Pittman v. Strange et al

Filing 42

ORDER granting 31 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 31 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff's "as-applied" ex post facto challenge.; finding as moot 40 Motion for Oral Argument. Signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr on 9/22/2014. copies to parties. (sdb)

IN
 THE
 UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 COURT
 FOR
 THE

SOUTHERN
 DISTRICT
 OF
 ALABAMA

SOUTHERN
 DIVISION

WILLIAM
 HENRY
 PITTMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

LUTHER
 STRANGE,
 in
 his

official
 capacity
 as
 Attorney

General
 of
 the
 State
 of

Alabama,
 and
 JOHN

RICHARDSON,1
 in
 his

official
 capacity
 as
 Acting

Director
 of
 the
 Alabama

Department
 of
 Public

Safety,

Defendants.

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CIVIL
 ACTION
 NO.

 12-­‐00667-­‐CB-­‐M

ORDER

This
 matter
 is
 before
 the
 Court
 on
 a
 motion
 for
 judgment
 on
 the
 pleadings
 or,

alternatively,
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment,
 filed
 by
 the
 Defendants
 (Doc.
 31),

Plaintiff’s
 response
 (Doc.
 37)
 and
 Defendant’s
 reply
 (Doc.
 39).

 After
 due

consideration
 of
 all
 issues
 raised,
 the
 Court
 finds
 that
 the
 motion
 is
 due
 to
 be

granted.

I.

 Factual
 &
 Procedural
 Background

Plaintiff
 William
 Henry
 Pittman
 is
 a
 convicted
 sex
 offender.

 In
 1989,
 Pittman

pled
 guilty
 in
 the
 United
 States
 District
 Court
 for
 the
 Southern
 District
 of
 Mississippi

1
 Pursuant
 to
 Rule
 25(d)
 of
 the
 Federal
 Rules
 of
 Civil
 Procedure,
 John

Richardson,
 Acting
 Director
 of
 the
 Alabama
 Department
 of
 Public
 Safety
 has
 been

substituted
 as
 an
 official
 capacity
 defendant
 in
 place
 of
 Hugh
 McCall,
 former

Director
 of
 the
 Alabama
 Department
 of
 Public
 Safety.

to
 a
 Federal
 offense—Transportation
 of
 a
 Minor
 for
 Sexual
 Purposes.2

 In
 2002,

Pittman
 moved
 to
 Alabama
 where
 he
 opened
 a
 small
 loan
 business,
 Cash-­‐N-­‐A-­‐Dash.

In
 January
 2012,
 he
 was
 indicted
 in
 this
 district
 for
 failure
 to
 register
 as
 a
 sex

offender,
 in
 violation
 of
 the
 Federal
 Sex
 Offender
 Registration
 and
 Notification
 Act

(SORNA).

 See
 Criminal
 No.
 12-­‐00014-­‐CG-­‐C,
 Doc.
 1.

 In
 June
 2012,
 Pittman
 was
 also

indicted
 on
 a
 charge
 of
 possession
 of
 a
 firearm
 by
 a
 convicted
 felon.

 See
 Criminal

No.
 12-­‐00155-­‐WS-­‐C.

 Pittman
 pled
 guilty
 to
 the
 latter
 charge,
 and
 the
 failure-­‐to-­‐
register
 charge
 was
 dismissed.

 Pittman
 was
 sentenced
 to
 10
 months
 in
 prison.

When
 he
 was
 released
 from
 prison
 in
 2014,
 Pittman
 was
 forced
 to
 relocate
 his

residence
 due
 to
 its
 proximity
 to
 a
 school.3

 As
 a
 convicted
 sex
 offender,
 Pittman
 is

subject
 to
 the
 requirements
 of
 the
 Alabama
 Sex
 Offender
 Registration
 and

Community
 Notification
 Act
 (ASORCNA),
 Ala.
 Code
 §§
 15-­‐20A-­‐1,
 et
 seq.
 (1975,
 as

amended).

In
 his
 complaint
 seeking
 declaratory
 judgment,
 Pittman
 challenged
 the

constitutionality
 of
 ASORCNA.

 Specifically,
 Plaintiff
 contested
 “the
 procedure
 used

[by
 the
 Defendants]
 to
 determine
 the
 Plaintiff
 .
 .
 .
 to
 be
 a
 ‘foreign
 jurisdiction

convicted
 sex
 offender’”
 as
 well
 as
 “the
 Defendants’
 final
 determination
 that
 Pittman

is
 non-­‐compliant
 with
 Alabama’s
 sex
 offender
 registry[,]
 administrative
 code
 and

Alabama
 statute.”
 (Compl.
 ¶
 1,
 Doc.
 1.)

 Defendants
 filed
 a
 motion
 to
 dismiss
 the

complaint
 for
 failure
 to
 state
 a
 claim
 on
 which
 relief
 can
 be
 granted.

 The
 Court

2
 Pittman
 devotes
 most
 of
 the
 “facts”
 section
 of
 his
 summary
 judgment

response
 to
 his
 version
 of
 events
 that
 led
 him
 to
 plead
 guilty
 to
 the
 underlying

offense,
 none
 of
 which
 is
 relevant
 to
 the
 legal
 issues
 presented
 in
 this
 case.

3
 Pittman
 argues
 throughout
 his
 brief
 that
 ASCORNA
 is
 punitive
 because
 it

will
 also
 force
 him
 to
 relocate
 his
 business,
 but
 he
 has
 not
 explained
 this
 assertion.

Apparently,
 the
 business
 remains
 in
 its
 original
 location.

2

granted
 the
 motion
 to
 dismiss
 as
 to
 Plaintiff’s
 due
 process
 and
 equal
 protection

claims
 but
 denied
 the
 motion
 as
 to
 Plaintiff’s
 ex
 post
 facto
 challenge.

That
 claim,
 as
 set
 fort
 in
 the
 compliant,
 is:

[
 ]

 The
 Defendants
 are
 attempting
 to
 enforce
 a
 law
 which
 was

enacted
 after
 Pittman’s
 guilty
 plea
 in
 1998.

 The
 laws
 [sic]
 sought
 to

be
 enforced
 by
 the
 Defendants
 were
 enacted
 after
 Pittman
 leased
 his

business
 property
 in
 approximately
 2001-­‐2002.

 It
 is
 an
 ex
 post
 facto

law.

 The
 question
 becomes
 is
 it
 a
 permissible
 ex
 post
 facto
 application

of
 law?

 The
 test
 of
 whether
 an
 ex
 post
 facto
 law
 is
 permissible
 is

whether
 or
 not
 the
 application
 of
 the
 ex
 post
 facto
 law
 is
 punitive
 in

nature
 versus
 a
 function
 of
 public
 safety.

[
 ]
 Plaintiff
 can
 demonstrate
 the
 application
 of
 the
 law
 to
 his

specific
 set
 of
 facts
 is
 punitive.

