Mantiply v. Horne et al

Filing 72

Order re: 1 Bankruptcy Appeal filed by Mary Beth Mantiply: ForFor the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Judge Shulman was not required to recuse himself from this case and did not err in denying the motion for relief from judgment. Accordingly, the order is AFFIRMED.. Signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr on 4/8/2014. (adk)

IN
 THE
 UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 COURT
 FOR
 THE

SOUTHERN
 DISTRICT
 OF
 ALABAMA

SOUTHERN
 DIVISION

In
 Re:

)

)

RICHARD
 D.
 HORNE
 and

)

PATRICIA
 NELSON
 HORNE,

)

)

Debtors,

)

)

MARY
 BETH
 MANTIPLY,

)

)

CIVIL
 ACTION
 NO.
 13-­‐00258-­‐CB-­‐B

Plaintiff/Appellant,

)

)

v.

)

)

RICHARD
 D.
 HORNE
 and

)

PATRICIA
 NELSON
 HORNE,

)

)

Defendants/Appellees.

)

OPINION

For
 the
 second
 time,
 this
 matter
 is
 before
 the
 Court
 on
 appeal
 of
 an
 order
 of

the
 bankruptcy
 court.

 After
 the
 Court
 entered
 its
 opinion
 in
 the
 first
 appeal,
 but

before
 entry
 of
 final
 judgment,
 appellant
 Mary
 Beth
 Mantiply
 filed
 a
 second
 notice
 of

appeal.

 The
 Court
 granted
 Mantiply’s
 motion
 to
 consolidate
 the
 two
 appeals.

 In
 the

current
 appeal,
 Mantiply
 appeals
 “from
 the
 Judgment
 Order,
 or
 Decree
 of
 the

Bankruptcy
 Judge
 of
 December
 17,
 2013.”

 (Notice
 of
 App.,
 R2.
 3,
 Bkt.
 Doc.
 388.)1

That
 order
 denied
 Mantiply’s
 “Motion
 for
 Recusal
 Based
 on
 Newly
 Discovered

1
 The
 record
 on
 appeal
 from
 the
 second
 appeal
 (Doc.
 58)
 will
 be
 designated

“R2.”.

 The
 record
 on
 appeal
 from
 the
 first
 appeal
 (Doc.
 1)
 will
 be
 designated
 “R.”.

The
 abbreviation
 “Bkt.
 Doc.”
 refers
 to
 the
 cm/ecf
 docket
 entry
 in
 bankruptcy
 court.

As
 is
 customary
 in
 this
 district,
 the
 abbreviation
 “Doc.”
 refers
 to
 the
 cm/ecf
 docket

entry
 in
 this
 Court.

Evidence
 and
 Motion
 to
 Supplement
 the
 Record
 on
 Appeal”
 (R2.

 862-­‐66,
 Bkt.
 Doc.

376)
 and
 Motion
 to
 Supplement
 (R2.
 867-­‐68,
 Bkt.
 Doc.
 377.)

Procedural
 History

In
 2011,
 Debtors
 Richard
 Horne
 and
 Patricia
 Horne
 filed
 a
 motion
 for

sanctions
 in
 bankruptcy
 court
 against
 attorney
 Mary
 Beth
 Mantiply
 for
 violating
 the

bankruptcy
 code’s
 automatic
 stay
 provision
 and
 for
 violating
 the
 bankruptcy
 code’s

discharge
 injunction.

 After
 a
 lengthy
 period
 of
 discovery
 and
 an
 evidentiary

hearing,
 Judge
 Shulman
 found
 in
 favor
 the
 Debtors
 and
 against
 Mantiply
 on
 both

counts.

 On
 January
 24,
 2013,
 the
 judge
 entered
 an
 oral
 motion
 order
 granting
 the

motion
 and
 awarding
 compensatory
 damages,
 punitive
 damages,
 and
 attorney’s

fees.

 Altogether,
 the
 sanctions
 award
 amounted
 to
 $81,714.31
 ($40,000
 in

compensatory
 and
 punitive
 damages
 and
 $41,714.31
 in
 attorneys
 fees).

 Mantiply

appealed
 (“the
 first
 appeal”).

While
 the
 first
 appeal
 was
 pending,
 Mantiply
 filed
 two
 identical
 motions

seeking
 relief
 from
 judgment
 in
 bankruptcy
 court
 based
 on
 “newly
 discovered

evidence.”

 Judge
 Shulman
 denied
 both
 motions—the
 first
 because
 of
 the
 divestiture

rule
 and
 the
 second
 because
 it
 was
 based
 on
 Fed.
 R.
 Civ.
 P.
 62.1,
 which
 is

inapplicable
 to
 bankruptcy
 courts.

 Mantiply
 subsequently
 filed
 a
 motion
 in
 this

Court
 seeking,
 in
 effect,
 limited
 remand
 so
 that
 the
 bankruptcy
 court
 could
 consider

the
 “newly
 discovered
 evidence.”

 This
 Court
 declined
 to
 remand
 the
 motion
 to
 the

bankruptcy
 court
 for
 its
 consideration.

 (Doc.
 24.)

