Cochran v. Harrison Finance Company

Filing 31

ORDER granting 23 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr on 3/17/2014. (adk)

IN
 THE
 UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 COURT
 FOR
 THE

SOUTHERN
 DISTRICT
 OF
 ALABAMA

SOUTHERN
 DIVISION

BELINDA
 KAYE
 COCHRAN

Plaintiff,

v.

HARRISON
 FINANCE
 CO.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CIVIL
 ACTION
 NO.

13-­‐00061-­‐CB-­‐M

OPINION
 and
 ORDER

This
 matter
 is
 before
 the
 Court
 on
 a
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment
 filed
 by

the
 defendant,
 Harrison
 Finance
 Co.

 (Doc.
 23.)

 Plaintiff
 has
 filed
 a
 pro
 se
 response

to
 the
 motion
 (Doc.
 28),
 Defendant
 has
 filed
 a
 reply
 brief
 (Doc.
 29),
 and
 Plaintiff
 has

filed
 a
 surreply
 (Doc.
 30).

 After
 careful
 consideration
 of
 the
 issues
 raised,
 the

applicable
 law,
 and
 the
 evidence
 submitted
 by
 the
 parties,
 the
 Court
 finds
 that
 the

motion
 is
 due
 to
 be
 granted.

Facts

Plaintiff
 Belinda
 Cochran
 was
 employed
 by
 the
 defendant,
 Harrison
 Finance

Company
 (Harrison)
 on
 two
 separate
 occasions,
 August
 19,
 2002
 to
 August
 5,
 2005

and
 June
 30,
 2008
 to
 December
 27,
 2011.

 Harrison
 is
 a
 wholly-­‐owned
 subsidiary
 of

Hancock
 Holding
 Company.

 Another
 Hancock
 Holding
 subsidiary,
 Hancock
 Bank
 of

Mississippi,
 performs
 the
 human
 resource
 functions
 for
 Harrison
 in
 Alabama.

Cochran
 attended
 an
 orientation
 when
 began
 her
 second
 round
 of
 employment
 with

Harrison
 as
 a
 Senior
 Manager.

 At
 that
 time,
 she
 signed
 a
 document
 entitled
 “Notice

of
 Highlighted
 Policies”
 indicating
 that
 she
 understood
 Harrison’s
 discrimination

and
 harassment
 policy.

That
 anti-­‐discrimination/anti-­‐harassment
 policy
 forbids,
 inter
 alia,
 “[a]ny

discriminatory
 employment
 action
 or
 unwelcome
 conduct”
 based
 on
 sex.
 (Def.’s
 Ex.

H,
 Doc.
 23-­‐10.)

 It
 specifically
 highlights
 sexual
 harassment
 and
 describes
 various

types
 of
 behavior
 that
 constitute
 sexual
 harassment.

 The
 policy
 sets
 out
 the

following
 procedure
 to
 reporting
 sexual
 harassment:

All
 associates
 are
 responsible
 to
 help
 assure
 that
 we
 avoid

discrimination
 and
 harassment.

 If
 you
 feel
 that
 you
 have
 experienced

or
 witnessed
 any
 conduct
 that
 could
 violate
 this
 policy,
 you
 are

encouraged
 to
 notify
 any
 one
 of
 the
 following:

• Your
 supervisor

• Your
 department
 head

• Your
 Employee
 Relations
 Liaison

• Director
 of
 Human
 Resources.

(Id.)

 In
 addition,
 the
 policy
 “forbids
 retaliation
 against
 (getting
 even
 with)
 anyone

for
 reporting
 possible
 violations
 of
 this
 policy,
 assisting
 in
 making
 a
 complaint

cooperating
 in
 an
 investigation,
 or
 filing
 an
 EEOC
 claim”
 and
 outlines
 a
 procedure

for
 reporting
 retaliation
 identical
 to
 the
 sexual
 harassment
 reporting
 procedure.

Further,
 the
 policy
 promises
 “to
 investigate
 all
 complaints
 .
 .
 .
 thoroughly
 and

promptly”
 and,
 if
 a
 violation
 has
 occurred,
 to
 “take
 corrective
 action
 up
 to
 and

including
 dismissal.”

 (Id.)

 Cochran
 has
 also
 acknowledged
 that
 she
 was
 fully
 aware

of
 the
 company’s
 complaint
 procedures.

In
 2009,
 Cochran
 was
 promoted
 to
 branch
 manager
 and
 in
 that
 capacity
 was

aware
 of
 responsibilities
 that
 included
 enforcing
 company
 policies
 and
 procedures.

