Lambeth v. PACCAR Inc.

Filing 17

ORDER granting 8 Motion to Remand to State Court. This action is remanded to the Circuit Court of Conecuh County, Alabama. Signed by Chief Judge William H. Steele on 5/15/2012. (tgw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

TEDDY LAMBETH,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
PETERBILT MOTORS COMPANY, et al., )
)
Defendants.
)

CIVIL ACTION 12-0169-WS-N

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (doc. 8). The
Motion has been briefed and is now ripe for disposition.
I.

Relevant Background.
Plaintiff, Teddy Lambeth, brought this action against named defendants Peterbilt Motors

Company and PACCAR, Inc. in the Circuit Court of Conecuh County, Alabama, on or about
February 3, 2012. The Complaint described the underlying incident as follows: “On or about
February 5, 2010, Plaintiff Teddy Lambeth … was attempting to enter the cab of the Peterbilt
truck he was going to operate, and when he stepped onto the side step located on said truck, the
step collapsed, causing him to fall and sustain a serious injury to his back.” (Complaint, ¶ 13.)
The Complaint divulges no specifics about this “serious injury,” in terms of medical diagnosis,
treatment plan, prognosis, permanent or transitory nature of injury, functional limitations, or
quantification of medical expenses or lost wages.1
1

At most, the Complaint includes largely stock language concerning Lambeth’s
injuries and damages, to-wit: “he was made sick, sore and lame; he was bruised and contused in
and about various portions of his body, including a serious injury to his back; he was caused to
undergo medical treatment and procedures for his injuries; he was caused to miss time from
work and he incurred and continues to incur lost wages; he was caused to suffer physical pain
and mental anguish, and still so suffers and will suffer in the future; and he was caused to incur
doctor bills, hospital bills and other medical expenses for the care and treatment of said injuries.”
(Complaint, ¶¶ 28, 34, 42, 49.)

Based on this incident, Lambeth asserts exclusively state-law causes of action against
Peterbilt and PACCAR on theories of products liability / AEMLD, negligence and wantonness,
failure to warn, and breach of express and implied warranties. In support of these theories,
Lambeth alleges that Peterbilt and PACCAR designed, manufactured and installed the step
system on the truck; that the step was defective and/or otherwise unsafe; that defendants were
aware of the unsafe/defective condition; that defendants failed to provide adequate warnings to
consumers about the step’s defectiveness and propensity to fail; and so on. Lambeth seeks an
award of unspecified compensatory and punitive damages.
On March 6, 2012, PACCAR filed a Notice of Removal (doc. 1), removing this action to
this District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446.2 PACCAR argued that federal
subject-matter jurisdiction was conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1332, inasmuch as there is complete
diversity of citizenship between Lambeth and defendants, and the amount in controversy exceeds
the sum of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Lambeth has now moved for remand of this
action to Conecuh County Circuit Court, reasoning that diversity jurisdiction does not lie because
the amount-in-controversy requirement is not satisfied. Defendants disagree, insisting that the
minimum jurisdictional threshold is indeed present. Both sides rely exclusively on the language
of the Complaint, and no outside or additional evidence has been presented by anyone. Thus, the
Motion to Remand hinges on the application of Eleventh Circuit amount-in-controversy
principles in removal actions to the damages allegations of the Complaint.
II.

Analysis.
A.

Legal Standard for Motion to Remand.

A removing defendant must establish the propriety of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441
and, therefore, must demonstrate the existence of federal jurisdiction. See City of Vestavia Hills
v. General Fidelity Ins. Co., --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 1232110, *2 n.1 (11th Cir. Apr. 13, 2012)
(“The removing party bears the burden of proof regarding the existence of federal subject matter
jurisdiction.”); Friedman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[i]n
removal cases, the burden is on the party who sought removal to demonstrate that federal
2

On the same day that defendant PACCAR filed its Notice of Removal, defendant
Peterbilt filed a document styled “Consent to and Joinder in Removal of Defendant Peterbilt
Motors Company” (doc. 4). As such, the unanimity of the defendants in the removal process
cannot reasonably be called into question.

