra,
the Board’s theory is that state judicial proceedings are deemed to be ongoing in this case, as a
matter of law. If state proceedings are deemed to be ongoing, then they were initiated well
before any proceedings of substance on the merits in this federal action. Accordingly, Hawaii
Housing does not support plaintiffs’ timeliness objection. Likewise, the Court finds no merit to
plaintiffs’ suggestion that, insofar as the Motion to Abstain and Dismiss is rooted in Rules
12(b)(1) and (6), it is “procedurally improper because Defendants answered Plaintiffs’
complaint.” (Doc. 77, at 3 n.2.) The Board’s Answer clearly preserves Rule 12(b)(1) and (6)
defenses as its First and Second Affirmative Defenses. (Doc. 6, at 11.) As a result, the Board’s
Motion is fully consistent with Rule 12(b), which provides that “[n]o defense or objection is
waived by joining it with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading.”
Rule 12(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. Under any reasonable analysis, the Board has not waived the right to
seek dismissal of this action on grounds of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.

-3-

The law is clear that “generally, as between state and federal courts, … the pendency of
an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal
court having jurisdiction.” Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, “[f]ederal courts should abstain from exercising their
jurisdiction if doing so would disregard the comity between the States and the National
Government.” Wexler v. Lepore, 385 F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). This doctrine is known as Younger abstention. “The Younger
doctrine … is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a district court to adjudicate a
controversy properly before it.” Green v. Jefferson County Com’n, 563 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th
Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although Younger abstention was
traditionally utilized in the criminal context, “its principles are fully applicable to noncriminal
judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.” 31 Foster Children v. Bush,
329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367-68,
109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) (“NOPSI”) (“our concern for comity and federalism has
led us to expand the protection of Younger beyond state criminal prosecutions, to civil
enforcement proceedings”).2
“A court may abstain from granting injunctive relief under Younger where: (1) the state
proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates an important state interest; and (3) there is
an adequate opportunity to raise a constitutional challenge in the state court proceedings.” Chen
ex rel. V.D. v. Lester, 2010 WL 339789, *4 (11th Cir. Feb. 1, 2010); see also 31 Foster Children,
329 F.3d at 1274 (identifying these same factors as governing determination of whether Younger
abstention applies). Plaintiffs’ opposition to the Motion to Abstain focuses on the first factor;
indeed, there appears to be no colorable basis in fact or law for disputing that the second and
third factors are satisfied here.3
2

In light of these clear, binding holdings that Younger abstention is properly
extended to the civil context, plaintiffs’ contention that defendants are attempting “to stretch
Younger beyond its logical bounds” because there is no “pending state criminal prosecution”
(doc. 77, at 8) is inaccurate and unavailing.
3

To be sure, plaintiffs do assert that the ongoing state-court juvenile proceedings
“do not implicate Alabama’s interest in the administration of its judicial system.” (Doc. 77, at
(Continued)
-4-

2.

The “Ongoing State Proceeding” Requirement.

Again, Younger abstention is appropriate in a civil case only where there is an ongoing
state proceeding. As a factual matter, there is no “ongoing state proceeding” at this time.
Plaintiffs did not file judicial actions in Alabama juvenile courts, although they could have done
so pursuant to Alabama Code § 12-15-115(b)(2). Nonetheless, the Board contends that this
requirement is satisfied here because the completed administrative proceedings and the
availability of state judicial review are properly viewed in the aggregate as a single unitary
proceeding for Younger purposes. Under the “unitary proceeding” rationale, the state proceeding
is still ongoing because plaintiffs have not seen it through to conclusion of the state judicial
review proceedings. Plaintiffs ridicule this argument, scoffing that “Defendants invoke a
hypothetical lawsuit to justify the application of a nonexistent rule.” (Doc. 77, at 1.) In