 The
 application
 of
 law
 to
 Pittman
 will

expose
 him
 to
 criminal
 prosecution
 for
 reported
 non-­‐compliance.

Additionally
 application
 of
 the
 law
 by
 the
 Defendants
 will
 deprive

Pittman’s
 liberty
 and
 property
 to
 which
 he
 was
 rightfully
 entitled

before
 the
 law’s
 enactment.

 Pittman
 acted
 in
 reliance
 on
 the
 law
 as
 it

existed
 at
 the
 time
 he
 established
 his
 business
 and
 its
 location.

 If
 an

ex
 post
 facto
 law
 is
 applied
 in
 such
 a
 way
 as
 to
 be
 punitive
 in
 nature,

then
 it
 is
 violations
 the
 [sic]
 the
 Constitution.

 Mir.
 Pittman
 requests
 a

trial
 on
 the
 merits
 in
 which
 he
 can
 present
 evidence
 of
 the
 punitive

effect
 of
 the
 ex
 post
 facto
 law.

(Compl.,
 ¶¶
 19-­‐20,
 emphasis
 added.)

 The
 Court
 interpreted
 Plaintiff’s
 claim
 to

assert
 only
 an
 ‘as
 applied’
 ex
 post
 facto
 challenge
 to
 ASORCNA.”

 (Order
 at
 11
 n.
 5,

Doc.
 14.)

In
 denying
 the
 motion
 to
 dismiss,
 this
 Court
 applied
 the
 Supreme
 Court’s
 ex

post
 facto
 analysis
 as
 set
 forth
 in
 Smith
 v.
 Doe,
 538
 U.S.
 84
 (2003),
 a
 case
 involving

Alaska’s
 sex
 offender
 notification
 act:

The
 first
 part
 of
 the
 Supreme
 Court’s
 ex
 post
 facto
 analysis
 in

Smith
 is
 purely
 legal.

 Initially,
 the
 Court
 “’must
 ascertain
 whether
 the

legislature
 meant
 the
 statute
 to
 establish
 civil
 proceedings.’”
 Smith,

538
 U.S.
 at
 92
 (quoting
 Kansas
 v.
 Hendricks,
 521
 U.S.
 346,
 361
 (1997)).

Obviously,
 if
 the
 intent
 was
 punitive,
 then
 the
 Ex
 Post
 Facto
 Clause

prohibits
 retroactive
 application.

 Id.
 If
 the
 legislature
 intended
 to

create
 “a
 regulatory
 scheme
 that
 is
 civil
 and
 nonpunitive,”
 then
 the

3

Court
 must
 determine
 whether
 the
 law
 is
 “so
 punitive
 in
 either

purpose
 or
 effect”
 as
 to
 render
 it
 a
 criminal
 penalty.

 Id.

 The
 Supreme

Court
 has
 cautioned
 that
 “’only
 the
 clearest
 proof
 will
 suffice
 to

override
 legislative
 intent
 and
 transform
 what
 has
 been
 denominated

a
 civil
 remedy
 into
 a
 criminal
 penalty.’”

 Id.
 (quoting
 Hudson
 v.
 United

States,
 522
 U.S.
 93,
 100
 (1997))
 (internal
 quotations
 omitted).

(Order
 at
 12.)

 Applying
 that
 first
 step
 of
 the
 Smith
 analysis,
 the
 Court
 concluded

that
 the
 Alabama
 Legislature’s
 clear
 intent
 in
 enacting
 ASORCNA
 “was
 to
 create
 a

regulatory
 scheme
 to
 protect
 the
 public
 and
 promote
 child
 safety.”
 (Id.
 at
 13.)

 With

regard
 to
 the
 second
 step,
 the
 Court
 reasoned
 that
 “the
 inquiry
 also
 involves
 factual

determinations”
 because
 “[t]he
 existence
 of
 a
 burden
 of
 proof
 implies
 the

presentation
 of
 evidence.”

 (Id.
 at
 14.)

 At
 the
 initial
 pleading
 stage,
 the
 Court
 found

Plaintiff’s
 complaint
 stated
 a
 plausible
 “as-­‐applied”
 ex
 post
 facto
 claim
 based
 on
 the

assertion
 that
 ASORCNA’s
 restrictions
 would
 require
 Plaintiff
 to
 move
 his
 home
 and

business.

II.

 Issues
 Presented

Defendants
 seek
 judgment
 on
 the
 pleadings
 because,
 they
 argue,
 “the
 case
 for

outright
 dismissal
 of
 Pittman’s
 ex
 post
 facto
 claim
 is
 far
 more
 compelling
 an
 the

Defendant’s
 articulated
 in
 their
 short
 motion
 to
 dismiss.”

 (Defs.’
 Br.
 3,
 Doc.
 34.)

 In

particular,
 Defendants
 point
 out,
 first
 that
 the
 factual
 component
 of
 the
 ex
 post
 facto

analysis
 must
 be
 viewed
 with
 great
 deference
 to
 the
 legislative
 intent
 and,
 second,

the
 facts
 to
 be
 considered
 are
 “legislative
 facts
 of
 which
 the
 Court
 may
 take
 judicial

notice.”
 (Id.)

 Alternatively
 Defendants
 argue
 that
 summary
 judgment
 is
 appropriate

because
 the
 facts
 upon
 which
 Plaintiff
 relies
 do
 not
 satisfy
 the
 heavy
 burden
 of
 proof

necessary
 to
 transform
 a
 civil
 regulatory
 scheme
 into
 an
 ex
 post
 facto
 criminal

punishment.

4

In
 response,
 Plaintiff
 argues
 that
 the
 motion
 for
 judgment
 on
 the
 pleadings
 is

due
 to
 be
 denied
 because
 the
 pleadings
 have
 not
 changed
 since
 the
 Court
 ruled
 on

the
 motion
 to
 dismiss.

 With
 regard
 to
 the
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment,
 Plaintiff

says
 there
 is
 “[a]
 mountain
 of
 evidence”
 that
 proves
 “that
 the
 application
 of

ASORCNA
 is
 punitive
 in
 effect
 so
 as
 to
 overcome
 the
 legislative
 label
 of
 ‘non-­‐
punitive’.”

 (Pl.’s
 Br.
 6,
 Doc.
 37.)

 Further,
 Plaintiff
 points
 out
 that
 this
 case
 is
 “an

outlier.

 It
 presents
 such
 an
 unusual
 pattern
 of
 facts
 that
 a
 ruling
 in
 [Plaintiff]’s
 favor

is
 almost
 certain
 not
 to
 open
 the
 door
 for
 cases
 to
 follow
 unless
 they
 have
 similarly

unique
 circumstances.”
 (Id.
 6.)

As
 discussed
 below,
 the
 ex
 post
 facto
 claim
 Plaintiff
 asserted
 in
 his
 complaint

is
 actually
 different
 from
 the
 ex
 post
 facto
 claim
 Plaintiff
 has
 argued
 in
 his
 summary

judgment
 response.

