Waffensmith v. Mora et al

Filing 46

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 42 Motion for Summary JudgmentDENIED,in part,with respect to Plaintiffs declaratory judgment claim (Count 4) and Plaintiffs request for attorneys fees. Because Plaintiff has conceded theslander of title claim (Count 5), summary judgment is GRANTED,in part,withrespect to that claim. Signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr on 4/8/2013. (adk)

IN
 THE
 UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 COURT
 FOR
 THE

SOUTHERN
 DISTRICT
 OF
 ALABAMA

SOUTHERN
 DIVISION

WALTER
 WAFFENSMITH,

Trustee
 of
 the
 WALTER

WAFFENSMITH

REVOCABLE
 TRUST,

12/31/2002,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID
 NATHAN
 MORA,

individually
 and
 d/b/a

ELITE
 YACHT
 COATINGS,

INC.
 and
 GLEN
 GARDEN,

individually
 and
 d/b/a

ELITE
 YACHT
 COATINGS,

INC.,
 and
 ELITE
 YACHT

COATINGS,
 INC.

Defendants,

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CIVIL
 ACTION
 NO.

12-­‐00055-­‐CB-­‐B

 ORDER

This
 matter
 is
 before
 the
 Court
 on
 a
 motion
 for
 partial
 summary
 judgment

filed
 by
 defendant
 David
 Nathan
 Mora
 d/b/a
 Elite
 Yacht
 Coatings,
 Inc.1

 (Doc.
 42.)

Defendant
 seeks
 summary
 judgment
 on
 two
 of
 the
 five
 counts
 asserted
 in
 the

Amended
 Complaint
 (declaratory
 judgment
 and
 slander
 of
 title)
 and
 on
 Plaintiff’s

demand
 for
 attorney’s
 fees.

 In
 response
 (Doc.
 44),
 Plaintiff
 does
 not
 oppose
 the

motion
 on
 the
 slander
 of
 title
 claim,
 but
 he
 argues
 that
 there
 are
 genuine
 issues
 of

1
 Whether
 Elite
 Yacht
 Coatings,
 Inc.
 exists
 as
 a
 separate
 legal
 entity
 is
 unclear.

According
 to
 the
 Amended
 Complaint,
 “it
 is
 not
 known
 if
 such
 entity
 has
 any
 legal

existence.”

 (Doc.
 24
 ¶
 6.)

 The
 Answer
 to
 the
 Amended
 Complaint

 identifies
 “the

Defendant
 David
 Nathan
 Mora,
 individually
 and
 d/b/a
 Elite
 Yacht
 Coatings”
 and
 is

signed
 by
 counsel
 on
 behalf
 of
 David
 Nathan
 Mora
 only.
 (Doc.
 41.)
 For
 the
 most
 part,

the
 summary
 judgment
 briefs
 refer
 to
 the
 two
 as
 one
 defendant.

 The
 Court
 will
 do

the
 same.

material
 fact
 that
 preclude
 summary
 judgment
 as
 to
 the
 declaratory
 judgment
 claim

and
 the
 demand
 for
 attorney’s
 fee.

 After
 due
 consideration
 of
 the
 evidence

presented
 and
 the
 applicable
 law,
 the
 Court
 finds
 summary
 judgment
 is
 not

appropriate
 as
 to
 those
 claims.

Facts2

In
 2009,
 Walter
 Waffensmith,
 as
 Trustee
 of
 Walter
 Waffensmith
 Revocable

Trust
 12/31/2002
 (hereinafter
 “Waffensmith”
 or
 “Plaintiff”),
 obtained
 a
 bid
 from

Nathan
 Mora
 and
 Elite
 Yacht
 Coatings,
 Inc.
 (hereinafter
 “Mora”
 or
 “Defendant”)
 of

Bayou
 La
 Batre,
 Alabama
 to
 perform
 work
 on
 Plaintiff’s
 vessel
 the
 SUMMER
 OF
 ’42,

including
 sandblasting,
 fairing
 and
 painting.
 The
 SUMMER
 OF
 ’42
 was
 located
 in

Jacksonville,
 Florida.
 Waffensmith
 resided
 in
 Minnesota.