8.) But plaintiffs do not elaborate on this remark. At any rate, the Court readily finds that this
case involves just the kind of important state interest that may justify Younger abstention. See,
e.g., 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1275 (second factor satisfied where state proceedings
involved dependency petitions relating to foster children); Chen, 2010 WL 339789, at *4
(“Because family relations and matters of child custody are important state interests, the second
… factor is satisfied.”); Hudson v. Campbell, 663 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir. 2011) (“important state
interest” criterion for Younger abstention satisfied because “Missouri Medicaid has an important
interest in administering benefits in a manner that ensures that those of its citizens who are in
need of and who are eligible for those benefits receive them”); see generally Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 213, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (“Providing public schools ranks at the
very apex of the function of a State.”). Plaintiffs’ argument appears to rest on the premise that
the only state interests that matter for Younger abstention purposes are those relating to
administration of the state judicial system. This is incorrect. See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 364 (all
that is required is “that the State have a legitimate, substantial interest in its pending
proceedings”); 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1275 (“Proceedings necessary for the vindication
of important state policies or for the functioning of the state judicial system … evidence the
state’s substantial interest in the litigation.”) (citation omitted and emphasis added); San Jose
Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Committee v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d
1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “[t]he importance of the interest is measured by
considering its significance broadly, rather than by focusing on the state’s interest in the
resolution of an individual’s case,” and indicating that preserving the integrity of horse racing is
an example of an important state interest justifying Younger abstention) (citations omitted). In
short, plaintiffs cannot reasonably suggest that state proceedings relating to discipline of
Alabama public school students do not implicate important state interests for Younger abstention
purposes.

-5-

actuality, however, the Board’s position is much stronger – and is backed by much more
authoritative heft – than plaintiffs’ dismissive, off-the-cuff rejoinder admits.
The First, Third, Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have all adopted the “unitary
proceeding” reasoning touted by the Board to deem state proceedings ongoing as a matter of law
for Younger purposes where state judicial review is available from a final administrative
proceeding, even where a plaintiff has not availed itself of that judicial review mechanism. See
Hudson v. Campbell, 663 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Missouri law provides for
administrative, circuit court, and appellate review of Medicaid eligibility decisions, …, remedies
that Hudson has not yet exhausted, and thus Hudson’s underlying state proceeding is ongoing”
for Younger abstention purposes); Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Wilson, 519 F.3d 156, 167 (4th
Cir. 2008) (“we hold that whereas here Laurel seeks to invalidate a state judgment [entered via
administrative order] by filing a federal action and circumventing state-court judicial remedies,
the state proceedings remain ‘pending’ within the meaning of Younger abstention.”); MaymoMelendez v. Alvarez-Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Younger now has to be read as
treating the state process … as a continuum from start to finish.”); Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149
F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that Younger precludes federal intervention in state
appellate proceedings when a state court loser files a federal suit in lieu of appealing the decision
to a state appellate court, and that although “the proceedings here are administrative, not
judicial,” that is “a distinction without a difference”); O’Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d
785, 791 (3rd Cir. 1994) (holding that “state proceedings remain ‘pending,’ within the meaning of
Younger abstention, in cases … where a coercive administrative proceeding has been initiated by
the State in a state forum, where adequate state-court judicial review of the administrative
determination is available to the federal claimants, and where the claimants have chosen not to
pursue their state-court judicial remedies, but have instead sought to invalidate the State’s
judgment by filing a federal action”). This reasoning represents the majority view on the subject.
See, e.g., San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Committee v. City of
San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2008) (characterizing as the “majority rule” the
proposition “that the administrative proceeding and the possibility for state court review are to be
viewed as one unitary proceeding”).
In response, plaintiffs do not argue that the majority view is misguided, nor do they make
any showing that the Eleventh Circuit has not adhered or has signaled that it would not adhere to
-6-

that majority view.4 They do not indicate that the majority view cases are wrongly decided, and
do not urge this Court to find that the minority view is better reasoned or more persuasive.
Given the paucity of briefing on this point, the Court declines to wade into that morass sua
sponte, but will accept the majority rule espoused by the O’Neill line of precedents as supplying
the rule of decision herein.5
In response to the O’Neill line of cases, plaintiffs state in conclusory fashion that those
authorities are distinguishable because they “involved state judicial or quasi-judicial
administrative proceedings where Younger abstention would at least arguably have been
appropriate.” (Doc. 77, at 5.) Plaintiffs provide the Court with no indication of what they mean
by “quasi-judicial administrative proceedings,” nor do they articulate why the school disciplinary
proceedings at issue here would not fall into that category. For that matter, plaintiffs do not even
4

To be sure, plaintiffs assert that “controlling 11th Circuit precedent is consistent
with the position that Younger abstention is not appropriate where no state case is pending
following a final decision by a state administrative agency.” (Doc. 77, at 5.) The Eleventh
Circuit has never said that; indeed, plaintiffs identify no binding precedent in which that tribunal
has even hinted at such a result. Nor do plaintiffs point to any Eleventh Circuit reasoning that
they maintain is in any way inconsistent with the majority rule as set forth by the five appellate
courts identified by the Board and discussed supra. Simply put, the Court has no reason to
believe – and plaintiffs have offered none – that the Eleventh Circuit would break rank with the
majority of its brethren on this question.
5

