Dunkerley v. State of Alabama

Filing 39

ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations re 36 Report and Recommendation. For the reasons set forth, Petitioner's objections are OVERRULED and the R&R is ADOPTED.. Signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr on 7/7/2014. (adk)

IN
 THE
 UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 COURT
 FOR
 THE

SOUTHERN
 DISTRICT
 OF
 ALABAMA

SOUTHERN
 DIVISION

PETER
 JAMES
 DUNKERLEY,

Petitioner,

v.

DEWAYNE
 ESTES,

Respondent,

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CIVIL
 ACTION
 NO.

13-­‐00331-­‐CB-­‐M

ORDER

Petitioner
 Peter
 James
 Dunkerley
 has
 filed
 an
 objection
 (Doc.
 37)
 to
 the

Magistrate
 Judge’s
 Report
 and
 Recommendation,
 made
 pursuant
 to
 28
 U.S.C.
 §

636(b)(1)(B),

 which
 recommends
 that
 Dunkerley’s
 habeas
 petition
 be
 denied.

 For

the
 reasons
 set
 forth
 below,
 the
 Court
 overrules
 Petitioner’s
 objections
 and
 adopts

the
 Report
 and
 Recommendation.

Background

Petitioner
 has
 raised
 four
 claims
 in
 his
 §
 2254
 petition
 challenging
 the

constitutionality
 of
 his
 state
 conviction
 for
 possession
 of
 child
 pornography.

 None

of
 those
 claims
 were
 raised
 on
 direct
 appeal
 in
 state
 court,
 but
 Petitioner
 did
 raise

them
 in
 his
 state
 Rule
 32
 collateral
 attack.

 In
 denying
 Petitioner’s
 Rule
 32
 appeal,

the
 Alabama
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals
 found
 three
 of
 the
 four
 claims
 were

procedurally
 barred
 under
 state
 law.

 The
 appellate
 court
 did
 not
 address

Petitioner’s
 fourth
 claim
 because
 he
 did
 not
 pursue
 it
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 appeal.

Petitioner
 did
 not
 file
 a
 petition
 for
 writ
 of
 certiorari
 with
 the
 Alabama
 Supreme

Court
 and,
 therefore,
 failed
 to
 exhaust
 his
 Rule
 32
 appeal.

The
 Magistrate
 Judge
 found
 all
 four
 claims
 raised
 in
 Petitioner’s
 §
 2254

habeas
 petition
 to
 be
 barred
 by
 the
 doctrine
 of
 procedural
 default.

 The
 first
 three

claims
 were
 procedurally
 defaulted
 for
 two
 alternative
 reasons.

 First,
 the
 Alabama

Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals
 found
 that
 the
 procedural
 default
 applied,
 and
 federal

courts
 are
 bound
 by
 that
 determination.

 See
 Harris
 v.
 Reed,
 489
 U.S.
 255
 (1989).

Second,
 by
 failing
 to
 petition
 the
 Alabama
 Supreme
 court
 for
 a
 writ
 of
 certiorari,

Petitioner
 failed
 to
 exhaust
 those
 claims,
 which
 are
 now
 barred
 by
 procedural

default.
 See
 McNair
 v.
 Campbell,
 416
 F.3d
 1291,
 1305
 (11th
 Cir.
 2005)
 (“It
 is
 well

established
 that
 when
 a
 petitioner
 has
 failed
 to
 exhaust
 his
 claim
 by
 failing
 to
 fairly

present
 it
 to
 the
 state
 courts
 and
 the
 state
 court
 remedy
 is
 no
 longer
 available,
 the

failure
 also
 constitutes
 a
 procedural
 bar.”)
 The
 Magistrate
 Judge
 found
 the
 fourth

claim
 to
 be
 procedurally
 barred
 for
 failure
 to
 exhaust
 because
 that
 claim
 was
 not

raised
 at
 all
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 appeal
 to
 the
 Alabama
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals.

 See
 id.