 Remand
 would
 have
 been
 futile

because
 the
 motion
 clearly
 did
 not
 meet
 four
 of
 the
 five
 requirements
 for
 relief
 from

2

judgment
 based
 on
 newly
 discovered
 evidence
 set
 forth
 in
 Fed.
 R.
 Civ.
 P.
 60(b).

 (Id.

at
 6-­‐9.)

Richard
 Horne
 died
 during
 the
 pendency
 of
 the
 first
 appeal.

 His
 counsel
 filed

suggestion
 of
 death
 on
 September
 6,
 2013.

 (Doc.
 31.)

 On
 October
 28,
 2014,
 Patricia

Horne,
 as
 personal
 representative
 of
 the
 Estate
 of
 Richard
 Horne,
 was
 substituted

for
 Richard
 Horne.

 (Doc.
 34.)

 The
 same
 day,
 the
 Court
 entered
 issued
 its
 opinion

affirming
 the
 bankruptcy
 court’s
 award
 of
 sanctions.

 (Doc.
 35.)
 Final
 judgment
 was

not
 entered,
 however.

 By
 separate
 order,
 the
 Court
 granted
 the
 Hornes’
 motion
 for

attorneys’
 fees
 on
 appeal
 and
 set
 a
 deadline
 for
 submission
 of
 fee
 request
 and

supporting
 documentation.

 That
 order
 also
 provided
 Mantiply
 an
 opportunity
 to

object
 to
 the
 amount
 of
 the
 fee
 request.

On
 November
 12,
 2013,
 Mantiply
 filed
 a
 pleading
 in
 this
 Court
 entitled

“Motion
 for
 Rehearing;
 to
 Alter,
 Amend
 or
 Vacate
 Opinion,
 or
 for
 Relief
 from

Opinion.”

 (Doc.
 37.)

 Attached
 to
 the
 motion
 were
 several
 exhibits,
 including

affidavits
 from
 Angela
 Brunson,
 Frank
 Kruse,
 Gus
 Dimitreolos,
 Paulene
 Phillips
 and

two
 affidavits
 from
 Mary
 Beth
 Mantiply.

 (Doc.
 37-­‐1.)

 The
 motion
 was
 a
 “bare

bones”
 motion,
 which
 cited
 no
 law
 or
 facts
 and
 for
 that
 reason
 was
 denied.

 (Doc.

41.)

 On
 November
 27,
 2013,
 Mantiply
 filed
 a
 pleading
 entitled
 “Objections
 to

Attorney
 Fees,
 Amended
 and
 Renewed
 Motion
 for
 Rehearing,
 or
 for
 Relief
 from

Opinion
 and
 Brief
 in
 Support
 Thereof.”

 (Doc.
 42.)

 Included
 as
 part
 of
 the
 same

filing,
 albeit
 a
 separate
 document
 was
 a
 “Motion
 for
 Recusal
 Based
 on
 Newly

Discovered
 Evidence
 and
 Motion
 to
 Supplement
 the
 Record
 on
 Appeal.”
 (Doc.
 42,
 pp.

3

12-­‐
 16)
 and
 attached
 affidavits2
 (Doc.
 42,
 pp.
 17-­‐29).

 In
 the
 order
 addressing
 the

claims
 raised
 in
 that
 pleading,
 this
 Court
 observed
 that
 the
 “Appellant
 ha[d]
 not

identified
 any
 legal
 basis
 for
 asserting
 th[e]
 [recusal]
 motion.”

 Because
 the
 motion

most
 closely
 resembled
 a
 Rule
 60(b)(2)
 motion
 for
 new
 trial
 based
 on
 newly

discovered
 evidence,
 the
 Court
 held
 that
 it
 should
 first
 be
 presented
 to
 the

bankruptcy
 court.

 (Id.
 at
 4-­‐5.)

In
 fact,
 on
 the
 same
 day
 she
 filed
 the
 above-­‐described
 motions
 in
 this
 Court,

Mantiply
 filed
 an
 identical
 “Motion
 for
 Recusal
 Based
 on
 Newly
 Discovered
 Evidence

and
 Motion
 to
 Supplement
 the
 Record
 on
 Appeal”
 in
 bankruptcy
 court.
 (R2.
 862,
 Bkt.

Doc.
 376.)

 In
 addition,
 Mantiply
 filed
 in
 bankruptcy
 court
 a
 separate
 “Motion
 to

Supplement
 the
 Record”
 requesting
 that
 the
 bankruptcy
 court
 supplement
 the

record
 on
 appeal
 with
 a
 transcript
 of
 a
 March
 25,
 2013
 hearing
 to
 set
 the
 bond

amount.3

 (R2.
 867-­‐68,
 Bkt.
 Doc.
 377.)

 On
 December
 17,
 2013,
 Judge
 Shulman

entered
 an
 order
 denying
 the
 motions.

 This
 appeal
 (“the
 second
 appeal”)
 followed,

and
 because
 final
 judgment
 had
 not
 been
 entered
 on
 the
 first
 appeal
 the
 two
 appeals

were
 consolidated.

Mantiply’s
 Newly
 Discovered
 Evidence
 &
 Judge
 Shulman’s
 Order

2
 These
 are
 the
 same
 affidavits
 submitted
 with
 the
 “Motion
 for
 Rehearing…”

(Doc.
 37.)

