Corley v. Boltech Mannings, Inc.

Filing 54

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION granting the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr on 4/28/2014. (adk)

IN
 THE
 UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 COURT
 FOR
 THE

SOUTHERN
 DISTRICT
 OF
 ALABAMA

SOUTHERN
 DIVISION

LINDA
 S.
 CORLEY,

Individually,
 and
 as

Representative
 of
 the

Estate
 of
 Darryl
 Corley,

Deceased,

Plaintiff,

v.

BOLTECH
 MANNINGS,

INC.,

Defendant.

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CIVIL
 ACTION
 NO.

13-­‐00108-­‐CB-­‐M

OPINION
 and
 ORDER

This
 matter
 is
 before
 the
 Court
 on
 a
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment
 filed
 by

the
 defendant,
 Boltech
 Mannings,
 Inc.
 (Doc.
 30.)

 Plaintiff
 has
 filed
 a
 response
 to
 the

motion
 (Doc.
 45),
 and
 Defendant
 has
 filed
 a
 reply
 (Doc.
 41).

 After
 due
 consideration

of
 the
 issues
 raised
 and
 the
 relevant
 facts
 in
 light
 of
 the
 applicable
 law,
 the
 Court

finds
 that
 the
 motion
 is
 due
 to
 be
 granted.1

Facts

This
 action
 arises
 from
 the
 tragic
 deaths
 of
 two
 men,
 Charles
 Corley
 and

Kenneth
 Boyer,
 during
 a
 fishing
 trip
 off
 the
 coast
 of
 Alabama
 on
 August
 27,
 2011.

Both
 were
 employees
 of
 Boltech
 Mannings,
 Inc.
 (Boltech),
 an
 industrial
 service

1
 Plaintiff
 has
 also
 filed
 a
 motion
 (Doc.
 41)
 to
 strike
 portions
 of
 the
 affidavit
 of

Kimberly
 Boyer,
 as
 well
 as
 portions
 of
 Boyer’s
 deposition
 testimony.

 The
 Court
 has

not
 considered
 the
 disputed
 portions
 of
 the
 testimony
 and,
 therefore,
 deems
 the

motion
 to
 strike
 to
 be
 moot.

provider
 located
 in
 Theodore,
 Alabama.
 Jacob
 Shenesy,
 another
 Boltech
 employee

who
 was
 on
 the
 fishing
 trip,
 survived.

Boyer
 was
 Boltech’s
 plant
 operations
 manager.
 Corley,
 who
 had
 worked
 at

Boltech
 since
 2002,2
 was
 lead
 heat
 treatment
 technician.

 His
 job
 often
 required
 him

to
 work
 for
 days,
 weeks,
 or
 months
 at
 a
 time
 out
 of
 town.

 Before
 Boyer
 became

plant
 operations
 manager,
 he
 and
 Corley
 would
 travel
 to
 job
 sites
 together.

Although
 they
 did
 not
 normally
 socialize
 off
 the
 job,
 Corley’s
 wife
 described
 the
 two

as
 “compatible,”
 noting
 that
 they
 often
 drove
 together
 to
 jobs
 and
 were
 in
 close

quarters.

 According
 to
 Mrs.
 Corley,
 the
 two
 men
 had
 the
 same
 nickname
 for
 each

other,
 “Brother
 Man.”

 As
 operations
 manager,
 Boyer
 had
 control
 over
 Corley’s
 work

assignments.

 This
 meant
 Boyer
 could
 assign
 jobs
 that
 were
 easier
 or
 harder,
 jobs

that
 involved
 more
 travel
 or
 less
 travel,
 or
 jobs
 that
 involved
 more
 hours
 or
 fewer

hours.

 Boyer
 also
 had
 the
 authority
 to
 recommend
 termination.

On
 Saturday
 morning,
 August
 27,
 Boyer
 called
 Corley
 and
 said
 he
 needed

Corley
 to
 go
 out
 with
 him
 and
 check
 out
 Boyer’s
 boat,
 which
 Boyer
 had
 just
 gotten

out
 of
 the
 shop.
 Corley’s
 wife
 heard
 part
 of
 the
 conversation
 between
 the
 two
 men

on
 speaker
 phone.

 Corley
 initially
 said
 no,
 but
 Boyer
 “just
 kept
 on.”
 (Corley
 Dep.

53.)

 Corley
 explained
 that
 he
 was
 taking
 his
 mom
 out
 for
 her
 birthday,
 but
 Boyer

just
 “still
 [kept]
 saying
 .
 .
 .
 I
 need
 you
 to
 go
 because
 I
 –
 I
 just
 –you
 know
 I
 can’t
 do
 it

by
 myself.”

 (Id.)