The
 Magistrate
 Judge
 rejected
 Petitioner’s
 attempts
 to
 overcome
 procedural
 default

based
 on
 “cause
 and
 prejudice”
 or
 “actual
 innocence”.

Discussion

Petitioner
 does
 not
 object
 to
 the
 Magistrate
 Judge’s
 initial
 conclusion
 that
 the

claims
 were
 procedurally
 defaulted.

 Instead,
 his
 objections
 are
 focused
 on
 the

exceptions
 to
 procedural
 default.

 Petitioner
 argues
 that
 the
 confiscation
 of
 his
 legal

papers
 by
 prison
 officials
 demonstrates
 cause
 for
 his
 procedural
 default.

 As

Petitioner’s
 evidence
 shows,
 those
 papers
 were
 not
 confiscated
 from
 him
 but
 from

another
 inmate-­‐-­‐a
 “prison
 law
 clerk”
 to
 whom
 he
 had
 given
 his
 papers
 for

assistance.

 That
 inmate
 was
 placed
 in
 segregation
 for
 disciplinary
 reasons
 and
 took

2

with
 him
 legal
 papers
 belonging
 to
 other
 inmates,
 including
 Petitioner.

 “’[C]ause’

under
 the
 cause
 and
 prejudice
 test
 must
 be
 something
 external
 to
 the
 petitioner,

something
 that
 cannot
 fairly
 be
 attributed
 to
 him.”

 Coleman
 v.
 Thompson,
 501
 U.S.

722,
 753
 (2001).
 Petitioner’s
 decision
 to
 entrust
 his
 legal
 papers
 to
 another
 inmate

who
 proved
 to
 be
 untrustworthy
 does
 not
 satisfy
 the
 “cause”
 requirement.

 See

Cabrera
 v.
 Page,
 172
 F.Supp.2d
 966,
 983-­‐84
 (N.D.
 Ill.
 2001)(“mistakes
 of
 a
 prison

law
 clerk”
 do
 not
 constitute
 “cause”
 for
 procedural
 default),
 rev’d
 on
 other
 grounds,

324
 F.3d
 527
 (7th
 Cir.
 2003).

 Even
 if
 Petitioner
 could
 demonstrate
 “cause”
 for
 (and

prejudice
 from)
 his
 failure
 to
 file
 a
 petition
 for
 certiorari,
 that
 would
 address
 only

one
 basis
 for
 the
 Magistrate
 Judge’s
 procedural
 default
 findings
 as
 to
 Claims
 One

through
 Three.

 The
 Magistrate
 found
 that
 procedural
 default
 also
 applied
 for
 an

alternative
 reason,
 that
 is,
 because
 the
 Alabama
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals,
 on
 Rule

32
 appeal,
 had
 found
 those
 claims
 to
 be
 procedurally
 defaulted
 under
 state
 court

rules.1

Next,
 Petitioner
 contends
 that
 his
 claims
 are
 not
 subject
 to
 procedural
 default

under
 the
 “miscarriage
 of
 justice”
 exception
 because
 he
 is
 actually
 innocent.
 “[T]he

miscarriage
 of
 justice
 exception
 is
 concerned
 with
 actual
 as
 compared
 to
 legal

innocence.”
 Calderon
 v.
 Thompson,
 523
 U.S.
 538,
 559
 (1998)
 (internal
 citations
 and

quotations
 omitted).
 The
 Supreme
 Court
 has
 sought
 to
 ensure
 that
 the
 exception

“would
 remain
 ‘rare’
 and
 would
 only
 be
 applied
 in
 the
 ‘extraordinary
 case,’
 while
 at

the
 same
 time
 ensuring
 that
 the
 exception
 would
 extend
 relief
 to
 those
 who
 were

truly
 deserving.”

 Schlup
 v.
 Delo,
 513
 U.S.
 298,
 321
 (1995).
 Because
 of
 the
 narrow

1
 Specifically,
 the
 claims
 were
 barred
 under
 state
 court
 rules
 because
 they

were
 not
 raised
 on
 direct
 appeal.

