Pritchard v. Astrue

Filing 24

Order entered that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiffs claim for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits be AFFIRMED.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 9/16/2013. (mjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JONATHAN PRITCHARD,

*
*
Plaintiff,
*
*
vs.
*
*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,1
*
Commissioner of Social Security,*
*
Defendant.
*

Civil Action No. 12-00167-B

ORDER
Plaintiff

Jonathan

Pritchard

(hereinafter

“Plaintiff”)

brings this action seeking judicial review of a final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claim for
supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits
under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
401, et seq., and 1381, et seq.
consented
proceedings

to
in

have

the

this

case.

On April 19, 2013, the parties

undersigned
(Doc.

22).

conduct
Thus,

any
the

and
action

all
was

referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order
the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and

1

Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security on February 14, 2013. Pursuant to Rule 25(d), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn W. Colvin
should be
substituted for Michael J. Astrue as the defendant in this suit.
No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason
of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security
1

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (Doc. 23).

Upon careful

consideration of the administrative record and the memoranda of
the

parties,

it

is

hereby

ORDERED

that

the

decision

of

the

Commissioner be AFFIRMED.
I.

Procedural History
Plaintiff

filed

applications

for

supplemental

security

income and disability insurance benefits disability insurance
benefits and alleged that his disability commenced on June 30,
2007. (Tr. 62, 67). His applications were denied on June 18,
2008 (id. at 18), and he timely filed a Request for Hearing on
July 19, 2008. (Id.).
January

7,

2010;

Plaintiff’s initial hearing was held on

however,

Administrative

Law

Judge

David

R.

Murchison (hereinafter “ALJ”) postponed testimony and ordered a
consultative

examination

for

Plaintiff.

(Id.

at

250-53).

A

subsequent hearing was conducted by the ALJ on June 23, 2010.
(Id. at 254).

On June 25, 2010, the ALJ issued an unfavorable

decision finding that Plaintiff is not disabled. (Id. at 15-27).
Plaintiff sought review before the Appeals Council, which denied
his request for review. (Id. at 4).

Thus, the ALJ’s decision

dated

final

June

25,

2010

became

the

decision

of

the

Commissioner. (Id. at 4-6).
Having

exhausted

his

administrative

remedies,

timely filed the present civil action. (Doc. 1).
2

Plaintiff

The parties

waived oral argument and agree that this case is now ripe for
judicial review by this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c)(3).
II.

Issue on Appeal
Whether the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff
does not meet the requirements of Listing
12.03(c)?

III. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born on June 14, 1988, and was 22 years of
age

at

the

Plaintiff

time

of

stopped

his

school

administrative
in

the

ninth

hearing.
grade,

(Tr.

and

257).

subsequent

thereto, he took classes and passed some parts of the GED test;
however, he has not earned his GED. (Id. at 257-58).

At the

June 23, 2010 administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that
he last worked in 2007 through the Employer’s Administrative
Services,
wrapping

which

placed

furniture

and

him

at

loading

Rooms

To

it

trucks.

on

Go

in

a

(Id.

warehouse
at

259).

Plaintiff testified that he stopped working at the warehouse
because his “stomach started hurting”. (Id.).
According to Plaintiff, he is disabled because he has “a
bad heart and [] paranoia”. (Id. at 258).

Plaintiff testified

that although he would like to work, he will probably not be
able to because sometimes his medicine makes him drowsy. (Id. at
260-61).

He reported sleeping three hours during the day, and
3

testified while his medicine has helped, it has not completely
resolved his problems with paranoia. (Id. at 262-265).
With respect to his typical day, Plaintiff testified that
he gets up around 8:00 a.m., puts on his clothing, eats, and
then watches television. (Id. at 261).

On a function report,

Plaintiff reported that his daily activities include cleaning
his

room,

dishes,
bills

taking

doing

and

a

the

shower,

laundry,

shopping.

(Id.

taking
raking

at

102,

his

the

medication,

yard,

washing

cooking,

104-106).

paying

Plaintiff

also

reported that he enjoys making, writing, and recording music,
and that he spends time with his family and plays with his
brother.