 The
 conversation
 continued
 after
 Mrs.
 Corley
 left
 the
 room.

 A
 few

minutes
 later,
 Corley
 told
 his
 wife
 that
 he
 was
 going
 with
 Boyer
 and
 that
 they
 might

fish
 a
 little
 but
 would
 be
 back
 in
 two
 or
 three
 hours.

 (Id.)

2
 At
 that
 time
 the
 company
 was
 Mannings.

 Several
 years
 later
 Mannings
 and

Boltech
 merged
 to
 become
 Boltech
 Mannings.

2

According
 to
 Corley’s
 wife,
 Corley
 did
 not
 want
 to
 go
 out
 with
 Boyer
 for

several
 reasons.

 First,
 he
 had
 just
 gotten
 back
 from
 a
 job
 in
 Chattanooga,
 Tennessee

and
 was
 exhausted.3

 Second,
 he
 was
 planning
 to
 take
 his
 mother
 out
 to
 lunch
 or

dinner
 that
 day
 for
 her
 birthday,
 which
 was
 the
 following
 day.

 Third,
 Corley
 had

recently
 undergone
 a
 terrifying
 ordeal
 involving
 the
 water
 and
 did
 not
 like
 to
 go

offshore.4

 Finally,
 Corley
 had
 gone
 out
 with
 Boyer
 in
 his
 boat
 a
 couple
 of
 months

earlier,
 but
 the
 boat
 had
 mechanical
 difficulties
 and
 they
 had
 to
 return
 to
 shore.

Mrs.
 Corley
 believed
 that
 Boyer
 needed
 Corley’s
 help
 to
 launch
 the
 boat
 because

Boyer
 had
 a
 bad
 ankle.

Boyer
 had
 also
 invited
 Jacob
 Shenesy
 to
 go
 along
 on
 the
 fishing
 trip.
 Boyer

was
 Shenesy’s
 boss,
 too,
 but
 Shenesy
 socialized
 with
 Boyer
 outside
 of
 work.

 Boyer

called
 Shenesy
 on
 August
 26
 and
 asked
 if
 he
 wanted
 to
 go
 fishing
 the
 next
 day.

Shenesy
 was
 eager
 to
 go.

 On
 Saturday,
 Shenesy
 drove
 to
 Corley’s
 house
 then
 the

two
 drove
 to
 Boyer’s
 house
 together.

Boyer
 had
 hitched
 the
 boat
 to
 his
 company-­‐owned
 truck,
 and
 the
 three

headed
 to
 Dauphin
 Island.

 On
 the
 way,
 Boyer
 stopped
 to
 put
 gas
 in
 the
 truck,
 which

he
 purchased
 using
 the
 company-­‐credit
 card.

 Boltech
 provided
 Boyer
 with
 a

company
 truck,
 a
 fuel
 credit
 card,
 an
 expense
 credit
 card,
 and
 a
 cell
 phone.

 They

launched
 the
 boat
 at
 Dauphin
 Island
 then
 fished
 for
 a
 while
 near
 the
 mouth
 of

3
 Plaintiff
 claims
 that
 Corley
 did
 not
 want
 to
 go
 because
 he
 had
 pneumonia,

but
 as
 Defendant
 points
 out
 the
 evidence
 of
 pneumonia
 came
 from
 autopsy
 results.

If
 Corley
 was
 sick
 with
 pneumonia
 (which
 could
 have
 occurred
 due
 to
 time
 spent
 in

the
 water
 after
 the
 accident),
 he
 did
 not
 know
 it.

4
 While
 he
 was
 attempting
 to
 pass
 a
 water
 submersion
 test
 that
 would
 allow

him
 to
 work
 on
 offshore
 oil
 rigs,
 Corley’s
 blood
 pressure
 sky-­‐rocketed
 and
 911
 was

called.

3

Mobile
 Bay
 at
 a
 rig
 known
 as
 The
 Ox.

 Boyer,
 who
 had
 no
 experience
 boating

offshore,
 decided
 to
 take
 the
 boat
 out
 into
 the
 Gulf.

 As
 they
 passed
 Sand
 Island,

south
 of
 Dauphin
 Island,
 the
 seas
 became
 choppy.

Next
 they
 tied
 up
 to
 a
 rig
 three
 to
 five
 miles
 offshore
 where
 they
 fished
 for

about
 30
 minutes.
 When
 Boyer
 went
 into
 the
 cabin
 and
 saw
 that
 the
 boat
 was
 taking

on
 water,
 the
 three
 decided
 to
 head
 back.5

 They
 untied
 the
 boat
 and
 managed
 to
 get

the
 engine
 started,
 but
 then
 it
 stalled
 and
 was
 almost
 immediately
 hit
 by
 a
 large

wave.