More than two decades ago, the Supreme Court declined to rule definitively on
the issue. See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 369 (where city council argued that “the litigation, from
agency through courts, is to be viewed as a unitary process that should not be disrupted, so that
federal intervention is no more permitted at the conclusion of the administrative stage than
during it,” stating that “[w]e will assume, without deciding, that this is correct”). Similarly, here,
plaintiffs do not ask this Court to determine the legal validity of the “unitary proceeding” theory
of Younger abstention, much less offer cogent arguments championing the minority view. At
best, plaintiffs merely list a few of the minority-rule precedents in a footnote, with no discussion
or analysis. (Doc. 77, at 5 n.4.) Federal courts do not develop parties’ legal arguments for them.
See, e.g., Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1284 (11th Cir. 2011) (“district courts cannot
concoct or resurrect arguments neither made nor advanced by the parties”); Continental Motors,
Inc. v. Jewell Aircraft, Inc., --- F. Supp.2d ----, 2012 WL 3113136, *5 n.13 (S.D. Ala. July 31,
2012) (“Continental has not made or developed such an argument, and this Court cannot and will
not do so on a litigant’s behalf.”). Given plaintiffs’ election not to contest the validity of the
majority rule in any meaningful way, this Court will accept and apply the O’Neill line of
authorities (i.e., the majority rule), without embarking on a sua sponte analysis of which
competing line of precedent is more persuasive.

-7-

explain why, under Younger, they believe the character of the administrative proceedings
matters. Such a fragmentary, undeveloped argument does not form a viable basis for opposing
the Motion to Abstain in this case. See generally Pears v. Mobile County, 645 F. Supp.2d 1062,
1081 n.27 (S.D. Ala. 2009) (“The parties … cannot be heard to balk if the undersigned does not
perform their research and develop their arguments for them.”); York v. Day Transfer Co., 525 F.
Supp.2d 289, 301 n.10 (D.R.I. 2007) (“It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in
the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the
argument, and put flesh on its bones.”) (citation omitted); Federal Ins. Co. v. County of
Westchester, 921 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Under the adversary system, it is
counsel’s responsibility to explain why these points have legal merit; the Court does not serve as
counsel’s law clerk.”).6
Next, plaintiffs cite Eleventh Circuit authorities and assert that “[i]n each of these cases, a
case in state court was already under way or decided but available to appeal, which was a
necessary ground for Younger abstention.” (Doc. 77, at 6.) Plaintiffs may well have accurately
characterized the procedural posture of these cases. But they have not explained why that
posture mattered. In other words, they have presented neither argument nor authority supporting
their proposition that an actual state judicial proceeding being underway as a factual matter is “a
6

Reading between the lines, it appears that plaintiffs may be attempting to exploit
the remedial/coercive distinction addressed in certain quarters of the case law. See, e.g., Brown
ex rel. Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882, 888 n.5 (10th Cir. 2009) (“we will use the dichotomy
between remedial and coercive administrative proceedings … as the touchstone for determining
whether the administrative proceeding is the type of proceeding that merits Younger abstention.
We prefer the coercive/remedial distinction because our sister circuits tend to use that
articulation.”). But federal appellate courts are far from unanimous in ascribing dispositive
significance to whether the state proceedings are coercive or remedial. Just last year, for
example, the Eighth Circuit clarified its position that “[a]lthough we have recognized the
existence of the coercive-remedial distinction in other of our abstention cases …, we have not
considered the distinction to be outcome determinative,” and noted that it has “afforded Younger
deference to the state administrative proceedings without classifying the proceeding as coercive
or remedial.” Hudson, 663 F.3d at 987-88. Plaintiffs have not articulated reasoning or
explanation for any of the following: (i) why, as a matter of law, the coercive/remedial
framework properly applies here; (ii) on which side of the coercive/remedial line the underlying
state proceedings in this case rest, and why; and (iii) what the nature, form and content of the
state administrative proceedings were, so that a reasoned determination could be made as to
whether said proceedings are properly classified as coercive or remedial. What plaintiffs have
provided, instead, is only the barest shell of an argument.