 Judgment
 on
 the
 pleadings
 is
 due
 to
 be
 granted
 as
 to
 the

former,
 and
 summary
 judgment
 is
 due
 to
 be
 granted
 as
 to
 the
 latter.4

III.

 Standard
 of
 Review

A.

 Motion
 for
 Judgment
 on
 the
 Pleadings

A
 motion
 for
 judgment
 on
 the
 pleadings
 must
 be
 granted
 “when
 there
 are
 no

material
 facts
 in
 dispute
 and
 the
 moving
 party
 is
 entitled
 to
 judgment
 as
 a
 matter
 of

law.

 All
 facts
 alleged
 in
 the
 complaint
 must
 be
 accepted
 as
 true
 and
 viewed
 in
 the

light
 most
 favorable
 to
 the
 nonmoving
 party.”

 Douglas
 Asphalt
 Co.
 v.
 Qore,
 Inc.,
 541

F.3d
 1269,
 1273
 (11th
 Cir.
 2008).

4
 The
 Court
 does
 not
 address
 Defendants’
 argument
 that
 only
 “legislative

facts”
 should
 be
 considered,
 judgment
 on
 the
 pleadings
 entered,
 and
 Plaintiff’s

evidence
 disregarded.

 Even
 when
 the
 facts
 proffered
 by
 Plaintiff
 are
 considered,
 the

evidence
 is
 insufficient
 to
 overcome
 legislative
 intent
 to
 create
 a
 civil
 regulatory

scheme.

5

B.

 Motion
 for
 Summary
 Judgment

Summary
 judgment
 should
 be
 granted
 only
 if
 “there
 is
 no
 issue
 as
 to
 any

material
 fact
 and
 the
 moving
 party
 is
 entitled
 to
 a
 judgment
 as
 a
 matter
 of
 law.”

 Fed.

R.
 Civ.
 P.
 56(c).

 The
 party
 seeking
 summary
 judgment
 bears
 “the
 initial
 burden
 to

show
 the
 district
 court,
 by
 reference
 to
 materials
 on
 file,
 that
 there
 are
 not
 genuine

issues
 of
 material
 fact
 that
 should
 be
 decided
 at
 trial”

 Clark
 v.
 Coats
 &
 Clark,
 Inc.,
 929

F.2d
 604,
 608
 (11th
 Cir.
 1991).

 Once
 the
 moving
 party
 has
 satisfied
 his

responsibility,
 the
 burden
 shifts
 to
 the
 nonmoving
 party
 to
 show
 the
 existence
 of
 a

genuine
 issue
 of
 material
 fact.

 Id.

 “If
 the
 nonmoving
 party
 fails
 to
 make
 ‘a
 sufficient

showing
 on
 an
 essential
 element
 of
 her
 case
 with
 respect
 to
 which
 she
 has
 the

burden
 of
 proof,’
 the
 moving
 party
 is
 entitled
 to
 summary
 judgment.”

 United
 States

v.
 Four
 parcels
 of
 Real
 Property,
 941
 F.2d
 1428,
 1437
 (11th
 Cir.
 1991)
 (quoting

Celotex
 Corp.
 v.
 Catrett,
 477
 U.S.
 317
 (1986))
 (footnote
 omitted).

“In
 reviewing
 whether
 the
 nonmoving
 party
 has
 met
 its
 burden,
 the
 court

must
 stop
 short
 of
 weighing
 the
 evidence
 and
 making
 credibility
 determination
 of

the
 truth
 of
 the
 matter.

 Instead,
 the
 evidence
 of
 the
 non-­‐movant
 is
 to
 be
 believed

and
 all
 justifiable
 inferences
 are
 to
 be
 drawn
 in
 his
 favor.”

 Tipton
 v.
 Bergrohr
 GMBH-­‐
Siegen,
 965
 F.2d
 994,
 999
 (11th
 Cir.
 1992)
 (internal
 citations
 and
 quotations

omitted).
 “However,
 we
 draw
 these
 inferences
 only
 “’to
 the
 extent
 supportable
 by

the
 record.’”

 Penley
 v.
 Eslinger,
 605
 F.3d
 843,
 848
 (11th
 Cir.
 2002)
 (quoting
 Scott
 v.

Harris,
 550
 U.S.
 372,
 381
 n.
 8
 (2007)
 (emphasis
 omitted)).

 Furthermore,
 “[a]

dispute
 over
 a
 fact
 will
 only
 preclude
 summary
 judgment
 if
 the
 dispute
 “might
 affect

6

the
 outcome
 of
 the
 suit
 under
 the
 governing
 law.”

 Id.
 (quoting
 Anderson
 v.
 Liberty

Lobby,
 Inc.,
 477
 US.
 242,
 248
 (1986)).

IV.

 ASCORNA

Effective
 July
 1,
 2011,
 Alabama
 replaced
 its
 prior
 sex
 offender
 registry
 law,

the
 Alabama
 Community
 Notification
 Act
 (CNA),
 Ala.
 Code
 §
 15-­‐20-­‐20,
 et
 seq.
 (1975),

with
 the
 Alabama
 Sex
 Offender
 Registration
 and
 Community
 Notification
 Act

(ASORCNA),
 Ala.
 Code
 §
 15-­‐20A-­‐1,
 et
 seq.
 (1975,
 as
 amended).

 A
 person
 subject
 to

ASORCNA
 must
 register
 as
 a
 sex
 offender
 with
 the
 Alabama
 Department
 of
 Public

Safety
 (DPS),
 id.
 §
 15-­‐20A-­‐7;
 must
 register
 with
 local
 law
 enforcement,
 pay
 a

registration
 fee,
 and
 abide
 by
 certain
 reporting
 requirements,
 id.
 §
 15-­‐20A-­‐10
 &
 §

15-­‐20A-­‐22;
 is
 subject
 to
 residency,
 travel,
 and
 employment
 restrictions,
 id.
 §§
 15-­‐
20A-­‐11,
 -­‐13,
 &
 -­‐15;
 and
 is
 subject
 to
 community
 notification
 requirements,
 id.
 §
 15-­‐
20A-­‐21.

 In
 addition,
 ASORCNA
 requires
 that
 the
 offender
 carry
 identification.

 Id.
 §

15-­‐20A-­‐18.

 Of
 particular
 significance
 in
 this
 case,
 an
 adult
 sex
 offender
 cannot

establish
 or
 maintain
 a
 residence
 or
 maintain
 employment
 within
 2,000
 feet
 of
 a

school.

 Id.
 §§
 15-­‐20A-­‐aa(a)
 (residence)
 &
 15-­‐20A-­‐13(b)
 (employment).

 However,

exceptions
 are
 possible
 in
 some
 instances.

 Id.

 §
 15-­‐20A-­‐11(f)(residence)
 &
 §
 15-­‐
20A-­‐25(a)
 (employment).
 An
 “adult
 sex
 offender”
 (i.e.
 an
 adult
 who
 has
 been

convicted
 of
 a
 sex
 offense)
 is
 subject
 to
 ASORCNA’s
 requirements
 for
 life.

