Howell v. Correctional Medical Services

Filing 98

ORDER granting 95 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law; granting 96 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law; granting 97 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. The plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice. Judgment will be entered by separate order. Signed by Chief Judge William H. Steele on 11/18/2013. (tgw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JULIE HOWELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORIZON, INC.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
) CIVIL ACTION 12-0272-WS-N
)
)
)
)
ORDER

The second amended complaint, (Doc. 37), alleged a total of 14 causes of
action against one or both of the two defendants. Counts Five through Nine were
dismissed based on the plaintiff’s formal abandonment of them. (Doc. 55 at 37
n.12; Doc. 74 at 2, 19). A portion of Count Thirteen (a claim against defendant
Gaillard for invasion of privacy) was dismissed on motion for summary judgment.
(Id. at 17-19). The plaintiff abandoned the balance of Count Thirteen, as well as
Count Ten, by omitting them from the joint pretrial document. (Doc. 84 at 4).1
During jury selection on November 5, 2013, the plaintiff orally moved to dismiss
her claims against defendant Gaillard, which motion the Court granted. (Doc. 93).
This ruling eliminated Counts Eleven, Twelve and the balance of Count Thirteen,
as well as that portion of Count Two directed against Gaillard.
The action proceeded to jury trial on November 12, 2013 against defendant
Corizon only. The sole remaining counts were for racial harassment under Title
1

The parties were warned in advance that, “[o]nce adopted by the Court as part of
the Pretrial Order, the Joint Pretrial Document shall constitute the final statement of the
claims … at issue ….” (Doc. 27, Attachment at 4, ¶ 5). The order on pretrial conference
thereafter incorporated the joint pretrial document by reference and declared that it “shall
constitute the final statement of the issues involved in this action …. Dispositive legal
issues that are not contained in the parties’ Joint Pretrial Document … will not be
considered.” (Doc. 89 at 2, ¶ C.1).

VII and Section 1981 (Counts One and Two); for retaliation under Title VII and
Section 1981 (Counts Three and Four); and for negligent hiring, training,
supervision and retention (“negligent employment”) under state law (Count
Fourteen). The plaintiff presented her evidence and rested on the afternoon of
November 13, following which the defendant presented three motions for
judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”). (Docs. 95-97). Both parties presented
oral argument concerning the motions. After carefully considering the motions,
the oral argument, the testimony and exhibits introduced during the plaintiff’s
case, and the governing law, the Court orally granted the defendant’s motions.
The Court enters this order to more fully explain its ruling.
A motion for JMOL should be granted when, after “a party has been fully
heard on an issue,” the Court finds that “a reasonable jury would not have a legally
sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue [and], under the
controlling law, [the party’s claim] can be maintained … only with a favorable
finding on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). “In order to survive a defendant’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law, offered at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s
case, the plaintiff must present evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to
find in the plaintiff’s favor on each and every element of the claim.” Nebula Glass
International, Inc. v. Reichhold, Inc., 454 F.3d 1203, 1210 (11th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotes omitted). “[T]he non-movant must do more than raise some doubt
as to the existence of facts but must produce evidence that would be sufficient to
require submission of the issue to a jury.” Thorne v. All Restoration Services, Inc.,
448 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006). “Although we look at the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-movant must put forth more
than a mere scintilla of evidence suggesting that reasonable minds could reach
differing verdicts.” Id. (internal quotes omitted).

2

I. Racial Harassment.2
The plaintiff, who is white, was employed by the defendant from late 2007
until April 2011 as an RN on the 11-7 shift. She testified that a racially hostile
work environment was created by three black LPNs (including Gaillard) whom
she supervised and by the black director of nursing (“Dailey”).
The plaintiff testified that, prior to the final 18 months of her employment,
she heard the black LPNs refer to white inmates as “mother fucker,” “cracker,”
“fucking crackers,” “fucking white bastards,” “old white bastards” and “fucking
white punks” and to white nurses as “snow bunnies.” The plaintiff offered no
evidence of non-verbal racial conduct preceding her final 18 months of
employment.
As for racial language used in the final 18 months of her employment, the
plaintiff testified to three racially tinged comments: (1) once, Gaillard asked a
correctional officer, in the plaintiff’s presence, “What, you want to ride the white
pony?”; (2) once, after seeing write-ups on the LPNs that the plaintiff had
authored, Gaillard referred to the plaintiff, in her hearing, as a “cracker”; and (3)
once, one of the LPNs told the plaintiff she wished they had a black supervisor.
While the plaintiff testified generally that the LPNs “had made racial slurs,” the
foregoing are the only three comments she identified, and she did not testify that
more than these three were made during the final 18 months of her employment.3
As for racially hostile conduct during her final 18 months of employment,
the plaintiff’s testimony and her many written complaints focus on the LPNs’
failure to do their jobs, failure to help the plaintiff when she needed it, yelling at
2