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jurisdiction exists”) (citation omitted). Because removal infringes upon state sovereignty and
implicates central concepts of federalism, removal statutes must be construed narrowly, with all
doubts resolved in favor of remand. See City of Vestavia Hills, 2012 WL 1232110, at *2
(“[b]ecause removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, federal courts are
directed to construe removal statutes strictly. Indeed, all doubts about jurisdiction should be
resolved in favor of remand to state court.”) (citation omitted).3
There being no federal question presented in the Complaint, PACCAR’s sole
jurisdictional hook for removal was diversity of citizenship. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), federal
courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of different states where the
amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. See
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2010) (“For
federal diversity jurisdiction to attach, all parties must be completely diverse … and the amount
in controversy must exceed $75,000.”) (citations omitted). Thus, “[a] defendant may remove an
action to a district court that would have original jurisdiction if complete diversity between the
parties exists and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” City of Vestavia Hills, 2012 WL
1232110, at *2 n.1. “In light of the federalism and separation of powers concerns implicated by
diversity jurisdiction, federal courts are obligated to strictly construe the statutory grant of
diversity jurisdiction … [and] to scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits
which the statute has defined.” Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir.
2000) (citations omitted); see also Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d at 1086 (similar).
B.

The Amount in Controversy.

As noted, the sole issue presented in Lambeth’s Motion to Remand is whether the § 1332
amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied.4
3

See also Whitt v. Sherman Int’l Corp., 147 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998)
(expressing preference for remand where removal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear); Burns v.
Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994) (uncertainties regarding removal are
resolved in favor of remand).
4

No colorable argument has been advanced that complete diversity of citizenship is
lacking. In that regard, it is undisputed that Lambeth is an Alabama citizen for diversity
purposes, that Peterbilt is an unincorporated entity with its principal place of business in Texas,
and that PACCAR is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Washington.
There appearing to be no question that plaintiff is of diverse citizenship from both named
(Continued)
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The removing defendants bear the burden of proof on this issue. It is well-settled that
“[i]f a plaintiff makes an unspecified demand for damages in state court, a removing defendant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more likely than
not exceeds the … jurisdictional requirement.” Roe v. Michelin North America, Inc., 613 F.3d
1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In shouldering this
burden, a removing defendant “is not required to prove the amount in controversy beyond all
doubt or to banish all uncertainty about it.” Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744,
754 (11th Cir. 2010). Rather, the defendant may satisfy its burden by showing either that it is
“facially apparent from the pleading itself that the amount in controversy exceeds the
jurisdictional minimum,” or that there is “additional evidence demonstrating that removal is
proper.” Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061 (citations omitted). What the defendant may not do, however, is
rely exclusively on “conjecture, speculation, or star gazing” to establish the requisite amount in
controversy. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754.
In the case at bar, PACCAR and Peterbilt have come forward with no additional evidence
(beyond the pleadings themselves) demonstrating that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. That omission, by itself, is not fatal to removal. Again, the Eleventh Circuit has
recognized that in some cases, “it may be ‘facially apparent’ from the pleading itself that the
amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum, even when the complaint does not
claim a specific amount of damages.” Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). This is the approach selected by defendants to carry their burden.
In the “facially apparent” method for proving amount in controversy, the removing
defendant need not come forward with evidence beyond the text of the complaint. Instead, the
Eleventh Circuit has instructed that “courts may use their judicial experience and common sense
in determining whether the case stated in a complaint meets federal jurisdictional requirements.”
Roe, 613 F.3d at 1062. In that regard, courts are free to rely on “reasonable deductions,

defendants, the diversity prong of the § 1332 jurisdictional analysis is satisfied, without regard to
the citizenship of any fictitious defendants. See generally Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ
Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Diversity jurisdiction requires complete
diversity between named plaintiffs and defendants.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) (“In determining
whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this
title, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.”).