 Mora
 had
 been
 a

professional
 boat
 painter
 for
 20
 years
 and
 started
 his
 own
 business,
 Elite
 Yacht

Coatings,
 Inc.
 in
 2005.

 (Mora
 Aff.
 ¶
 2,
 Def.’s
 Ex.
 1,
 Doc.
 42-­‐1.)

 Mora
 learned
 from
 his

then
 son-­‐in-­‐law,
 Glen
 Garden,
 that
 the
 SUMMER
 OF
 ‘42’s
 owner
 was
 looking
 for

someone
 to
 perform
 a
 paint
 job.
 (Id.
 ¶
 3.)
 Garden
 was
 not
 an
 employee
 or
 owner
 of

Elite
 but
 was
 paid
 as
 a
 consultant
 to
 promote
 the
 business
 and
 to
 maintain
 the

company’s
 website.

 (Id.
 ¶
 4.)

Mora
 never
 saw
 the
 SUMMER
 OF
 ’42
 before
 submitting
 a
 bid.

 (Mora
 Dep.
 63,

Pl.’s
 Ex
 C.,
 Doc.
 44-­‐1.)

 He
 prepared
 his
 bid
 based
 on
 photographs
 and
 statements

made
 by
 others
 regarding
 the
 vessel’s
 condition.
 (Mora
 Aff.
 ¶¶
 3-­‐4.)

 When
 Garden

2
 As
 the
 law
 requires,
 the
 facts,
 and
 all
 inferences
 arising
 from
 them,
 are

viewed
 forth
 in
 the
 light
 most
 favorable
 to
 the
 non-­‐moving
 party.
 Merritt
 v.
 Dillard

Paper
 Co.,
 120
 F.3d
 1181,
 1182
 (11th
 Cir.
 1997).

 Moreover,
 only
 those
 facts
 relevant

to
 the
 summary
 judgment
 issues
 are
 set
 out
 in
 this
 order.

 These,
 of
 course,
 may
 not

be
 the
 actual
 facts
 adduced
 at
 trial.

 Id.

2

told
 Mora
 about
 the
 job,
 he
 said
 that
 the
 vessel
 was
 in
 good
 structural
 condition
 and

needed
 a
 routine
 paint
 job.

 (Id.
 ¶3.)

 Waffensmith
 told
 Mora
 that
 the
 vessel
 was
 in

good
 condition
 and
 described
 it
 as
 “My
 Pristine”.
 (Id.
 ¶
 4.)

 Even
 though
 Mora
 “never

laid
 eyes
 on
 the
 vessel”
 until
 after
 the
 bid
 was
 accepted,
 Garden
 told
 Waffensmith
 in

an
 email
 that
 Mora
 had
 gone
 to
 Jacksonville,
 Florida,
 to
 look
 at
 the
 vessel.

 (Id.
 ¶
 7;

Mora
 Dep.
 62-­‐63.)

Defendant’s
 initial
 bid,
 submitted
 May
 28,
 2009,
 was
 $49,000.

 (Pl.’s
 Ex.
 B.)
 In

June
 2009,
 Waffensmith
 came
 to
 Bayou
 La
 Batre
 to
 discuss
 the
 work
 and
 the
 cost.

Waffensmith
 did
 not
 tell
 Mora
 about
 any
 problems
 with
 the
 vessel.

 (Mora
 Aff.
 ¶
 5.)

In
 a
 June
 29,
 2009,
 email
 to
 Defendant,
 Waffensmith
 questioned
 whether
 the
 bid

included
 all
 of
 the
 necessary
 work.3

 (Pl.’s
 Ex.
 B.)

 On
 that
 same
 date,
 Defendant

emailed
 Waffensmith
 a
 revised
 bid
 of
 $51,000,
 with
 an
 estimated
 12-­‐week

timeframe
 for
 completion.

 (Id.)

 Waffensmith
 accepted
 the
 bid,
 the
 vessel
 was

moved
 from
 Jacksonville
 to
 Bayou
 La
 Batre,
 and
 work
 commenced
 in
 July
 2009.

(Mora
 Aff.
 ¶
 7.)

The
 work
 did
 not
 go
 as
 expected
 because
 the
 vessel
 had
 problems
 that

Defendant
 had
 not
 anticipated.