The parties agree that the same analysis applies to both the Title VII and Section
1981 variants of the plaintiff’s harassment and retaliation claims. (Doc. 74 at 4). See
also Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012) (hostile work
environment); Chapter 7 Trustee v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1257-58 (11th
Cir. 2012) (retaliation).
3

As the defendant pointed out in cross-examination of various witnesses, none of
the plaintiff’s written complaints mention anything about any racially tinged comments.
3

her, directing profanity at her, using body language (rolling eyes and folding arms)
and voice inflections the plaintiff did not like, and being generally rude to her –
conduct that the plaintiff describes globally as “insubordination.” There was also
a single incident in which Gaillard shoved a medicine cart into the plaintiff. As to
the director of nursing, the plaintiff testified that Dailey failed to investigate or to
support her when she complained of the LPNs’ conduct; wrote her up when she
complained; and altered her work assignments at the LPNs’ instigation. Finally,
the plaintiff relies on the habit of the LPNs and Dailey of excluding the plaintiff
when they socialized on the work site.
A. Matters That Cannot Be Considered.
The plaintiff testified that her work environment was racially hostile only
during the final 18 months of her employment and that she has “no complaints”
from before that time because the hostility did not begin until then.4 “To be
actionable under Title VII, a hostile work environment must be both objectively
and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile and
abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.” Hulsey v. Pride
Restaurants, LLC, 367 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotes omitted).
Because the plaintiff did not subjectively perceive her work environment to be
racially hostile prior to the final 18 months of her employment, she cannot base
her claim on the LPNs’ descriptions of white inmates and nurses.
As the parties agree, (Doc. 84 at 5), the Eleventh Circuit “has repeatedly
instructed that a plaintiff wishing to establish a hostile work environment claim
show: (1) that he belongs to a protected group; (2) that he has been subject to

4

The plaintiff testified that she did not consider the LPNs’ descriptions of white
inmates and nurses to create a hostile work environment because they were not directed
at her. She further testified that, until the summer of 2009, she was assigned the medical
ward down the hall and so had little contact with the LPNs. She confirmed that, until her
physical location changed in the middle of 2009, she did not experience insubordination,
cursing or any hostility.
4

unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment must have been based on a
protected characteristic of the employee …; (4) that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment
and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that the
employer is responsible for such environment .…” Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan,
Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002).
A claim of hostile work environment must be based on “harassment.” This
limits in several ways the range of language and conduct that can be used to
support such a claim, two of which are important here. First, “discrete acts …
must be challenged as separate statutory discrimination and retaliation claims
[and] cannot be brought under a hostile work environment claim.” McCann v.
Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1379 (11th Cir. 2008). Thus, for example, a plaintiff
cannot base a hostile work environment claim on allegations that “harsher
discipline was received by [white] employees, and complaints of discrimination
were subject to retaliation and not investigated.” Id. at 1378-79. The plaintiff
alleges such things as to Dailey, but they cannot be challenged under her racial
harassment claim. The same is true of the allegation that Dailey altered the
plaintiff’s work assignments.
Second, “[t]o establish that a workplace constitutes a hostile work
environment, a plaintiff must show that the workplace is permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult ….” Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d
1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotes omitted); accord Miller, 277 F.3d at
1276-77. Being “treated coolly and made to feel unwelcome” does not create a
fact issue under this standard. Rojas, 285 F.3d at 1344. Nor does “uncooperative
behavior of co-workers.” Woodruff v. School Board, 304 Fed. Appx. 795, 799
(11th Cir. 2008).
Little of what the plaintiff alleges can be characterized as “intimidation,
ridicule, and insult,” on which a harassment claim must be based. Being excluded
from on-site social gatherings may make one feel unwelcome, but it does not
5