Sheryl
 Melton,
 a
 regional
 employee
 relations
 liaison,
 provided
 human
 resources

2

assistance
 as
 need
 to
 branch
 management
 and
 was
 assigned
 to
 Cochran’s
 branch.

Cochran
 found
 Melton
 to
 be
 approachable
 and
 friendly.

 Cochran
 could,
 and
 did,

contact
 Melton
 directly
 via
 company
 email
 or
 telephone
 to
 discuss
 personnel
 issues.

Melton
 also
 visited
 Cochran’s
 branch
 on
 several
 occasions
 while
 Cochran
 was

working
 there.

On
 August
 24,
 2011,
 Hancock
 Holding’s
 hotline
 received
 an
 anonymous
 call

complaining
 about
 Jim
 McCroan,
 President
 of
 Harrison
 Finance
 in
 Alabama.

 The

caller
 asserted
 that
 McCroan
 was
 engaging
 in
 acts
 of
 immorality,
 displays
 of

unwanted
 affection,
 was
 promoting
 unqualified
 individuals
 and
 was
 having
 an
 on-­‐
going
 affair
 with
 a
 current
 employee.

 As
 a
 result
 of
 the
 call,
 Melton
 and
 Mary
 Ann

Wilkerson,
 Hancock
 Banks’
 Regional
 Human
 Resource
 Manager,
 began
 an

investigation
 into
 McCroan.

 Between
 September
 and
 December,
 Melton
 and

Wilkerson
 interviewed
 more
 than
 a
 dozen
 past
 and
 present
 employees
 about

McCroan.

On
 December
 12,
 2011,
 Melton
 and
 Wilkerson
 visited
 Cochran’s
 branch
 as

part
 of
 their
 investigation
 of
 McCroan.

 Cochran
 was
 aware
 of
 the
 purpose
 of
 the

visit
 in
 advance,
 and
 she
 knew
 she
 was
 expected
 to
 tell
 the
 truth
 during
 the

interview.

 During
 a
 three-­‐hour
 interview,
 Cochran
 was
 asked
 whether
 she
 had
 ever

witnessed
 anyone
 any
 management
 touching
 women
 in
 an
 inappropriate
 manner.

At
 that
 point,
 Cochran
 began
 to
 cry
 because
 she
 believed
 co-­‐workers
 perceived
 that

she
 and
 McCroan
 were
 having
 an
 affair.

 When
 one
 of
 the
 interviewers
 asked
 why

people
 might
 have
 that
 impression,
 Cochran
 responded
 that
 they
 may
 have
 gotten

the
 wrong
 impression
 when
 McCroan
 had
 touched
 or
 rubbed
 her
 shoulders
 or

3

patted
 her
 on
 the
 leg.

 Cochran
 did
 not
 say
 anything
 to
 Melton
 and
 Wilkerson
 about

having
 sexual
 relations—either
 consensual
 or
 nonconsensual—with
 McCroan.

As
 result
 of
 the
 investigation,
 Harrison
 terminated
 Jim
 McCroan’s
 employment
 on

December
 16,
 2011.

On
 December
 27,
 2011,
 Wilkerson
 and
 Melton
 again
 met
 with
 Cochran,
 this

time
 about
 photographs
 found
 on
 her
 company
 computer.

 In
 October
 2011,
 a

vendor
 discovered
 three
 pornographic
 photographs
 on
 Cochran’s
 computer
 while

attempting
 to
 recover
 a
 hard
 drive.

 The
 vendor
 reported
 the
 photographs
 to
 Tom

Vickerman,
 Harrison’s
 manager
 of
 desktop
 services.

 When
 the
 vendor’s
 technician

told
 Vickerman
 he
 had
 also
 reported
 the
 photos
 to
 “Sheryl”,
 Vickerman
 assumed
 he

meant
 “Sheryl
 Melton”
 in
 Human
 Resources.

 But
 the
 technician
 made
 the
 report
 to

someone
 named
 “Cheryl”
 in
 IT.

 Thus,
 Human
 Resources
 did
 not
 learn
 about
 the

photographs
 until
 December
 21,
 2011.

 As
 it
 turns
 out,
 two
 of
 the
 photographs
 were

of
 Cochran
 herself,
 taken
 in
 the
 company
 bathroom.

 One
 is
 a
 torso
 shot
 in
 which
 she

is
 wearing
 only
 a
 bra
 and
 panties.