 These
 problems
 required
 additional
 work
 that

Defendant
 believed
 was
 outside
 the
 scope
 of
 the
 contract.

 (Id.
 ¶¶
 9,
 13-­‐15,
 27.)

Defendant
 worked
 on
 the
 vessel
 for
 approximately
 6
 months,
 at
 which
 point
 Plaintiff

hired
 other
 contractors
 to
 finish
 the
 job.

 (Id.
 31-­‐32.)

 Defendant
 asserts
 that
 Plaintiff

3
 Specifically,
 Waffensmith

 was
 “concerned
 that
 we
 are
 not
 all
 talking
 about

the
 same
 project”
 and
 pointed
 out
 that
 other
 bidders
 “were
 concerned
 about
 rust

along
 vertical
 walls
 that
 might
 go
 below
 the
 deck
 line.”

 He
 did
 not
 know
 if

“[p]erhaps
 the
 others
 were
 jerking
 [him]
 .
 .
 .
 or
 perhaps
 they
 know
 of
 think

something
 needs
 to
 be
 done
 and
 you
 don’t
 agree.”

 (Pl.’s
 Ex.
 B,
 Doc.
 44-­‐1.)

3

authorized
 the
 additional
 work,
 but
 Plaintiff
 disputes
 this
 assertion.4

 Mora

estimates
 that
 Defendant
 is
 owed
 approximately
 $101,826
 for
 additional
 work
 on

Plaintiff’s
 vessel.
 (Mora
 Aff.,
 Doc.
 42-­‐1,
 ¶
 42.)

 In
 June
 2011,
 Defendant
 filed
 a
 Notice

of
 Claim
 of
 Lien
 against
 the
 SUMMER
 OF
 ’42
 in
 the
 amount
 of
 $95,697.36.5
 (Pl.’s
 Ex.

E,
 Doc.
 44-­‐1.)

On
 January
 30,
 2012,
 Waffensmith
 filed
 the
 instant
 action
 in
 admiralty
 and
 in

personam
 against
 David
 N.
 Mora,
 Elite
 Yacht
 Coatings,
 Inc.
 and
 Glen
 Garden.6

 The

complaint
 was
 subsequently
 amended
 to
 substitute
 “Walter
 Waffensmith,
 as

Trustee
 of
 Walter
 Waffensmith
 Revocable
 Trust
 12/31/2002”
 as
 plaintiff
 in
 place
 of

Walter
 Waffensmith,
 individually.

 The
 Amended
 Complaint
 asserts
 claims
 for

breach
 of
 contract,
 negligence,
 breach
 of
 warranty
 (Counts
 1-­‐
 3)
 and
 slander
 of
 title

(Count
 5).

 Plaintiff
 also
 seeks
 a
 declaratory
 judgment
 (Count
 4)
 that
 the
 maritime

lien
 filed
 by
 Defendants
 “against
 the
 M/V
 SUMMER
 OF
 ’42
 was
 filed
 in
 bad
 faith,
 is

void,
 invalid
 and
 of
 no
 effect”
 and
 that
 the
 lien
 be
 removed.

 Finally,
 Plaintiff
 seeks

recovery
 of
 attorney’s
 fees
 pursuant
 to
 46
 U.S.C.
 §
 31343(c)(2).

 Defendant
 has
 filed

a
 counterclaim
 against
 Plaintiff
 to
 recover
 payment
 for
 work
 performed
 on
 the

vessel.

4
 Plaintiff
 cites
 Waffensmith’s
 deposition
 testimony
 as
 evidence
 that
 Plaintiff

did
 not
 authorize
 anything
 beyond
 the
 agreement
 (Pl.’s
 Ex.
 H,
 Doc.
 44-­‐1),
 but

Defendants
 argue
 that
 the
 cited
 testimony
 is
 insufficient.

 The
 Court,
 for
 reasons

discussed
 infra
 at
 7,
 finds
 this
 evidence
 is
 sufficient
 for
 summary
 judgment

purposes.

5
 It
 is
 not
 clear
 to
 the
 Court
 why
 lien
 amount
 is
 different
 from
 the
 amount

Mora
 claims
 he
 is
 owed.

