McDonald v. ST Aerospace Mobile, Inc.
ORDER granting defendant's 42 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Callie V. S. Granade on 3/13/2013. (copy to pltf) (mab)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
CLARENCE McDONALD, III,
ST AEROSPACE MOBILE, INC.
Civil Action No. 12-0313-CG-C
This matter is before the court on defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. (Doc. 42). The parties have filed briefs and filed evidentiary
materials in support of their respective positions, and the motion is now ripe
for resolution. After careful consideration of the foregoing, the court
concludes that the motion is due to be GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The defendant, ST Aerospace Mobile, Inc. (“STA Mobile”), is a Federal
Aviation Administration (“FAA”)-approved aircraft repair station that
performs aircraft inspection, maintenance, and repair on commercial
passenger and cargo aircraft. The plaintiff, Clarence McDonald, III
(“McDonald”), is an African-American male and an aircraft mechanic
employed by STA Mobile. Doc. 14 at 1. He claims that STA Mobile
suspended him without pay for three days in November 2011 because of his
race and in retaliation for a 2008 complaint he directed to the company’s
human resources department about racist graffiti written on a bathroom wall
and about Confederate flags displayed in STA Mobile’s facility. Id.; Doc. 42-3
at 45. McDonald maintains that he suffered worse treatment from STA
Mobile’s human resources department in the wake of his complaint,
culminating in the November 2011 suspension. Id.
Boiled down to its essence, the factual background of McDonald’s
suspension concerns whether he used the correct tool to deactivate a thrust
reverser on the jet engine of a commercial airliner. FAA regulations and STA
Mobile require strict compliance with all maintenance steps, which are
specified in documents called “job cards” and “aircraft maintenance
manuals.” Doc. 42-1 at 5. The job cards and aircraft maintenance manuals
require mechanics to use tools specified with an individual tool number,
which must be obtained from STA Mobile’s tool room. Id. Under STA
Mobile’s “zero tolerance” policy, a mechanic can be subject to a three-day
suspension without pay for the first offense if the mechanic violates these
procedures. Id. To ensure compliance, STA Mobile employs quality
assurance personnel to inspect all completed maintenance work and conduct
investigations of any alleged violation of the mandated maintenance
procedures. Id. at 6.
On November 1, 2011, STA Mobile suspended McDonald for three days
without pay at the conclusion of a quality assurance investigation which
found that he used the wrong “HCU lock-out pin” while he was performing
maintenance on the jet engine of a commercial airliner, and failed to obtain
the correct lock-out pin from the STA Mobile tool room. Id. at 14-15. The
HCU lock-out pin is a tool that is specified both in the aircraft’s job cards and
in its maintenance manual. Id.; Doc. 42-8 at 5, 8, 13. While the record is
peppered with McDonald’s contradictory denials and admissions of this
violation, he has nevertheless admitted that he used a lock-out pin that was
stowed onboard the aircraft, the so-called “ship set pin” or “onboard pin,”
instead of obtaining and using a lock-out pin from the tool room, as required.
Doc. 42-4 at 15; Doc. 42-4, Exhibit B, “Recording 2;” Doc. 42-2 at 25-26.
Accordingly, STA Mobile’s Director of Maintenance, Alvin Bass, issued the
three-day suspension after determining that McDonald violated several
mandated maintenance procedures, including portions of the Aircraft
Maintenance Manual and section 188.8.131.52 of the company’s Repair Station &
Quality Control Manual (“RS&QCM”). Doc. 42-9 at 3-4.
Approximately two weeks later, on November 15, 2011, McDonald
submitted a written complaint to the human resources department. In it, he
alleged that his suspension was an act of retaliation for his 2008 complaint
regarding racist graffiti found on a bathroom wall and about Confederate flag
t-shirts and stickers that were worn and displayed by some STA Mobile
employees. Doc. 42-1 at 17. The following day, November 16, McDonald
attended a meeting to discuss his complaint with Karen Hempfleng, STA
Mobile’s Human Resources Manager, and Bill Hafner, STA Mobile’s Vice
President of Operations. Doc. 42-3 at 45. According to McDonald,
Hempfleng told him that she would look into his concerns and contact him.