 In
 less
 than
 a
 minute,
 the
 boat
 was
 sunk.

 All
 three
 survived
 initially
 but
 were

thrown
 into
 the
 water.

 Corley
 was
 separated
 from
 the
 other
 two.

 His
 body
 was

found
 the
 next
 day.

 After
 surviving
 the
 night,
 Boyer
 drowned.

 Shenesy
 was
 rescued

by
 a
 Good
 Samaritan.

 The
 Coast
 Guard
 conducted
 an
 investigation
 and
 concluded

that
 “during
 the
 installation
 of
 a
 new
 fuel
 tank,
 the
 subfloor
 was
 cut,
 at
 which
 point

the
 vessel
 lost
 watertight
 integrity,
 which
 inevitably
 led
 to
 the
 vessel
 sinking.”

(Coast
 Guard
 Rept.,
 Pl.’s
 Ex.
 E.)

As
 a
 result
 of
 these
 events,
 Linda
 Corley,
 individually
 and
 as
 representative
 of

the
 estate
 of
 Darryl
 Corley,
 filed
 suit
 against
 Boltech
 in
 the
 Circuit
 Court
 of
 Mobile

County.

 Boltech
 removed
 the
 action
 to
 this
 Court
 based
 on
 diversity
 jurisdiction.6

The
 Complaint
 alleges
 causes
 of
 action
 under
 General
 Maritime
 Law
 because
 “Boyer

was
 acting
 as
 an
 agent
 or
 respondeat
 for
 his
 employer,
 Boltech
 Mannings,
 Inc.”

(Count
 One)
 and
 because
 “[a]t
 all
 relevant
 times,
 the
 vessel
 in
 question
 was
 under

the
 exclusive
 control
 of
 Boltech
 Mannings,
 Inc.,
 by
 and
 through
 its
 agent/supervisor,

5
 The
 boat
 had
 no
 radio
 and
 no
 emergency
 beacon.

6
 The
 notice
 of
 removal
 establishes
 that
 Plaintiff
 is
 a
 citizen
 of
 Alabama,

Boltech
 is
 a
 citizen
 of
 Pennsylvania,
 and
 that
 the
 amount
 in
 controversy
 greater
 than

$75,000.

4

Boyer”
 Count
 Two).

 In
 addition,
 the
 Complaint
 asserts
 a
 claim
 under
 the
 Savings
 to

Suitors
 Clause,
 28
 U.S.C.
 §
 1331(1)
 (Count
 Three),
 a
 claim
 for
 negligence
 under

General
 Maritime
 Law
 (Count
 Four),
 and
 a
 claim
 under
 the
 Death
 on
 the
 High
 Seas

Act,
 46
 U.S..
 §
 303,
 et
 seq.
 (Count
 Five).

 Each
 count
 “adopts
 and
 realleges”
 the

preceding
 paragraphs
 and
 counts.

Legal
 Analysis

Jurisdiction

In
 each
 count
 of
 her
 Complaint,
 Plaintiff
 “demands
 judgment
 .
 .
 .
 under

General
 Maritime
 Law.”
 Because
 general
 maritime
 law
 does
 not
 provide
 an

independent
 basis
 for
 federal
 jurisdiction,
 Romero
 v.
 Int’l
 Terminal
 Operating
 Co.
 ,
 35

U.S.
 354,
 368
 (1959),
 Defendant
 has
 invoked
 this
 Court’s
 removal
 jurisdiction

pursuant
 to
 28
 U.S.C.
 §§
 1332
 and
 1441
 based
 on
 diversity
 of
 citizenship.

Jurisdiction
 is
 proper
 in
 this
 case
 because
 there
 is
 complete
 diversity
 between
 the

parties
 and
 the
 amount
 in
 controversy
 exceeds
 the
 $75,000
 jurisdictional
 minimum.

See
 28
 U.S.C.
 §
 1332(a)(1)
 (district
 courts
 have
 original
 jurisdiction
 where
 amount

in
 controversy
 “exceeds
 .
 .
 .
 $75,000,
 exclusive
 of
 interest
 and
 costs,
 and
 is
 between
 .

.
 citizens
 of
 different
 States”).

Summary
 Judgment
 Standard

Summary
 judgment
 should
 be
 granted
 only
 if
 "there
 is
 no
 issue
 as
 to
 any

material
 fact
 and
 the
 moving
 party
 is
 entitled
 to
 a
 judgment
 as
 a
 matter
 of
 law."

Fed.
 R.
 Civ.
 P.
 56(c).

 The
 party
 seeking
 summary
 judgment
 bears
 "the
 initial
 burden

to
 show
 the
 district
 court,
 by
 reference
 to
 materials
 on
 file,
 that
 there
 are
 no
 genuine

issues
 of
 material
 fact
 that
 should
 be
 decided
 at
 trial."