(Id.

at

106,

262,

reported

that

he

socializes

264).
with

In
others

addition,
on

a

Plaintiff

daily

basis;

however, he feels isolated and does like being around a lot of
people. (Id., at 106-07).
Plaintiff

also

reported

that

since

being

released

from

Searcy Hospital2, he has been interviewed for positions at Family
Dollar and Church’s Chicken; however, he was not hired because
there were no availabilities. (Id., at 263).

2

According to Plaintiff’s medical records, Plaintiff was
released from Searcy Hospital on April 4, 2008, over 9 months
after the reported date of the start of his disability on June
30, 2007. (Tr. 131).
4

Plaintiff’s

mother

also

administrative hearing.

testified

at

June

23,

2010

She reported that in November 2007,

Plaintiff began exhibiting weird behavior in that he ran quite a
distance to his grandmother’s house in the middle of the night
and told her that someone had come into the house and killed his
family.

(Id.

Plaintiff’s

at

267).

hands

were

Plaintiff’s
bloody,

mother

apparently

from

testified
having

that
fallen

down, and that he was paranoid and insistent that someone was
after him. (Id.).
(Infirmary

Plaintiff was taken to Knollwood Hospital

West)

and

provided

medicine.

According

to

Plaintiff’s mother, he would not take the prescribed medication,
so, she took him to Mobile Infirmary, where he was hospitalized
for a week.

Upon his release, Plaintiff still refused to take

his medication, and his paranoid behavior continued; thus, his
mother petitioned the probate court to have him involuntarily
committed to Searcy Hospital. (Id.).
Plaintiff was initially placed at Bay Pointe for a couple
of days, and then he was sent on to Searcy Hospital. (Id.).
According

to

Plaintiff’s

treatment

twice

Risperdal

injections

a

month

mother,
at

because

he

is

Alapointe,
he

will

currently

receiving

where

is

not

take

he

the

given
pills.

Plaintiff’s mother testified that the injections have helped to
keep him from hearing voices, but he is now in a depressed
5

state. (Id. at 268).

She testified that Plaintiff is withdrawn,

that he hardly leaves his room, and that he sleeps fully dressed
in his clothes and his shoes. (Id. at 268-269).
mother

also

testified

that

Plaintiff

walks

Plaintiff’s

constantly

during

throughout the night, that he has to be told to take a bath,
clean his room and to eat, and that he once had a knife and
scissors “at” her other son while he was asleep on the couch.
(Id. at 270-271).

Plaintiff’s mother further testified that

while Plaintiff does not like to socialize and go outside, he
keeps up with his doctors’ appointments, and will leave home to
attend his doctors’ appointments. (Id. at 272).
mother

disputed

his

assertions,

made

Plaintiff’s

during

a

doctor’s

appointment, that he goes jogging and plays pool. (Id. at 273274).

She also testified that she had to stop working because

Plaintiff was constantly calling her at work because he was
afraid to be home alone. (Id. at 274).
IV.

Analysis
A.

Standard of Review

In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s
role

is

a

determining

limited
1)

one.

whether

The
the

Court’s
decision

6

review
of

the

is

limited

to

Secretary

is

supported by substantial evidence and 2) whether the correct
legal standards were applied.3 Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520,
1529 (11th Cir. 1990).

A court may not decide the facts anew,

reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir.
1986).

The Commissioner’s findings of fact must be affirmed if

they are based upon substantial evidence. Brown v. Sullivan,
F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703
F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding substantial evidence
is

defined

as

preponderance”
reasonable

“more
and

person

conclusion.”).

than

a

consists

of

“such

relevant

evidence

accept

as

adequate

to

would

In

determining

scintilla,

whether

but

less

than

a

as

a

support

a

substantial

evidence

exists, a court must view the record as a whole, taking into
account

evidence

favorable,

as

well

as

unfavorable,

to

the

Commissioner’s decision. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131
(11th Cir. 1986); Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163, *4
(S.D. Ala. June 14, 1999).

3

This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of
legal principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999
(11th Cir. 1987).
7

B.

Discussion

An individual who applies for Social Security disability
benefits
416.912.
any

must

prove

his

disability.

20

C.F.R.

§§

404.1512,

Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in

substantial

gainful

activity

by

reason

of

any

medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C.