Id. The day after this meeting, on November 17, STA Mobile conducted an
inspection of all two million square feet of its facilities for any offensive
symbols or graffiti. Id. at 18-19. The inspection found two small Confederate
flag decals on two mechanics’ toolboxes. Id. at 20. Both decals were removed
and each mechanic was issued a counseling memorandum. Id.
On December 28, 2011, McDonald filed a charge of discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC Charge”),
repeating his allegation that his suspension was racially discriminatory. Doc.
42-3 at 45. Two weeks later, on January 12, 2012, Bass, who is himself
African American, rescinded McDonald’s suspension after determining that
the disciplinary report issued to McDonald was poorly written and “possibly
misleading.” Doc. 42-9 at 6. Bass noted that McDonald had violated
RS&QCM § 5.2, yet his disciplinary report cited only RS&QCM § 184.108.40.206,
which was not covered by STA Mobile’s zero tolerance policy. Id.
Accordingly, McDonald was paid full back pay for the three-day suspension,
and the disciplinary report was removed from his personnel file and replaced
with a counseling memorandum. Id.
On April 12, 2012, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to McDonald,
stating that it was unable to conclude that the information he provided
established Title VII violations. Doc. 43-3 at 48. McDonald subsequently
filed the instant lawsuit on May 14, 2012.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment
shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” The trial court’s function is not “to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “The mere
existence of some evidence to support the non-moving party is not sufficient
for denial of summary judgment; there must be ‘sufficient evidence favoring
the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.’” Bailey v.
Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 249). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,
summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250.
(internal citations omitted).
The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail
as a matter of law.” See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252. The moving party
bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists.
O'Ferrell v. United States, 253 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001). In
evaluating the argument of the moving party, the court must view all
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all
reasonable doubts about the facts in its favor. Burton v. City of Belle Glade,
178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999). “If reasonable minds might differ on
the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny
summary judgment.” Hinesville Bank v. Pony Exp. Courier Corp., 868 F.2d
1532, 1535 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Once the movant satisfies his initial burden under Rule 56(a), the nonmoving party “must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of
each essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.” Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 524 (11th
Cir. 1994)(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)).
Otherwise stated, the non-movant must “demonstrate that there is indeed a
material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment.” Clark v. Coats &
Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The non-moving party “may
not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its
response .... must be by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule be set
out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Vega v. Invsco Group,
Ltd., 2011 WL 2533755, *2 (11th Cir. 2011). “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence
supporting the [non-moving] party’s position will not suffice; there must be
enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.”
Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
“[T]he nonmoving party may avail itself of all facts and justifiable inferences
in the record taken as a whole.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d
994, 998 (11th Cir. 1992). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead
a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine
issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
III. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Prior to filing a Title VII action, a plaintiff first must file a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. Gregory v. Georgia Dept. of Human
Resources, 355 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Sanchez v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 1970)). The purpose of this
exhaustion requirement “is that the [EEOC] should have the first
opportunity to investigate the alleged discriminatory practices to permit it to
perform its role in obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliation
efforts.” Evans v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 929 (11th Cir.
1983); see also Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1989).
In light of the purpose of the EEOC exhaustion requirement, courts
have held that a “plaintiff's judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the
EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the
charge of discrimination.” Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga., 207 F.3d 1303,
1332 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Sanchez, 431
F.2d at 466 (noting that the allegations in a judicial complaint filed pursuant
to Title VII may encompass any kind of discrimination like or related to the
allegations contained in the charge). Courts are nonetheless “extremely
reluctant to allow procedural technicalities to bar claims brought under [Title
VII].” Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 460-61. As such, this Court has noted that “ ‘the
scope of an EEOC complaint should not be strictly interpreted’ ” Id. at 465
STA Mobile argues that McDonald raised only the issue of his
November 2011 suspension with the EEOC, and therefore failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies with respect to his claims for retaliation, hostile
work environment, and failure to promote. Doc. 42-1 at 22; Doc. 45 at 2. STA
Mobile also argues that McDonald admitted to this failure at his deposition,
agreeing with defense counsel that the box marked “retaliation” was not
checked on the EEOC Charge form and agreeing further that the only
substantive allegation on the face of the document was the discipline issue.