 Clark
 v.
 Coats
 &
 Clark,
 Inc.,

5

929
 F.2d
 604,
 608
 (11th
 Cir.
 1991).

 Once
 the
 moving
 party
 has
 satisfied
 his

responsibility,
 the
 burden
 shifts
 to
 the
 nonmoving
 party
 to
 show
 the
 existence
 of
 a

genuine
 issue
 of
 material
 fact.

 Id.

 "If
 the
 nonmoving
 party
 fails
 to
 make
 'a
 sufficient

showing
 on
 an
 essential
 element
 of
 her
 case
 with
 respect
 to
 which
 she
 has
 the

burden
 of
 proof,'
 the
 moving
 party
 is
 entitled
 to
 summary
 judgment."

 United
 States

v.
 Four
 Parcels
 of
 Real
 Property,
 941
 F.2d
 1428,
 1437
 (11th
 Cir.
 1991)
 (quoting

Celotex
 Corp.
 v.
 Catrett,
 477
 U.S.
 317
 (1986))
 (footnote
 omitted).

"In
 reviewing
 whether
 the
 nonmoving
 party
 has
 met
 its
 burden,
 the
 court

must
 stop
 short
 of
 weighing
 the
 evidence
 and
 making
 credibility
 determinations
 of

the
 truth
 of
 the
 matter.

 Instead,
 the
 evidence
 of
 the
 non-­‐movant
 is
 to
 be
 believed,

and
 all
 justifiable
 inferences
 are
 to
 be
 drawn
 in
 his
 favor.”

 Tipton
 v.
 Bergrohr
 GMBH-­‐
Siegen,
 965
 F.2d
 994,
 999
 (11th
 Cir.
 1992)
 (internal
 citations
 and
 quotations

omitted).

 “However,
 we
 draw
 these
 inferences
 only
 “’to
 the
 extent
 supportable
 by

the
 record.’”
 Penley
 v.
 Eslinger,
 605
 F.3d
 843,
 848

 (11th
 Cir.
 2010)
 (quoting
 Scott
 v.

Harris,
 550
 U.S.
 372,
 381
 n.
 8
 (2007)
 (emphasis
 omitted)).

 Furthermore,
 “[a]

dispute
 over
 a
 fact
 will
 only
 preclude
 summary
 judgment
 if
 the
 dispute
 “might
 affect

the
 outcome
 of
 the
 suit
 under
 the
 governing
 law.”
 Id.
 (quoting
 Anderson
 v.
 Liberty

Lobby,
 Inc.,
 477
 U.S.
 242,
 248,
 (1986)).

Issues
 Presented

All
 of
 Plaintiff’s
 claims
 hinge
 on
 a
 theory
 of
 vicarious
 liability.

 Plaintiff

asserts
 that
 Boltech
 is
 liable
 for
 Darryl
 Corley’s
 death
 because
 Kenneth
 Boyer
 was,

at
 all
 relevant
 times,
 “acting
 as
 agent

 or
 respondeat
 for
 his
 employer
 [Boltech].”

Boltech
 has
 moved
 for
 summary
 judgment,
 pointing
 out
 Plaintiff’s
 inability
 to
 satisfy

6

the
 requirements
 for
 agency
 under
 Alabama
 law.

 In
 response,
 Plaintiff
 argues
 that

Alabama
 law
 does
 not
 apply
 because
 she
 is
 proceeding
 under
 general
 maritime
 law7

and
 the
 Death
 on
 High
 Seas
 Act
 (DOSHA),
 46
 U.S.C.
 §
 303.
 Plaintiff
 points
 to
 evidence

that,
 she
 contends,
 raises
 a
 genuine
 issue
 of
 material
 fact
 under
 federal
 agency

principles.

 No
 matter
 which
 agency
 law
 applies,
 Plaintiff
 has
 failed
 to
 adduce
 facts

from
 which
 a
 factfinder
 could
 conclude
 that
 Boyer
 was
 acting
 as
 Boltech’s
 agent

during
 the
 events
 that
 resulted
 in
 Corley’s
 death.

Alabama
 Law

The
 principle
 of
 respondeat
 superior
 allows
 a
 party
 injured
 in
 tort
 to
 recover

from
 the
 tortfeasor’s
 employer
 if
 “the
 act
 complained
 of
 was
 done,
 either
 by
 agent
 or

servant,
 while
 acting
 within
 the
 line
 and
 scope
 of
 employment.
 .
 .,
 even
 though
 [the

employer]
 did
 not
 authorize
 or
 ratify
 such
 acts
 or
 even
 expressly
 forbade
 them.”