§§

416.905(a).

423(d)(1)(A);

see

also

20

C.F.R.

§§

404.1505(a),

The Social Security regulations provide a five-step

sequential evaluation process for determining if a claimant has
proven her disability.4 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

4

The claimant must first prove that he or she has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity.
The second step
requires the claimant to prove that he or she has a severe
impairment or combination of impairments.
If, at the third
step, the claimant proves that the impairment or combination of
impairments meets or equals a listed impairment, then the
claimant is automatically found disabled regardless of age,
education, or work experience.
If the claimant cannot prevail
at the third step, he or she must proceed to the fourth step
where the claimant must prove an inability to perform their past
relevant work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir.
1986). In evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden,
the examiner must consider the following four factors: (1)
objective medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of
examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the
claimant’s age, education and work history. Id. Once a claimant
meets this burden, it becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove
at the fifth step that the claimant is capable of engaging in
8

In the case sub judice, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 30,
2007, and that he has the severe impairments of psychosis (not
otherwise

specified),

personality
Plaintiff

polysubstance

disorder.
does

not

(Tr.
have

20).
an

abuse

The

and

ALJ

also

impairment

or

antisocial
found

combination

that
of

impairments that meets or medically equals any of the listed
impairments contained in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. (Id.).
The

ALJ

concluded

that

Plaintiff

retains

the

residual

functional capacity (hereinafter “RFC”) to perform a full range
of

work

at

all

exertional

limitations. (Id. at 22).

levels

with

some

nonexertional

The ALJ specifically found that

Plaintiff can understand, remember, and carry out simple one and
two-step instructions and tasks on a frequent basis and he can
understand,

remember,

and

carry

out

complex

instructions

and

another kind of substantial gainful employment which exists in
significant
numbers
in
the
national
economy,
given
the
claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and
work history. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir.
1985). If the Commissioner can demonstrate that there are such
jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant must prove inability
to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v.
Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th
Cir. 1999); see also Hale v.
Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v.
Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).
9

tasks on an occasional basis. (Id.).

The ALJ further found that

Plaintiff is limited to occasional interaction with the general
public; can never

perform production paced

work; must avoid

dangerous heights and machinery; and can never climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds. (Id.).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has no past relevant
work. (Id. at 26).
Expert

and

the

determined

Relying on the testimony of the Vocational

Medical-Vocational

that

considering

Guidelines,

Plaintiff’s

RFC

the
and

ALJ

also

vocational

factors such as age, education, and work experience, Plaintiff
is “capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” (Id. at
27).

Thus, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled.

(Id.).
1. Medical Evidence
The relevant medical evidence of record reflects that on
November 9, 2007, Plaintiff was taken to the emergency room at
Infirmary

West

Hospital

in

Mobile,

Alabama

due

to

bizarre

behavior and his insistence that someone was after him. (Id. at
122, 124).

Confusion was listed as Plaintiff’s chief complaint.

The medical staff also made a “drug abuse” notation. (Id. at
122).
agitated

The
and

ER

notes
that

he

reflect

that

had

trouble
10

Plaintiff

was

confused,

concentrating.

(Id.).

Plaintiff denied suicidal and homicidal thoughts (id. at 123)
but

reported

diagnosed

visual

with

hallucinations.

anxiety

and

paranoia,

discharged. (Id. at 123, 125).
was listed as
On

15,

2008,

at

124).

proscribed

He

was

Ativan,

and

Upon discharge, his condition

“improved” and “stable”.

January

(Id.

5

(Id.).

Plaintiff’s

mother

had

him

involuntarily admitted to Searcy Hospital in Mr. Vernon, Alabama
because Plaintiff was insistent that someone was after him, and
was not taking his medication. (Id. at 131, 267).

According to

his mother, Plaintiff was not sleeping, walking around at night
and

refusing

to

take

his

medications

effects. (Id. at 131, 134, 267-268).
Plaintiff’s
“defiant”,

mental
“easily

status

was

irritable”,

because

of

the

side

At the time of admission,

listed

“angry”

and

as

“oppositional”,

“hostile”

mood was “loud and threatening.” (Id. at 131, 134).

and

his

Plaintiff

reported that people were out to get him; however, he denied
hearing voices. (Id.).