 Ala.
 Code

§§
 15-­‐20A-­‐3(b),
 15-­‐20A-­‐4(1).

V.

 Smith
 v.
 Doe
 and
 the
 Ex
 Post
 Facto
 Analysis

The
 first
 step
 in
 the
 ex
 post
 facto
 analysis
 set
 out
 in
 Smith
 is
 not
 in
 dispute.

Initially,
 the
 Court
 “’must
 ascertain
 whether
 the
 legislature
 meant
 the
 statue
 to

7

establish
 civil
 proceedings.’”

 Smith,
 538
 U.S.
 at
 92
 (quoting
 Kansas
 v.
 Hendricks,
 521

U.S.
 346,
 361
 (1997)).

 In
 the
 order
 addressing
 the
 motion
 to
 dismiss,
 this
 Court

held:

 “The
 Alabama
 legislature’s
 expressed
 intent
 was
 to
 create
 a
 civil
 regulatory

scheme
 to
 protect
 the
 public
 and
 promote
 child
 safety.”

 (Order
 at
 13,
 Doc.
 14.)

Pittman
 concedes
 this
 point.

 (Pl.’s
 Br.
 6,
 Doc.
 37.)

 If
 the
 legislative
 intent
 “was
 to

enact
 a
 regulatory
 scheme
 that
 is
 civil
 and
 nonpunitive,”
 the
 inquiry
 “examines

whether
 the
 statutory
 scheme
 is
 so
 punitive
 in
 either
 purpose
 or
 effect
 as
 to
 negate

[the
 legislature’s]
 intention
 to
 deem
 it
 civil.”

 Smith,
 538
 U.S.
 at
 97.

 As
 the
 Eleventh

Circuit

 has
 recognized,
 “[this]
 second
 step
 is
 a
 steep
 one
 for
 those
 challenging
 a

statute
 on
 these
 grounds
 .
 .
 .
 only
 the
 clearest
 proof
 will
 suffice
 to
 override
 legislative

intent.’”

 United
 States
 v.
 W.B.H.,
 664
 F.3d
 848,
 853
 (11th
 Cir.
 2011
 (quoting
 Smith,
 id.

at
 97
 (emphasis
 added)).

 On
 summary
 judgment,
 Plaintiff
 argues
 that
 his
 evidence

is
 sufficient
 to
 meet
 this
 burden.

 The
 claim
 Plaintiff
 actually
 pled
 in
 the
 complaint,

however,
 is
 different.

 It
 would
 add
 a
 third
 level
 to
 the
 ex
 post
 facto
 analysis.

 That
 is,

an
 otherwise
 civil
 regulatory
 scheme
 could
 be
 deemed
 ex
 post
 facto
 as
 applied
 to
 a

single
 individual.

 The
 latter
 claim,
 which
 is
 clearly
 subject
 to
 judgment
 on
 the

pleadings,
 is
 addressed
 first
 below.

A.

 Plaintiff’s
 “As-­‐Applied”
 Ex
 Post
 Facto
 Challenge

The
 Supreme
 Court
 has
 flatly
 rejected
 the
 concept
 of
 an
 “as-­‐applied”
 ex
 post

facto
 challenge
 to
 a
 civil
 statute.5

 In
 Seling
 v.
 Young,
 531
 U.S.
 250
 (2001),
 the
 Court

5
 “The
 Constitution
 of
 the
 United
 States,
 article
 1,
 .
 .
 .
 section
 10,
 lays
 several

restrictions
 on
 the
 authority
 of
 the
 Legislatures
 of
 the
 several
 states;
 and,
 among

them,
 ‘that
 no
 state
 shall
 pass
 any
 ex
 post
 facto
 law.’”

 Calder
 v.
 Bull,
 3
 U.S.
 386,
 389

(1789).

 An
 ex
 post
 facto
 law
 is
 one
 that
 makes
 criminal
 an
 act
 that
 was
 not
 criminal

8

examined
 an
 ex
 post
 facto
 challenge
 to
 Washington’s
 State
 Community
 Protection

Act,
 which
 provided
 for
 civil
 commitment
 of
 sexually
 violent
 predators.

 The
 Seling

court
 reversed
 the
 Ninth
 Circuit’s
 ruling
 that
 a
 complaint
 “alleging
 that
 [the

Washington
 Act]
 was
 punitive
 as
 applied”
 stated
 a
 plausible
 claim
 for
 relief.

 Id.
 at

261.

 The
 Court
 recognized
 that
 “the
 civil
 nature
 of
 an
 Act
 cannot
 be
 determined
 “by

reference
 to
 the
 effect
 that
 an
 Act
 has
 on
 a
 single
 individual.”

 Id.
 at
 262.

 Further
 “an

‘as
 applied’
 analysis
 would
 prove
 unworkable.

 Such
 an
 analysis
 would
 never

conclusively
 resolve
 whether
 a
 particular
 scheme
 is
 punitive
 and
 would
 thereby

prevent
 a
 final
 determination
 of
 the
 scheme’s
 validity
 under
 the
 Double
 Jeopardy
 or

Ex
 Post
 Facto
 Clauses.”

 Id.
 at
 263.

 In
 ruling
 on
 the
 motion
 to
 dismiss,
 this
 Court
 held

that
 the
 complaint
 stated
 a
 plausible
 claim
 for
 relief
 based
 on
 an
 “as-­‐applied”
 ex
 post

facto
 challenge.

 As
 Seling
 makes
 clear,
 that
 is
 wrong
 because
 no
 such
 claim
 exists.

The
 posture
 of
 this
 case
 is
 a
 bit
 different
 from
 that
 in
 Seling.

 In
 that
 case,
 the

second
 step
 of
 the
 ex
 post
 facto
 analysis—whether
 the
 legislation
 was
 so
 punitive
 in

effect
 as
 to
 render
 it
 a
 criminal
 penalty
 (“the
 effects
 test”)—had
 already
 been

decided
 in
 favor
 of
 the
 state.

 Consequently,
 the
 Act
 was
 indisputably
 civil,
 and
 the

only
 issue
 before
 the
 Supreme
 Court
 was
 whether
 application
 of
 a
 civil
 regulatory

scheme
 to
 an
 individual
 could
 constitute
 an
 ex
 post
 facto
 violation.6

 Plaintiff’s

summary
 judgment
 response
 appears
 to
 redefine
 his
 claim
 to
 address
 the
 second

when
 committed
 or
 increases
 the
 punishment
 for
 a
 previously
 committed
 offense.

Id.

6
 The
 Seling
 court
 did
 not
 prohibit
 consideration
 of
 a
 statute’s
 effects
 on
 a

single
 individual
 as
 evidence
 of
 the
 act’s
 overall
 punitive
 effect.