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reasonable inferences, or other reasonable extrapolations from the pleadings,” and “need not
suspend reality or shelve common sense” in performing this analysis. Id. at 1061-62 (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, the clear teaching of binding precedent is
that courts must not resort to conjecture or speculation in deeming the amount-in-controversy
requirement to be satisfied. See Pretka, 608 F.3d at 753-54 (“without facts or specific
allegations, the amount in controversy could be divined only by looking at the stars – only
through speculation – and that is impermissible”) (citation and internal marks omitted).
The parties spar as to where the factual allegations of Lambeth’s Complaint lie on the
continuum between improper speculation and reasonable inference. After careful review of the
briefs and the factual allegations of the Complaint (the sole source of information pertaining to
the amount in controversy), the Court concludes that defendants have not met their burden of
establishing the sufficiency of the amount in controversy. The Complaint indicates that Lambeth
hurt his back while trying to enter the cab of a Peterbilt truck. While the back injury is
characterized as “serious,” nothing in the Complaint elaborates on the nature or severity of that
injury, or otherwise lends substance or meaning to it. We simply do not know -- or have any
basis for inferring from the pleadings -- anything about how severe, permanent, debilitating or
painful the injury might be; how extensive, costly, or traumatic the course of treatment was, is or
might be; or whether and to what extent the injury did, does or will constrain Lambeth’s work or
life activities.
As expected, defendants place tremendous weight on the Pretka / Roe guidance that
courts are permitted to engage in deduction, inference and extrapolation, and to rely on their
experience and common sense, in evaluating the amount in controversy. But in the context of
this case, those techniques do not compensate for the dearth of facts about plaintiff’s injury.
Again, all that is known is that Lambeth says he hurt his back when a side step collapsed as he
was climbing into a truck. Back injuries are not per se accompanied by an amount in
controversy in excess of $75,000. Indeed, there are occupational back injuries as to which a low
four-digit amount may be all that is legitimately in controversy. And there are occupational back
injuries as to which a high six-digit amount may be in controversy after accounting for punitive
damages. Where on this wide monetary spectrum of potential recoveries and amounts in
controversy does Lambeth’s back injury lie? The Court has no way of knowing, other than by
guesswork and assumption. Certainly, the Complaint does not say. And defendants have done
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nothing more than point to the Complaint. All the reasonable inferences and extrapolation in the
world cannot obscure that fundamental shortcoming in the record.
To be sure, in the Notice of Removal (doc. 1), PACCAR cited the Complaint’s
allegations that Lambeth’s injury was “serious,” that he “was made sick, sore and lame,” that he
was “bruised and contused,” that he underwent unspecified “medical treatment and procedures,”
that he suffered “physical pain and mental anguish,” and so on. But “serious” is such a general,
subjective modifier that it reveals next to nothing about Lambeth’s injury. In the eyes of the
beholder (or a hypothetical plaintiff’s attorney given to puffery in his pleadings), a hangnail
might be considered “serious.” And boilerplate language about Lambeth being sick and sore,
having bruises, experiencing pain and suffering, and the like is devoid of substance in evaluating
how extensive his injuries are, how disabling they might be, or how expansive the claimed
compensatory damages are likely to be.5 This type of non-specific, general allegation is found in
virtually every complaint for personal injury, and falls far short of giving rise to a reasonable
inference that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.6
Nor does the Complaint’s reference to punitive damages automatically equate to an
amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. See, e.g., Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316,
1320 (11th Cir. 2001) (determining that “it is not facially apparent from Williams’ complaint that
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000,” where complaint alleged that plaintiff had suffered
permanent physical and mental injuries for which she sought general, special and punitive
5

For example, this language would be equally consistent with an injury that had
rendered the plaintiff unable to work for two years and an injury that had caused him to miss
three hours of work. It would be equally consistent with an injury that incapacitated the plaintiff
for six months and an injury that caused him to wake up feeling groggy and achy the next
morning. The point is that for amount-in-controversy purposes, these sorts of general allegations
of injury are unilluminating to the extreme.
6

Cases where the “facially apparent” requirement has been deemed satisfied
involve substantially more detail in the pleadings than is set forth in Lambeth’s Complaint. See
Nelson v. Whirlpool Corp., 668 F. Supp.2d 1368 (S.D. Ala. 2009) (in wrongful death action
where complaint “alleges that the defendants wantonly took human life … it is readily deducible
from the complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000”); Maconeghy v. Cooper
Tire & Rubber Co., 2008 WL 4811398, *3 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 3, 2008) (complaint satisfied amount
in controversy by alleging that plaintiff had “suffered serious and permanent injuries which will
affect him for the rest of his life,” that “he is unable to perform normal daily activities,” and that
“he has been permanently disfigured and disabled,” among other things).