3
 Adding
 confusion
 to
 the
 chaos
 of
 this
 record,
 the
 Motion
 for
 Recusal.
 .
 .
 and

to
 Supplement.
 .
 .”

 requests
 that
 the
 bankruptcy
 court
 supplement
 the
 record
 on

appeal
 “with
 the
 attached
 affidavits”
 (R2.
 864,
 Bkt.
 Doc.
 376),
 but
 no
 affidavits
 are

attached.

 Instead,
 those
 affidavits
 and
 other
 related
 documents
 are
 attached
 to
 the

separate
 “Motion
 to
 Supplement
 the
 Record
 on
 Appeal”
 regarding
 bond
 hearing

transcript.

 (R2.
 869-­‐81,
 Bkt.
 Doc.
 377-­‐1.)

 The
 affidavits
 are
 identical
 to
 those
 filed

in
 this
 Court.

4

Mantiply’s
 “Motion
 for
 Recusal
 Based
 on
 Newly
 Discovered
 Evidence”
 was

based
 on
 her
 discovery
 (made
 less
 than
 three
 weeks
 prior)
 that
 Judge
 Shulman’s

courtroom
 deputy,
 Angela
 Jemison,
 and
 Chrissie
 Carnley,
 a
 paralegal
 for
 one
 of
 the

Hornes’
 attorneys,
 are
 sisters.

 Carnley
 had
 submitted
 an
 affidavit
 on
 behalf
 of
 the

Hornes
 attesting
 that
 she
 had
 served
 copies
 of
 the
 amended
 petition
 adding

Mantiply’s
 clients
 as
 creditors
 in
 the
 bankruptcy
 case
 on
 Mantiply
 via
 United
 States

mail.

 Mantiply
 denied,
 under
 oath,
 having
 received
 them.4

 According
 to
 the
 motion,

“Judge
 Shulman
 made
 factual
 findings
 that
 Mrs.
 Mantiply’s
 testimony
 as
 to

numerous
 issues
 was
 not
 credible
 and
 resolved
 almost
 every
 disputed
 question
 of

fact
 and
 inference
 against
 her.”

 (R2.
 863,
 Bkt.
 Doc.
 376.)

The
 motion
 cited
 no
 Bankruptcy
 Rule
 or
 Federal
 Rule
 of
 Civil
 Procedure.

After
 reciting
 the
 recusal
 standard
 of
 28
 U.S.C.
 §
 455(a),
 which
 requires
 that
 a
 judge

“shall
 disqualify
 himself
 in
 any
 proceeding
 in
 which
 his
 impartiality
 might

reasonably
 be
 questioned,”

 Mantiply
 argued
 that
 “observers
 would
 certainly

entertain
 doubt”
 about
 Judge
 Shulman’s
 impartiality
 because
 he
 “was
 required
 to

choose
 between
 the
 conflicting
 testimonies
 of
 his
 Courtroom
 Deputy’s
 sister
 and

Mrs.
 Mantiply.”

 (Id.
 864.)

 The
 motion
 did
 not
 seek
 any
 specific
 remedy
 other
 than

recusal.

In
 response,
 Horne
 argued
 that
 the
 appeal
 had
 divested
 the
 bankruptcy
 of

jurisdiction
 to
 consider
 the
 motion.

 Alternatively,
 Horne
 pointed
 out
 the
 motion’s

“multiple
 factual
 inaccuracies
 and
 incorrect
 legal
 assertions.”
 (R2.
 889,
 Bkt.
 Doc.

4
 There
 were
 a
 total
 of
 six
 amended
 petitions,
 one
 for
 each
 of
 Mantiply’s

clients.

5

379.)

 Horne
 also
 filed
 an
 objection
 to
 the
 motion
 to
 supplement
 the
 record
 on

appeal.

 (R2.
 931,
 Bkt.
 Doc.
 380.)

In
 his
 written
 order
 dated
 December
 17,
 2013,
 Judge
 Shulman
 found
 that
 the

bankruptcy
 court
 had
 jurisdiction
 to
 “either
 deny
 a
 Rule
 60(b)
 motion
 or
 indicate
 its

opinion
 that
 the
 arguments
 raised
 have
 merit
 when
 a
 case
 is
 on
 appeal.”

 (R2.
 963,

Bkt.
 Doc.
 386)
 (citing
 Mahone
 v.
 Ray,
 326
 F.3d
 1176
 (11th
 Cir.
 2003)).

 Next,
 because

Mantiply
 had
 asserted
 the
 motion
 for
 recusal
 as
 one
 based
 on
 “newly
 discovered

evidence”
 Judge
 Shulman
 addressed
 it
 as
 a
 motion
 for
 relief
 from
 judgment
 based
 on

newly
 discovered
 evidence
 under
 Fed.
 R.
 Civ.
 P.
 60(b)(2)
 (adopted
 by
 Bankruptcy

Rule
 9024)
 and
 applied
 the
 five
 requirements
 for
 relief
 from
 judgment
 based
 on

newly
 discovered
 evidence:

 “(1)
 the
 evidence
 was
 newly
 discovered
 since
 trial;
 (2)

the
 movant
 used
 due
 diligence
 to
 discover
 the
 evidence;
 (3)
 the
 evidence
 is
 not

merely
 cumulative
 or
 impeaching;
 (4)
 the
 evidence
 is
 material;
 and
 (5)
 the
 evidence

is
 such
 that
 a
 new
 trial
 would
 probably
 produce
 a
 new
 result.”