 In
 other
 words,
 such

evidence
 may
 be
 considered
 in
 determining
 whether
 Plaintiff
 has
 proved
 “by

clearest
 evidence
 “
 that
 ASORCNA
 is
 so
 punitive
 in
 effect
 as
 to
 override
 legislative

intent
 to
 create
 a
 civil
 regulatory
 scheme.

 Id.

9

step—i.e.,
 that
 ASORCNA
 is
 so
 punitive
 in
 “purpose
 or
 effect”
 as
 to
 render
 it
 a

criminal
 penalty.7

 Plaintiff
 presents
 evidence
 of
 the
 effect
 on
 him
 as
 part
 of
 his

evidence
 that
 ASORCNA
 is
 so
 punitive
 overall
 as
 to
 render
 the
 statute
 (as
 opposed
 to

the
 individual
 application
 of
 the
 statute)
 an
 ex
 post
 facto
 violation.

B.

 Plaintiff’s
 Attempt
 to
 Prove
 ASORCNA’s
 Punitive
 Effect

In
 Smith,
 the
 Court
 articulated
 the
 framework
 for
 determining
 whether
 a
 civil

statute
 has
 a
 sufficiently
 punitive
 effect
 to
 overcome
 legislative
 intent:

In
 analyzing
 the
 effects
 of
 the
 Act
 we
 refer
 to
 the
 seven
 factors
 noted

in
 Kennedy
 v.
 Mendoza–Martinez,
 372
 U.S.
 144,
 168–169,
 83
 S.Ct.
 554,

9
 L.Ed.2d
 644
 (1963),
 as
 a
 useful
 framework.
 These
 factors,
 which

migrated
 into
 our
 ex
 post
 facto
 case
 law
 from
 double
 jeopardy

jurisprudence,
 have
 their
 earlier
 origins
 in
 cases
 under
 the
 Sixth
 and

Eighth
 Amendments,
 as
 well
 as
 the
 Bill
 of
 Attainder
 and
 the
 Ex
 Post

Facto
 Clauses.
 Because
 the
 Mendoza–Martinez
 factors
 are
 designed
 to

apply
 in
 various
 constitutional
 contexts,
 we
 have
 said
 they
 are

“neither
 exhaustive
 nor
 dispositive,”
 but
 are
 “useful
 guideposts.”
 The

factors
 most
 relevant
 to
 our
 analysis
 are
 whether,
 in
 its
 necessary

operation,
 the
 regulatory
 scheme:
 has
 been
 regarded
 in
 our
 history

and
 traditions
 as
 a
 punishment;
 imposes
 an
 affirmative
 disability
 or

restraint;
 promotes
 the
 traditional
 aims
 of
 punishment;
 has
 a
 rational

connection
 to
 a
 nonpunitive
 purpose;
 or
 is
 excessive
 with
 respect
 to

this
 purpose.

Id.
 at
 97
 (internal
 citations
 omitted).

 Furthermore,
 as
 previously
 noted,
 “only
 the

‘clearest
 proof’
 will
 suffice
 to
 override
 legislative
 intent
 and
 transform
 what
 has

been
 denominated
 a
 civil
 remedy
 into
 a
 criminal
 penalty.”

 Id.
 at
 92
 (internal

citations
 omitted).

 As
 the
 Eleventh
 Circuit
 said
 in
 W.B.H.,
 “[w]e
 take
 the
 Court
 at
 its

word:

 some
 evidence
 will
 not
 do;
 substantial
 evidence
 will
 not
 do;
 and
 a

7
 Plaintiff’s
 argument,
 however,
 conflates
 two
 distinct
 principles:

 Punitive

effect
 and
 punitive
 application.

 The
 former,
 if
 proved
 “by
 the
 clearest
 evidence,”

may
 render
 a
 civil
 statute
 an
 ex
 post
 facto
 violation.

 Smith,
 538
 U.S.
 at
 92.

 The
 latter

will
 not.

 Seling,
 531
 U.S.
 at
 263.

10

preponderance
 of
 the
 evidence
 will
 not
 do.

 ‘[O]nly
 the
 clearest
 proof’
 will
 do.”

W.B.H.,
 664
 F.3d
 at
 855
 (quoting
 Smith,
 id.
 at
 97).

 It
 is
 a
 heavy
 burden,
 indeed,
 and

one
 that
 Plaintiff’s
 evidence
 does
 not
 come
 close
 to
 satisfying.

1.

 Historically
 Regarded
 as
 Punishment

Pittman
 argues
 that
 some
 aspects
 of
 ASORCNA
 are
 like
 traditional

forms
 of
 punishment.

 First,
 Pitman
 asserts
 ASORCNA
 travel
 restrictions
 and

registration
 requirements
 amount
 to
 punishment
 based
 on
 his
 own
 experience,
 to

wit:

 “’I
 have
 been
 to
 prison
 …
 and
 been
 on
 probation.

 I
 know
 what
 it
 feels
 like
 to
 be

punished
 [and]
 .
 .
 .
 [ASORCNA’s
 requirements]
 are
 identical
 to
 being
 on
 supervised

probation.’”

 (Pl.’s
 Br.
 12,
 quoting
 Pl.’s
 Aff.)

 But
 “feels
 like
 punishment”
 is
 not

persuasive
 evidence,
 or
 even
 persuasive
 argument,
 that
 ASORCNA’s
 restrictions

have
 been
 considered
 punishment
 throughout
 history.

 In
 Smith
 the
 Supreme
 Court

recognized
 “some
 force”
 to
 the
 argument
 that
 a
 registration
 system
 was
 akin
 to

supervised
 release,
 but
 ultimately
 rejected
 it.

 AS
 the
 Court
 pointed
 out,
 there
 is
 a

difference
 between
 actions
 that
 must
 be
 reported
 (such
 as
 ASORCNA’s
 requirement

that
 travel
 plans
 be
 reported
 to
 authorities
 in
 advance)
 but
 do
 not
 restrict

movement
 and
 “[p]robation
 and
 supervised
 release
 which
 entail
 a
 series
 of

mandatory
 conditions
 and
 allow
 the
 supervising
 officer
 to
 seek
 the
 revocation
 of

probation
 or
 release
 in
 case
 of
 infraction.”

 Smith
 538
 U.S.
 at
 101.

Pittman
 also
 likens
 aspects
 of
 ASORCNA
 to
 public
 shaming,
 a

historical
 form
 of
 punishment.

 The
 Act
 requires
 that
 a
 convicted
 sex

offender
 “obtain,
 and
 always
 have
 in
 his
 or
 her
 possession,”
 “a
 driver’s

license
 or
 identification
 card
 bearing
 a
 designation
 that
 enables
 law

enforcement
 to
 identify
 the
 licenses
 as
 a
 sex
 offender.”

 Ala.
 Code
 §
 15-­‐
20A-­‐18(a),
 (d)
 (1975,
 as
 amended).

