Pittman v. Strange et al

Filing 42

ORDER granting 31 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 31 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff's "as-applied" ex post facto challenge.; finding as moot 40 Motion for Oral Argument. Signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr on 9/22/2014. copies to parties. (sdb)

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IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  COURT  FOR  THE   SOUTHERN  DISTRICT  OF  ALABAMA   SOUTHERN  DIVISION     WILLIAM  HENRY  PITTMAN,     Plaintiff,     v.     LUTHER  STRANGE,  in  his   official  capacity  as  Attorney   General  of  the  State  of   Alabama,  and  JOHN   RICHARDSON,1  in  his   official  capacity  as  Acting   Director  of  the  Alabama   Department  of  Public   Safety,     Defendants.     )   )   )   )   )   )   )   )   )   )   )   )   )   )   )   )   )           CIVIL  ACTION  NO.        12-­‐00667-­‐CB-­‐M     ORDER       This  matter  is  before  the  Court  on  a  motion  for  judgment  on  the  pleadings  or,   alternatively,  motion  for  summary  judgment,  filed  by  the  Defendants  (Doc.  31),   Plaintiff’s  response  (Doc.  37)  and  Defendant’s  reply  (Doc.  39).    After  due   consideration  of  all  issues  raised,  the  Court  finds  that  the  motion  is  due  to  be   granted.   I.    Factual  &  Procedural  Background   Plaintiff  William  Henry  Pittman  is  a  convicted  sex  offender.    In  1989,  Pittman   pled  guilty  in  the  United  States  District  Court  for  the  Southern  District  of  Mississippi                                                                                                                   1  Pursuant  to  Rule  25(d)  of  the  Federal  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure,  John   Richardson,  Acting  Director  of  the  Alabama  Department  of  Public  Safety  has  been   substituted  as  an  official  capacity  defendant  in  place  of  Hugh  McCall,  former   Director  of  the  Alabama  Department  of  Public  Safety.   to  a  Federal  offense—Transportation  of  a  Minor  for  Sexual  Purposes.2    In  2002,   Pittman  moved  to  Alabama  where  he  opened  a  small  loan  business,  Cash-­‐N-­‐A-­‐Dash.     In  January  2012,  he  was  indicted  in  this  district  for  failure  to  register  as  a  sex   offender,  in  violation  of  the  Federal  Sex  Offender  Registration  and  Notification  Act   (SORNA).    See  Criminal  No.  12-­‐00014-­‐CG-­‐C,  Doc.  1.    In  June  2012,  Pittman  was  also   indicted  on  a  charge  of  possession  of  a  firearm  by  a  convicted  felon.    See  Criminal   No.  12-­‐00155-­‐WS-­‐C.    Pittman  pled  guilty  to  the  latter  charge,  and  the  failure-­‐to-­‐ register  charge  was  dismissed.    Pittman  was  sentenced  to  10  months  in  prison.     When  he  was  released  from  prison  in  2014,  Pittman  was  forced  to  relocate  his   residence  due  to  its  proximity  to  a  school.3    As  a  convicted  sex  offender,  Pittman  is   subject  to  the  requirements  of  the  Alabama  Sex  Offender  Registration  and   Community  Notification  Act  (ASORCNA),  Ala.  Code  §§  15-­‐20A-­‐1,  et  seq.  (1975,  as   amended).       In  his  complaint  seeking  declaratory  judgment,  Pittman  challenged  the   constitutionality  of  ASORCNA.    Specifically,  Plaintiff  contested  “the  procedure  used   [by  the  Defendants]  to  determine  the  Plaintiff  .  .  .  to  be  a  ‘foreign  jurisdiction   convicted  sex  offender’”  as  well  as  “the  Defendants’  final  determination  that  Pittman   is  non-­‐compliant  with  Alabama’s  sex  offender  registry[,]  administrative  code  and   Alabama  statute.”  (Compl.  ¶  1,  Doc.  1.)    Defendants  filed  a  motion  to  dismiss  the   complaint  for  failure  to  state  a  claim  on  which  relief  can  be  granted.    The  Court                                                                                                                   2  Pittman  devotes  most  of  the  “facts”  section  of  his  summary  judgment   response  to  his  version  of  events  that  led  him  to  plead  guilty  to  the  underlying   offense,  none  of  which  is  relevant  to  the  legal  issues  presented  in  this  case.   3  Pittman  argues  throughout  his  brief  that  ASCORNA  is  punitive  because  it   will  also  force  him  to  relocate  his  business,  but  he  has  not  explained  this  assertion.     Apparently,  the  business  remains  in  its  original  location.     2   granted  the  motion  to  dismiss  as  to  Plaintiff’s  due  process  and  equal  protection   claims  but  denied  the  motion  as  to  Plaintiff’s  ex  post  facto  challenge.       That  claim,  as  set  fort  in  the  compliant,  is:   [  ]    The  Defendants  are  attempting  to  enforce  a  law  which  was   enacted  after  Pittman’s  guilty  plea  in  1998.    The  laws  [sic]  sought  to   be  enforced  by  the  Defendants  were  enacted  after  Pittman  leased  his   business  property  in  approximately  2001-­‐2002.    It  is  an  ex  post  facto   law.    The  question  becomes  is  it  a  permissible  ex  post  facto  application   of  law?    