Id. (citing Doc. 42-3 at 45). STA Mobile also points to the fact that the EEOC
investigator told McDonald that he would investigate only the discipline
issue, id. (citing Doc 42-3 at 47), and thus argues that the other claims were
not exhausted and are not ripe for judicial review.
The court finds that McDonald has failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with regard to his failure to promote claim, but has properly
exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to his retaliation and
hostile work environment claims. The EEOC interview notes from
McDonald’s file show that McDonald complained to the investigator about
being disciplined in retaliation his complaints of confederate flags and
various “racial graffiti” allegedly found throughout STA Mobile’s facility.
Doc. 42-3 at 46. Thus, the EEOC had an opportunity to investigate the
retaliation and hostile work environment allegations before McDonald
pursued them in court. Furthermore, the details provided on the face of the
EEOC Charge sheet include the statement that “I complained about rebel
flags on employee’s [sic] toolboxes,” which implicates the hostile work
environment claim. Id. at 45. The court is also inclined to interpret this
statement as broadly suggesting retaliation, given the fact that McDonald
was not represented by counsel when he filed the EEOC Charge. Thus, the
court sees no reason why McDonald should be penalized when, acting pro se,
he reported allegations of discriminatory suspension, retaliation and a hostile
work environment to the EEOC and the EEOC opted to investigate the
McDonald’s failure to promote claim is a different story. Neither the
EEOC Charge sheet nor EEOC investigator’s notes (Doc. 42-3 at 45-47)
reflect any mention of the QA Records Auditor position, nor any suggestion
that McDonald may have been passed over for a promotion. See id. Thus,
there is no evidence that the EEOC had an opportunity to investigate before
McDonald filed suit on this claim.1 The court therefore finds that he has
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to the failure to
promote claim and STA Mobile’s motion for summary judgment is due to be
GRANTED with respect to that claim.
IV. DISCRIMINATORY SUSPENSION AND RETALIATION CLAIMS
A. Prima Facie Case
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person
based on race. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1).
The plaintiff bears the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination, which he
may do by demonstrating that (1) he is a member of a protected class (here,
African-American); (2) he was qualified for the position he held; (3) he
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) his employer treated him less
favorably than similarly situated individuals outside of his protected class.
Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir.
2010). See also Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555 at 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1997).
Title VII also forbids an employer from retaliating against an employee
who has engaged in statutorily-protected activity, such as opposing racial
discrimination. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,
The court does note that McDonald made a passing reference to his having
unsuccessfully “interviewed for a different position” in a document titled
“EEOC Complaint” which was attached to his amended complaint. Doc. 14 at
6-7; Doc. 42-3 at 33-35. However, the record evidence indicates only that
McDonald only submitted this document to STA Mobile pursuant to the
company’s EEO policy on or around November 15, 2011. See Doc. 42-2 at 4.
There is no evidence that he submitted this “EEOC Complaint” as part of the
EEOC charge on December 28, 2011. See Doc 42-3 at 45.
548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006). As with a discrimination claim, a plaintiff alleging
retaliation bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case, which
he may do by demonstrating that
(1) he engaged in statutorily-protected
activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) there was some
causal relation between these two events. Dixon v. The Hallmark
Companies, Inc., 627 F.3d 849 (11th Cir. 2010). Thus, both McDonald’s
discriminatory suspension claim and his retaliation claim require McDonald
to establish that he suffered a materially adverse employment action.
The court finds, however, that the November 2011 suspension cannot
qualify as an “adverse employment action” for Title VII purposes because it
was rescinded two months later on January 17, 2012, with the original
disciplinary report removed from McDonald’s personnel file and McDonald
receiving full back pay, including full overtime pay that he would have
earned during the three days that he was suspended. Doc. 42-2 at 35. In the
absence of any tangible harm to McDonald, a rescinded suspension cannot
qualify as an adverse employment action for purposes of a Title VII analysis.