 (Id.
 964)
 (citing

Waddell
 v.
 Henry
 County
 Sheriff’s
 Office,
 329
 F.3d
 1300,
 1309
 (11th
 Cir.
 2003)).

After
 finding
 that
 the
 first
 two
 requirements
 were
 met,
 Judge
 Shulman
 noted

that
 “[t]he
 crux
 of
 Mantiply’s
 argument
 is
 that
 [the
 judge]
 was
 biased
 in
 favor
 of
 the

evidence
 presented
 by
 the
 Hornes
 that
 Mantiply
 was
 served
 with
 the
 amendments

that
 added
 her
 clients
 to
 the
 Hornes’
 bankruptcy
 schedules
 due
 to
 the
 familial

relationship
 between
 his
 deputy
 clerk
 and
 the
 proponent
 of
 the
 affidavit
 to
 prove

service
 [Carnley].”

 (R2.
 964,
 Bkt.
 Doc.
 386.)

 Judge
 Shulman
 found
 that
 the
 evidence

was
 impeachment
 evidence
 because
 it
 was
 directed
 at
 bias
 and
 related
 to
 Mantiply’s

credibility.

 He
 also
 found
 that
 the
 evidence
 was
 cumulative
 because
 “there
 was

6

evidence
 of
 Mantiply’s
 actual
 knowledge
 of
 the
 Hornes’
 bankruptcy
 almost
 from
 the

time
 of
 filing.”

 (Id.)

 Next,
 the
 judge
 determined
 that
 the
 evidence
 was
 not
 material

because
 “Mrs.
 Carnley’s
 affidavit
 merely
 outlined
 the
 routine
 and
 ministerial
 actions

she
 took
 as
 Mr.
 Wynne’s
 legal
 assistant
 to
 serve
 the
 amendments.”
 5
 (Id.
 965.)

Finally,
 Judge
 Shulman
 concluded
 that
 the
 outcome
 of
 the
 hearing
 would
 have
 been

the
 same
 even
 if
 the
 relationship
 between
 Carnley
 and
 Jemison
 had
 been
 raised
 at

that
 time
 because
 “[t]he
 Court
 was
 not
 biased
 by
 the
 relationship.”

 (Id.)

 The
 order

concluded
 by
 denying
 “Mantiply’s
 motion
 for
 recusal
 based
 on
 newly
 discovered

evidence
 and
 motion
 to
 supplement
 the
 record.”6

 (Id.)

Issues
 Presented

On
 appeal,
 Mantiply
 argues
 that
 Judge
 Shulman
 applied
 the
 wrong
 legal

analysis
 to
 her
 motion
 for
 recusal
 based
 on
 newly
 discovered
 evidence
 and
 that

application
 of
 the
 correct
 legal
 standard
 should
 result
 in
 Judge
 Shulman’s

5
 Furthermore,
 Judge
 Shulman
 rejected
 Mantiply’s
 implication
 that

something
 nefarious
 was
 afoot
 because
 Carnley’s
 testimony
 was
 not
 verified
 by
 a

notation
 of
 service
 on
 the
 docket
 sheet.

 Pursuant
 to
 Bankruptcy
 Local
 Rule
 1009-­‐1,

“the
 debtor’s
 attorney
 is
 responsible
 for
 serving
 amendments
 on
 creditors,
 not
 the

Clerk’s
 office;
 therefore,
 there
 is
 not
 docket
 entry
 regarding
 service.”

 (Id.
 965)

6
 The
 order
 did
 not
 specifically
 address
 the
 motion
 to
 supplement
 the
 record

contained
 within
 the
 motion
 for
 recusal,
 nor
 did
 it
 specifically
 address
 the

separately
 filed
 motion
 to
 supplement
 the
 record
 with
 the
 bond
 hearing
 transcript.

It
 did,
 however,
 refer
 to
 both
 motions
 by
 docket
 entry.

 (Id.
 967.)

 Therefore,
 the

order
 applies
 to
 both
 motions
 to
 supplement.

7

disqualification
 and
 vacatur
 of
 the
 sanctions
 award.7

 In
 response,
 Horne
 argues
 that

the
 bankruptcy
 court
 did
 not
 abuse
 its
 discretion
 in
 denying
 the
 recusal
 motion.
 8

Standard
 of
 Review

A
 district
 court
 sitting
 as
 an
 appellate
 court
 in
 a
 bankruptcy
 appeal
 reviews

the
 bankruptcy
 court’s
 legal
 conclusions
 de
 novo
 and
 reviews
 findings
 of
 fact
 under

a
 clearly
 erroneous
 standard.

 In
 re
 Sublett,
 895
 F.2d
 1381,
 1383
 (11th
 Cir.
 1990).