 The
 other
 is
 a
 photo
 of
 her
 genitalia.
 The
 third

photo
 was
 a
 nude
 male
 identified
 as
 DW.

 When
 Wilkerson
 and
 Melton
 asked

Cochran
 if
 she
 had
 downloaded
 any
 her
 pictures
 onto
 her
 hard
 drive,
 she
 initially

denied
 it.

 After
 seeing
 the
 evidence,
 she
 admitted
 that
 she
 was
 the
 person
 in
 the

photos.

 Cochran
 was
 terminated
 for
 uploading
 the
 photographs
 onto
 the
 company

computer.1

1
 Wilkerson
 and
 Melton
 subsequently
 discovered
 that
 Cochran
 had,
 in

violation
 of
 company
 policy,
 used
 her
 company
 email
 account
 to
 send
 photos
 of

herself
 to
 DW
 and
 had
 received
 DW’s
 photo
 in
 response.

4

Cochran
 filed
 a
 charge
 of
 discrimination
 with
 the
 Equal
 Employment

Opportunity
 Commission
 (EEOC)
 on
 June
 14,
 2012.

 In
 that
 charge,
 which
 she

signed
 under
 penalty
 of
 perjury,
 Cochran
 alleged
 the
 following:

I
 was
 hired
 in
 2008
 by
 the
 Respondent
 as
 a
 Senior
 Branch
 Manager.

In
 June
 2011
 I
 was
 promoted
 to
 the
 position
 of
 Centralized
 Mortgage

Manager.

 On
 December
 27,
 2011,
 Sheryl
 Melton
 (Assistant
 Vice

President
 Employee
 Relations
 Liaison)
 terminated
 my
 employment.

 I

believe
 I
 was
 discriminated
 against
 because
 of
 my
 sex.

On
 December
 13,
 2011,
 I
 complained
 to
 Melton
 and
 Mary
 Ann

Wilkerson
 (Regional
 Manager,
 Human
 Resources)
 that
 I
 felt

uncomfortable
 with
 Jim
 McCroan
 (President,
 Harrison
 Finance

Company)
 inappropriately
 rubbing
 my
 shoulders
 and
 patting
 me
 on

my
 legs.

 The
 Respondent
 reported
 I
 was
 terminated
 due
 to
 the

pornographic
 pictures
 loaded
 on
 to
 my
 work
 Computer.

 The
 pictures

were
 discovered
 in
 October
 2011,
 but
 I
 was
 not
 fired
 until
 after
 I

complained.

I
 believe
 I
 have
 been
 retaliated
 and
 discriminated
 against
 in
 violation

of
 the
 Title
 VII
 of
 the
 Civil
 Rights
 Act
 of
 1964,
 as
 amended.

(Pl.’s

 Rsp.,
 Ex.
 C,
 Doc.
 28.)

The
 EEOC
 issued
 a
 right-­‐to-­‐sue
 notice
 on
 November
 15,
 2012.

 On
 February

7,
 2013,
 Cochran
 filed
 the
 instant
 action,
 pro
 se,
 against
 Harrison
 Finance.

 The
 form

complaint
 asserts
 claims
 of
 “Gender
 discrimination,
 Sexual
 Harassment,
 [and]

Retaliation”
 in
 violation
 of
 the
 Title
 VII
 of
 the
 Civil
 Rights
 Act
 of
 1964
 (Title
 VII),
 42

U.S.C.
 §
 2000e.

 (Compl.
 1,
 Doc.
 1.)

 The
 complaint
 alleges
 that
 Cochran
 was
 “verbally

and
 physically
 sexually
 harassed
 by
 the
 President
 of
 Harrison
 Finance
 Company,
 Jim

McCroan[,]”
 that
 she
 reported
 this
 harassment
 on
 December
 11,
 2011,
 that
 McCroan

was
 terminated
 on
 December
 16,
 2011
 (with
 benefits
 and
 a
 severance
 package),
 and

that
 Cochran
 was
 terminated
 on
 December
 27,
 2011
 without
 warning
 and
 in

retaliation
 for
 speaking
 out
 and
 was
 denied
 unemployment
 benefits.

 (Id.
 3.)

5

After
 this
 lawsuit
 was
 filed,
 in
 response
 to
 a
 discovery
 request,
 Cochran

informed
 counsel
 for
 Harrison
 that
 Jim
 McCroan
 had
 forced
 her
 to
 have
 sex
 with
 him

on
 eight
 different
 occasions
 between
 April
 2010
 and
 October
 2011.