5

The records from Searcy also reflect that Plaintiff was
admitted to Mobile Infirmary before Thanksgiving due to his
bizarre behavior.
He was diagnosed with Schizophrenia and
treated for four days. Although he was provided medication, he
refused to take it and his behavior persisted. While the Searcy
notes made reference to the Mobile Infirmary hospitalization,
the record before the court does not contain any treatment notes
from said hospitalization. (Tr. at 131, 267 ).
11

Plaintiff’s diagnosis upon admission was psychosis (nonspecific),
disorder.

alcohol
(Id.).

dependence
His

GAF

score

and
was

antisocial

personality

6

Plaintiff’s

20.

In

psychiatric evaluation, it was recommended that Plaintiff should
be admitted for two months and that at discharge, he should “be
able to function in a least restrictive setting.” (Id. at 141).
Plaintiff was admitted to a structured environment and treated

6

Formerly, the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) Scale
describes the overall psychological, social, and occupational
functioning resulting from mental illness, but without inclusion
of any impaired functioning caused by physical or environmental
limitations. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 30-32 (4th ed. 1994). A
GAF score between 11 and 20 reflected some danger of hurting
oneself or others (e.g., suicidal attempts without clear
expectation of death; frequently violent; manic excitement)
(Id.) The most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual, however, no longer recommends the use of the GAF scale,
noting that “[i]t was recommended that the GAF be dropped from
DSM-5 for several reasons, including its conceptual lack of
clarity and questionable psychometrics in routine practice.”
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders 16 (5th ed. 2013). Moreover, the
Commissioner has declined to endorse the GAF scale for “use in
the Social Security and SSI disability programs,” and has
indicated that GAF scores have no “direct correlation to the
severity requirements of the mental disorders listing.” See Nye
v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15258(11th
Cir. July 26, 2013)(“the Commissioner has noted that the GAF
scale "does not have a direct correlation to the severity
requirements in our mental disorders listings.”).

12

with different medications, including Risperdal. (Id. at 132).
Upon his discharge on April 4, 2008, Plaintiff’s diagnosis was
unchanged; however, his GAF score was 80, and his demeanor was
noted as calm and cooperative. The discharge notes reflect that
Plaintiff

experienced

no

side

effects

from

the

medications

during his stay, and he denied depression, suicidal/homicidal
ideations or hallucinations. (Id.).

In addition, Plaintiff was

scheduled for aftercare treatment with AltaPointe Health Care
System’s Bridge Team. (Id.).
On

April

7,

2013,

Plaintiff

reported

to

AltaPointe

7

as

scheduled and was seen by a registered nurse who reported that
Plaintiff reported that his appetite was good and that he was
sleeping

well.

(Id.

suicidal/homicidal

at

151).

ideations

Plaintiff
or

also

denied

hallucinations.

any

(Id.).

Plaintiff was also examined by therapist, Jasmin Taylor. (Id. at
148).

Ms.

Taylor

noted

that

Plaintiff

was

stable

and

cooperative, that he reported that his sleep was fair, and that
he was logical, coherent and unimpaired. (Id. at 145-148).

7

She

The undersigned observes that some of the records from
Alapointe Health Systems are difficult to read.

13

noted

that

the

Plaintiff

reported

that

basketball and video games and that he
(Id.).

he

likes

to

play

enjoys “chill[ing] out”.

She also noted that Plaintiff had a good sense of humor

and good leisure interests. (Id. at 150).

Ms. Taylor further

noted that Plaintiff was stable on his medication and that he
was able to “care for himself.” (Id. at 150, 146).
Plaintiff presented to AltaPointe on April 30, 2008, to
receive

his

Risperdal

injection

and

Cogentin.

(Id.

at

143).