Legal
 Analysis

Introduction

In
 retrospect,
 the
 legal
 analysis
 applied
 by
 the
 bankruptcy
 court
 was
 wrong;

however;
 application
 of
 the
 correct
 legal
 standard
 leads
 to
 the
 same
 result.9

Confronted
 with
 a
 “Motion
 for
 Recusal
 Based
 on
 Newly
 Discovered
 Evidence”
 in
 a

matter
 in
 which
 judgment
 had
 been
 entered,
 Judge
 Shulman
 analyzed
 it
 under
 Rule

60(b)(2)
 as
 a
 motion
 for
 relief
 from
 judgment
 based
 on
 newly
 discovered

evidence.10

 Postjudgment
 motions
 to
 vacate
 based
 on
 violations
 of
 28
 U.S.C.
 §

7
 In
 her
 Statement
 of
 Issues
 and
 Standard
 of
 Review,
 Mantiply
 also
 asserts

the
 following
 issue:

 “Whether
 the
 Trial
 Court’s
 denial
 of
 Appellant’s
 Motion
 to

Supplement
 was
 error[?]”

 (Appellant’s
 Br.
 3,
 Doc.
 66.)

 Nowhere
 in
 her
 brief
 does

she
 identify
 which
 motion
 to
 supplement
 she
 is
 referring
 to,
 identify
 the
 error,
 or

address
 the
 issue.

 The
 Court
 deems
 this
 issue
 to
 be
 abandoned.

8
 Horne
 also
 points
 to
 a
 number
 of
 issues
 and
 arguments
 raised
 in
 Mantiply’s

motions
 that
 are
 due
 to
 be
 stricken
 for
 failure
 to
 cite
 to
 the
 record
 or
 to
 legal

authority.

 Though
 many
 of
 Horne’s
 arguments
 are
 well
 taken,
 it
 is
 ultimately

unnecessary
 to
 resolve
 them.

9
 An
 appellate
 court
 may
 affirm
 a
 lower
 court’s
 decision
 “’on
 any
 ground
 that

appears
 in
 the
 record
 whether
 or
 not
 that
 ground
 was
 relief
 upon
 or
 even

considered
 by
 the
 court
 below.
 ‘”

 Rowell
 v.
 BellSouth
 Corp.,
 433
 F.3d
 794,
 798-­‐99

(11th
 Cir.
 2005)
 (quoting
 Powers
 v.
 United
 States,
 996
 F.2d
 1121,
 1123-­‐1124
 (11th

Cir.
 1993)).

10Horne
 argues
 that
 Mantiply
 never
 requested
 relief
 from
 judgment
 below

and,
 therefore,
 the
 issue
 cannot
 be
 considered
 on
 appeal.

 This
 argument
 presents
 a

close
 question.
 Horne
 points
 out
 that
 the
 motion
 filed
 in
 bankruptcy
 court
 sought

8

455(a)
 fall
 under
 Rule
 60(b)(6),
 which
 provides
 relief
 from
 judgment
 under
 “upon

such
 terms
 as
 are
 just.”

 Liljeberg
 v.
 Health
 Serv.
 Acquisition
 Corp.,
 486
 U.S.
 847,
 863-­‐
64
 (1988).

 On
 appeal,
 the
 denial
 of
 a
 Rule
 60(b)
 motion
 is
 reviewed
 for
 abuse
 of

discretion.

 Crapp
 v.
 City
 of
 Miami
 Beach,
 242
 F.3d
 1017,
 1019
 (11th
 Cir.
 2006).

The
 Supreme
 Court
 has
 held
 that
 “Rule
 60(b)(6)
 relief
 is
 [
 ]
 neither

categorically
 available
 nor
 categorically
 unavailable
 for
 all
 §
 455(a)
 violations.”

Liljeberg,
 486
 U.S.
 at
 863.

 Instead,
 three
 issues
 should
 be
 considered
 in
 deciding

whether
 a
 judgment
 should
 be
 vacated
 when
 a
 violation
 has
 occurred:
 “the
 risk
 of

injustice
 to
 the
 parties
 in
 the
 particular
 case,
 the
 risk
 that
 the
 denial
 of
 relief
 will

produce
 injustice
 in
 other
 cases,
 and
 the
 risk
 of
 undermining
 the
 public’s
 confidence

in
 the
 judicial
 process.”

 Id.
 at
 864.

 The
 Court
 rejects
 Mantiply’s
 claim
 that
 the

sibling
 relationship
 between
 Judge
 Shulman’s
 courtroom
 deputy
 and
 Ms.
 Carnley

created
 an
 appearance
 of
 impropriety.

 Even
 though
 affirmance
 is
 appropriate
 on

that
 ground
 alone,
 the
 Court
 also
 considers,
 and
 rejects,
 Mantiply’s
 position
 that
 the

purported
 violation
 would
 entitle
 her
 to
 relief
 from
 judgment.

Judge
 Shulman’s
 Failure
 to
 Disqualify
 Himself
 Did
 Not
 Violate
 §
 455(a)

The
 first
 question
 to
 be
 considered
 is
 whether
 the
 sibling
 relationship

between
 a
 witness
 and
 a
 courtroom
 deputy
 creates
 an
 appearance
 of
 impropriety.

only
 “recusal”
 in
 a
 matter
 no
 longer
 pending
 before
 the
 bankruptcy
 court.