The  test  of  whether  an  ex  post  facto  law  is  permissible  is   whether  or  not  the  application  of  the  ex  post  facto  law  is  punitive  in   nature  versus  a  function  of  public  safety.   [  ]  Plaintiff  can  demonstrate  the  application  of  the  law  to  his   specific  set  of  facts  is  punitive.    The  application  of  law  to  Pittman  will   expose  him  to  criminal  prosecution  for  reported  non-­‐compliance.     Additionally  application  of  the  law  by  the  Defendants  will  deprive   Pittman’s  liberty  and  property  to  which  he  was  rightfully  entitled   before  the  law’s  enactment.    Pittman  acted  in  reliance  on  the  law  as  it   existed  at  the  time  he  established  his  business  and  its  location.    If  an   ex  post  facto  law  is  applied  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  punitive  in  nature,   then  it  is  violations  the  [sic]  the  Constitution.    Mir.  Pittman  requests  a   trial  on  the  merits  in  which  he  can  present  evidence  of  the  punitive   effect  of  the  ex  post  facto  law.   (Compl.,  ¶¶  19-­‐20,  emphasis  added.)    The  Court  interpreted  Plaintiff’s  claim  to   assert  only  an  ‘as  applied’  ex  post  facto  challenge  to  ASORCNA.”    (Order  at  11  n.  5,   Doc.  14.)         In  denying  the  motion  to  dismiss,  this  Court  applied  the  Supreme  Court’s  ex   post  facto  analysis  as  set  forth  in  Smith  v.  Doe,  538  U.S.  84  (2003),  a  case  involving   Alaska’s  sex  offender  notification  act:     The  first  part  of  the  Supreme  Court’s  ex  post  facto  analysis  in   Smith  is  purely  legal.    Initially,  the  Court  “’must  ascertain  whether  the   legislature  meant  the  statute  to  establish  civil  proceedings.’”  Smith,   538  U.S.  at  92  (quoting  Kansas  v.  Hendricks,  521  U.S.  346,  361  (1997)).     Obviously,  if  the  intent  was  punitive,  then  the  Ex  Post  Facto  Clause   prohibits  retroactive  application.    Id.  If  the  legislature  intended  to   create  “a  regulatory  scheme  that  is  civil  and  nonpunitive,”  then  the     3   Court  must  determine  whether  the  law  is  “so  punitive  in  either   purpose  or  effect”  as  to  render  it  a  criminal  penalty.    Id.    The  Supreme   Court  has  cautioned  that  “’only  the  clearest  proof  will  suffice  to   override  legislative  intent  and  transform  what  has  been  denominated   a  civil  remedy  into  a  criminal  penalty.’”    Id.  (quoting  Hudson  v.  United   States,  522  U.S.  93,  100  (1997))  (internal  quotations  omitted).     (Order  at  12.)    Applying  that  first  step  of  the  Smith  analysis,  the  Court  concluded   that  the  Alabama  Legislature’s  clear  intent  in  enacting  ASORCNA  “was  to  create  a   regulatory  scheme  to  protect  the  public  and  promote  child  safety.”  (Id.  at  13.)    With   regard  to  the  second  step,  the  Court  reasoned  that  “the  inquiry  also  involves  factual   determinations”  because  “[t]he  existence  of  a  burden  of  proof  implies  the   presentation  of  evidence.”    (Id.  at  14.)    At  the  initial  pleading  stage,  the  Court  found   Plaintiff’s  complaint  stated  a  plausible  “as-­‐applied”  ex  post  facto  claim  based  on  the   assertion  that  ASORCNA’s  restrictions  would  require  Plaintiff  to  move  his  home  and   business.   II.    Issues  Presented     Defendants  seek  judgment  on  the  pleadings  because,  they  argue,  “the  case  for   outright  dismissal  of  Pittman’s  ex  post  facto  claim  is  far  more  compelling  an  the   Defendant’s  articulated  in  their  short  motion  to  dismiss.”    (Defs.’  Br.  3,  Doc.  34.)    In   particular,  Defendants  point  out,  first  that  the  factual  component  of  the  ex  post  facto   analysis  must  be  viewed  with  great  deference  to  the  legislative  intent  and,  second,   the  facts  to  be  considered  are  “legislative  facts  of  which  the  Court  may  take  judicial   notice.”  (Id.)    Alternatively  Defendants  argue  that  summary  judgment  is  appropriate   because  the  facts  upon  which  Plaintiff  relies  do  not  satisfy  the  heavy  burden  of  proof   necessary  to  transform  a  civil  regulatory  scheme  into  an  ex  post  facto  criminal   punishment.     4     In  response,  Plaintiff  argues  that  the  motion  for  judgment  on  the  pleadings  is   due  to  be  denied  because  the  pleadings  have  not  changed  since  the  Court  ruled  on   the  motion  to  dismiss.    With  regard  to  the  motion  for  summary  judgment,  Plaintiff   says  there  is  “[a]  mountain  of  evidence”  that  proves  “that  the  application  of   ASORCNA  is  punitive  in  effect  so  as  to  overcome  the  legislative  label  of  ‘non-­‐ punitive’.”    (Pl.’s  Br.  6,  Doc.  37.)    Further,  Plaintiff  points  out  that  this  case  is  “an   outlier.    It  presents  such  an  unusual  pattern  of  facts  that  a  ruling  in  [Plaintiff]’s  favor   is  almost  certain  not  to  open  the  door  for  cases  to  follow  unless  they  have  similarly   unique  circumstances.”  (Id.  6.)     