 This
 was
 the

first
 time
 Cochran
 informed
 the
 defendant
 about
 sexual
 relations
 between
 McCroan

and
 herself.

 Prior
 to
 this
 revelation,
 Cochran’s
 only
 report
 of
 inappropriate

behavior
 was
 that
 McCroan
 touched
 or
 rubbed
 her
 on
 the
 shoulders
 or
 leg,
 and
 that

report
 was
 in
 response
 to
 questioning
 by
 Wilkerson
 and
 Melton
 during
 their

investigation.

 See
 discussion,
 supra,
 at
 2-­‐3.

 According
 to
 her
 declaration
 in

opposition
 to
 summary
 judgment,
 Cochran
 “was
 going
 through
 a
 bad
 divorce
 .
 .
 .
 and

was
 afraid
 to
 tell
 anyone”
 about
 the
 rapes
 and
 also
 feared
 that
 she
 would
 lose
 her

job
 if
 she
 reported
 McCroan
 “because
 [she]
 had
 already
 been
 warned
 by
 the
 District

Manager
 at
 the
 time
 [and
 others]
 about
 the
 close
 friendship
 Mr.
 McCroan
 had
 with

Human
 Resources
 and
 many
 superiors
 at
 Hancock
 Bank.”

 (Pl.’s
 Decl.,
 Ex.
 C
 to
 Pl.’s

Surreply,
 Doc.
 30.)

Issues
 Raised

Harrison
 has
 moved
 for
 summary
 judgment
 on
 the
 two
 claims
 clearly

identified
 in
 Plaintiff’s
 pro
 se
 complaint:

 (1)
 gender
 discrimination
 based
 on
 hostile

work
 environment
 sexual
 harassment
 and
 (2)
 retaliation.2

2
 The
 complaint
 states
 that
 Harrison
 denied
 Plaintiff’s
 claim
 for

“unemployment
 benefits”
 and
 also
 states
 that
 the
 company
 approved
 McCroan’s

unemployment
 benefits
 and
 “he
 received
 a
 large
 severance
 package.”

 (Comp.
 3.)

Although
 neither
 party
 has
 stated
 as
 much,
 this
 could
 be
 construed
 as
 an
 additional

gender
 discrimination
 or
 retaliation
 claim.

 Cf.
 Robinson
 v.
 Shell
 Oil
 Co.,
 519
 U.S.
 337

(1997)
 (post-­‐employment
 actions
 can
 qualify
 as
 “adverse
 employment
 action”

under
 Title
 VII’s
 anti-­‐retaliation
 provision);
 McGuiness
 v.
 Lincoln
 Hall,
 263
 F.3d
 49

(2nd
 Cir.
 2001)
 (holding
 disparate
 treatment
 in
 severance
 pay
 actionable
 under
 Title

VII).

 However,
 as
 Harrison
 points
 out
 in
 its
 summary
 judgment
 motion
 (albeit
 with

6

Legal
 Analysis

Summary
 Judgment
 Standard

Summary
 judgment
 should
 be
 granted
 only
 if
 "there
 is
 no
 issue
 as
 to
 any

material
 fact
 and
 the
 moving
 party
 is
 entitled
 to
 a
 judgment
 as
 a
 matter
 of
 law."

Fed.
 R.
 Civ.
 P.
 56(c).

 The
 party
 seeking
 summary
 judgment
 bears
 "the
 initial
 burden

to
 show
 the
 district
 court,
 by
 reference
 to
 materials
 on
 file,
 that
 there
 are
 no
 genuine

issues
 of
 material
 fact
 that
 should
 be
 decided
 at
 trial."

 Clark
 v.
 Coats
 &
 Clark,
 Inc.,

929
 F.2d
 604,
 608
 (11th
 Cir.
 1991).

 Where
 the
 moving
 party
 also
 has
 the
 burden
 of

proof
 at
 trial,
 “that
 party
 must
 show
 affirmatively
 the
 absence
 of
 a
 genuine
 issue
 of

material
 fact:
 it
 must
 support
 its
 motion
 with
 credible
 evidence
 ...
 that
 would
 entitle

it
 to
 a
 directed
 verdict
 if
 not
 controverted
 at
 trial.”
 United
 States
 v.
 Four
 Parcels
 of

Real
 Property,
 941
 F.2d
 1428,
 1438
 (11th
 Cir.
 1991)

 Once
 the
 moving
 party
 has

satisfied
 his
 responsibility,
 the
 burden
 shifts
 to
 the
 nonmoving
 party
 to
 show
 the

existence
 of
 a
 genuine
 issue
 of
 material
 fact.