 Pursuant
 to
 this
 statute,
 the

Alabama
 Department
 of
 Public
 Safety
 has
 issued
 Pittman
 a
 driver’s

license
 bearing
 the
 words
 “Criminal
 Sex
 Offender”
 in
 red
 letters.

11

Pittman
 feels
 “’shamed
 and
 embarrassed’”
 whenever
 he
 is
 required
 to

show
 his
 driver’s
 license.

 (Pl.’s
 Br.
 at
 12,
 quoting
 Pl.’s
 Aff.)

 Further

Pittman
 points
 to
 the
 embarrassing
 effects
 of
 the
 Act’s
 notification

requirement,
 stating:

 “’My
 landlord
 told
 me
 that
 because
 I
 was
 a
 sex

offender
 and
 the
 neighbors
 complained,
 he
 intended
 to
 periodically

enter
 the
 rental
 house
 I
 was
 living
 in
 to
 .
 .
 .
 make
 sure
 I
 was
 not
 doing

anything
 wrong.’”

 (Id.)

As
 the
 Smith
 court
 pointed
 out,
 however,
 early
 forms
 of
 punishment
 such
 as

public
 shaming,
 humiliation,
 and
 banishment
 involved
 more
 than
 the
 dissemination

of
 information.”

 Smith,
 538
 U.S.
 at
 98.

 The
 practice
 of
 public
 shaming
 meant
 holding

a
 person
 up
 for
 pubic
 ridicule.

 Id.
 “By
 contrast,
 the
 stigma
 of
 [sex
 offender

notification
 laws]
 results
 not
 from
 public
 display
 for
 ridicule
 and
 shaming
 but
 from

the
 dissemination
 of
 accurate
 information
 about
 a
 criminal
 record,
 most
 of
 which
 is

already
 public.

 Our
 system
 does
 not
 treat
 dissemination
 of
 truthful
 information
 in

furtherance
 of
 a
 legitimate
 governmental
 objective
 as
 punishment.”

 Id.

Furthermore,
 making
 information
 public
 is
 not
 transformed
 into
 “public
 shaming”

simply
 because
 the
 offender
 feels
 shame
 and
 embarrassment.

2.

 Affirmative
 Disability
 or
 Restraint

In
 a
 recent
 unpublished
 opinion
 upholding
 ASORCNA,
 the
 Eleventh
 Circuit

discussed
 the
 application
 of
 this
 factor
 as
 follows:

As
 for
 whether
 ASORCNA
 imposes
 an
 affirmative
 disability
 or

restraint,
 this
 factor
 does
 not
 tip
 the
 balance
 in
 favor
 of
 [the
 plaintiff].

In
 analyzing
 this
 issue,
 we
 must
 keep
 in
 mind
 that
 “[i]f
 the
 disability

or
 restraint
 is
 minor
 and
 indirect,
 its
 effects
 are
 unlikely
 to
 be

punitive.”

 As
 a
 result
 we’ve
 found
 no
 punitive
 restraining
 effect
 even

where
 the
 federal
 Sex
 Offender
 Registration
 and
 Notification
 Act

(“SORNA”)
 required
 in-­‐person
 reporting
 and
 mandated
 dissemination

on
 the
 internet
 of
 information
 regarding
 the
 whereabouts
 of
 convicted

sex
 offenders.

 We
 said
 that
 “[a]ppearing
 in
 person
 may
 be
 more

inconvenient,
 but
 requiring
 it
 is
 not
 punitive.”

 We
 also
 recognized

that
 [a]lthough
 the
 public
 availability
 of
 information
 may
 have
 a

lasting
 and
 painful
 impact
 on
 the
 convicted
 sex
 offender,
 these

consequences
 flow
 not
 form
 the
 Act’s
 registration
 and
 dissemination

12

provisions,
 but
 from
 the
 fact
 of
 conviction,
 already
 a
 matter
 of
 public

record.”

 To
 the
 extent
 ASORCNA
 imposes
 additional
 burdens,
 we
 still

fail
 to
 find
 it
 punitive.

Windwalker
 v.
 Governor
 of
 Alabama,
 et
 al.,
 No
 13-­‐11279,
 2014
 WL
 4290604,
 *2
 (11th

Cir.
 Sept.
 2,
 2014
 (Internal
 citations
 omitted)
 (emphasis
 added).

 Because

Windwalker
 is
 an
 published
 opinion,
 it
 is
 not
 dispositive.

 See
 11th
 Cir.
 Rule
 36-­‐2.

 It

is,
 however,
 persuasive,
 even
 with
 respect
 to
 those
 “additional
 burdens”
 about

which
 Pittman
 complains,
 such
 as
 being
 required
 to
 carry
 identification,
 to
 have
 his

photograph
 taken
 annually,
 and
 to
 not
 reside
 near
 a
 school.

 These
 are

“inconveniences”
 which
 “’do[
 ]
 not
 resemble
 the
 punishment
 of
 imprisonment
 …
 the

paradigmatic
 affirmative
 disability
 or
 restraint.’”

 United
 States
 v.
 Under
 Seal,
 709

F.3d,
 265
 (4th
 Cir.
 2013)
 (quoting
 Smith,
 538
 U.S.
 at
 100).

3.

 Promotes
 Traditional
 Aims
 of
 Punishment

“[T]he
 traditional
 aims
 of
 punishment
 …
 [are]
 retribution
 and

deterrence.”

 Kennedy
 v.
 Mendoza-­‐Martinez,
 372
 U.S.
 144,
 168
 (1963).

 Pittman

points
 out
 that
 ASORCNA’s
 legislative
 findings
 list
 deterrence
 as
 one
 of
 the
 aims
 of

the
 statute.

 Those
 findings
 state,
 in
 relevant
 part:

Registration
 and
 notification
 laws
 are
 a
 vital
 concern
 as
 the
 number
 of

sex
 offenders
 continues
 to
 rise.
 The
 increasing
 numbers
 coupled
 with

the
 danger
 of
 recidivism
 place
 society
 at
 risk.
 Registration
 and

notification
 laws
 strive
 to
 reduce
 these
 dangers
 by
 increasing
 public

safety
 and
 mandating
 the
 release
 of
 certain
 information
 to
 the
 public.

This
 release
 of
 information
 creates
 better
 awareness
 and
 informs
 the

public
 of
 the
 presence
 of
 sex
 offenders
 in
 the
 community,
 thereby

enabling
 the
 public
 to
 take
 action
 to
 protect
 themselves.
 Registration

and
 notification
 laws
 aid
 in
 public
 awareness
 and
 not
 only
 protect
 the

community
 but
 serve
 to
 deter
 sex
 offenders
 from
 future
 crimes
 through

frequent
 in-­‐person
 registration.
 Frequent
 in-­‐person
 registration

maintains
 constant
 contact
 between
 sex
 offenders
 and
 law

enforcement,
 providing
 law
 enforcement
 with
 priceless
 tools
 to
 aid

13

them
 in
 their
 investigations
 including
 obtaining
 information
 for

identifying,
 monitoring,
 and
 tracking
 sex
 offenders.