See generally Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 973 (11th Cir. 2008); Gupta
v. Florida Board of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 588 (11th Cir. 2000) (“An action
which, it turns out, had no effect on an employee is not an ‘adverse’ action.”)
overturned on other grounds by Burlington Northern, supra.; Pennington v.
City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that Title VII
retaliation case law “indicates that the decision to reprimand or transfer an
employee, if rescinded before the employee suffers a tangible harm, is not an
adverse employment action”).
McDonald argues that he did suffer tangible harm, in the form of a
counseling memorandum he received after his suspension was rescinded,
noting that it “was a negative performance counseling.” Doc. 44 at 21.
However, McDonald did not proffer any evidence that the counseling
memorandum constituted a formal reprimand or triggered any tangible form
of adverse action such as loss in benefits, ineligibility for promotional
opportunities, or more formal discipline.
In fact, courts in the Eleventh
Circuit have repeatedly held that counseling memoranda are not adverse
employment actions and do not result in tangible harm. Davis v. Town of
Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000); Austin v. City of
Montgomery, 196 Fed. Appx. 747, 753 (11th Cir. 2006).
Therefore, because McDonald suffered no tangible harm, the court
finds that the rescinded November 2011 suspension was not an adverse
employment action and, therefore, finds that McDonald cannot make a prima
facie showing of discrimination or retaliation on that basis.
Even if McDonald were able to establish that he suffered an adverse
employment action, his discrimination and retaliation claims would still fail.
The discrimination claim would still fail because McDonald failed to identify
a similarly-situated person outside of his protected class whom STA Mobile
treated more favorably. While McDonald did assert in his EEOC Charge
(Doc. 42-3 at 45) that a white aircraft mechanic named Jamie Logan
committed the same violation yet suffered no punishment, McDonald
nevertheless admitted at his deposition that he has no personal knowledge of
what Logan may or may not have done. Doc. 42-2 at 14. Thus, McDonald
has not established that he and Logan were similarly situated.
McDonald’s retaliation claims would also fail even in the presence of
an adverse employment action because he has offered no evidence whatsoever
of a causal connection between his 2008 complaint and his 2011 suspension.2
To the contrary, McDonald admitted at his deposition that he had no
firsthand knowledge that anyone who prepared his 2011 disciplinary report
had any knowledge of his 2008 complaint to the human resources
department, or any subsequent complaint. (Doc. 42-2 at 28). McDonald has
also failed to identify any acts other than his suspension which constitute the
“worse treatment” he alleges that he faced after 2008.
V. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
A. Statement of the Law
“A hostile work environment claim under Title VII is established upon
proof that ‘the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
2 The court disregards McDonald’s assertion, made in his opposition to
summary judgment, that “I made a complaint in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011”
regarding Confederate flags and racist graffiti. Doc. 44 at 2, ¶ 6. Firstly, this
assertion contradicts the amended complaint, which references only the 2008
complaint. Doc. 14 at 2. Secondly, this assertion contradicts some of the very
evidence McDonald cites for support. For example, his “EEOC Complaint”
(Doc. 42-3 at 33-35) references the 2008 complaint only, while his EEOC
Charge (Doc. 42-3 at 45) does not specify any date at all.
ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.’ ” Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275
(11th Cir, 2002) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993)).
A plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a protected group, (2) he has been
subject to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment was based on a
protected characteristic of the employee, such as race or national origin, (4)
the harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,” and
(5) the plaintiff’s employer is responsible for such an environment, either
directly or vicariously. Miller, 277 F.3d at 1275.
In order to determine whether harassment meets the “severe and
pervasive” requirement, the court must consider an additional four factors in
order to evaluate the objective severity of the harassment, including (1) the
frequency of the conduct, (2) the severity of the conduct, (3) whether the
conduct was physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance, and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the
employee’s job performance. Medoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246
(11th Cir. 1999). The employee must establish not only that he subjectively
perceived the environment as hostile, but that a reasonable person would
perceive the environment to be hostile and abusive. Barrow v. Georgia
Pacific, Inc., 144 Fed. Appx. 54, 56 (11th Cir. 2005).