As  discussed  below,  the  ex  post  facto  claim  Plaintiff  asserted  in  his  complaint   is  actually  different  from  the  ex  post  facto  claim  Plaintiff  has  argued  in  his  summary   judgment  response.    Judgment  on  the  pleadings  is  due  to  be  granted  as  to  the   former,  and  summary  judgment  is  due  to  be  granted  as  to  the  latter.4   III.    Standard  of  Review     A.    Motion  for  Judgment  on  the  Pleadings     A  motion  for  judgment  on  the  pleadings  must  be  granted  “when  there  are  no   material  facts  in  dispute  and  the  moving  party  is  entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of   law.    All  facts  alleged  in  the  complaint  must  be  accepted  as  true  and  viewed  in  the   light  most  favorable  to  the  nonmoving  party.”    Douglas  Asphalt  Co.  v.  Qore,  Inc.,  541   F.3d  1269,  1273  (11th  Cir.  2008).                                                                                                                   4  The  Court  does  not  address  Defendants’  argument  that  only  “legislative   facts”  should  be  considered,  judgment  on  the  pleadings  entered,  and  Plaintiff’s   evidence  disregarded.    Even  when  the  facts  proffered  by  Plaintiff  are  considered,  the   evidence  is  insufficient  to  overcome  legislative  intent  to  create  a  civil  regulatory   scheme.     5     B.    Motion  for  Summary  Judgment     Summary  judgment  should  be  granted  only  if  “there  is  no  issue  as  to  any   material  fact  and  the  moving  party  is  entitled  to  a  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law.”    Fed.   R.  Civ.  P.  56(c).    The  party  seeking  summary  judgment  bears  “the  initial  burden  to   show  the  district  court,  by  reference  to  materials  on  file,  that  there  are  not  genuine   issues  of  material  fact  that  should  be  decided  at  trial”    Clark  v.  Coats  &  Clark,  Inc.,  929   F.2d  604,  608  (11th  Cir.  1991).    Once  the  moving  party  has  satisfied  his   responsibility,  the  burden  shifts  to  the  nonmoving  party  to  show  the  existence  of  a   genuine  issue  of  material  fact.    Id.    “If  the  nonmoving  party  fails  to  make  ‘a  sufficient   showing  on  an  essential  element  of  her  case  with  respect  to  which  she  has  the   burden  of  proof,’  the  moving  party  is  entitled  to  summary  judgment.”    United  States   v.  Four  parcels  of  Real  Property,  941  F.2d  1428,  1437  (11th  Cir.  1991)  (quoting   Celotex  Corp.  v.  Catrett,  477  U.S.  317  (1986))  (footnote  omitted).     “In  reviewing  whether  the  nonmoving  party  has  met  its  burden,  the  court   must  stop  short  of  weighing  the  evidence  and  making  credibility  determination  of   the  truth  of  the  matter.    Instead,  the  evidence  of  the  non-­‐movant  is  to  be  believed   and  all  justifiable  inferences  are  to  be  drawn  in  his  favor.”    Tipton  v.  Bergrohr  GMBH-­‐ Siegen,  965  F.2d  994,  999  (11th  Cir.  1992)  (internal  citations  and  quotations   omitted).  “However,  we  draw  these  inferences  only  “’to  the  extent  supportable  by   the  record.’”    Penley  v.  Eslinger,  605  F.3d  843,  848  (11th  Cir.  2002)  (quoting  Scott  v.   Harris,  550  U.S.  372,  381  n.  8  (2007)  (emphasis  omitted)).    Furthermore,  “[a]   dispute  over  a  fact  will  only  preclude  summary  judgment  if  the  dispute  “might  affect     6   the  outcome  of  the  suit  under  the  governing  law.”    Id.  (quoting  Anderson  v.  Liberty   Lobby,  Inc.,  477  US.  242,  248  (1986)).       IV.    ASCORNA     Effective  July  1,  2011,  Alabama  replaced  its  prior  sex  offender  registry  law,   the  Alabama  Community  Notification  Act  (CNA),  Ala.  Code  §  15-­‐20-­‐20,  et  seq.  (1975),   with  the  Alabama  Sex  Offender  Registration  and  Community  Notification  Act   (ASORCNA),  Ala.  Code  §  15-­‐20A-­‐1,  et  seq.  (1975,  as  amended).    A  person  subject  to   ASORCNA  must  register  as  a  sex  offender  with  the  Alabama  Department  of  Public   Safety  (DPS),  id.  §  15-­‐20A-­‐7;  must  register  with  local  law  enforcement,  pay  a   registration  fee,  and  abide  by  certain  reporting  requirements,  id.  §  15-­‐20A-­‐10  &  §   15-­‐20A-­‐22;  is  subject  to  residency,  travel,  and  employment  restrictions,  id.  §§  15-­‐ 20A-­‐11,  -­‐13,  &  -­‐15;  and  is  subject  to  community  notification  requirements,  id.  §  15-­‐ 20A-­‐21.    In  addition,  ASORCNA  requires  that  the  offender  carry  identification.    Id.  §   15-­‐20A-­‐18.    Of  particular  significance  in  this  case,  an  adult  sex  offender  cannot   establish  or  maintain  a  residence  or  maintain  employment  within  2,000  feet  of  a   school.    Id.  §§  15-­‐20A-­‐aa(a)  (residence)  &  15-­‐20A-­‐13(b)  (employment).    However,   exceptions  are  possible  in  some  instances.    Id.    §  15-­‐20A-­‐11(f)(residence)  &  §  15-­‐ 20A-­‐25(a)  (employment).  An  “adult  sex  offender”  (i.e.  an  adult  who  has  been   convicted  of  a  sex  offense)  is  subject  to  ASORCNA’s  requirements  for  life.    Ala.  