constitute intimidation, ridicule or insult. Off-putting body language and tonal
inflections may be cool treatment, but it is not intimidation, ridicule or insult. Not
performing one’s work duties and not helping a superior perform hers may be
uncooperative, but it is not intimidation, ridicule or insult. Wishing for a
supervisor of a different race may reflect racial bias, but it is not intimidation,
ridicule or insult.5 All of this conduct may be considered rude in certain circles,
but “Title VII … is not a general civility code,” Gupta v. Florida Board of
Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 583 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotes omitted), and it “was
never intended to protect employees from all unpleasant and rude conduct in the
workplace.” Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 1999)
(en banc) (Edmondson, J., concurring).
In Njie v. Regions Bank, 198 Fed. Appx. 878 (11th Cir. 2006), the plaintiff
complained that her subordinate: made racial slurs; stated that she did not respect
the plaintiff and that she did not want to work for the plaintiff; refused to follow
orders; refused to hold committee meetings; refused to submit reports; refused to
inform the plaintiff of her lunch or vacation schedule; stated that the plaintiff
could not do anything to her; and was generally insubordinate. Id. at 880. In
assessing the plaintiff’s racial harassment claim, the Eleventh Circuit considered
only the racial slurs. Id. at 883-84. This was proper, because the subordinate’s
rudeness, insubordination and failure to do her job did not constitute intimidation,
ridicule or insult, as required to support such a claim.
B. Matters That May Be Considered.
The Court assumes without deciding that the balance of the language and
conduct of which the plaintiff complains constitutes intimidation, ridicule or insult
for purposes of a racial harassment claim. The Court further assumes that the
plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find that this
language and conduct was based on her race for purposes of the third element of
5

The plaintiff acknowledged that this comment was not a racial slur.
6

her racial harassment claim. Even indulging these assumptions, the sum total of
the language and conduct the Court may consider in evaluating the plaintiff’s
claim consists of the yelling and cursing, the medicine cart incident, and two
racially tinged comments.
“Determining whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive
involves both an objective and a subjective component. [citation omitted] In
determining the objective element, a court looks to all the circumstances,
including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” McCann, 526
F.3d at 1378 (internal quotes omitted). “Any relevant factor must be taken into
account, but no single factor is dispositive.” Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683
F.3d 1283, 1299 (11th
1. Frequency.
As noted, the plaintiff is left with only two racially tinged comments. She
offered evidence of only four instances of yelling: on September 2, 1010, on
February 14, 2011, on February 21, 2011, and on March 2, 2011. She identifies
only one instance of cursing, which is part of the March 2 event and not a separate
incident. The medicine cart episode brings the total to seven.
The Eleventh Circuit considers an incident every two months, or even every
month, to be too infrequent to weigh in favor of a harassment claim. Mendoza,
195 F.3d at 1249 (five inappropriate instances in eleven months were “far too
infrequent” to support a sexual harassment claim); Gupta, 212 F.3d at 579, 584-85
(eight episodes of touching, partial exposure, staring and complimenting in six or
seven months, plus repeated invitations to lunch during the same period, was not

7

frequent). Here, the plaintiff has presented evidence of seven incidents over a
period of 18 months, which is “far too infrequent” to support her claim.6
2. Severity.
The plaintiff testified that she found the “ride the white pony” comment
offensive because of its sexual connotation, not because of any racial connotation.
This underscores the relative mildness of the comment from a racial standpoint.
Being called a “cracker” may be offensive, but it is not severe. Hansen v. Perry
Technologies, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1232-33 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
The plaintiff’s evidence of yelling and cursing was as follows. First, on
September 2, 2010, Gaillard yelled, “Ms. Howell, it’s time for pill call!” and then
did so again a moment later. Second, at a meeting with management on February
14, 2011 to discuss friction on the 11-7 shift, Gaillard yelled that the plaintiff
wouldn’t help the LPNs; two LPNs yelled out objections when the plaintiff
accused them of work rule violations; and Dailey then yelled something before
storming out and slamming the door. Third, on February 21, 2011, Gaillard
shouted, “I don’t want that there,” when the plaintiff placed a machine on the
medicine cart that Gaillard was using in performing pill call. Finally, on March 2,
2011, Gaillard yelled at the plaintiff as she stretched past Gaillard (who was seated
at a desk), “You could ask me to move!” When the plaintiff explained she was
trying to reach the telephone, Gaillard yelled, “How am I supposed to know you
need the F- - - - - - phone!” When the plaintiff told Gaillard she didn’t need to
yell, Gaillard yelled, “You’re not going to cuss at me.” When the plaintiff denied
cursing, Gaillard yelled, “You said ‘you know I need to use the damn phone.’”
The plaintiff thereupon left the room, and the episode ended.