-8-

necessary ground for Younger abstention.” Certainly, plaintiffs do not point to holdings or dicta
by the Eleventh Circuit suggesting that in the absence of an actual, live state-court judicial
proceeding, Younger abstention does not apply. And, as discussed supra, they offer no reason to
believe that the Eleventh Circuit would not adopt the “unitary proceeding” notion that the
majority of appellate courts have embraced to find the “ongoing proceeding” requirement
satisfied where, as here, the administrative proceeding is completed and the plaintiff has a right
to invoke state judicial review, but instead files a § 1983 action in federal court. Thus, merely
stating (as plaintiffs do) that, to date, the Eleventh Circuit has addressed Younger abstention only
in cases where a state-court judicial proceeding is underway or already decided tells us nothing
about whether the Eleventh Circuit does or would confine its use of the Younger doctrine to that
procedural context, when so many of its sister courts have expanded it to embrace the very set of
circumstances presented in this case.
For all of these reasons, the Court agrees with the Board that there is an ongoing state
proceeding, inferred as a matter of law on a “unitary proceeding” theory, for Younger abstention
purposes because plaintiffs could have obtained judicial review of the challenged disciplinary
proceedings in Alabama’s juvenile courts, but chose to come to federal court instead.
3.

The “Undue Interference” Requirement.

Plaintiffs’ fallback position is that, even if ongoing state judicial proceedings are deemed
to exist (as the Court has found), Younger abstention remains unwarranted because this action
would not unduly interfere with the state proceedings. After careful consideration of the parties’
arguments, the Court agrees with plaintiffs that the “undue interference” prerequisite to
abstention is not satisfied here.
“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that the [Younger] abstention doctrine is not
triggered in a civil context unless the federal injunction requested would create an undue
interference with state proceedings.” Green, 563 F.3d at 1251 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1276 (“we join our sister circuits in
explicitly stating that an essential part of the first … factor in Younger abstention analysis is
whether the federal proceeding will interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding. If there is
no interference, then abstention is not required.”). The Eleventh Circuit has found the requisite
quantum of interference to trigger Younger abstention when “plaintiffs are seeking relief that
would interfere with the ongoing state … proceedings by placing decisions that are now in the
-9-

hands of the state courts under the direction of the federal district court.” 31 Foster Children,
329 F.3d at 1278 (first factor satisfied where requested declaratory judgment and injunction
would take responsibility for state’s child dependency proceedings away from state courts and
place it under federal court control). “The relief sought need not directly interfere with an
ongoing proceeding … in order for Younger abstention to be required.” Id. at 1276.
Plaintiffs argue that Younger abstention is inappropriate because this “undue
interference” requirement is not satisfied here. In their view, nothing about the pendency of this
federal § 1983 action would inhibit or prevent state courts from hearing any claims that plaintiffs
may put before them, and no remedy contemplated in this case would culminate in federal
oversight of or infringement on state court functions. The Board counters that the “undue
interference” prerequisite to Younger abstention is satisfied here because “Duplicative Legal
Proceedings Interfere With State Judicial Proceedings.” (Doc. 78, at 3.) In other words,
defendant claims that the mere existence of duplication, by itself, is tantamount to undue
interference.7 Unquestionably, the concern that duplicative legal proceedings might reflect
negatively on state courts’ ability to resolve constitutional issues was an animating force behind
the Younger doctrine.8 But duplication of proceedings does not constitute per se undue
interference for purposes of the Younger doctrine. The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that
“[t]he Younger doctrine does not require abstention merely because a federal plaintiff, alleging a
constitutional violation in federal court, filed a claim under state law, in state court, on the same
7

Defendant makes this point explicit in its principal brief, wherein it argues as
follows: “[H]ad the Plaintiffs filed Petitions in Juvenile Court, they could have sought the
identical constitutional relief it now seeks [sic] in Federal Court. Thus, the decree being
requested by the Plaintiffs in the Federal proceedings inevitably would interfere with those
ongoing juvenile proceedings.” (Doc. 72, at 5-6 (internal marks and emphasis omitted).)
8

See, e.g., Village of DePue, Ill. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 537 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir.
2008) (“The rule in Younger … is concerned with preventing duplicative legal proceedings …
and the negative implication that state courts are unable to enforce constitutional principles.”)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 971-72
(9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that Younger abstention is concerned with interference that “results
in duplicative legal proceedings, and can readily be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the
state courts’ ability to enforce constitutional principles”) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); Hayse v. Wethington, 110 F.3d 18, 20 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that federal intervention
in state proceedings as to which appellate review has not been completed is “a direct aspersion
on the capabilities and good faith of state appellate courts”) (citation omitted).