Code   §§  15-­‐20A-­‐3(b),  15-­‐20A-­‐4(1).           V.    Smith  v.  Doe  and  the  Ex  Post  Facto  Analysis     The  first  step  in  the  ex  post  facto  analysis  set  out  in  Smith  is  not  in  dispute.     Initially,  the  Court  “’must  ascertain  whether  the  legislature  meant  the  statue  to     7   establish  civil  proceedings.’”    Smith,  538  U.S.  at  92  (quoting  Kansas  v.  Hendricks,  521   U.S.  346,  361  (1997)).    In  the  order  addressing  the  motion  to  dismiss,  this  Court     held:    “The  Alabama  legislature’s  expressed  intent  was  to  create  a  civil  regulatory   scheme  to  protect  the  public  and  promote  child  safety.”    (Order  at  13,  Doc.  14.)     Pittman  concedes  this  point.    (Pl.’s  Br.  6,  Doc.  37.)    If  the  legislative  intent  “was  to   enact  a  regulatory  scheme  that  is  civil  and  nonpunitive,”  the  inquiry  “examines   whether  the  statutory  scheme  is  so  punitive  in  either  purpose  or  effect  as  to  negate   [the  legislature’s]  intention  to  deem  it  civil.”    Smith,  538  U.S.  at  97.    As  the  Eleventh   Circuit    has  recognized,  “[this]  second  step  is  a  steep  one  for  those  challenging  a   statute  on  these  grounds  .  .  .  only  the  clearest  proof  will  suffice  to  override  legislative   intent.’”    United  States  v.  W.B.H.,  664  F.3d  848,  853  (11th  Cir.  2011  (quoting  Smith,  id.   at  97  (emphasis  added)).    On  summary  judgment,  Plaintiff  argues  that  his  evidence   is  sufficient  to  meet  this  burden.    The  claim  Plaintiff  actually  pled  in  the  complaint,   however,  is  different.    It  would  add  a  third  level  to  the  ex  post  facto  analysis.    That  is,   an  otherwise  civil  regulatory  scheme  could  be  deemed  ex  post  facto  as  applied  to  a   single  individual.    The  latter  claim,  which  is  clearly  subject  to  judgment  on  the   pleadings,  is  addressed  first  below.     A.    Plaintiff’s  “As-­‐Applied”  Ex  Post  Facto  Challenge     The  Supreme  Court  has  flatly  rejected  the  concept  of  an  “as-­‐applied”  ex  post   facto  challenge  to  a  civil  statute.5    In  Seling  v.  Young,  531  U.S.  250  (2001),  the  Court                                                                                                                   5  “The  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  article  1,  .  .  .  section  10,  lays  several   restrictions  on  the  authority  of  the  Legislatures  of  the  several  states;  and,  among   them,  ‘that  no  state  shall  pass  any  ex  post  facto  law.’”    Calder  v.  Bull,  3  U.S.  386,  389   (1789).    An  ex  post  facto  law  is  one  that  makes  criminal  an  act  that  was  not  criminal     8   examined  an  ex  post  facto  challenge  to  Washington’s  State  Community  Protection   Act,  which  provided  for  civil  commitment  of  sexually  violent  predators.    The  Seling   court  reversed  the  Ninth  Circuit’s  ruling  that  a  complaint  “alleging  that  [the   Washington  Act]  was  punitive  as  applied”  stated  a  plausible  claim  for  relief.    Id.  at   261.    The  Court  recognized  that  “the  civil  nature  of  an  Act  cannot  be  determined  “by   reference  to  the  effect  that  an  Act  has  on  a  single  individual.”    Id.  at  262.    Further  “an   ‘as  applied’  analysis  would  prove  unworkable.    Such  an  analysis  would  never   conclusively  resolve  whether  a  particular  scheme  is  punitive  and  would  thereby   prevent  a  final  determination  of  the  scheme’s  validity  under  the  Double  Jeopardy  or   Ex  Post  Facto  Clauses.”    Id.  at  263.    In  ruling  on  the  motion  to  dismiss,  this  Court  held   that  the  complaint  stated  a  plausible  claim  for  relief  based  on  an  “as-­‐applied”  ex  post   facto  challenge.    As  Seling  makes  clear,  that  is  wrong  because  no  such  claim  exists.     The  posture  of  this  case  is  a  bit  different  from  that  in  Seling.    In  that  case,  the   second  step  of  the  ex  post  facto  analysis—whether  the  legislation  was  so  punitive  in   effect  as  to  render  it  a  criminal  penalty  (“the  effects  test”)—had  already  been   decided  in  favor  of  the  state.    Consequently,  the  Act  was  indisputably  civil,  and  the   only  issue  before  the  Supreme  Court  was  whether  application  of  a  civil  regulatory   scheme  to  an  individual  could  constitute  an  ex  post  facto  violation.6      Plaintiff’s   summary  judgment  response  appears  to  redefine  his  claim  to  address  the  second                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             when  committed  or  increases  the  punishment  for  a  previously  committed  offense.   Id.   6  The  Seling  court  did  not  prohibit  consideration  of  a  statute’s  effects  on  a   single  individual  as  evidence  of  the  act’s  overall  punitive  effect.    In  other  words,  such   evidence  may  be  considered  in  determining  whether  Plaintiff  has  proved  “by   clearest  evidence  “  that  ASORCNA  is  so  punitive  in  effect  as  to  override  legislative   intent  to  create  a  civil  regulatory  scheme.    