Ala.
 Code
 §
 15-­‐20A-­‐2(1)
 (emphasis
 added).

 The
 statute
 acknowledges
 a
 known

fact,
 i.e.,
 “[m]ost
 civil
 regulatory
 schemes
 have
 some
 deterrent
 effect.”

 Smith,
 538

U.S.
 at
 102.

 “’To
 hold
 that
 the
 mere
 presence
 of
 a
 deterrent
 purpose
 renders
 such

sanctions
 ‘criminal’
 .
 .
 .
 would
 severely
 undermine
 the
 Government’s
 ability
 o

engage
 in
 effective
 regulation.”

 Id.

Similarly,
 a
 statute’s
 incidental
 retributive
 effect
 does
 not
 weigh
 in
 favor
 of

finding
 the
 statute
 punitive.

 As
 the
 Eighth
 Circuit
 held
 in
 Doe
 v.
 Miller,
 405
 F.3d
 700

(8th
 Cir.
 2005),
 retributive
 effect
 “reasonably
 related
 to”
 and
 “consistent
 with
 the

regulatory
 objective”
 is
 permissible
 and
 “[w]hile
 any
 restraint
 or
 requirement

imposed
 on
 those
 who
 commit
 crimes
 is
 at
 least
 potentially
 retributive
 in
 effect,
 we

believe
 that
 [the
 residency
 restrictions
 imposed
 on
 convicted
 sex
 offenders
 by
 Iowa

law]
 like
 the
 registration
 requirement
 in
 Smith
 v.
 Doe,
 8s
 consistent
 with
 the

legislature’s
 regulatory
 objective
 of
 protecting
 the
 health
 and
 safety
 of
 children.”

Id.
 at
 720.

Pittman
 asserts
 that
 ASORCNA
 is
 retributive
 because
 he
 “lives
 in
 fear
 of
 his

neighbors’
 wrath
 and
 landlord’s
 invasion
 of
 privacy.”

 (Pl.’s
 Br.
 14.)

 Pittman’s

subjective
 fear
 of
 retribution
 is
 not
 evidence
 of
 retributive
 effect.

 Moreover,
 even
 if

the
 actions
 Pittman
 fears
 had
 occurred,
 incidental
 effects
 of
 the
 law
 are
 not

considered.

 See
 Doe
 v.
 Pataki,
 120
 F.3d
 1263,
 1279
 (2nd
 Cir.
 1997)
 (“unfortunate

incidents
 that
 have
 occurred
 in
 the
 aftermath
 of
 notification”
 are
 not
 attributable
 to

the
 law
 but
 to
 private
 third
 parties”);
 E.
 B.
 v.
 Verniero,
 119
 F.3d
 1077,
 1104
 (3d
 Cir.

14

1997)
 (increased
 risk
 of
 private
 violence
 “understandably
 of
 concern
 to
 plaintiffs”

but
 risk
 not
 great
 enough
 to
 amount
 to
 punishment).

4.

 Rational
 Connection
 to
 a
 Nonpunitive
 Purpose

The
 Supreme
 Court
 has
 said
 that
 this
 factor—a
 statute’s
 rational

connection
 to
 a
 nonpunitive
 purpose—“is
 a
 [m]ost
 significant
 factor”
 in

determining
 whether
 the
 statute’s
 effects
 are
 punitive.

 Smith,
 538
 U.S.
 at
 102.

Pittman’s
 argument
 with
 respect
 to
 this
 factor
 is
 narrowly
 focused
 on
 one
 specific

ASORCNA
 requirement,
 that
 is,
 that
 the
 “criminal
 sex
 offender
 designation
 be

printed
 on
 his
 driver’s
 license.

 He
 argues
 that
 the
 only
 purpose
 of
 this
 provision
 is

to
 shame
 him
 when
 he
 uses
 his
 identification
 “at
 stores,
 restaurants,
 doctor’s
 visits

and
 the
 like.”

 (Pl.’s
 Br.
 16.)

 “The
 requirement
 of
 a
 ‘rational
 connection’
 is
 not

demanding:

 A
 statute
 is
 not
 deemed
 punitive
 simply
 because
 it
 lacks
 a
 close
 or

perfect
 fit
 with
 the
 nonpunitive
 aims
 it
 seeks
 to
 advance.’”

 Windwalker,
 2014
 WL

4290605
 at
 *2
 (quoting
 Smith,
 id.).

 Like
 sex
 offender
 notification
 and
 residency

requirements
 reviewed
 by
 other
 courts,
 ASORCNA,
 overall,
 advances
 “a
 legitimate

nonpunitive
 purpose
 of
 ‘public
 safety
 .
 .
 .
 by
 alerting
 the
 public
 to
 the
 risk
 of
 sex

offenders
 in
 their
 community.”

 Smith,
 id.
 at
 103
 (quoting
 Ursery
 v.
 $405,089.23
 in

United
 States
 Currency,
 518
 U.S.
 267,
 290
 (1996));
 see
 also
 Doe
 v.
 Bredesen,
 507
 F.3d

998,
 1007
 (6th
 Cir.
 2007)
 (finding
 rational
 connections
 between
 residency

restrictions
 and
 aim
 of
 protecting
 public
 from
 sex
 offenders
 who,
 as
 a
 group,
 have
 a

high
 rate
 of
 recidivism);
 Doe
 v.
 Miller
 ,
 405
 F.3d
 700,
 721
 (8th
 Cir.
 2005)
 (reasonable

to
 conclude
 that
 law
 imposing
 sex
 offender
 residency
 restrictions
 “would
 protect

society
 by
 minimizing
 the
 risk
 of
 repeated
 sex
 offenses
 against
 minors”).

 Although

15

the
 driver’s
 license
 “sex
 offender”
 notation
 may
 be
 a
 loose
 fit
 with
 ASORCNA’s

public
 safety
 purpose,
 it
 nonetheless
 has
 a
 rational
 connection.

 As
 Defendants

point
 out
 the
 notation
 allows
 law
 enforcement
 to
 determine
 a
 person’s
 status

quickly
 and
 easily,
 and
 it
 may
 be
 of
 particular
 use
 when
 computer-­‐based

information
 is
 not
 readily
 accessible.

5.

 Excessiveness
 With
 Respect
 to
 Nonpunitive
 Purpose

Pittman
 contends
 that
 ASORCNA
 is
 excessive
 with
 respect
 to
 its
 public

safety
 purpose
 for
 two
 reasons.

 First,
 he
 argues
 that
 the
 lifetime
 registration

requirement
 is
 excessive
 in
 view
 of
 the
 type
 of
 offense
 for
 which
 he
 was
 convicted.

However,
 “the
 Supreme
 Court
 has
 already
 permitted
 sex
 offenders
 to
 be
 regulated

as
 a
 class
 regardless
 of
 individualized
 risk
 assessment.”

 Windwalker,
 2014
 WL

4290604
 at
 *3.