Nurse Practioner Danette Overstreet noted that Plaintiff “says
things are going well except for his younger brother who is
always after him to play” and that Plaintiff says he needs the
benztropine because he “fells jumpy sometimes.” (Id. at 143).
During

this

effects

visit,

from

hallucinations
ideations.

his
and

Plaintiff

denied

medication,
denied

experiencing

any

any

side

experiencing

denied

any

suicidal/homicidal

Plaintiff reported that since taking his medication

he is able to think more clearly. (Id.).
that

experiencing

Plaintiff

reported

that

he

Nurse Overstreet noted

planned

to

begin

his

usual

summer job working at the local icehouse. (Id.).
From

8

May

28,

2008

through

September

2,

2008

8

Plaintiff

The undersigned observes that some of the records from
Alapointe Health Systems are difficult to read.
14

continued

receiving

bi-weekly

medicinal

injections

and

occasional therapy treatment at AltaPointe and reported largely
positive

results,

indicating

good

sleep

and

appetite,

no

concentration impairments and no hallucinations. (Id. at 205209).

On July 21, 2008, Plaintiff reported that he was working

with his uncle and denied experiencing any paranoid behavior at
all. (Id. at 206).

On September 5, 2008, during his AltaPointe

visit, Plaintiff saw Dr. Florin Ghelmez, M.D., who noted that
Plaintiff’s sleep was fair, his insight was sophisticated, and
his thought process was logical and coherent. (Id. at 202).

Dr.

Ghelmez also noted that Plaintiff reported hearing voices, but
that he could not make out what they were saying.

Dr. Ghelmez

observed that “it almost feels to me as if he makes it up . . .”
(Id.).
The notes reflect that during Plaintiff’s April 3, 2009,
visit to AltaPointe, Dr. Ghelmez noted that Plaintiff reported
sleep problems while at the same time reporting that he gets at
least 10 hours of sleep at night. (Id. at 201).

Dr. Ghelmez

also noted that Plaintiff had no mood symptoms or psychosis.
(Id.).

Later, during a July 15, 2009 to AltaPointe, he reported

that his sleep was good and questioned whether he needed to
continue on his medication. (Id. at 200).
On September 1, 2009,

when Plaintiff saw seen again at
15

AltaPointe, he denied experiencing any side effects from his
medications
symptoms.

and

further

denied

experiencing

any

psychotic

He also reported that he was “doing well” and was

getting good sleep. (Id. at 199).

Plaintiff continued reporting

similar results on his visits to AltaPointe throughout September
and November of 2009. (Id. at 245-47).

During that period, the

AltaPointe

although

nursing

staff

noted

that

Plaintiff

had

agreed to participate in the vocational rehabilitation program
to learn job skills, and had signed up for the program, his
mother refused to allow him to participate. (Id.).

The notes

also reflect that Plaintiff reported that he was still playing
basketball but that he was tired of just playing basketball all
of the time. (Id.).
At the January 1, 2009 AltaPointe visit, Plaintiff’s mother
reported that he was isolating himself. (Id. at 239).

When

Plaintiff was questioned about his mother’s concern, he denied
feeling depressed and said, “I like being by myself.” (Id.).
Plaintiff also reported that his sleep and appetite was normal.
(Id.).

Plaintiff

also

any

side

effects

from

his

medication

(Id.).
The record reflects that Plaintiff continued biweekly
appointments at AltaPointe throughout the next several months.
(Id., at 226-36).

At no time during these visits did Plaintiff
16

report any side effects from his medication. (Id.).

On March

22, 2010, Plaintiff was seen by the physician at AltaPointe, who
observed that Plaintiff’s behavior was normal and cooperative,
his

mood

was

normal

and

memory

and

concentration

were

unimpaired. (Id. at 231-232).
During Plaintiff’s May 4, 2010 AltaPointe visit, he again
denied any delusions or side effects from his medications. (Id.
at 223).

He also reported that “[e]verything been pretty well”

and that he had been engaging in several activities such as
shooting pool and jogging. (Id.).
The record also reflects that on June 17, 2008, Dr. Ellen
V. Eno, Ph.D. reviewed Plaintiff’s records and prepared a Mental
RFC assessment at the request of the Agency.

She opined that

Plaintiff

most

is

not

significantly

limited

in

areas

of

functioning and is only moderately limited in a few areas. (Id.
at

152-54).

limited

in:

According
the

to

ability

Dr.

to

Eno,

Plaintiff

understand

and

is

moderately

remember

detailed

instructions, the ability to carry out detailed instructions,
the ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended
periods of time, and the ability to interact appropriately with
the general public. (Id.).