 Not
 until

appeal
 did
 Mantiply
 assert
 that
 the
 judgment
 should
 be
 vacated.
 It
 is
 true
 that
 “an

issue
 not
 raised
 [below]
 and
 raised
 for
 the
 first
 time
 in
 an
 appeal
 will
 not
 be

considered
 [on
 appeal].”

 Access
 Now,
 Inc.
 v.
 Southwest
 Airlines
 Co.,
 385
 F.3d
 1324,

1331
 (11th
 Cir.
 2004).

 The
 motion
 filed
 below
 addressed
 only
 grounds
 for
 recusal

under
 28
 U.S.C.
 §
 455(a),
 did
 not
 address
 the
 point
 of
 a
 motion
 for
 recusal
 filed
 post-­‐
judgment,
 did
 not
 cite
 any
 rule
 supporting
 relief
 from
 judgment,
 and
 did
 not
 request

specific
 relief
 other
 than
 recusal.

 Nevertheless,
 Judge
 Shulman
 interpreted
 the

motion
 as
 one
 for
 relief
 from
 judgment
 and
 addressed
 it
 as
 such.

 For
 that
 reason,

this
 Court
 will
 also
 address
 the
 merits
 of
 the
 claim.

9

The
 unequivocal
 answer
 is
 that
 it
 does
 not.

 The
 Court
 has
 neither
 found,
 nor
 been

directed
 to,
 any
 cases
 in
 which
 recusal
 was
 sought
 based
 on
 the
 relationship

between
 a
 court’s
 administrative
 employee,
 such
 as
 a
 courtroom
 deputy,
 and
 a

witness
 or
 party.

 There
 are,
 however,
 a
 number
 of
 recusal
 cases
 involving
 law

clerks,
 who
 are
 members
 of
 chambers
 staff
 and
 who
 engage
 in
 substantive
 work
 on

cases
 assigned
 to
 the
 judge.

 The
 rule
 that
 emerges
 from
 those
 cases
 is
 this:

 If
 a
 law

clerk’s
 relationship
 with
 an
 attorney
 or
 party
 in
 a
 case
 creates
 an
 appearance
 of

impropriety,
 then
 the
 law
 clerk
 is
 disqualified
 from
 working
 on
 that
 case
 but
 the

judge
 is
 not.

 See
 Parker
 v.
 Connors
 Steel
 Co.,
 855
 F.2d
 1510,
 1523-­‐25
 (11th
 Cir.
 1988)

(appearance
 of
 impropriety
 based
 on
 totality
 of
 circumstances,
 including
 judge

giving
 credit
 to
 law
 clerk
 in
 opinion,
 law
 clerk’s
 father
 partner
 in
 law
 firm
 that

represented
 defendant,
 and
 law
 clerk
 holding
 hearing
 in
 judge’s
 absence);

 Hunt
 v.

Am.
 Bank
 &
 Trust
 Co.
 of
 Baton
 Rouge,
 783
 F.2d
 1011
 (11th
 Cir.
 1986)
 (per
 curiam),

(recusal
 not
 required
 where
 two
 of
 judge’s
 law
 clerks
 accepted
 offers
 of

employment
 from
 law
 firm
 representing
 defendants
 while
 case
 was
 pending
 and

case
 had
 been
 assigned
 to
 one
 of
 those
 law
 clerks
 as
 a
 “ministerial”
 matter
 before

law
 clerk
 recused);
 Crawford
 v.
 Dept.
 of
 Homeland
 Security,
 245
 Fed.
 Appx.
 369
 (5th

Cir.
 2007)
 (affirming
 denial
 of
 recusal
 motion
 based
 on
 unsupported
 speculation

that
 law
 clerk
 previously
 litigated
 against
 plaintiff
 and
 noting
 that
 “the
 final

decisions
 in
 this
 case
 were
 made
 by
 the
 judge,
 not
 the
 law
 clerk”).

 The
 mere

existence
 of
 a
 relationship
 between
 a
 law
 clerk
 and
 a
 party
 does
 not
 disqualify
 the

judge;
 rather,
 disqualification
 may
 be
 called
 for
 only
 if
 the
 law
 clerk
 works
 on
 the

case,
 i.e.,
 makes
 a
 substantive
 contribution
 to
 the
 outcome
 of
 the
 case.

10

A
 courtroom
 deputy
 functions
 as
 an
 administrative
 employee
 who
 plays
 no

substantive
 role
 in
 the
 decision-­‐making
 process.

 A
 law
 clerk’s
 relationship
 to
 a

party
 does
 not
 create
 an
 appearance
 of
 impropriety,
 as
 long
 as
 the
 law
 clerk

performs
 no
 substantive
 work
 on
 the
 case.

 A
 fortiori,
 no
 appearance
 of
 impropriety

arises
 from
 courtroom
 deputy’s
 relationship
 to
 a
 party
 because
 that
 courtroom

deputy’s
 function
 is
 administrative,
 not
 substantive.