 Clark,
 929
 F.2d
 at
 608.

"In
 reviewing
 whether
 the
 nonmoving
 party
 has
 met
 its
 burden,
 the
 court

must
 stop
 short
 of
 weighing
 the
 evidence
 and
 making
 credibility
 determinations
 of

the
 truth
 of
 the
 matter.

 Instead,
 the
 evidence
 of
 the
 non-­‐movant
 is
 to
 be
 believed,

and
 all
 justifiable
 inferences
 are
 to
 be
 drawn
 in
 his
 favor.”

 Tipton
 v.
 Bergrohr
 GMBH-­‐
Siegen,
 965
 F.2d
 994,
 999
 (11th
 Cir.
 1992)
 (internal
 citations
 and
 quotations

omitted).

 “However,
 we
 draw
 these
 inferences
 only
 “’to
 the
 extent
 supportable
 by

respect
 to
 the
 hostile
 work
 environment
 claim),
 a
 civil
 complaint
 is
 “limited
 by
 the

scope
 of
 the
 EEOC
 investigation
 which
 can
 reasonably
 expected
 to
 grow
 out
 of
 the

charge
 of
 discrimination.”

 Gregory
 v.
 Ga.
 Dep’t
 of
 Human
 Res.,
 355
 F.3d
 1277,
 1280

(11th
 Cir.
 2005).

 Consequently,
 because
 no
 claim
 for

 (or
 related
 to)
 disparate

treatment
 or
 retaliation
 based
 on
 severance
 pay
 was
 asserted
 in
 the
 EEOC
 charge,

no
 such
 claim
 would
 be
 actionable
 here.

7

the
 record.’”
 Penley
 v.
 Eslinger,
 605
 F.3d
 843,
 848

 (11th
 Cir.
 2010)
 (quoting
 Scott
 v.

Harris,
 550
 U.S.
 372,
 381
 n.
 8
 (2007)
 (emphasis
 omitted)).

 Furthermore,
 “[a]

dispute
 over
 a
 fact
 will
 only
 preclude
 summary
 judgment
 if
 the
 dispute
 “might
 affect

the
 outcome
 of
 the
 suit
 under
 the
 governing
 law.”
 Id.
 (quoting
 Anderson
 v.
 Liberty

Lobby,
 Inc.,
 477
 U.S.
 242,
 248,
 (1986)).

Hostile
 Work
 Environment/Sexual
 Harassment

Harrison
 argues
 that
 it
 is
 entitled
 to
 summary
 judgment
 on
 Cochran’s
 hostile

work
 environment
 claim
 for
 several
 reason:

 (1)
 the
 claim
 is
 barred
 because
 the

harassment
 took
 place
 more
 than
 180
 days
 prior
 to
 the
 date
 the
 EEOC
 charge;
 (2)

the
 scope
 of
 EEOC
 charge
 did
 not
 include
 the
 sexual
 harassment
 claims
 alleged
 in

this
 lawsuit;
 and
 (3)
 Cochran
 unreasonably
 failed
 to
 use
 the
 company’s
 complaint

procedure
 to
 report
 the
 sexual
 harassment.

 The
 Court
 need
 not
 address
 the
 first

two
 arguments
 because
 it
 is
 clear
 that
 the
 company
 had
 a
 reporting
 procedure
 in

place,
 that
 Cochran
 knew
 about
 the
 procedure,
 and
 that
 she
 unreasonably
 failed
 to

utilize
 it.

Title
 VII
 prohibits
 an
 employer
 from
 discriminating
 against
 an
 individual

“with
 respect
 to
 compensation,
 terms,
 conditions,
 or
 privileges
 of
 employment

because
 of
 [
 ]
 race,
 religion,
 sex
 ,
 or
 national
 origin.”

 42
 U.S.C.
 §
 2000e-­‐2(a)(1).

“[S]exual
 harassment
 so
 ‘severe
 or
 pervasive’
 as
 to
 ‘alter
 the
 conditions
 of
 [the

victim’s]
 employment
 and
 create
 an
 abusive
 working
 environment’
 violates
 Title

VII.”

 Faragher
 v.
 City
 of
 Boca
 Raton,
 524
 U.S.
 775,
 786
 (1998)
 (quoting
 Meritor

Savings
 Bank,
 FSB
 v.
 Vinson,
 477
 U.S.
 57,
 67
 (1986)).