Id.         9   step—i.e.,  that  ASORCNA  is  so  punitive  in  “purpose  or  effect”  as  to  render  it  a   criminal  penalty.7    Plaintiff  presents  evidence  of  the  effect  on  him  as  part  of  his   evidence  that  ASORCNA  is  so  punitive  overall  as  to  render  the  statute  (as  opposed  to   the  individual  application  of  the  statute)  an  ex  post  facto  violation.     B.    Plaintiff’s  Attempt  to  Prove  ASORCNA’s  Punitive  Effect     In  Smith,  the  Court  articulated  the  framework  for  determining  whether  a  civil   statute  has  a  sufficiently  punitive  effect  to  overcome  legislative  intent:       In  analyzing  the  effects  of  the  Act  we  refer  to  the  seven  factors  noted   in  Kennedy  v.  Mendoza–Martinez,  372  U.S.  144,  168–169,  83  S.Ct.  554,   9  L.Ed.2d  644  (1963),  as  a  useful  framework.  These  factors,  which   migrated  into  our  ex  post  facto  case  law  from  double  jeopardy   jurisprudence,  have  their  earlier  origins  in  cases  under  the  Sixth  and   Eighth  Amendments,  as  well  as  the  Bill  of  Attainder  and  the  Ex  Post   Facto  Clauses.  Because  the  Mendoza–Martinez  factors  are  designed  to   apply  in  various  constitutional  contexts,  we  have  said  they  are   “neither  exhaustive  nor  dispositive,”  but  are  “useful  guideposts.”  The   factors  most  relevant  to  our  analysis  are  whether,  in  its  necessary   operation,  the  regulatory  scheme:  has  been  regarded  in  our  history   and  traditions  as  a  punishment;  imposes  an  affirmative  disability  or   restraint;  promotes  the  traditional  aims  of  punishment;  has  a  rational   connection  to  a  nonpunitive  purpose;  or  is  excessive  with  respect  to   this  purpose.     Id.  at  97  (internal  citations  omitted).    Furthermore,  as  previously  noted,  “only  the   ‘clearest  proof’  will  suffice  to  override  legislative  intent  and  transform  what  has   been  denominated  a  civil  remedy  into  a  criminal  penalty.”    Id.  at  92  (internal   citations  omitted).    As  the  Eleventh  Circuit  said  in  W.B.H.,  “[w]e  take  the  Court  at  its   word:    some  evidence  will  not  do;  substantial  evidence  will  not  do;  and  a                                                                                                                   7  Plaintiff’s  argument,  however,  conflates  two  distinct  principles:    Punitive   effect  and  punitive  application.    The  former,  if  proved  “by  the  clearest  evidence,”   may  render  a  civil  statute  an  ex  post  facto  violation.    Smith,  538  U.S.  at  92.    The  latter   will  not.    Seling,  531  U.S.  at  263.     10   preponderance  of  the  evidence  will  not  do.    ‘[O]nly  the  clearest  proof’  will  do.”     W.B.H.,  664  F.3d  at  855  (quoting  Smith,  id.  at  97).    It  is  a  heavy  burden,  indeed,  and   one  that  Plaintiff’s  evidence  does  not  come  close  to  satisfying.       1.    Historically  Regarded  as  Punishment       Pittman  argues  that  some  aspects  of  ASORCNA  are  like  traditional   forms  of  punishment.    First,  Pitman  asserts  ASORCNA  travel  restrictions  and   registration  requirements  amount  to  punishment  based  on  his  own  experience,  to   wit:    “’I  have  been  to  prison  …  and  been  on  probation.    I  know  what  it  feels  like  to  be   punished  [and]  .  .  .  [ASORCNA’s  requirements]  are  identical  to  being  on  supervised   probation.’”    (Pl.’s  Br.  12,  quoting  Pl.’s  Aff.)    But  “feels  like  punishment”  is  not   persuasive  evidence,  or  even  persuasive  argument,  that  ASORCNA’s  restrictions   have  been  considered  punishment  throughout  history.    In  Smith  the  Supreme  Court   recognized  “some  force”  to  the  argument  that  a  registration  system  was  akin  to   supervised  release,  but  ultimately  rejected  it.    AS  the  Court  pointed  out,  there  is  a   difference  between  actions  that  must  be  reported  (such  as  ASORCNA’s  requirement   that  travel  plans  be  reported  to  authorities  in  advance)  but  do  not  restrict   movement  and  “[p]robation  and  supervised  release  which  entail  a  series  of   mandatory  conditions  and  allow  the  supervising  officer  to  seek  the  revocation  of   probation  or  release  in  case  of  infraction.”    Smith  538  U.S.  at  101.     Pittman  also  likens  aspects  of  ASORCNA  to  public  shaming,  a   historical  form  of  punishment.    The  Act  requires  that  a  convicted  sex   offender  “obtain,  and  always  have  in  his  or  her  possession,”  “a  driver’s   license  or  identification  card  bearing  a  designation  that  enables  law   enforcement  to  identify  the  licenses  as  a  sex  offender.”    Ala.  Code  §  15-­‐ 20A-­‐18(a),  (d)  (1975,  as  amended).    Pursuant  to  this  statute,  the   Alabama  Department  of  Public  Safety  has  issued  Pittman  a  driver’s   license  bearing  the  words  “Criminal  Sex  Offender”  in  red  letters.       11     Pittman  feels  “’shamed  and  embarrassed’”  whenever  he  is  required  to   show  his  driver’s  license.    (Pl.’s  Br.  at  12,  quoting  Pl.’s  Aff.)    Further   Pittman  points  to  the  embarrassing  effects  of  the  Act’s  notification   requirement,  stating:    “’My  landlord  told  me  that  because  I  was  a  sex   offender  and  the  neighbors  complained,  he  intended  to  periodically   enter  the  rental  house  I  was  living  in  to  .  .  .  make  sure  I  was  not  doing   anything  wrong.’”    (Id.)   As  the  Smith  court  pointed  out,  however,  early  forms  of  punishment  such  as   public  shaming,  humiliation,  and  banishment  involved  more  than  the  dissemination   of  information.”    Smith,  538  U.S.  at  98.    The  practice  of  public  shaming  meant  holding   a  person  up  for  pubic  ridicule.    Id.  “By  contrast,  the  stigma  of  [sex  offender   notification  laws]  results  not  from  public  display  for  ridicule  and  shaming  but  from   the  dissemination  of  accurate  information  about  a  criminal  record,  most  of  which  is   already  public.    Our  system  does  not  treat  dissemination  of  truthful  information  in   furtherance  of  a  legitimate  governmental  objective  as  punishment.”    Id.     Furthermore,  making  information  public  is  not  transformed  into  “public  shaming”   simply  because  the  offender  feels  shame  and  embarrassment.     2.    Affirmative  Disability  or  Restraint     In  a  recent  unpublished  opinion  upholding  ASORCNA,  the  Eleventh  Circuit   discussed  the  application  of  this  factor  as  follows:     As  for  whether  ASORCNA  imposes  an  affirmative  disability  or   restraint,  this  factor  does  not  tip  the  balance  in  favor  of  [the  plaintiff].     In  analyzing  this  issue,  we  must  keep  in  mind  that  “[i]f  the  disability   or  restraint  is  minor  and  indirect,  its  effects  are  unlikely  to  be   punitive.”    As  a  result  we’ve  found  no  punitive  restraining  effect  even   where  the  federal  Sex  Offender  Registration  and  Notification  Act   (“SORNA”)  required  in-­‐person  reporting  and  mandated  dissemination   on  the  internet  of  information  regarding  the  whereabouts  of  convicted   sex  offenders.    We  said  that  “[a]ppearing  in  person  may  be  more   inconvenient,  but  requiring  it  is  not  punitive.”    We  also  recognized   that  [a]lthough  the  public  availability  of  information  may  have  a   lasting  and  painful  impact  on  the  convicted  sex  offender,  these   consequences  flow  not  form  the  Act’s  registration  and  dissemination     12   provisions,  but  from  the  fact  of  conviction,  already  a  matter  of  public   record.”    To  the  extent  ASORCNA  imposes  additional  burdens,  we  still   fail  to  find  it  punitive.     Windwalker  v.  Governor  of  Alabama,  et  al.,  No  13-­‐11279,  2014  WL  4290604,  *2  (11th   Cir.  Sept.  2,  2014  (Internal  citations  omitted)  (emphasis  added).    Because   Windwalker  is  an  published  opinion,  it  is  not  dispositive.    See  11th  Cir.  Rule  36-­‐2.    It   is,  however,  persuasive,  even  with  respect  to  those  “additional  burdens”  about   which  Pittman  complains,  such  as  being  required  to  carry  identification,  to  have  his   photograph  taken  annually,  and  to  not  reside  near  a  school.    These  are   “inconveniences”  which  “’do[  ]  not  resemble  the  punishment  of  imprisonment  …  the   paradigmatic  affirmative  disability  or  restraint.’”    United  States  v.  Under  Seal,  709   F.3d,  265  (4th  Cir.  2013)  (quoting  Smith,  538  U.S.  at  100).         3.    Promotes  Traditional  Aims  of  Punishment       “[T]he  traditional  aims  of  punishment  …  [are]  retribution  and   deterrence.”    Kennedy  v.  Mendoza-­‐Martinez,  372  U.S.  144,  168  (1963).    Pittman   points  out  that  ASORCNA’s  legislative  findings  list  deterrence  as  one  of  the  aims  of   the  statute.    Those  findings  state,  in  relevant  part:   Registration  and  notification  laws  are  a  vital  concern  as  the  number  of   sex  offenders  continues  to  rise.  The  increasing  numbers  coupled  with   the  danger  of  recidivism  place  society  at  risk.  Registration  and   notification  laws  strive  to  reduce  these  dangers  by  increasing  public   safety  and  mandating  the  release  of  certain  information  to  the  public.   This  release  of  information  creates  better  awareness  and  informs  the   public  of  the  presence  of  sex  offenders  in  the  community,  thereby   enabling  the  public  to  take  action  to  protect  themselves.  Registration   and  notification  laws  aid  in  public  awareness  and  not  only  protect  the   community  but  serve  to  deter  sex  offenders  from  future  crimes  through   frequent  in-­‐person  registration.  Frequent  in-­‐person  registration   maintains  constant  contact  between  sex  offenders  and  law   enforcement,  providing  law  enforcement  with  priceless  tools  to  aid     13   them  in  their  investigations  including  obtaining  information  for   identifying,  monitoring,  and  tracking  sex  offenders.     Ala.  Code  §  15-­‐20A-­‐2(1)  (emphasis  added).    