6

Even if all seven incidents occurred between September 2010 and March 2011
(and this cannot be assumed, since the plaintiff did not provide dates for several
incidents), this would still be too infrequent under Gupta to favor her claim.
8

The first three incidents are simply communications about work matters,
with no exacerbating factors beyond rudeness. The final incident reflects
inappropriate behavior, but it lasted only a few seconds, the bad language was
used to describe the telephone rather than the plaintiff, and the plaintiff did not
testify that she felt threatened or that others witnessed the episode. See Johnson v.
Chevron Corp., 2009 WL 1404699 at *2-3, 13 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (three episodes of
the plaintiff’s supervisor yelling at him, at least two of them occurring during staff
meetings and including the supervisor’s physically preventing the plaintiff from
leaving the room, were not sufficiently severe to support a sexual harassment
claim); Ervin v. Nashville Peace and Justice Center, 673 F. Supp. 2d 592, 600,
604 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) (the plaintiff’s being repeatedly screamed at by the board
chair at a board meeting while having papers grabbed from his hands was not
severe conduct for purposes of a racial harassment claim); Johnson v. Tune, 2011
WL 3299927 at *6 (E.D. Tex.) (being yelled at by a red-faced supervisor for 15
seconds was not sufficiently severe to support a racial harassment claim), report
and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 3329066 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
Shoving a medicine cart into someone cannot be a good thing, but the
plaintiff’s evidence provided no detail about this incident (such as the force
employed or the infliction of any injury or pain) and so failed to show that the
incident was severe.
In summary, the plaintiff failed to show that any of the relevant incidents
individually, or all of them in combination, were sufficiently severe to support a
claim of racial harassment.
3. Quality.
There is no evidence that any incident, other than the medicine cart episode,
was physically threatening. Nor are any of the episodes humiliating. See Fuelling
v. New Vision Medical Laboratories, LLC, 284 Fed. Appx. 247, 259 (6th Cir. 2008)
(use of the term “cracker” is offensive but is not, without special evidence to that
9

effect, humiliating); Aguilera v. Fluor Enterprises, Inc., 2012 WL 3108864 at *10
(N.D. Ind. 2012) (a plaintiff’s being yelled at in front of others for an infraction he
did not commit “does not reach the level of objectively humiliating”). The quality
of the incidents does not support a claim of racial harassment.
4. Interference.
This factor “involves both a subjective and objective inquiry.” Gupta, 212
F.3d at 586. Subjectively, the plaintiff testified that she dreaded going to work,
was in tears by the end of her shift, was anxious and experienced headaches and
sick stomach, but she did not testify that her work performance was adversely
impacted by the language and conduct of which she complains, much less that it
was affected by that small subset of language and conduct on which her clam can
legally be based. See Whitby v. Secretary for Department of Homeland Security,
480 Fed. Appx. 960, 966 (11th Cir. 2012) (plaintiff’s testimony that the
environment “made him not want to work with” the alleged harassers is not
enough; there must be evidence the plaintiff’s job performance was affected).
Without such evidence, this factor does not support her claim. Mendoza, 195 F.3d
at 1248-49 (where “nothing in the record indicates that Page’s conduct impaired
Mendoza’s job performance,” the unreasonable interference factor was
“absen[t]”); cf. Gupta, 212 F.3d at 586 (subjective prong met when the plaintiff
testified not merely to physical manifestations of stress but testified that those
manifestations affected her work performance).
Objectively, the question is whether “the conduct and statements in
question [would or] would not have interfered with a reasonable employee’s
performance of her job.” Gupta, 212 F.3d at 586. Two uses of mild racial
language, plus four brief instances of yelling over work-related disagreements, and
one incident of being shoved with a medicine cart, spread out over 18 months or
even seven months, would not interfere with a reasonable employee’s job
performance.
10

5. Totality of the circumstances.
Because none of the four listed factors support a claim of racial harassment,
combining them does not support such a claim. See, e.g., McCann, 526 F.3d at
1378-79 (being called “girl” once, hearing black employees called “boy” once,
and hearing of two uses of the “N” word, over a period exceeding two years, could
not support a racial harassment claim); Peters v. HealthSouth, Inc., ___ Fed.
Appx. ___, 2013 WL 5567734 at *6 (11th Cir. 2013), (“The discrete instances of
mockery and yelling identified by [the plaintiff], which were neither physically
threatening nor particularly frequent, were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to
rise to the extreme level of abuse demanded by Title VII.”).
C. Summary.
As the Court stated in orally announcing its ruling, the plaintiff’s evidence
reflects that her working conditions were less than ideal. But Title VII and
Section 1981 do not protect employees from the “ordinary tribulations of the
workplace,” Gupta, 212 F.3d at 586 (internal quotes omitted), and working with
unpleasant, unhelpful subordinates and supervisors is, unfortunately, an ordinary
tribulation. The Eleventh Circuit has “decline[d] [an] implicit invitation to
transform Title VII into a general civility code that bars any and all workplace
conduct that smacks of immaturity, boorishness, discourtesy, or bad taste.” 2013
WL 5567734 at *6. Here, as in Gupta, “a finding that [the plaintiff’s] complaints
constitute [racial] harassment would lower the bar of Title VII [and Section 1981]
to punish mere bothersome and uncomfortable conduct, and would trivialize true
instances of [racial] harassment.” 212 F.3d at 586.
Accepting all the plaintiff’s evidence as true and applying it to the
governing legal standard, a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to find for the plaintiff as to the fourth essential element of her