Furthermore, “[t]his is not, and by its nature cannot be, a
mathematically precise test.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. Whether a work
environment is hostile can be determined only by looking at all the
circumstances. Id. at 23.
McDonald alleges that in 2008, he reported to STA Mobile’s human
resources department the existence of certain racist, offensive graffiti written
on the bathroom walls with a marker (“[w]ords like nigger and coon”), as well
as Confederate flags emblazoned on certain t-shirts and toolbox stickers
around the STA Mobile facility, all of which understandably offended him.
Doc. 14 at 1-2. McDonald’s amended complaint alleges that “[t]he graffiti
was removed but some of the rebel flags are still on [sic] the facility.” Id. At
his deposition, however, McDonald admitted that after his 2008 complaint,
both the graffiti and rebel flags were removed. Doc. 42-2 at 6-7.
McDonald also submitted the declaration of Alvin Kirsky, an STA
Mobile employee who stated that he “[has] seen countless rebel confederate
flags on the company premises since I have been an employee at STA Mobile
Inc. [sic] some of which had been displayed for several months.” Doc. 44-1 at
12. However, the severity alleged in the Kirsky declaration (“countless”
Confederate flags) does not comport with McDonald’s admission that all or
most of the Confederate flags were removed shortly after his 2008 complaint.
Doc. 42-2 at 6-7 (Q: “The Confederate flags you call the rebel flags that you
reported, were they removed?” A: (McDonald) “Yes, sir.”); see Doc. 14 at 1
(“[t]he graffiti was removed but some of the rebel flags are still on [sic] the
facility.”). The Kirsky declaration is also out of step with the fact that
between McDonald’s 2008 complaint and his 2010 EEOC Charge, he made no
additional complaints regarding Confederate flags being displayed at the
STA Mobile facility. Doc. 42-2 at 7.
Additionally, McDonald attached to his opposition brief several
photocopies of photographs depicting items emblazoned with the Confederate
flag. Doc. 44-1 at 15-18. Yet McDonald has not authenticated any of these
photographs, and the court has no way of knowing whether he personally
took the photographs, whether they were taken at the STA Mobile facility,
and if so, when. See Doc. 44 and Doc. 44-1.
Even setting aside these evidentiary concerns, and accepting for
purposes of summary judgment that all of McDonald’s allegations regarding
the Confederate flags and racist graffiti are true, the court finds that they
still do not establish that STA Mobile was “permeated with ‘discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that [was] ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of [McDonald’s] employment and create an abusive
working environment.” Barrow, 144 Fed. Appx. at 57-58 (quoting Harris, 510
US at 21). The incidents that McDonald complains of were not especially
severe when compared with conduct that the Eleventh Circuit has found to
fall short of severe harassment. For example, the Eleventh Circuit found in
Barrow that a group of African-American plaintiffs failed to establish a
hostile working environment despite testimony that some plaintiffs saw
Confederate flag stickers on toolboxes and hard hats; saw the letters “KKK”
on a bathroom wall and on a block-saw console; saw a noose hanging in
another employee’s locker; and that one of the plaintiffs was called “nigger”
three times in one year by a shift superintendent. Id. at 57. Additionally, the
conduct McDonald complained of was neither physically threatening nor
particularly humiliating, nor has he alleged that it interfered with his ability
to perform his duties at work. While McDonald may have been
understandably offended at the sight of Confederate flags or stickers, such
allegations simply do not meet the standard of severe and pervasive
harassment set forth by the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit and
which are necessary to establish a prima facie case of hostile working
environment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1981.
The same holds true with regard to the graffiti in the bathroom. The
words “nigger” and “coon” certainly qualify as offensive utterances; however,
the fact that these words were removed immediately after McDonald
complained to STA Mobile’s human resources department, and the fact that
McDonald complained on one occasion, do not tend to prove that STA Mobile
was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [McDonald’s]
employment and create an abusive working environment.” Barrow, at 54.
Upon a thorough analysis of all matters presented, the court concludes
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, STA Mobile’s motion
for summary judgment (Doc. 42) is GRANTED as to all claims.
DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of March, 2013.
/s/ Callie V.S. Granade
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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