3

scope
 of
 the
 exception,
 Petitioner
 must
 rely
 on
 new
 evidence
 to
 demonstrate
 that
 he

is
 “”factually
 innocent
 rather
 than
 legally
 innocent.”

 San
 Martin
 v.
 McNeil,
 633
 F.3d

1257,
 1268
 (11th
 Cir.
 2011).

 Petitioner
 himself
 “points
 out
 that
 he
 has
 never
 alleged

any
 new
 evidence
 in
 his
 petition
 nor
 relied
 on
 Schulp
 v.
 Delo
 [sic]
 in
 his
 habeas

petition.”

 (Obj.
 ¶
 26,
 Doc.
 37.)2

Finally,
 Petitioner
 objects
 to
 the
 Magistrate
 Judge’s
 “refusal
 to
 consider
 [his]

request
 that
 he
 be
 allowed
 to
 amend
 his
 petition.”

 (Id.
 ¶
 28.)

 The
 Magistrate
 Judge

did
 not
 err
 by
 failing
 to
 grant
 leave
 to
 amend.

 The
 proper
 method
 for
 requesting

leave
 to
 amend
 a
 complaint
 is
 by
 filing
 a
 motion
 for
 leave
 to
 amend.

 Long
 v.
 Satz,

181
 F.3d
 1275,
 1279
 (11th
 Cir.
 1999).

 Furthermore,
 “[a]
 motion
 for
 leave
 to
 amend

should
 either
 set
 forth
 the
 substance
 of
 the
 proposed
 amendment
 or
 attach
 a
 copy
 of

the
 proposed
 amendment.”

 Id.

 Petitioner
 did
 not
 fulfill
 either
 of
 these

requirements.

 He
 did
 not
 file
 a
 motion
 for
 leave
 to
 amend.

 Instead,
 the
 request
 for

leave
 to
 amend
 is
 contained
 within
 Petitioner’s
 response
 addressing
 the
 issue
 of

procedural
 default
 (Doc.
 33).

 That
 document
 contains
 two
 vague
 statements

regarding
 the
 need
 to
 amend,
 neither
 of
 which
 set
 forth
 the
 substance
 of
 the

proposed
 amendment.
 (Petr’s
 Resp.
 p.
 14,
 ¶
 13
 &
 p.
 15,
 Doc.
 33.)
 Because
 Petitioner

failed
 to
 file
 a
 separate
 motion
 for
 leave
 to
 amend
 and
 failed
 to
 provide
 the

2
 Petitioner
 insists
 that
 the
 Magistrate
 Judge
 misconstrued
 his
 actual

innocence
 claim,
 but
 it
 appears
 that
 Petitioner
 has
 misunderstood
 the
 difference

between
 legal
 and
 factual
 innocence.

 In
 his
 response
 brief
 addressing
 procedural

default
 (Doc.
 33),
 Petitioner
 argued
 that
 he
 is
 actually
 innocent
 because
 the
 statute

under
 which
 he
 was
 convicted
 is
 unconstitutional.

 That
 is
 a
 claim
 of
 legal

insufficiency
 and,
 as
 such,
 does
 not
 satisfy
 the
 actual
 innocence
 exception.

 See

Bousley
 v.
 United
 States,
 523
 U.S.
 614
 (1998)
 (factual
 innocence
 is
 not
 “mere
 legal

insufficiency”).

4

substance
 of
 the
 amendments
 he
 proposed
 to
 make,
 he
 was
 not
 entitled
 to
 amend

his
 petition.

Conclusion

For
 the
 reasons
 set
 forth
 above,
 Petitioner’s
 objections
 are
 OVERRULED,
 and

the
 Magistrate
 Judge’s
 Report
 and
 Recommendation
 is
 ADOPTED
 as
 the
 opinion
 of

this
 Court.

DONE
 and
 ORDERED
 this
 the
 7th
 day
 of
 July,
 2014.

s/Charles
 R.
 Butler,
 Jr.

Senior
 United
 States
 District
 Judge

5