 Next,
 he
 states
 that
 “having
 to
 move
 his
 home
 and
 business
 is

excessive.”

 (Pl.’s
 Br.
 17.)

 While
 the
 statute
 might
 be
 considered
 excessive
 in
 the

Court’s
 judgment
 if
 it
 mandated
 relocation
 of
 a
 sex
 offender’s
 home
 prohibited
 his

continued
 employment,
 ASORCNA
 does
 not
 do
 that.8

 Instead,
 it
 provides

exceptions
 in
 certain
 situations.

 The
 residency
 restriction
 includes
 a
 “grandfather”

clause
 that
 allows
 offenders
 to
 maintain
 their
 residence
 while
 incarcerated.

 See

Ala.
 Code
 §
 15-­‐20A-­‐11(f).

 Relief
 rom
 employment
 restrictions
 is
 available
 pursuant

to
 §
 15-­‐20A-­‐25,
 which
 states:

 “A
 sex
 offender
 may
 petition
 the
 circuit
 court
 in
 the

county
 where
 the
 offender
 seeks
 to
 accept
 or
 maintain
 employment
 for
 relief
 from

8
 The
 evidence
 provided
 does
 not
 clearly
 explain
 Pittman’s
 residence
 and

employment
 situation.

 Pittman
 has
 moved
 from
 his
 Outley
 Drive
 residence
 and,

according
 to
 Defendants,
 was
 required
 to
 do
 so
 because
 of
 his
 felon-­‐in-­‐possession

conviction.

 Defendants
 say
 that
 had
 it
 not
 been
 for
 that
 conviction,
 Pittman
 could

have
 maintained
 his
 residence.

 Pitman
 apparently
 has
 not
 been
 required
 to
 relocate

his
 business.

16

the
 employment
 restrictions
 of
 [§15-­‐20A-­‐13]
 [unless
 the
 offender
 was
 convicted
 of

certain
 enumerated
 sex
 offenses].”

 Ala
 Code
 §
 15-­‐20A-­‐25(a).

 In
 summary,
 the

Court
 is
 not
 persuaded
 that
 ASORCNA’s
 residency
 and
 employment
 restrictions
 are

excessive.

 Even
 if
 those
 restrictions
 were
 excessive,
 this
 single
 factor
 would
 not
 be

sufficient
 to
 override
 the
 legislature’s
 intent.

6.

 Other
 Factors

Pointing
 out
 that
 the
 Smith
 v.
 Doe
 factors
 are
 not
 exclusive,
 Pittman

urges
 the
 Court
 to
 consider
 other
 “useful
 guideposts.”

 Pittman
 relies
 on
 two
 state

supreme
 court
 cases
 to
 introduce
 these
 additional
 guideposts.
 However,
 those

courts
 were
 applying
 more
 favorable
 state
 ex
 post
 facto
 laws.

 In
 Doe
 v.
 Dep’t
 of
 Pub.

Safety
 &
 Corr.
 Servs.,
 430
 Md.
 535,
 62
 A.3d
 123
 (Md.
 2013),
 the
 Maryland
 Supreme

Court
 held
 that
 the
 state’s
 sex
 offender
 registry
 law
 violated
 the
 prohibition
 on
 ex

post
 facto
 laws
 contained
 in
 the
 Maryland
 constitution.

 In
 so
 doing,
 the
 court

specifically
 declined
 to
 follow
 Smith
 v.
 Doe,
 stating:

 “We
 are
 persuaded,
 in
 the

present
 case,
 to
 follow
 our
 long-­‐standing
 interpretation
 of
 the
 xe
 post
 facto

prohibition
 and
 depart
 from
 the
 approach
 taken
 by
 the
 United
 States
 Supreme

Court
 when
 it
 analyzed
 the
 Alaskan
 sex
 offender
 registration
 statute
 in
 Smith
 v.

Doe.”

 Id.,
 430
 Md.
 at
 550,
 62
 A.3d
 at
 132.

 In
 Gonzalez
 v.
 State,
 980
 N.E.2d
 321
 (Ind.

2013),
 the
 Indiana
 Supreme
 Court
 applied
 the
 same
 guideposts
 set
 forth
 in
 Federal

law
 to
 its
 ex
 post
 facto
 review
 under
 the
 state
 constitution.

 But
 the
 court

recognized
 one
 important
 difference:

 “While
 Indiana
 courts
 have
 adopted
 an

approach
 consistent
 with
 the
 federal
 standard
 through
 use
 of
 the
 intent-­‐effects
 test,

.
 .
 .
 ‘Indiana
 does
 not
 use
 the
 heightened
 standard
 of
 clearest
 proof
 …
 as
 used
 by
 the

17

United
 States
 Supreme
 Court.
 …
 Thus,
 our
 analysis
 under
 the
 intent-­‐effects
 test
 is

independent
 from
 that
 of
 the
 federal
 standard.”

 Id.
 at
 316
 n.
 2
 (internal
 citations

omitted).

 These
 cases
 are
 of
 no
 value
 in
 deciding
 the
 applicability
 of
 Federal

constitutional
 law.9

VI.

 Conclusion

Plaintiff’s
 summary
 judgment
 response
 does
 not
 demonstrate
 by
 a

preponderance
 of
 evidence,
 much
 less
 by
 “the
 clearest
 proof,”
 that
 ASORCNA
 is
 so

punitive
 in
 effect
 as
 to
 override
 legislative
 intent
 to
 create
 a
 civil
 regulatory

scheme.

 For
 that
 reason,
 the
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment
 is
 GRANTED.

Furthermore,
 the
 motion
 for
 judgment
 on
 the
 pleadings
 is
 GRANTED
 as
 to

Plaintiff’s
 ”as-­‐applied”
 ex
 post
 facto
 challenge.

 Defendant’s
 motion
 for
 oral

argument
 (Doc.
 40)
 is
 moot.

DONE
 and
 ORDERED
 this
 the
 22nd
 day
 of
 September,
 2014.

s/Charles
 R.
 Butler,
 Jr.

Senior
 United
 States
 District
 Judge

9
 Furthermore,
 the
 “other
 useful
 guideposts”
 Plaintiff
 has
 gleaned
 from
 these

cases
 have
 little
 relevance
 here.

 Two
 of
 those
 factors—whether
 the
 sanction
 applies

to
 behavior
 that
 is
 already
 a
 crime
 and
 whether
 it
 comes
 into
 play
 only
 on
 a
 finding

of
 scienter—are
 factors
 that
 the
 Smith
 court
 found
 not
 to
 be
 relevant.

 Smith,
 538

U.S.
 at
 97
 (applying
 “most
 relevant”
 Mendoza-­‐Martinez
 factors).

 Plaintiff
 admits
 that

the
 final
 “guidepost”
 he
 proffers—the
 availability
 of
 meaningful
 review
 of
 an

offender’s
 future
 dangerousness—can
 also
 be
 considered
 under
 the
 “excessiveness”

factor.

18