 An
 employer
 may
 be,
 but
 is
 not

always,
 liable
 for
 hostile
 work
 environment
 created
 by
 one
 of
 its
 employees.
 In
 two

8

companion
 cases,
 Burlington
 Indus.,
 Inc.
 v.
 Ellerth,
 524
 U.S.
 742
 (1998)
 and
 Faragher

v.
 City
 of
 Boca
 Raton,
 524
 U.S.
 775
 (1998),
 the
 Supreme
 Court
 defined
 the
 contours

of
 an
 employer’s
 liability.

An
 employer
 is
 subject
 to
 vicarious
 liability
 to
 a
 victimized
 employee

for
 an
 actionable
 hostile
 environment
 created
 by
 a
 supervisor
 with

immediate
 (or
 successively
 higher)
 authority
 over
 the
 employee.

When
 no
 tangible
 employment
 action
 is
 taken,
 a
 defending
 employer

may
 raise
 an
 affirmative
 defense
 to
 liability
 or
 damages,
 subject
 to

proof
 by
 a
 preponderance
 of
 the
 evidence,
 .
 .
 .
 The
 defense
 comprises

two
 necessary
 elements:
 (a)
 that
 the
 employer
 exercised
 reasonable

care
 to
 prevent
 and
 correct
 promptly
 any
 sexually
 harassing
 behavior,

and
 (b)
 that
 the
 plaintiff
 employee
 unreasonably
 failed
 to
 take

advantage
 of
 any
 preventive
 or
 corrective
 opportunities
 provided
 by

the
 employer
 or
 to
 avoid
 harm
 otherwise.
 While
 proof
 that
 an

employer
 had
 promulgated
 an
 antiharassment
 policy
 with
 complaint

procedure
 is
 not
 necessary
 in
 every
 instance
 as
 a
 matter
 of
 law,
 the

need
 for
 a
 stated
 policy
 suitable
 to
 the
 employment
 circumstances

may
 appropriately
 be
 addressed
 in
 any
 case
 when
 litigating
 the
 first

element
 of
 the
 defense.
 And
 while
 proof
 that
 an
 employee
 failed
 to

fulfill
 the
 corresponding
 obligation
 of
 reasonable
 care
 to
 avoid
 harm
 is

not
 limited
 to
 showing
 an
 unreasonable
 failure
 to
 use
 any
 complaint

procedure
 provided
 by
 the
 employer,
 a
 demonstration
 of
 such
 failure

will
 normally
 suffice
 to
 satisfy
 the
 employer's
 burden
 under
 the

second
 element
 of
 the
 defense.
 No
 affirmative
 defense
 is
 available,

however,
 when
 the
 supervisor's
 harassment
 culminates
 in
 a
 tangible

employment
 action,
 such
 as
 discharge,
 demotion,
 or
 undesirable

reassignment.

Ellerth,
 524
 U.S.
 at
 765-­‐66;
 Faragher,
 524
 U.S.
 at
 807-­‐08.

Harrison
 asserts
 that
 it
 has
 satisfied
 its
 burden
 as
 to
 this
 affirmative
 defense

because:
 (1)
 the
 harassment
 perpetrated
 by
 McCroan
 did
 not
 result
 in
 any
 tangible

employment
 action
 against
 Cochran:
 (2)
 the
 company
 had
 an
 adequate
 anti-­‐
harassment
 policy
 in
 place
 and
 once
 it
 received
 a
 complaint
 it
 took
 prompt

corrective
 action
 and
 (3)
 Cochran
 unreasonably
 failed
 to
 utilize
 the
 complaint

procedures
 set
 out
 in
 that
 policy.

 There
 is
 no
 dispute
 as
 to
 the
 first
 element
 of
 the

affirmative
 defense.

 Cochran’s
 termination
 was
 unrelated
 to
 the
 alleged

9

harassment,
 and
 she
 suffered
 no
 demotion,
 loss
 of
 pay
 or
 benefits,
 change
 in

working
 conditions,
 or
 any
 other
 type
 unfavorable
 employment
 action
 as
 a
 result
 of

McCroan’s
 harassment.

 As
 to
 the
 Harrison’s
 effort
 to
 prevent
 harassment,
 a

company’s
 anti-­‐harassment
 policy
 is
 adequate
 if
 it
 is
 effectively
 disseminated
 and

the
 policy’s
 reporting
 procedures
 allow
 “alternative
 avenues
 for
 lodging
 a
 complaint

other
 than
 a
 harassing
 supervisor.”