Prior
 v.
 Brown
 &
 Root
 US,
 Inc.
 674
 So.2d
 45,
 48
 (Ala.
 1995)
 (quoting
 Autrey
 v.
 Blue

Cross
 &
 Blue
 Shield
 of
 Alabama,
 481
 So.
 2d
 345,
 347-­‐48
 (Ala.
 1985)).

 “An
 act
 is

within
 an
 employee's
 scope
 of
 employment
 if
 the
 act
 is
 done
 as
 part
 of
 the
 duties
 the

employee
 was
 hired
 to
 perform
 or
 if
 the
 act
 confers
 a
 benefit
 on
 his
 employer.”

Hulbert
 v.
 State
 Farm
 Mut.
 Auto.
 Ins.
 Co.,
 723
 So.
 2d
 22,
 23
 (Ala.
 1998).

 Likewise,
 it
 is

within
 the
 scope
 of
 employment
 if
 it
 is
 done
 in
 furtherance
 of
 his
 employment.

 Id.

7
 Plaintiff’s
 Complaint
 is
 somewhat
 confusing
 in
 this
 regard.

 Count
 Three

sets
 out
 a
 claim
 under
 the
 saving-­‐to-­‐suitors
 clause,
 28
 U.S.C.
 §
 1331(1)
 and
 seeks

relief
 under
 General
 Maritime
 law.

 This
 would
 appear
 to
 be
 contradictory.

 The

saving-­‐to-­‐suitor
 clause,
 which
 was
 part
 of
 the
 Judiciary
 Act
 of
 1789,
 preserves
 the

right
 of
 a
 plaintiff
 who
 possesses
 an
 in
 personam
 maritime
 claim
 to
 elect,
 instead,
 to

bring
 his
 claim
 as
 a
 state
 common
 law
 action.

 Powell
 v.
 Offshore
 Nav.,
 Inc.
 644
 F.2d

1063,
 1066
 (5th
 Cir.
 Unit
 A
 1981).

 Consequently,
 a
 saving-­‐to-­‐suitors
 claim
 is
 a
 one

that
 does
 not
 seek
 relief
 under
 general
 maritime
 or
 admiralty
 claim.

7

Conduct
 that
 is
 undertaken
 for
 purely
 personal
 motives
 or
 personal
 gratification

does
 not
 fall
 within
 the
 scope
 of
 employment.

 Id.

Darryl
 Corley
 was
 killed
 on
 a
 weekend
 fishing
 trip.

 Although
 Boyer,
 who

arranged
 the
 trip,
 was
 his
 supervisor,
 nothing
 about
 the
 trip
 was
 job-­‐related.

 It
 did

not
 occur
 during
 working
 hours.

 There
 is
 no
 evidence
 that
 the
 trip
 was
 related
 to,

sanctioned
 by,
 or
 for
 the
 benefit
 of
 Boltech.

 Nor
 is
 there
 any
 evidence
 that
 it
 was

part
 of,
 related
 to,
 or
 furthered
 Boyer’s
 employment
 in
 any
 way.8

 In
 fact,
 Plaintiff

does
 not
 rely
 on
 principles
 of
 agency,
 vicarious
 liability,
 or
 respondeat
 superior
 law

at
 all.

 Instead,
 Plaintiff
 argues
 that
 “whether
 or
 not
 Corley’s
 death
 occurred
 in
 the

line
 and
 scope
 of
 his
 employment
 must
 be
 analyzed
 under
 a
 scenario
 where
 an

employee
 is
 injured
 while
 engaging
 in
 social
 or
 recreational
 activities,
 which
 are

almost
 always
 governed
 by
 workers
 compensation
 law.”

 (Pl.’s
 Brf.
 23.)

 No
 citation

is
 provided
 for
 this
 novel
 assertion
 that
 workers
 compensation
 law
 provides
 the

framework
 for
 determining
 an
 employer’s
 liability
 for
 the
 tortious
 conduct
 of
 its

employee.

Even
 if
 workers
 compensation
 law
 were
 applicable,
 Plaintiff’s
 claim
 would

fail.

 Plaintiff
 cites
 one
 case,
 Board
 of
 Managers
 of
 the
 City
 of
 Birmingham
 Ret.
 and

Relief
 Sys.
 v.
 Elliot,
 532
 So.2d
 1019
 (Ala.
 Civ.
 App.
 1988),
 which
 held
 that
 a
 fireman

was
 entitled
 to
 workers
 compensation
 for
 an
 injury
 incurred
 while
 playing

8
 The
 only
 connection
 between
 the
 fishing
 trip
 and
 Boltech,
 other
 than
 the

fact
 that
 the
 participants
 were
 employees,
 was
 Boyer’s
 use
 of
 his
 company-­‐owned

truck,
 and
 even
 Plaintiff
 does
 not
 argue
 that
 this
 is
 sufficient
 .