She further found that Plaintiff has

the ability to understand and carry out very short and simple
instructions and he can attend to for two-hour intervals.
17

In

addition, she found that Plaintiff’s contact with the general
public should be infrequent and casual. (Id. at 154).
Dr. Eno also prepared a Physiatrist Review Technique, in
which

she

disorder

diagnosed

and

alcohol

Plaintiff

with

dependence.

(Id.

antisocial
at

personality

163-64).

Dr.

Eno

determined that Plaintiff is moderately limited in the areas of
maintaining

social

functions

and

maintaining

concentration,

persistence or pace, and that he is mildly limited in activities
of daily living. She also opined that Plaintiff
episodes of decompensation. (Id. at 166).
that

Plaintiff’s

medical

evidence

does

experienced no

Dr. Eno concluded
not

establish

the

presence of “C” criteria, as required under § 12.03, mental
disorders. (Id. at 167).
On August 8, 2009, the Agency referred Plaintiff to Dr.
John

W.

Davis,

Ph.D.

evaluation.

(Id.

at

evaluation,

Plaintiff

for

170).
showed

a

Dr.
a

consultative
Davis
good

noted
degree

psychological

that
of

during

the

cooperation.

Plaintiff reported that he is unable to work because he hears
voices and due to lack of concentration. (Id.).

Plaintiff also

reported that his medicine makes him calm but he still hears
voices. (Id. at 171).

Additionally, Plaintiff reported a good

degree of self-sufficiency in his bathing, dressing and feeding,
and that he helps with “domestics” and enjoys music. (Id. at
18

170-173).

Plaintiff

delusions,

or

gave

other

no

indication

perceptual

of

hallucinations,

disturbances

and

his

concentration/attention and though content was unimpaired. (Id.
at

172).

Dr.

disorder,

Davis

antisocial

diagnosed

behavior

Plaintiff

and

with

personality

polysubstance

abuse,

opined that his prognosis was “fair”. (Id. at 173).
opined

that

Plaintiff

is

remembering

and

interacting

appropriately

supervisors.

carrying

mildly
out

limited

simple

with

the

in

Dr. Davis

understanding,

instructions,
public,

and

and

coworkers

in
and

He further opined that Plaintiff is moderately

limited in remembering and carrying out complex instructions,
and that Plaintiff would have a favorable response to treatment
within the net six to twelve months if he was compliant with his
treatment and if he stayed sober. (Id. at 173-176).
The Agency referred Plaintiff to Dr. John W. Davis, Ph.D.
for a second consultative psychological evaluation on April 1,
2010. (Id. at 211).

Dr. Davis noted that during this visit,

Plaintiff was difficult to talk to and that
agenda.” (Id.).

“he ha[d] his own

Plaintiff reported that his medicine makes him

calmer but that he continues to hear voices and feel restless.
(Id.).

Dr.

Plaintiff’s
indications

Davis
overall

of

noted

no

indications

concentration

hallucinations

or
19

or

of

deficits

attention

delusions

or

and

feelings

in
no
of

detachment from his environment; however, Plaintiff’s judgment
and insight were noted as impaired “secondary to a self-centered
orientation”. (Id. at 212-13).
Dr. Davis administered the WAIS-IV to Plaintiff and noted
that his full-scale score was 64, which places his functioning
level in the mild range of mental retardation.

Dr. Davis opined

that

of

the

score

intellectual

was

functioning

an

underestimation

and

that

Plaintiff

was

Plaintiff’s
not

putting

forth his best effort given that he has a driver’s license and
is independent in his activities of daily living. (Id. at 213).
Dr. Davis also questioned Plaintiff’s results on other testing
that

showed

that

Plaintiff

had

a

“full

blown

sociopathic

profile”, which was not consistent with earlier testing during
August 2009. (Id. at 214).
personality

disorder

Dr. Davis diagnosed Plaintiff with
(non-specific),

malingering

and

polysubstance abuse, and listed his prognosis as poor. (Id.).
Dr. Davis noted that there were strong signs that Plaintiff was
malingering to either draw attention to himself for treatment
purposes or for the benefit of accessing secondary gains. (Id.
at 214).
2.

