Anderson v. Astrue
ORDER granting 18 Motion to Remand; the Commissioner's decision is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42:405(g) for further administrative procedures. Signed by Magistrate Judge Katherine P. Nelson on 7/13/2012. (srr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MICHAEL P. ANDERSON,
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
) CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-00582-N
This action is before the Court on an unopposed motion (doc. 18) filed by the
defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), under sentence four
of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to enter a judgment of remand to the Commissioner for further
administrative proceedings. It is the Commissioner’s professed intent that, on remand,
the Appeals Council will refer the case to an Administrative Law Judge with directions to
obtain vocational expert evidence to clarify the effect of all assessed limitations on the
claimant’s occupational base and resolve any conflicts between the vocational expert’s
testimony and information contained in the U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (4th ed. 1991). See Doc. 18 at 1. The Court is advised that the
plaintiff has no objection to this requested relief. This action has been referred to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R.Civ.Pro.73 (doc. 20) and pursuant to
the consent of the parties (doc. 19).
In light of the foregoing, and the plain language of sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) empowering this Court “to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing[,] it is ORDERED that the
Commissioner’s unopposed motion is hereby GRANTED and that the Commissioner’s
decision in this case is hereby REVERSED and the case REMANDED pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for further administrative proceedings. See
Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 90 (1991). The remand pursuant to sentence four of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) makes the plaintiff a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and terminates this Court’s jurisdiction over this
matter. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 298 (1993).
DONE this 13th day of July, 2012.
/s/ Katherine P. Nelson
KATHERINE P. NELSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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