 Boyer
 used
 the
 truck

to
 carry
 himself,
 his
 companions,
 and
 the
 boat
 to
 the
 launch
 at
 Dauphin
 Island.

Boyer
 also
 purchased
 fuel
 for
 the
 truck
 using
 a
 company
 credit
 card.

 But
 this

evidence
 alone
 does
 not
 create
 a
 reasonable
 inference
 that
 Boyer
 was
 acting
 within

the
 scope
 of
 his
 employment.

8

basketball
 while
 on
 duty
 at
 the
 fire
 station.

 Plaintiff
 does
 not
 rely
 on
 any
 holding
 in

Elliot
 but
 merely
 cites
 it
 for
 the
 court’s
 reliance
 on
 a
 section
 of
 a
 treatise,
 A.
 Larson,

The
 Law
 of
 Workmen’s
 Compensation
 §
 22
 (1985),
 regarding
 an
 employer’s
 liability

for
 injuries
 sustained
 during
 recreational
 activities.
 One
 of
 the
 circumstances
 in

which
 liability
 may
 be
 imposed
 is
 “[w]hen
 .
 .
 .
 [t]he
 employer,
 by
 expressly
 or

impliedly
 requiring
 participation,
 or
 by
 making
 the
 activity
 part
 of
 the
 services
 of
 an

employee,
 brings
 the
 activity
 within
 the
 orbit
 of
 the
 employment.”
 Id.
 (emphasis

added).
 ,”
 Plaintiff
 argues
 that
 Boltech
 (the
 employer)
 is
 liable
 because
 Boyer
 (a

Boltech
 employee)
 “expressly
 or
 impliedly[
 ]
 compelled
 Corley
 to
 go
 fishing.”

 (Pl.’s

Br.
 23.)

 The
 fallacy
 in
 this
 argument
 is
 that
 it
 still
 requires
 proof
 that
 the
 Boyer
 was

acting
 on
 behalf
 of
 Boltech.

 Thus,
 the
 argument
 comes
 full
 circle,
 and,
 ironically,

Plaintiff’s
 alternative
 theory
 of
 vicarious
 liability
 requires
 proof
 of
 vicarious
 liability.

Maritime
 Law/Federal
 Common
 Law

Plaintiff
 argues
 that
 Boltech
 is
 liable
 under
 federal
 common
 law
 even
 if
 Boyer

was
 acting
 outside
 the
 scope
 of
 his
 employer.

 As
 Plaintiff
 points
 out,
 “[f]ederal

maritime
 law
 embraces
 the
 principles
 of
 agency.”

 Naviera
 Neptuno
 S.A.
 v.
 All
 Int’l

Freight
 Forwarders,
 Inc.,
 709
 F.2d
 663,
 665
 (11th
 Cir.
 1983).

 Federal
 courts
 have

looked
 to
 the
 Restatement
 (Second)
 of
 Agency
 to
 help
 define
 the
 contours
 of
 agency

under
 federal
 common
 law.

 See,
 e.g.,
 Kolstad
 v.
 Am.
 Dental
 Assoc.,
 527
 U.S.
 526,
 542

(1999).

 To
 support
 her
 claim
 that
 Boyer
 was
 acting
 as
 Boltech’s
 agent,
 Plaintiff

relies
 on
 the
 Restatement
 (Second)
 of
 Agency
 §
 219(2)
 (1958),
 which
 states:

(2)
 A
 master
 is
 not
 subject
 to
 liability
 for
 the
 torts
 of
 his
 servants

acting
 outside
 the
 scope
 of
 their
 employment,
 unless:

(a)
 the
 master
 intended
 the
 conduct
 or
 the
 consequences,
 or

(b)
 the
 master
 was
 negligent
 or
 reckless,
 or

9

(c)
 the
 conduct
 violated
 a
 non-­‐delegable
 duty
 of
 the
 master,
 or

(d)
 the
 servant
 purported
 to
 act
 or
 to
 speak
 on
 behalf
 of
 the

principal
 and
 there
 was
 reliance
 upon
 apparent
 authority,
 or
 he

was
 aided
 in
 accomplishing
 the
 tort
 by
 the
 existence
 of
 the
 agency

relation.

Pointing
 to
 the
 highlighted
 portion
 of
 subsection
 (2)(d),
 Plaintiff
 argues
 that

Boltech
 is
 vicariously
 liable,
 even
 though
 he
 was
 acting
 outside
 the
 scope
 of

his
 employment,
 because
 “Boyer
 used
 his
 authority
 as
 plant
 manager
 to

compel
 [Corley]
 to
 go
 fishing
 against
 his
 will
 which
 led
 to
 his
 death.

 (Pl.’s
 Br.