Whether the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff does
not meet the requirements of Listing 12.03(c)?

Plaintiff

argues

that

the

Commissioner

erred

in

finding

that he does not meet the requirements of Listing 12.03 (c).
20

In

response, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence.

The regulations promulgated

by the Commissioner at Appendix 1, Subpart P, set out specific
physical and mental conditions that are presumptively disabling.
If a claimant meets the requirements of one of the listings, no
further proof of disability is required. Crayton v. Callahan,
120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997).

Listing 12.03 provides,

in relevant part:
12.03 Schizophrenic, paranoid and other psychotic
disorders: Characterized by the onset of psychotic
features with deterioration from a previous level
of functioning.
The required level of severity for these disorders
is met when the requirements in both A and B are
satisfied, or when the requirements in C are
satisfied.
* * *
C. Medically documented history of a chronic
schizophrenic,
paranoid,
or
other
psychotic
disorder of at least 2 years’ duration that has
caused more than a minimal limitation of ability to
do basic work activities, with symptoms or signs
currently attenuated by medication or psychosocial
support, and one of the following:
1. Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of
extended duration; or
2. A residual disease process that has resulted
in such marginal adjustment that even a minimal
increase in mental demands or change in the
environment would be predicted to cause the
individual to decompensate; or
21

3. Current history of 1 or more years’
inability to function outside a highly supportive
living arrangement, with an indication of continued
need for such an arrangement.
20 C. F. R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (2008).
In his decision, the ALJ found as follows:
The undersigned has also considered whether the
“paragraph C” criteria are satisfied. In this case,
the evidence fails to establish the presence of the
“paragraph C” criteria.
The “paragraph C” criteria
for Listing 12.03 require repeated episodes of
decompensation, each of extended duration; a residual
disease process that has resulted in such marginal
adjustment that even a minimal increase in mental
demands or change in the environment would be
predicted to cause the individual to decompensate; or
current history of one or more years of inability to
function
outside
a
highly
supportive
living
arrangement, with an indication of continued need for
such an arrangement.
However, the medical evidence
does not suggest that the claimant has experienced any
repeated episodes of decompensation, history of a
highly supportive living arrangement, or any risk of
decompensation to meet these requirements.
(Id. at 22).
In

his

brief,

Plaintiff

contends

that

he

meets

the

disability requirement of subpart 3 of listing 12.03(c) based on
the

complete

record,

including

the

medical

evidence

and

his

mother’s testimony that she had to quit her job in order to
provide
(Doc.

14

the
at

supportive
10).

living

Plaintiff

arrangement
also

points

that
to

he

his

requires.
receipt

of

biweekly Risperdal injections from AltaPointe and his mother’s
testimony that Plaintiff has to be “made to do simple things
22

regarding his own person hygiene, such as to take a bath because
he will not do it on his own” as additional evidence that he
requires a highly supportive living arrangement. (Id.).
Upon consideration, the undersigned finds that while the
record reflects that Plaintiff was involuntarily committed to a
state

hospital

for

three

months

in

2008

due

to

paranoid

symptoms, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that
Plaintiff is not disabled.
Plaintiff’s

medical

medical opinions.

In his decision, the ALJ detailed

treatment

and

the

weight

accorded

the

As noted by the ALJ, the record reflects that

Plaintiff first received emergency treatment in November 2007
due

to

his

belief

that

someone

was

“after

him”.

(Tr.

23).

Plaintiff was prescribed medication; however, he refused to take
it.

As

a

result,

he

was

involuntarily

admitted

to

Searcy

Hospital where he received treatment for three months.
hospital
discharge,

records
he

reflect

was

calm

that

cooperative

effects from his medications.
began

receiving

at

treatment

the

time

and

he

AlaPointe

Plaintiff’s

reported

(Id. at 132).

from

of

The

no

side

Plaintiff then

where

he

has

been

receiving Risperdal injections every two weeks. (Tr. 141, 151).
As

noted

by

the

ALJ,

the

AlaPointe

intake

reflects

that

Plaintiff’s behavior was cooperative and normal, and that his
perceptions,

memory,

thoughts

and
23

concentration

were

within

normal limit. (Id. at 25).