The  statute  acknowledges  a  known   fact,  i.e.,  “[m]ost  civil  regulatory  schemes  have  some  deterrent  effect.”    Smith,  538   U.S.  at  102.    “’To  hold  that  the  mere  presence  of  a  deterrent  purpose  renders  such   sanctions  ‘criminal’  .  .  .  would  severely  undermine  the  Government’s  ability  o   engage  in  effective  regulation.”    Id.     Similarly,  a  statute’s  incidental  retributive  effect  does  not  weigh  in  favor  of   finding  the  statute  punitive.    As  the  Eighth  Circuit  held  in  Doe  v.  Miller,  405  F.3d  700   (8th  Cir.  2005),  retributive  effect  “reasonably  related  to”  and  “consistent  with  the   regulatory  objective”  is  permissible  and  “[w]hile  any  restraint  or  requirement   imposed  on  those  who  commit  crimes  is  at  least  potentially  retributive  in  effect,  we   believe  that  [the  residency  restrictions  imposed  on  convicted  sex  offenders  by  Iowa   law]  like  the  registration  requirement  in  Smith  v.  Doe,  8s  consistent  with  the   legislature’s  regulatory  objective  of  protecting  the  health  and  safety  of  children.”     Id.  at  720.         Pittman  asserts  that  ASORCNA  is  retributive  because  he  “lives  in  fear  of  his   neighbors’  wrath  and  landlord’s  invasion  of  privacy.”    (Pl.’s  Br.  14.)    Pittman’s   subjective  fear  of  retribution  is  not  evidence  of  retributive  effect.    Moreover,  even  if   the  actions  Pittman  fears  had  occurred,  incidental  effects  of  the  law  are  not   considered.    See  Doe  v.  Pataki,  120  F.3d  1263,  1279  (2nd  Cir.  1997)  (“unfortunate   incidents  that  have  occurred  in  the  aftermath  of  notification”  are  not  attributable  to   the  law  but  to  private  third  parties”);  E.  B.  v.  Verniero,  119  F.3d  1077,  1104  (3d  Cir.     14   1997)  (increased  risk  of  private  violence  “understandably  of  concern  to  plaintiffs”   but  risk  not  great  enough  to  amount  to  punishment).       4.    Rational  Connection  to  a  Nonpunitive  Purpose       The  Supreme  Court  has  said  that  this  factor—a  statute’s  rational   connection  to  a  nonpunitive  purpose—“is  a  [m]ost  significant  factor”  in   determining  whether  the  statute’s  effects  are  punitive.    Smith,  538  U.S.  at  102.     Pittman’s  argument  with  respect  to  this  factor  is  narrowly  focused  on  one  specific   ASORCNA  requirement,  that  is,  that  the  “criminal  sex  offender  designation  be   printed  on  his  driver’s  license.    He  argues  that  the  only  purpose  of  this  provision  is   to  shame  him  when  he  uses  his  identification  “at  stores,  restaurants,  doctor’s  visits   and  the  like.”    (Pl.’s  Br.  16.)    “The  requirement  of  a  ‘rational  connection’  is  not   demanding:    A  statute  is  not  deemed  punitive  simply  because  it  lacks  a  close  or   perfect  fit  with  the  nonpunitive  aims  it  seeks  to  advance.’”    Windwalker,  2014  WL   4290605  at  *2  (quoting  Smith,  id.).    Like  sex  offender  notification  and  residency   requirements  reviewed  by  other  courts,  ASORCNA,  overall,  advances  “a  legitimate   nonpunitive  purpose  of  ‘public  safety  .  .  .  by  alerting  the  public  to  the  risk  of  sex   offenders  in  their  community.”    Smith,  id.  at  103  (quoting  Ursery  v.  $405,089.23  in   United  States  Currency,  518  U.S.  267,  290  (1996));  see  also  Doe  v.  Bredesen,  507  F.3d   998,  1007  (6th  Cir.  2007)  (finding  rational  connections  between  residency   restrictions  and  aim  of  protecting  public  from  sex  offenders  who,  as  a  group,  have  a   high  rate  of  recidivism);  Doe  v.  Miller  ,  405  F.3d  700,  721  (8th  Cir.  2005)  (reasonable   to  conclude  that  law  imposing  sex  offender  residency  restrictions  “would  protect   society  by  minimizing  the  risk  of  repeated  sex  offenses  against  minors”).    Although     15   the  driver’s  license  “sex  offender”  notation  may  be  a  loose  fit  with  ASORCNA’s   public  safety  purpose,  it  nonetheless  has  a  rational  connection.    As  Defendants   point  out  the  notation  allows  law  enforcement  to  determine  a  person’s  status   quickly  and  easily,  and  it  may  be  of  particular  use  when  computer-­‐based   information  is  not  readily  accessible.       5.    Excessiveness  With  Respect  to  Nonpunitive  Purpose       Pittman  contends  that  ASORCNA  is  excessive  with  respect  to  its  public   safety  purpose  for  two  reasons.    First,  he  argues  that  the  lifetime  registration   requirement  is  excessive  in  view  of  the  type  of  offense  for  which  he  was  convicted.     However,  “the  Supreme  Court  has  already  permitted  sex  offenders  to  be  regulated   as  a  class  regardless  of  individualized  risk  assessment.”    Windwalker,  2014  WL   4290604  at  *3.    Next,  he  states  that  “having  to  move  his  home  and  business  is   excessive.”    (Pl.’s  Br.  17.)    While  the  statute  might  be  considered  excessive  in  the   Court’s  judgment  if  it  mandated  relocation  of  a  sex  offender’s  home  prohibited  his   continued  employment,  ASORCNA  does  not  do  that.8    Instead,  it  provides   exceptions  in  certain  situations.    