19.)

For
 several
 reasons,
 the
 Court
 finds
 that
 §
 219(2)(d)
 does
 not
 apply.

First,
 in
 its
 most
 recent
 version,
 the
 Restatement
 (Third)
 of
 Agency
 (2006)

specifically
 abandoned
 the
 “aided
 in
 accomplishing”
 theory
 expressed
 in
 §

219(2)(d)
 of
 the
 Restatement
 (Second).

This
 Restatement
 does
 not
 include
 “aided
 in
 accomplishing”
 as
 a

distinct
 basis
 for
 an
 employer’s
 (or
 principal’s)
 vicarious
 liability.

 The

purposes
 likely
 intended
 to
 be
 met
 by
 the
 “aided
 in
 accomplishing”

basis
 are
 satisfied
 by
 a
 more
 fully
 elaborated
 treatment
 of
 apparent

authority
 and
 by
 the
 duty
 of
 reasonable
 care
 that
 a
 principal
 owes
 to

third
 parties
 with
 whom
 it
 interacts
 through
 employees
 and
 other

agents.

Restatement
 (Third)
 of
 Agency
 §
 7.08
 cmt
 b.9

 In
 fact,
 the
 authors
 declined
 to

address
 “an
 employer’s
 vicarious
 liability
 for
 an
 employee’s
 tortious
 conduct
 against

9
 The
 current
 version
 focuses
 instead
 on
 the
 concept
 of
 “apparent
 authority.”

“A
 principal
 is
 subject
 to
 vicarious
 liability
 for
 a
 tort
 committed
 by
 an
 agent
 in

dealing
 or
 communicating
 with
 a
 third
 party
 on
 or
 purported
 on
 behalf
 of
 the

principal
 when
 actions
 taken
 by
 the
 agent
 with
 apparent
 authority
 constitute
 the

tort.
 .
 .”

 Id.
 §
 7.08.

 “Apparent
 authority
 is
 the
 power
 held
 by
 an
 agent
 or
 other
 actor

to
 affect
 a
 principal's
 legal
 relations
 with
 third
 parties
 when
 a
 third
 party
 reasonably

believes
 the
 actor
 has
 authority
 to
 act
 on
 behalf
 of
 the
 principal
 and
 that
 belief
 is

traceable
 to
 the
 principal's
 manifestations.”
 Id.
 §
 2.03.

 Plaintiff,
 of
 course,
 does
 not

10

a
 fellow
 employee,”
 leaving
 that
 task
 to
 the
 Restatement
 (Third)
 of
 Employment

Law,
 which
 was
 in
 preparation
 at
 the
 time
 the
 Restatement
 (Third)
 of
 Agency
 was

published.10
 Id.
 §
 7.08,
 cmt.
 a.

Second,
 there
 must
 be
 some
 limitation
 to
 the
 “aided
 in
 accomplishing”

theory;
 otherwise
 the
 rule
 that
 the
 principle
 is
 not
 liable
 for
 torts
 committed
 outside

the
 scope
 of
 employment
 is
 swallowed
 by
 the
 exception.

 As
 the
 notes
 accompanying

the
 most
 recent
 draft
 of
 the
 Restatement
 (Third)
 of
 Employment
 Law
 point
 out,
 the

“aided
 in
 accomplishing”
 theory
 renders
 the
 distinction
 between
 acts
 done
 in
 the

scope
 of
 employment
 (for
 which
 the
 employer
 is
 always
 liable)
 and
 acts
 done

outside
 the
 scope
 of
 employment
 (for
 which
 the
 employer
 is
 not
 liable
 except
 in

limited
 situations)
 essentially
 meaningless.

 Restatement
 (Third)
 of
 Agency,
 §
 4.03

Reptr.’s
 Notes
 (Tentative
 Draft
 No.
 6,
 March
 30,
 2013).

 “[A]lmost
 all
 torts
 resulting

from
 the
 employment
 relationship
 are
 ‘aided’
 by
 the
 existence
 of
 that
 relationship,

regardless
 of
 the
 tortfeasor's
 independent
 course
 of
 conduct
 and
 motivation
 for

committing
 the
 torts.”

 Id.

 If
 the
 theory
 still
 applies,
 it
 applies
 only
 to
 intentional

torts.
 This
 interpretation
 is
 supported
 by
 the
 illustrations
 provided
 in
 the

Restatement
 (Second).

 “Clause
 (d)
 includes
 primarily
 situations
 in
 which
 the

principal’s
 liability
 is
 based
 upon
 conduct
 which
 is
 within
 the
 apparent
 authority
 of

a
 servant,
 as
 where
 one
 purports
 to
 speak
 for
 his
 employer
 in
 defaming
 another
 or

interfering
 with
 another’s
 business.”