The ALJ further noted that while

Plaintiff continued to receive the Risperdal injections in 2009
and 2010, the records reflect that he consistently exhibited
normal memory, logical thoughts, good or fair insight and no
anxiety. (Id. at 24).
The ALJ also relied upon and accorded great weight to the
assessments by Dr. Davis and Dr. Eno.

During his consultative

evaluations, Dr. Davis noted that Plaintiff has a good degree of
self-sufficiency in bathing, dressing and feeding himself, and
that although he chooses not to drive, Plaintiff has a driver’s
license and is independent in his activities of daily living.
(Id. at 170, 213).

In addition, Dr. Eno found that Plaintiff is

not significantly limited in most areas of functioning and is
only moderately limited in a few areas. (Id. at 152-54).
Taylor,

a

therapist

at

AltaPointe,

further

found

that

Ms.
when

Plaintiff is on his medication he “can care for himself.” (Id.
at 150, 146).
While Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination of his
activities of daily living are inconsistent with his mother’s
testimony, Plaintiff’s medical records, his own testimony at the
administrative

hearing

and

the

information

in

his

function

report support the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff does not
require a highly supportive living environment.
24

With respect to

his typical day, Plaintiff testified that gets up around 8:00
a.m., puts on his clothing, eats and then watches television.
(Id. at 261).

On his function report, Plaintiff stated that his

daily activities include cleaning his room, taking a shower,
taking

his

medication

and

washing

dishes.

(Id.

at

102).

Plaintiff further indicated that he has no problems maintaining
his personal hygiene and care. (Id. at 103).
that

he

cooks,

when

he

is

alone,

and

is

Plaintiff stated

able

to

clean

his

bedroom, wash dishes, do his laundry, rake the yard, put out the
trash, pay bills and handle his financial affairs and shop for
clothing and food. (Id. at
Additionally,

the

104- 105).

AltaPointe

records

reflect

that

the

nursing staff opined that Plaintiff was capable of participating
in their vocational rehabilitation program to assist him with
finding a job and Plaintiff registered for the program; however,
his mother refused to let him participate in the program. (Id.
at 245, 247).

Further, while Plaintiff and his mother testified

at the hearing that his medication makes him excessively drowsy
and inhibits his ability to work, the medical treatment records
reflect that Plaintiff consistently denied experiencing any side
effects from his medication upon being switched to Risperdal in
January of 2008. (Id. at 132, 141, 143, 223, 226-36, 235-47).
In addition, while his mother testified that he sits in his room
25

in the dark by himself all day long, Plaintiff treatment records
indicate that he plays basketball and video games, shoots pool,
and goes jogging. 9 (Id. at 146, 223).

This

extensive record

evidence relied upon by the ALJ clearly belies the testimony of
Plaintiff’s mother regarding the intensity and limiting effects
of Plaintiff’s impairments.
that

the

testimony

of

Thus, ALJ did not err in finding

Plaintiff’s

mother

was

not

fully

credible10.
Based upon a careful review of all of the evidence in the
record, the Court finds that the ALJ properly
appropriately

considered

all

the

evidence,

evaluated and
including

the

testimony of Plaintiff’s mother, in finding that Plaintiff is
not

disabled,

and

that

the

ALJ’s

decision

is

supported

by

substantial record evidence.

9

Also noteworthy is the fact that at the administrative
hearing, Plaintiff’s mother testified that while Plaintiff does
not like to socialize and go outside, he keeps up with his own
doctors’ appointments and gets up to attend his doctors’
appointments. (Id. at 272).

10

“[C]redibility determinations are the province of the
ALJ.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (llth Cir. 2005),
and a reviewing court will not disturb a clearly articulated
credibility finding with substantial supporting evidence in the
record. Kalishek v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 470 Fed. App’x,
868, 871 (llth Cir. 2012).
26

V.
For

Conclusion
the

reasons

set

forth

herein,

and

upon

careful

consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the
parties,

it

is

hereby

ORDERED

that

the

decision

of

the

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for
supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits
be AFFIRMED.
ORDERED this 16th day of September, 2013.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

27