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damages in unspecified amounts); Reed v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 2011 WL 321737, *4
(S.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 2011) (noting paucity of authority that mere presence of demand for
emotional distress and punitive damages carries removing defendant’s burden of demonstrating
that amount-in-controversy threshold is satisfied); Paco Assur. Co. v. Rowley, 2009 WL
3756697, *2 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 5, 2009) (rejecting notion that plaintiff’s claim for punitive
damages necessarily vaults amount in controversy above the $75,000 jurisdictional floor). To be
sure, plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is properly considered in the evaluation of whether
defendants have shown that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. But there is nothing
talismanic about such a demand that would per se satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement
and trigger federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
Defendants also argue that the Motion to Remand should be denied because any other
ruling would allow plaintiffs like Lambeth to “pull a rabbit of [sic] a hat” (doc. 10, at 13) by
playing fast and loose with the jurisdictional allegations in their pleadings. In particular,
defendants bemoan the use of “tactics” in which plaintiff’s counsel provides “vague” and
“smoke-and-mirror” damages allegations in his complaint, only to force defendants into a
“Hobson’s Choice” with respect to removal. (Id.) As described by PACCAR, this dilemma is
that defendants can either remove the case immediately under the “first paragraph” of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b) (and run the risk of having the case remanded for lack of proof of the amount in
controversy) or wait until discovery solidifies the amount in controversy and then remove the
case under the “second paragraph” of § 1446(b) (and run the risk of having the case remanded on
timeliness grounds on the theory that it could have been removed earlier based on the factual
allegations of the original pleading).7

7

The “first paragraph” / “second paragraph” language used by defendants is
anachronistic and obsolete, as are the lengthy statutory quotations provided on page 4 of their
brief. Section 1446(b) was amended and subdivided last year in such a manner that it no longer
has a “first paragraph” or a “second paragraph.” See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue
Clarification Act of 2011, Publ.L. 112-63, § 103(b)(3)(B). What PACCAR calls the “first
paragraph” is now found at § 1446(b)(2)(B), which generally provides that defendants must file a
notice of removal within 30 days after receipt of the initial pleading. And what PACCAR calls
the “second paragraph” is now found at § 1446(b)(3), which provides that “if the case stated by
the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after
receipt by the defendant … of a … paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is
one which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Notwithstanding defendants’
(Continued)
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These sentiments are an oft-heard refrain voiced by members of the defense bar who feel
aggrieved by the manner in which Eleventh Circuit amount-in-controversy jurisprudence has
developed in recent years. Their lament is understandable. It is true enough that defendants who
wish to remove an action to federal court on diversity grounds may face daunting proof obstacles
and difficult strategic choices, particularly as to whether to remove the case right away or to
develop additional evidence on damages via discovery before pulling the removal trigger.
Contrary to defendants’ insinuation, however, Lambeth neither created this state of affairs nor
engaged in impropriety, trickery or skullduggery in proceeding as he has. For better or worse,
the harrowing Scylla-and-Charybdis scenario described by PACCAR is a natural, inevitable
consequence of the interaction among liberal pleading rules that do not require a plaintiff to
plead injuries and damages with specificity, strict federal removal statutes that place both the
burden of proof and temporal constraints on removing defendants, and appellate evolution of a
substantial, subjective gray area in which defense counsel cannot discern for sure whether the
“facially apparent” criterion will be deemed to be satisfied in a particular case.8 Lambeth is not
to blame for conforming his pleadings to the applicable procedural requirements and for holding
PACCAR to its statutory burden of proof on removal. And PACCAR’s dissatisfaction with the
practical effects of this statutory, procedural, and doctrinal landscape on its ability to remove a
case to federal court does not authorize this Court to ignore, rewrite or otherwise dispense with
those requirements. A perception of unfairness or hardship is not a valid reason to excuse
removing defendants from their strict jurisdictional burden of proving by a preponderance of the