 Restatement
 (Second)
 of
 Agency
 §
 219
 cmt.
 e.

rely
 on
 apparent
 authority,
 and
 the
 evidence
 would
 not
 support
 such
 a
 finding
 if
 he

did.

 There
 is
 no
 evidence
 that
 Boltech
 did
 anything
 to
 suggest
 that
 Boyer
 had

authority
 to
 compel
 Corley
 to
 go
 fishing
 on
 his
 time
 off.

10
 The
 Restatement
 (Third)
 of
 Employment
 Law
 has
 not
 yet
 been
 adopted.

11

Other
 examples
 include
 “a
 telegraph
 operator
 [who]
 sends
 false
 messages”
 or
 “the

manager
 of
 a
 store
 [who]
 is
 enabled
 to
 cheat
 a
 customer
 because
 of
 his
 position.”

 Id.

Third,
 the
 case
 law
 applying
 §
 219(2)(d)
 has
 no
 application
 here.

 Plaintiff

relies
 on
 three
 cases
 to
 support
 her
 theory
 that
 Boyer’s
 position
 as
 supervisor

amounted
 to
 “misuse
 of
 delegated
 authority”
 sufficient
 to
 create
 an
 issue
 of
 fact

under
 the
 “aided
 by
 agency”
 theory-­‐-­‐Burlington
 Indus.,
 Inc.
 v.
 Ellerth,
 524
 U.S.
 742

(1998),
 Walton
 v.
 Johnson
 &
 Johnson
 Serv.,
 Inc.,
 347
 F.3d
 1272
 (11th
 Cir.
 2003)
 and

LaRouche
 v.
 Denny’s,
 Inc.,
 62
 F.Supp.2d
 1366
 (S.D.
 Fla.).

 Walton

 and
 LaRouche
 rely

extensively
 on
 Ellerth
 and
 its
 companion
 case,
 Faragher
 v.
 City
 of
 Boca
 Raton,
 524

U.S.
 775
 (1998).

 In
 Faragher
 and
 Ellerth,
 the
 Supreme
 Court
 used
 §
 219(2)(d)
 as
 a

“starting
 point”
 for
 determining
 whether
 an
 employer
 can
 be
 held
 vicariously
 liable

for
 a
 sexually
 hostile
 work
 environment
 created
 by
 its
 employees.

 It
 did
 not
 intend

“to
 make
 a
 pronouncement
 of
 agency
 law
 in
 general
 or
 to
 transplant
 §
 219(2)(d)

into
 Title
 VII.”

 Faragher,
 524
 U.S.
 at
 803
 n.
 3.

 Instead,
 the
 Court’s
 aim
 was
 “to
 adapt

agency
 concepts
 to
 the
 practical
 objectives
 of
 Title
 VII.”

 Id.

 The
 Court
 held
 that
 “an

employer
 is
 subject
 to
 vicarious
 liability
 to
 a
 victimized
 employee
 for
 an
 actionable

hostile
 environment
 created
 by
 a
 supervisor
 with
 immediate
 (or
 successively

higher)
 authority
 over
 the
 employee.”

 Faragher,
 524
 U.S.
 at
 807.

 In
 reaching
 this

conclusion,
 the
 Court
 recognized
 that
 “[s]ection
 219(2)(d)

 concerns
 vicarious

liability
 for
 intentional
 torts
 committed
 by
 an
 employee
 when
 the
 employee
 uses

apparent
 authority
 .
 .
 .
 ,
 or
 when
 the
 employee
 was
 aided
 in
 accomplishing
 the
 tort

by
 the
 existence
 of
 the
 agency
 relationship.”

 Ellerth,
 524
 U.S.
 at
 759
 (emphasis

added).

 Not
 only
 is
 Faragher/Ellerth
 limited
 to
 hostile
 work
 environment
 cases,
 its

12

principles
 are
 not
 transferrable
 to
 this
 case
 because
 the
 holding
 is
 limited
 to

intentional
 torts.
 11

Conclusion

For
 the
 reasons
 set
 forth
 above,
 the
 Defendant’s
 motion
 for
 summary

judgment
 is
 hereby
 GRANTED.

DONE
 this
 the
 28th
 day
 of
 April,
 2014.

s/Charles
 R.
 Butler,
 Jr.

Senior
 United
 States
 District
 Judge

11
 Walton
 was
 a
 hostile
 work
 environment/sexual
 harassment
 case,
 similar

to
 Faragher/Ellerth.

 LaRouche
 involved
 claims
 against
 a
 restaurant
 for
 intentional

discrimination
 in
 public
 accommodations
 based
 on
 its
 manager’s
 refusal
 to
 serve

the
 plaintiffs
 on
 account
 of
 their
 race.

13