 Madray
 v.
 Publix
 Supermarkets,
 Inc.,
 208
 F.3d

1290,
 1298
 (11th
 Cir.
 2000).

 There
 is
 no
 question
 that
 the
 anti-­‐harassment
 policy

was
 adequately
 disseminated
 in
 this
 case.

 Furthermore,
 Cochran
 admits
 that
 she

knew
 and
 understood
 the
 policy,
 which
 encouraged
 victims
 to
 come
 forward
 and

provided
 multiple
 avenues
 for
 lodging
 a
 complaint.

 In
 that
 respect,
 the
 policy
 is

similar
 to
 those
 sexual
 harassment
 policies
 found
 reasonable
 by
 the
 Eleventh

Circuit.

 Madray,
 id.
 at
 1299
 (policy
 sufficient
 under
 Ellerth/Faragher
 where

complaint
 procedures
 that
 did
 not
 require
 victim
 to
 report
 complaint
 to
 supervisor

or
 through
 supervisor’s
 chain
 of
 command
 and
 provided
 other
 avenues
 of

reporting);
 Coats
 v.
 Sundor
 Brands,
 164
 F.3d
 1361,
 1364
 (11th
 Cir.
 1999)
 (per

curiam)
 (policy
 required
 employees
 to
 report
 harassment
 to
 their
 manager,

personnel
 department,
 or
 other
 manager
 with
 whom
 employee
 felt
 comfortable).

Cochran
 did
 not
 use
 the
 company’s
 complaint
 procedures
 to
 report

McCroan’s
 harassment.

 She
 attempts
 to
 justify
 her
 failure
 to
 report,
 pointing
 out

that
 she
 feared
 retaliation
 since
 she
 had
 been
 told
 that
 McCroan
 was
 close
 to
 the

people
 in
 Human
 Resource.

 However,
 “[e]very
 employee
 could
 say
 .
 .
 .
 that
 she
 did

not
 report
 the
 harassment
 earlier
 for
 fear
 of
 losing
 her
 job
 or
 damaging
 her
 career

prospects.

 .
 .
 .
 [T]he
 Supreme
 Court
 undoubtedly
 realized
 as
 much
 when
 it
 designed

10

the
 Faragher/Ellerth
 defense,
 but
 it
 nonetheless
 decided
 to
 require
 an
 employee
 to

make
 the
 choice
 [to
 report
 the
 harassment]
 if
 she
 wanted
 to
 impose
 vicarious

liability
 on
 her
 employer.”

 Baldwin
 v.
 Blue
 Cross
 Blue
 Shield
 of
 Alabama,
 480
 F.3d

1287,
 1307
 (11th
 Cir.
 2007);
 accord
 Walton
 v.
 Johnson
 &
 Johnson
 Servs.,
 Inc.,
 347
 F.3d

1272,
 1290-­‐91
 (11th
 Cir.
 2003)
 (subjective
 fears
 of
 reprisal
 do
 not
 excuse
 failure
 to

report
 harassment).

When
 Harrison
 did
 receive
 an
 anonymous
 report
 about
 McCroan’s

inappropriate
 behavior,
 it
 took
 prompt
 action.

 First,
 Melton
 and
 Wilkerson
 began

an
 investigation
 which
 lasted
 over
 three
 months,
 not
 an
 unreasonable
 amount
 of
 in

this
 situation.3

 When
 the
 investigation
 was
 concluded,
 the
 company
 took
 prompt

remedial
 action
 by
 terminating
 McCroan’s
 employment.

In
 summary,
 Harrison
 has
 submitted
 undisputed
 evidence
 that
 it
 had
 an

adequate
 anti-­‐harassment
 policy
 in
 place
 and
 that
 Cochran
 was
 familiar
 with
 that

policy
 and
 with
 the
 procedures
 for
 reporting
 sexual
 harassment.

 Because
 Cochran

unreasonably
 failed
 to
 report
 McCroan,
 the
 company
 cannot
 be
 held
 vicariously

liable
 for
 McCroan’s
 actions.4

3
 The
 defendant
 has
 not
 provided
 much
 information
 about
 the
 scope
 of
 the

investigation,
 except
 to
 provide
 notes
 of
 interviews
 of
 various
 employees.

According
 to
 information
 provided
 in
 plaintiff’s
 summary
 judgment
 response,

Harrison
 Finance
 has
 33
 branches.

 Cochran
 implies
 that
 the
 three-­‐month
 period

between
 the
 anonymous
 report
 and
 McCroan’s
 termination
 was
 too
 long
 to
 be

considered
 prompt
 remedial
 action.