 Furthermore,
 the
 figures
 provided
 in
 Mora’s
 affidavit
 do

not
 appear
 to
 take
 into
 account
 payments
 made
 by
 the
 Plaintiff.

 These
 apparent

inconsistencies
 are
 simply
 a
 matter
 of
 curiosity
 and
 have
 no
 impact
 on
 the
 outcome

of
 the
 summary
 judgment
 motion.

6
 It
 appears
 that
 Garden
 has
 never
 been
 served.

4

Summary
 Judgment
 Standard

Summary
 judgment
 should
 be
 granted
 only
 if
 "there
 is
 no
 issue
 as
 to
 any

material
 fact
 and
 the
 moving
 party
 is
 entitled
 to
 a
 judgment
 as
 a
 matter
 of
 law."

Fed.
 R.
 Civ.
 P.
 56(c).

 The
 party
 seeking
 summary
 judgment
 bears
 "the
 initial
 burden

to
 show
 the
 district
 court,
 by
 reference
 to
 materials
 on
 file,
 that
 there
 are
 no
 genuine

issues
 of
 material
 fact
 that
 should
 be
 decided
 at
 trial."

 Clark
 v.
 Coats
 &
 Clark,
 Inc.,

929
 F.2d
 604,
 608
 (11th
 Cir.
 1991).

 Once
 the
 moving
 party
 has
 satisfied
 his

responsibility,
 the
 burden
 shifts
 to
 the
 nonmoving
 party
 to
 show
 the
 existence
 of
 a

genuine
 issue
 of
 material
 fact.

 Id.

 On
 summary
 judgment
 review,
 “the
 facts-­‐-­‐as

supported
 by
 the
 evidence
 in
 the
 record-­‐-­‐and
 reasonable
 inferences
 from
 those

facts”
 must
 be
 viewed
 in
 the
 light
 most
 favorable
 to
 the
 nonmoving
 party.

 Young
 v.

City
 of
 Palm
 Bay,
 Florida,
 358
 F.3d
 859,
 860
 (11th
 Cir.
 2004).

Legal
 Analysis

Declaratory
 Judgment/Maritime
 Lien

In
 his
 summary
 judgment
 motion,
 Defendant
 asserts
 that
 Plaintiff
 cannot

maintain
 a
 declaratory
 judgment
 claim
 because
 “[a]s
 a
 contractor
 who
 provided

repair
 services
 to
 the
 MV
 Summer
 of
 42,
 and
 was
 not
 fully
 paid
 for
 his
 services,

Defendant
 has
 a
 maritime
 lien
 against
 the
 vessel.”

 (Def.’s
 Brf.,
 Doc.
 42-­‐7,
 3.)

 Under

the
 maritime
 lien
 statutes,
 “a
 person
 providing
 necessaries
 to
 a
 vessel
 on
 the
 order

of
 the
 owner
 or
 a
 person
 authorized
 by
 the
 owner.
 .
 .
 has
 a
 maritime
 lien
 on
 the

vessel;
 [
 ]
 may
 bring
 a
 civil
 action
 in
 rem
 to
 enforce
 the
 lien,
 and
 [
 ]is
 not
 required
 to

allege
 or
 prove
 in
 the
 action
 that
 credit
 was
 given
 to
 the
 vessel.”

 42
 U.S.C.
 §
 31342.

5

But
 a
 vessel
 owner
 has
 the
 right
 to
 seek
 a
 declaratory
 judgment
 that
 the
 vessel
 is
 not

subject
 to
 the
 lien.

 The
 district
 courts
 of
 the
 United
 States
 shall
 have
 jurisdiction
 over
 a

civil
 action
 in
 Admiralty
 to
 declare
 that
 a
 vessel
 is
 not
 subject
 to
 a
 lien

claimed
 under
 subsection
 (b)
 of
 this
 section,
 or
 that
 the
 vessel
 is
 not

subject
 to
 the
 notice
 of
 claim
 of
 lien,
 or
 both,
 regardless
 of
 the
 amount

in
 controversy
 or
 the
 citizenship
 of
 the
 parties.

46
 U.S.C.
 §
 31343(c)(2).

 The
 maritime
 lien
 statutes
 create
 a
 presumption
 in
 favor
 of

the
 supplier
 or
 contractor,
 so
 that
 the
 owner
 has
 the
 burden
 to
 show
 the
 services

were
 not
 authorized.