11

racial harassment claim. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law, (Doc. 97), is granted.
II. Retaliation.
As the parties agree, (Doc. 84 at 16), the first element of the plaintiff’s
retaliation claim is that she “engaged in statutorily protected activity.” Alvarez v.
Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 2010). The
relevant “statutorily protected activity” in this case reads as follows: “It shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of
[its] employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter ….” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Although
the plaintiff need not prove an actual violation of Title VII (or Section 1981) to
support a retaliation claim for opposing the practice, she must have possessed “a
good faith, reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful
employment practices.” Butler v. Alabama Department of Transportation, 536
F.3d 1209, 1213 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotes omitted). “A plaintiff must not
only show that [s]he subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that [her]
employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices, but also that [her] belief
was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented.” Id.
(emphasis in original; internal quotes omitted).
The plaintiff’s retaliation claims are based on the allegation that she was
given greater job responsibilities and then fired for complaining of racial
harassment/racially hostile work environment. (Doc. 37 at 33-34). When, as here,
the asserted unlawful employment practice is a hostile work environment, the
plaintiff must have an objectively reasonable belief that the language and conduct
at issue “is enough to permeate the workplace with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule and insult and to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and
create an abusive working environment.” Id. at 1214 (internal quotes omitted).

12

“[T]he reasonableness of [a plaintiff’s] belief that [the defendant] engaged
in an unlawful employment practice must be measured against existing substantive
law.” Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotes omitted). That is, an otherwise unreasonable belief that the defendant’s
conduct was unlawful is not rendered reasonable by the plaintiff’s “ignorance of
the substantive law.” Weeks v. Harden Manufacturing Corp., 291 F.3d 1307,
1317 (11th Cir. 2002).
There is evidence that the plaintiff subjectively believed she experienced
actionable racial harassment. For reasons set forth in Part I, however, any such
belief was not objectively reasonable in light of existing substantive law. As in
Butler, “[i]t is not even close.” 536 F.3d at 1213. No plaintiff versed in the
relevant law could reasonably believe that she could base a racial harassment
claim on allegations that her subordinates did not do their jobs, did not help her,
used unwelcoming body language and voice inflections, and excluded her from
social gatherings. Nor could a plaintiff versed in the relevant law reasonably
believe she could base such a claim on allegations that her supervisor did not
investigate complaints of such conduct, did not support her in her conflicts with
her subordinates, and retaliated against her for complaining. Finally, no plaintiff
versed in the relevant law could reasonably believe that two comments with a mild
racial flavor, plus four brief incidents of yelling over work matters and one
incident of being bumped by a medicine cart, spread over 18 months (or even
seven months) could constitute actionable racial harassment.
Accepting all the plaintiff’s evidence as true and applying it to the
governing legal standard, a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to find for the plaintiff as to the first essential element of her
retaliation claim. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of
law, (Doc. 95), is granted.

13

III. Negligent Employment.
“[A] party alleging negligent supervision and hiring must prove the
underlying wrongful conduct of the defendant’s agents.” Flying J Fish Farm v.
Peoples Bank, 12 So. 3d 1185, 1196 (Ala. 2008) (internal quotes omitted). The
plaintiff confirmed at oral argument on the instant motion that the “underlying
wrongful conduct” on which she relies is the hostile work environment created by
the LPNs and Dailey and the retaliation practiced by Dailey and those responsible
for her termination, both made wrongful by Title VII and Section 1981.
That being so, the plaintiff’s claim fails for two reasons. First, as discussed
in Parts I and II, the plaintiff cannot prove that she was subjected to an unlawful
hostile work environment or to unlawful retaliation. Second, as this Court has
previously held, “the underlying conduct must constitute a common-law, Alabama
tort committed by the employee, not … a federal cause of action such as Title
VII.” Roberson v. BancorpSouth Bank, Inc., 2013 WL 3153755 at *4 (S.D. Ala.
2013) (internal quotes omitted) (citing cases).
Accepting all the plaintiff’s evidence as true and applying it to the
governing legal standard, a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to find for the plaintiff as to an essential element of her negligent
employment claim. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter
of law, (Doc. 96), is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in open court on November 13, 2013,
the defendant’s motions for judgment as a matter of law are granted. The
plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice. Judgment will be entered
accordingly by separate order.
DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of November, 2013.
s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14