 To
 paraphrase
 the
 First
 Circuit:

“Both
 bench
 and
 bar
 recognize,
 moreover,
 that
 judges,
 not
 [courtroom
 deputies]

make
 the
 decisions.”

 In
 re
 Allied–Signal,
 Inc.,
 891
 F.2d
 967,
 971
 (1st
 Cir.
 1989).

Mantiply’s
 reliance
 on
 United
 States
 v.
 Kelly,
 888
 F.2d
 732
 (11th
 Cir.
 1989),
 to

demonstrate
 the
 need
 for
 recusal
 is
 woefully
 misplaced.

 In
 Kelly,
 a
 criminal
 case

tried
 nonjury,
 the
 judge’s
 wife
 and
 the
 wife
 of
 a
 witness
 for
 defense
 were
 close

friends.

 The
 judge
 asked
 the
 witness’s
 wife
 into
 chambers
 during
 the
 trial
 where

she
 told
 him
 that
 her
 husband
 was
 going
 to
 be
 a
 witness.

 The
 judge
 informed
 the

parties
 of
 the
 friendship,
 “expressed
 profound
 doubts”
 that
 he
 should
 continue,

“expressed
 near
 certainty”
 that
 he
 should
 recuse,
 and
 admitted
 that
 the
 situation

had
 caused
 him
 marital
 disharmony.

 Id.
 at
 745.
 Nevertheless,
 he
 did
 not
 recuse

himself
 for
 fear
 that
 jeopardy
 had
 attached.

 The
 appellate
 court
 reversed,
 holding

that
 all
 of
 these
 considerations—the
 personal
 relationship,
 the
 judge’s
 expressed

discomfort,
 and
 his
 decision
 to
 avoid
 a
 potential
 double
 jeopardy
 claim—created
 an

appearance
 of
 impropriety.

 In
 the
 instant
 case,
 the
 witness
 had
 no
 relationship
 to

either
 the
 judge
 or
 a
 member
 of
 his
 family.

 For
 that
 reason
 alone,
 Kelly
 is
 inapposite.

In
 further
 support
 of
 her
 argument
 that
 recusal
 was
 required
 under
 §
 455(a),

Mantiply
 cites
 a
 number
 of
 Judge
 Shulman’s
 rulings
 and
 other
 case-­‐related
 actions

11

that
 she
 contends
 demonstrate
 partiality.

 This
 Court
 will
 not
 attempt
 to
 address
 in

detail
 this
 exhaustive
 list
 of
 complaints
 of
 unfair
 treatment.

 Suffice
 it
 to
 say
 that

“judicial
 rulings
 alone
 almost
 never
 constitute
 a
 valid
 basis
 for
 [a
 recusal
 motion

under
 §
 455(a)]
 when
 no
 extrajudicial
 source
 is
 involved.”

 Liteky
 v.
 United
 States,

510
 U.S.
 540,
 555
 (1994).

 Because
 the
 Court
 has
 found
 no
 extrajudicial
 bias
 (i.e.,
 the

sibling
 relationship
 between
 the
 courtroom
 deputy
 and
 the
 witness
 did
 not
 create

an
 appearance
 of
 impropriety),
 the
 evidence
 of
 unfavorable
 rulings
 or
 treatment

cannot
 support
 the
 recusal
 argument.11

The
 Decision
 Would
 be
 Affirmed
 Even
 if
 Recusal
 Had
 Been
 Required

In
 Liljeberg,
 the
 Supreme
 Court
 held
 that
 failure
 to
 recuse
 when
 recusal
 is

warranted
 is
 not
 necessarily
 grounds
 for
 reversal.

 Instead
 a
 court
 must
 consider
 the

risk
 of
 injustice
 to
 the
 parties,
 risk
 of
 injustice
 in
 other
 cases
 and
 the
 risk
 of

undermining
 the
 public’s
 confidence
 in
 the
 judicial
 process.

 Liljeberg,
 486
 U.S.
 at

864.

 Affirming
 the
 bankruptcy
 judge’s
 decision
 would
 not
 reflect
 adversely
 on
 any

of
 these
 factors
 because
 the
 evidence
 supporting
 the
 sanctions
 award
 was

overwhelming.

 Mantiply
 was
 sanctioned
 for
 willful
 violation
 of
 the
 automatic
 stay,

11
 U.S.C.
 §
 362(a)(1),
 and
 for
 willful
 violation
 of
 the
 discharge
 injunction,
 11
 U.S.C.
 §

11
 Mantiply
 has
 made
 a
 number
 of
 unsupported,
 inflammatory
 accusations

regarding
 Judge
 Shulman’s
 handling
 of
 this
 case.

 This
 Court
 cannot
 allow
 them
 all
 to

go
 without
 remark.

 On
 pages
 15-­‐16
 of
 her
 brief,
 Mantiply
 argues
 that
 Judge

Shulman’s
 partiality
 was
 apparent
 because
 he
 ruled
 too
 quickly
 on
 Mantiply’s

February
 20,
 2013
 motion
 to
 vacate
 the
 bankruptcy
 judgment.