 See
 Belcher
 Oil
 Co.
 v.
 M/V
 Gardenia,
 766
 F.2d
 1508,
 1513
 (11th

Cir.
 1985).

In
 response
 to
 the
 summary
 judgment
 motion,
 Plaintiff
 points
 to
 his
 own

deposition
 testimony
 as
 evidence
 that
 he
 did
 not
 authorize
 additional
 work:

Q

A

Q

A

Q

A

Okay.

 Looking
 at
 your
 email
 to
 Vickie
 on
 the
 26th.

(Witness
 examines
 the
 document.)

The
 one
 at
 the
 top.

 And
 you
 say
 you
 never
 authorized
 him
 to

do
 anything
 beyond
 that
 agreement.

 That’s
 your
 position.

Yeah.

Okay.

 And
 so
 what
 did
 you
 –
 When
 you
 received
 the
 invoice

back
 on
 the
 19th
 or
 the
 20th,
 this
 is
 six
 days
 later,
 your
 response

was
 to
 tell
 him
 that
 you’d
 never
 authorized
 any
 additional

work?

Yeah.

 Particularly
 not
 without
 talking
 about
 it
 ahead
 of
 time,

yeah.

(Waffensmith
 Dep.
 126,
 Pl.’s
 Ex.
 H,
 Doc.
 44-­‐1.)

Defendant
 contends
 that
 this
 evidence
 does
 not
 create
 an
 issue
 of
 fact,

though
 it
 is
 not
 clear
 why.

 The
 argument
 is
 as
 follows:

6

The
 Plaintiff
 has
 not
 contested
 Defendant’s
 statement
 that
 he
 notified

the
 Plaintiff
 about
 the
 need
 for
 the
 repairs
 nor
 has
 he
 denied
 that

Plaintiff
 responded
 [by
 telling
 him
 to
 “fix
 it”].

 Instead
 the
 Plaintiff

merely
 points
 out
 that,
 in
 his
 own
 deposition,
 the
 Plaintiff
 answered

affirmatively
 when
 asked
 whether
 it
 was
 his
 po[si]tion
 that
 he
 never

authorized
 the
 Defendant
 to
 do
 anything
 beyond
 the
 contractual

allegation.

 This
 allegation
 is
 insufficient
 to
 defeat
 summary
 judgment.

(Def.’s
 Reply
 Brf.
 9,
 Doc.
 45.)

 Defendant
 next
 cites
 several
 cases
 in
 support
 of
 the

well-­‐established
 summary
 judgment
 rule
 that
 once
 the
 moving
 party
 has
 met
 its

burden
 on
 summary
 judgment
 the
 nonmoving
 party
 cannot
 rely
 on
 mere
 allegation

but
 must
 offer
 evidence
 to
 support
 its
 claim.7

 Here,
 Plaintiff
 has
 met
 this
 burden.

Plaintiff
 has
 offered
 deposition
 testimony,
 which
 is
 an
 acceptable
 method
 of

supporting
 a
 factual
 position
 on
 summary
 judgment.

 See
 Fed.
 R
 Civ.
 P.

56(c)(1)(A)(“party
 asserting
 that
 a
 fact
 cannot
 be
 or
 is
 genuinely
 disputed
 must

support
 the
 assertion
 by
 .
 .
 .
 citing
 to
 particular
 parts
 of
 materials
 in
 the
 record,

including
 depositions…”).
 Defendant’s
 argument
 may
 be
 that
 Plaintiff’s
 deposition

testimony
 does
 not
 actually
 refute
 Mora’s
 affidavit
 testimony
 because
 Plaintiff
 did

not
 specifically
 deny
 that
 he
 told
 Mora
 to
 “fix
 it”
 when
 Mora
 told
 him
 about
 the

needed
 repairs.

 If
 so,
 it
 is
 not
 a
 winning
 argument.

 Plaintiff’s
 deposition
 testimony

(i.e.,
 his
 position
 that
 he
 never
 authorized
 the
 any
 work
 beyond
 the
 contract)

certainly
 can
 be
 interpreted
 as
 a
 denial.