 In
 light
 of
 McCroan’s
 position
 in
 the
 company,

the
 number
 of
 branches
 (and
 employees)
 under
 his
 supervision,
 and
 the
 very

serious
 nature
 of
 the
 charges,
 a
 three-­‐month
 investigation
 is
 not
 unreasonable.

4
 Cochran
 insists
 that
 she
 did
 report
 that
 McCroan
 touched
 her

inappropriately
 when
 she
 was
 interviewed
 on
 December
 12,
 2011.

 Assuming
 this
 to

be
 true,
 McCroan’s
 termination
 four
 days
 later
 qualifies
 as
 prompt
 remedial
 action.

11

Retaliation

Title
 VII’s
 anti-­‐retaliation
 provision
 makes
 it
 unlawful
 for
 an
 employer
 to

retaliate
 against
 an
 employee
 because
 the
 employee
 (1)
 opposed
 an
 unlawful

employment
 practice
 under
 Title
 VII
 or
 (2)
 participated
 in
 an
 investigation
 under

Title
 VII.

 42
 U.S.C.
 §
 20003-­‐3(a).

 The
 precise
 contours
 of
 Plaintiff’s
 retaliation
 claim

are
 not
 well
 defined.

 The
 claim
 may
 possibly
 be
 based
 on
 both
 her
 participation
 in

the
 investigation
 of
 McCroan
 during
 the
 December
 12th
 interview
 and
 on
 her

opposition
 to
 sexual
 harassment,
 i.e.,
 her
 statement
 during
 that
 interview
 that

McCroan’s
 inappropriately
 rubbed
 her
 shoulders
 and
 touched
 her
 leg.

The
 Court
 evaluates
 a
 Title
 VII
 retaliation
 claim
 based
 on
 circumstantial

evidence
 using
 the
 shifting
 burdens
 framework
 of
 McDonnell
 Douglas
 Corp.
 v.
 Green,

411
 U.S.
 792
 (2008).

 Crawford
 v.
 Carroll,
 529
 F.3d
 961,
 976
 (11th
 Cir.
 2008).

 First

the
 plaintiff
 must
 establish
 a
 prima
 facie
 case
 of
 discrimination.

 Id.
 If
 she
 does
 so,

the
 defendant
 must
 articulate
 a
 legitimate
 nondiscriminatory
 reason
 for
 its
 decision.

Id.

 Once
 a
 defendant
 articulates
 a
 legitimate
 nondiscriminatory
 reason,
 the
 burden

shifts
 back
 to
 the
 plaintiff
 to
 show
 that
 the
 stated
 reason
 was
 a
 pretext
 for

discrimination.

 Id.

 Pretext
 means
 that
 the
 proffered
 reasons
 were
 not
 what
 actually

motivated
 the
 defendant’s
 decision.

 Id.

In
 this
 case,
 the
 Court
 need
 not
 decide
 whether
 Cochran
 could
 prove
 a
 prima

facie
 case
 of
 retaliation
 because
 Harrison
 Finance
 has
 asserted
 a
 legitimate

nondiscriminatory
 reason
 for
 terminating
 her
 employment—the
 pornographic

photographs
 found
 on
 her
 computer.

 Cochran
 points
 out
 that
 there
 was
 a
 two-­‐
month
 time
 lapse
 between
 the
 discovery
 of
 the
 photos
 and
 her
 termination.

 This

12

gap
 between
 discovery
 and
 termination
 is
 not
 evidence
 of
 pretext,
 however,
 because

the
 photos
 were
 not
 immediately
 reported
 to
 Human
 Resources.

 According
 to

Defendant’s
 uncontroverted
 evidence,
 the
 photos
 were
 discovered
 by
 a
 vendor
 who

reported
 them
 to
 “Cheryl”
 in
 the
 IT
 department,
 rather
 than
 “Sheryl”
 in
 Human

Resources.

 Consequently,
 Human
 Resources
 did
 not
 know
 about
 the
 photos
 until

December
 2011,
 shortly
 before
 Cochran’s
 termination.

Conclusion

For
 the
 foregoing
 reasons,
 the
 Court
 finds
 that
 the
 motion
 for
 summary

judgment
 is
 due
 to
 be
 and
 hereby
 is
 GRANTED.

DONE
 and
 ORDERED
 this
 the
 17th
 day
 of
 March,
 2014.

s/Charles
 R.
 Butler,
 Jr.

Senior
 United
 States
 District
 Judge

13