 Because
 a
 ruling
 was

entered
 less
 than
 two
 working
 days
 after
 the
 motion
 was
 filed,
 Mantiply
 concludes

that
 “having
 your
 sister
 running
 the
 Judge’s
 docket
 comes
 in
 quite
 handy
 for
 a
 legal

assistant,
 her
 boss
 and
 their
 clients
 when
 the
 collection
 of
 a
 large
 monetary

judgment
 is
 at
 stake.”

 (Appellant’s
 Br.
 16.)

 Mantiply
 concludes
 her
 brief
 in
 a
 similar

vein,
 requesting
 that
 “the
 judgment
 [
 ]
 be
 vacated
 and
 the
 case
 remanded
 to
 an

impartial
 Judge
 and
 preferably
 one
 without
 a
 fox
 guarding
 the
 henhouse.”

 (Id.
 21.)

These
 gratuitous
 statements
 serve
 no
 useful
 purpose.

12

524(a).

 Willful
 violation
 of
 either
 statute
 occurs
 when
 a
 party
 is
 aware
 of
 the

bankruptcy
 and
 intended
 the
 actions
 that
 violated
 the
 stay
 or
 discharge.

 In
 re
 Hardy,

97
 F.3d
 1384,
 1390
 (11th
 Cir.
 1996).

 Mantiply
 admittedly
 knew
 of
 the
 Hornes’

bankruptcy
 petition
 shortly
 after
 it
 was
 filed.

 With
 that
 knowledge,
 she
 filed
 the

state
 court
 action
 against
 Richard
 Horne
 and
 kept
 that
 action
 alive
 long
 after
 the

discharge
 had
 been
 entered.

 Indeed,
 Mantiply
 admits
 that
 she
 violated
 the

automatic
 stay
 and
 seeks
 reversal
 only
 as
 to
 violation
 of
 the
 discharge
 injunction.

Mantiply
 argued
 at
 the
 sanctions
 hearing
 that
 she
 lacked
 the
 knowledge

necessary
 for
 a
 willful
 violation
 of
 the
 discharge
 injunction
 because
 she
 was
 not

aware
 that
 he
 clients
 had
 been
 added
 as
 creditors
 in
 the
 bankruptcy
 petition.

 In
 her

current
 appeal,
 Mantiply
 maintains
 that
 the
 only
 evidence
 of
 her
 knowledge
 is
 the

allegedly
 tainted
 Carnley
 affidavit
 and,
 therefore,
 reversal
 is
 warranted.12

 That

argument
 ignores
 crucial
 law
 and
 evidence.

 First,
 knowledge
 of
 the
 existence
 of
 the

bankruptcy
 proceeding
 is
 adequate
 to
 put
 a
 creditor
 on
 notice
 that
 he
 must
 file
 a

complaint
 in
 bankruptcy
 contesting
 dischargeability
 or
 be
 forever
 barred,
 even
 if
 the

debtor
 failed
 to
 list
 him
 as
 a
 creditor.

 Byrd
 v.
 Alton
 (In
 re
 Alton),
 837
 F.2d
 457,
 461

(11th
 Cir.
 1988)
 (per
 curiam).13

 Therefore,
 because
 Mantiply
 had
 actual
 knowledge

of
 the
 bankruptcy
 petition,
 notice
 that
 her
 clients
 had
 been
 listed
 as
 creditors
 was

unnecessary.

 Second,
 there
 is
 indisputable
 evidence
 that
 Mantiply
 received
 actual

12
 Carnley
 testified
 that
 she
 served
 the
 amended
 petition
 adding
 Mantiply’s

clients
 by
 mailing
 them
 to
 Mantiply.

 Mantiply
 denied
 receiving
 any
 of
 the
 six
 copies

Carnley
 allegedly
 mailed.

13
 Mantiply
 points
 out
 that
 Alton
 was
 abrogated
 by
 Kontrick
 v.
 Ryan,
 540
 U.S.

443
 (2004).

 It
 was,
 however,
 abrogated
 on
 a
 completely
 unrelated
 issue,
 i.e.,

whether
 a
 bankruptcy
 court
 had
 discretion
 to
 consider
 a
 late-­‐filed
 motion
 to
 extend

time
 to
 file
 dischargeability
 complaint.
 With
 respect
 to
 other
 issues,
 Alton
 remains

good
 law.

13

notice
 that
 her
 clients
 were
 listed
 as
 creditors.

 After
 her
 clients
 were
 added
 as

creditors,
 Mantiply
 received
 at
 least
 120
 notices,
 on
 behalf
 of
 her
 clients,
 from
 the

bankruptcy
 court.

 (Oct.
 28,
 2013
 Opinion
 3,
 Doc.
 35.)

Conclusion

For
 the
 reasons
 set
 forth
 above,
 the
 Court
 finds
 that
 Judge
 Shulman
 was
 not

required
 to
 recuse
 himself
 from
 this
 case
 and
 did
 not
 err
 in
 denying
 the
 motion
 for

relief
 from
 judgment.

 Accordingly,
 the
 order
 is
 AFFIRMED.

DONE
 and
 ORDERED
 this
 the
 8th
 day
 of
 April,
 2014.

s/Charles
 R.
 Butler,
 Jr.

Senior
 United
 States
 District
 Judge

14