oversight concerning the amendment, the fundamental point remains: If the case is removable at
its inception, then the defendant must act within 30 days after service of process. If the case later
becomes removable, then the defendant must act within 30 days after receiving paper from
which it first may ascertain that fact. As defendants argue, it may not be a clearcut endeavor for
a defendant to determine when the case first became removable or when the 30-day removal
window commences, so either path (removing immediately, or waiting for discovery on
damages) is fraught with uncertainty and the potential for failure.
8

That is not to say that this Court deems Lambeth’s Complaint to lie within that
“gray area,” but is simply to acknowledge that such an area exists in which reasonable minds
could differ as to whether a plaintiff’s damages allegations do or do not render it facially
apparent from the pleadings that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

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evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Here, defendants simply have not
carried that burden.9
Finally, defendants point to jury verdicts in other cases and insist that “a review of
Alabama trial court verdicts showcases that the amount in controversy in this case is greater than
$75,000.” (Doc. 10, at 20.) It does nothing of the sort. Without knowing what Lambeth’s
injuries are, it is nothing short of folly to liken his claims to those of another plaintiff in another
case. There is no reasonable, principled basis for drawing an apples-to-apples comparison
between Lambeth and any plaintiff in any of the other cases described by defendants. Without
knowing the nature and severity of his injuries, any attempt to formulate an analogy between
Lambeth and an injured plaintiff in another case who received damages greater than $75,000 is
nothing more than gross speculation, guesswork and wishful thinking, none of which the Court
can indulge.10

9

The other, broader point is that plaintiff, not defendant, is the master of his
complaint. See Hill v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 364 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, free to avoid federal jurisdiction by pleading” his
claims in a manner calculated to achieve that result) (citation omitted); Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (similar). If a plaintiff
wants to be cagey, vague, or imprecise in his complaint about the nature and extent of the
injuries for which he seeks recompense, it is ordinarily his prerogative to do so. In that event,
the defendant’s remedy is to avail itself of the arsenal of available discovery tools to flesh out the
plaintiff’s injuries and damages claims with precision. But defendants in this case bypassed
those mechanisms and leaped ahead to removal, notwithstanding the paucity of hard facts in the
Complaint from which an amount-in-controversy assessment could reasonably be made.
10

An example may make the point more concrete. Defendants champion the April
2010 verdict in McWhorter v. Bridgeport Tarping Service from Etowah County, Alabama, as
demonstrating that the amount in controversy must be satisfied here. In McWhorter, defendants
say, the plaintiff received a jury award in excess of $400,000 where he suffered a leg injury, back
contusions and emotional distress for falling off a truck. (Doc. 10, at 20.) The implication is that
if Mr. McWhorter was injured to the tune of $400,000 when he fell off a truck, then Lambeth’s
claims for injury sustained in falling from a truck step must be of a similar magnitude. This
logic is faulty. On this record, how can one possibly liken Lambeth’s unspecified back injury to
the horrific “degloving” of Mr. McWhorter’s right leg? One cannot. And the superficial
similarity that both men purportedly sustained injuries relating to falling from a truck tells us
nothing about the similarity of their damages claims. To compare Lambeth to McWhorter based
on what is known today would be to engage in impermissible speculation and stargazing. This
Court will not do so.

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III.

Conclusion.
Because it is not facially apparent from the Complaint that the amount-in-controversy

prong of § 1332 is satisfied, the Court concludes that federal subject-matter jurisdiction is
lacking and that removal was improper. Accordingly, plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (doc. 8) is
granted, and this action is hereby remanded to the Circuit Court of Conecuh County, Alabama,
for further proceedings.

DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of May, 2012.
s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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