-10-

underlying facts.” Wexler, 385 F.3d at 1340. In Wexler, the district court did what the Board
urges this Court to do here, to-wit: made a finding “that the relief sought by Appellants would
directly interfere with the state proceeding: seemingly by potentially rendering moot the state
proceeding.” Id. at 1341. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that there was no undue
interference inherent in the pendency of parallel state and federal proceedings because “[a]
dispositive decision by either court does not offend the respectful relationship between state and
federal courts, nor would it place the district court in the role of supervisor of state litigation or
the state court.” Id.; see also NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 373 (“It is true, of course, that the federal
court’s disposition of such a case may well affect, or for practical purposes pre-empt, a … statecourt action. But there is no doctrine that the availability or even the pendency of state judicial
proceedings excludes the federal courts.”). Contrary to the Board’s argument, mere duplication
of proceedings between federal and state courts does not constitute the sort of interference that
suffices to show “undue interference” in a Younger abstention analysis.
Binding precedent is clear: The kind of interference that matters for Younger purposes is
that which jeopardizes the comity between state courts and federal courts. Again, the basic
function of this doctrine is that of “preventing federal courts from being the grand overseers of
state courts and court-like administration.” Wexler, 385 F.3d at 1341; see also Joseph A. ex rel.
Corrine Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1271 (10th Cir. 2002) (Younger abstention is designed
to avoid “an ongoing federal audit of state … proceedings” or a decision that “would have the
effect of a federal court telling a state court how to run an ongoing criminal prosecution”)
(citations omitted). That is to say, the kind of interference with which Younger is concerned is
not the possibility that a federal court might moot a pending state proceeding by beating a state
court to the punch on an issue that is pending before both of them in parallel proceedings, but is
rather the entry of federal rulings that “usurp the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial
functions.” Wexler, 385 F.3d at 1341 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the
bare existence of a parallel state action does not warrant Younger abstention “unless the
requested federal relief would result in meticulous and burdensome federal oversight of state

-11-

court or court-like functions.” Id. at 1340. This is not such a case; therefore, the “undue
interference” requirement is not satisfied, and Younger abstention is unavailable.9
III.

Conclusion.
Upon careful review of the relief requested by plaintiffs and the effect that such relief (if

granted) would have on state court proceedings, the Court concludes that this action does not and
would not have the effect of unduly interfering in state proceedings. The requested federal relief
would not render federal courts the grand overseers of Alabama juvenile courts and court-like
administration. It would not usurp state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions. And it
would not inevitably interfere with state court proceedings. Accordingly, the comity principles
undergirding Younger abstention are not implicated here. Under these circumstances, this Court
declines to apply that “extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a district court to
adjudicate a controversy properly before it.” Green, 563 F.3d at 1251 (citations omitted). For all
of these reasons, defendant’s Motion to Abstain and Dismiss (doc. 72) is denied.
9

In arguing otherwise, the Board would liken this case to 31 Foster Children v.
Bush via a conclusory statement that “Plaintiffs’ federal proceedings would interfere with the
state juvenile proceedings by fundamentally changing the disposition and oversight of children.”
(Doc. 72, at 6.) This case bears not even passing resemblance to 31 Foster Children. If
plaintiffs prevail on their federal constitutional claims, then the Board will be subject to a federal
injunction requiring it to provide written notice and a hearing to students before imposing longterm suspensions. Neither this Court nor any other would be intruding on those proceedings in
individual cases, stripping state courts of their authority to decide them, or telling state courts
what to do. By contrast, in 31 Foster Children, the relief requested would have “tak[en] the
responsibility for a state’s child dependency proceedings away from state courts and put[] it
under federal court control.” 329 F.3d at 1279. Specifically, the requested declaratory and
injunctive relief would have effectively resulted in federal courts making approval and
amendment decisions concerning a particular child’s case plan, even though state law conferred
authority on state courts to approve, monitor and amend the plans. Id. at 1278. Moreover, the 31
Foster Children plaintiffs wanted “to have the district court appoint a panel and give it authority
to implement a systemwide plan to revamp and reform dependency proceedings in Florida, as
well as the appointment of a permanent children’s advocate to oversee that plan.” Id. at 1279.
The relief sought by plaintiffs in this case is far less intrusive than the sweeping shift of control
from state to federal courts that was contemplated in 31 Foster Children. More to the point, the
relief requested by plaintiffs here simply does not implicate the comity concerns that underlie the
Younger doctrine. Comity does not require that federal courts yield to state courts as a matter of
course whenever the same constitutional issue is presented to both. And nothing about the relief
sought here would constitute the kind of invasive, disruptive federal court oversight or
entanglement in state-court proceedings that constitutes undue interference.

-12-

DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of August, 2012.
s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-13-