 Therefore,
 this
 evidence
 creates
 a
 genuine

7
 In
 each
 of
 the
 cases
 cited
 by
 Defendant,
 the
 nonmoving
 party
 had
 offered
 no

evidence
 to
 refute
 evidence
 presented
 in
 support
 of
 the
 summary
 judgment
 motion.

See,
 e.g.
 Westcap
 Government
 Securities,
 Inc.
 v.
 Homestead
 Air
 Force
 Base
 Fed.
 Credit

Union,
 697
 F.2d
 911
 (11th
 Cir.
 1983)
 (only
 evidence
 on
 point
 was
 moving
 party’s

“uncontroverted
 affidavit”);
 In
 re
 Royal
 Caribbean
 Cruises
 Ltd.,
 403
 F.
 Supp.
 2d
 1168,

1173
 (S.D.
 Fla.
 2008)
 (nonmoving
 party
 “failed
 to
 put
 forth
 any
 evidence”
 to
 refute

affidavit
 submitted
 by
 moving
 party);
 Gantt
 v.
 Whirlpool
 Fin.
 Nat’l
 Bank,
 2000
 WL

1375298
 (S.D.
 Ala.
 Aug.
 22,
 2000)
 (plaintiff
 failed
 to
 come
 forward
 with
 evidence
 to

refute
 defendant’s
 affidavit).

7

issue
 of
 material
 fact.

 See
 Hunt
 v.
 Cromartie,
 526
 U.S.
 541
 (1999)
 (summary

judgment
 inappropriate
 where
 evidence
 is
 susceptible
 to
 different
 interpretations

or
 inferences).

Attorney’s
 Fees

Defendants
 argue
 that
 Plaintiff
 will
 not
 be
 entitled
 to
 an
 award
 of
 attorney’s

fees
 even
 if
 Plaintiff
 prevails
 because
 Defendant’s
 position
 in
 this
 action
 is

“substantially
 justified.”

 In
 an
 action
 to
 declare
 that
 a
 vessel
 is
 not
 subject
 to
 a
 lien,

[t]he
 court
 may
 award
 costs
 and
 attorneys
 fees
 to
 the
 prevailing
 party,
 unless
 the

court
 finds
 that
 the
 position
 of
 the
 other
 party
 was
 substantially
 justified
 or
 other

circumstances
 make
 an
 award
 of
 costs
 and
 attorneys
 fees
 unjust.”

 46
 U.S.C.
 §

31343(c)(2).

 Defendant
 is
 not
 entitled
 to
 summary
 judgment
 on
 this
 issue
 because

the
 factual
 basis
 for
 this
 argument
 is
 disputed.

 Defendant
 argues
 that
 “Defendant

provided
 necessaries
 to
 the
 Plaintiff’s
 vessel
 on
 the
 authority
 of
 the
 Plaintiff
 .
 .
 .

Therefore,
 Defendant
 had
 a
 reasonable
 belief
 in
 law
 and
 fact
 for
 recording
 the

maritime
 lien.”

 (Def.’s
 Reply
 Brf.
 8,
 Doc
 45.)

 As
 discussed,
 supra
 at
 7-­‐8,
 it
 is
 disputed

whether
 Plaintiff
 gave
 authority
 to
 provide
 the
 additional
 work
 on
 which
 the
 lien
 is

apparently
 based.

 Consequently,
 the
 Court
 cannot
 say,
 based
 upon
 the
 summary

judgment
 record,
 that
 Defendant’s
 position
 was
 substantially
 justified.

Conclusion

For
 the
 reasons
 discussed
 above,
 the
 Defendant’s
 motion
 for
 summary

judgment
 is
 DENIED,
 in
 part,
 with
 respect
 to
 Plaintiff’s
 declaratory
 judgment
 claim

(Count
 4)
 and
 Plaintiff’s
 request
 for
 attorney’s
 fees.

 Because
 Plaintiff
 has
 conceded

8

the
 slander
 of
 title
 claim
 (Count
 5),
 summary
 judgment
 is
 GRANTED,
 in
 part,
 with

respect
 to
 that
 claim.

DONE
 and
 ORDERED
 this
 the
 8th
 day
 of
 April,
 2013.

s/Charles
 R.
 Butler,
 Jr.

Senior
 United
 States
 District
 Judge

9