The  residency  restriction  includes  a  “grandfather”   clause  that  allows  offenders  to  maintain  their  residence  while  incarcerated.    See   Ala.  Code  §  15-­‐20A-­‐11(f).    Relief  rom  employment  restrictions  is  available  pursuant   to  §  15-­‐20A-­‐25,  which  states:    “A  sex  offender  may  petition  the  circuit  court  in  the   county  where  the  offender  seeks  to  accept  or  maintain  employment  for  relief  from                                                                                                                   8  The  evidence  provided  does  not  clearly  explain  Pittman’s  residence  and   employment  situation.    Pittman  has  moved  from  his  Outley  Drive  residence  and,   according  to  Defendants,  was  required  to  do  so  because  of  his  felon-­‐in-­‐possession   conviction.    Defendants  say  that  had  it  not  been  for  that  conviction,  Pittman  could   have  maintained  his  residence.    Pitman  apparently  has  not  been  required  to  relocate   his  business.     16   the  employment  restrictions  of  [§15-­‐20A-­‐13]  [unless  the  offender  was  convicted  of   certain  enumerated  sex  offenses].”    Ala  Code  §  15-­‐20A-­‐25(a).    In  summary,  the   Court  is  not  persuaded  that  ASORCNA’s  residency  and  employment  restrictions  are   excessive.    Even  if  those  restrictions  were  excessive,  this  single  factor  would  not  be   sufficient  to  override  the  legislature’s  intent.       6.    Other  Factors       Pointing  out  that  the  Smith  v.  Doe  factors  are  not  exclusive,  Pittman   urges  the  Court  to  consider  other  “useful  guideposts.”    Pittman  relies  on  two  state   supreme  court  cases  to  introduce  these  additional  guideposts.  However,  those   courts  were  applying  more  favorable  state  ex  post  facto  laws.    In  Doe  v.  Dep’t  of  Pub.   Safety  &  Corr.  Servs.,  430  Md.  535,  62  A.3d  123  (Md.  2013),  the  Maryland  Supreme   Court  held  that  the  state’s  sex  offender  registry  law  violated  the  prohibition  on  ex   post  facto  laws  contained  in  the  Maryland  constitution.    In  so  doing,  the  court   specifically  declined  to  follow  Smith  v.  Doe,  stating:    “We  are  persuaded,  in  the   present  case,  to  follow  our  long-­‐standing  interpretation  of  the  xe  post  facto   prohibition  and  depart  from  the  approach  taken  by  the  United  States  Supreme   Court  when  it  analyzed  the  Alaskan  sex  offender  registration  statute  in  Smith  v.   Doe.”    Id.,  430  Md.  at  550,  62  A.3d  at  132.    In  Gonzalez  v.  State,  980  N.E.2d  321  (Ind.   2013),  the  Indiana  Supreme  Court  applied  the  same  guideposts  set  forth  in  Federal   law  to  its  ex  post  facto  review  under  the  state  constitution.    But  the  court   recognized  one  important  difference:    “While  Indiana  courts  have  adopted  an   approach  consistent  with  the  federal  standard  through  use  of  the  intent-­‐effects  test,   .  .  .  ‘Indiana  does  not  use  the  heightened  standard  of  clearest  proof  …  as  used  by  the     17   United  States  Supreme  Court.  …  Thus,  our  analysis  under  the  intent-­‐effects  test  is   independent  from  that  of  the  federal  standard.”    Id.  at  316  n.  2  (internal  citations   omitted).    These  cases  are  of  no  value  in  deciding  the  applicability  of  Federal   constitutional  law.9   VI.    Conclusion     Plaintiff’s  summary  judgment  response  does  not  demonstrate  by  a   preponderance  of  evidence,  much  less  by  “the  clearest  proof,”  that  ASORCNA  is  so   punitive  in  effect  as  to  override  legislative  intent  to  create  a  civil  regulatory   scheme.    For  that  reason,  the  motion  for  summary  judgment  is  GRANTED.     Furthermore,  the  motion  for  judgment  on  the  pleadings  is  GRANTED  as  to   Plaintiff’s  ”as-­‐applied”  ex  post  facto  challenge.    Defendant’s  motion  for  oral   argument  (Doc.  40)  is  moot.     DONE  and  ORDERED  this  the  22nd  day  of  September,  2014.                         s/Charles  R.  Butler,  Jr.       Senior  United  States  District  Judge                                                                                                                     9  Furthermore,  the  “other  useful  guideposts”  Plaintiff  has  gleaned  from  these   cases  have  little  relevance  here.    Two  of  those  factors—whether  the  sanction  applies   to  behavior  that  is  already  a  crime  and  whether  it  comes  into  play  only  on  a  finding   of  scienter—are  factors  that  the  Smith  court  found  not  to  be  relevant.    Smith,  538   U.S.  at  97  (applying  “most  relevant”  Mendoza-­‐Martinez  factors).    Plaintiff  admits  that   the  final  “guidepost”  he  proffers—the  availability  of  meaningful  review  of  an   offender’s  future  dangerousness—can  also  be  considered  under  the  “excessiveness”   factor.     18  

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