Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. et al v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services et al

Filing 61

ORDER, GRANTING EWTN's motion to expedite summary judgment proceedings; DENYING EWTN's motion for summary judgment; and GRANTING Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to Counts I, II, V, and IX of the complaint. The court will address EWTN's motion for discovery under 56(d) and the remainder of the Defendants' dispositive motion in a separate order. Signed by Judge Callie V. S. Granade on 6/17/2014. (mab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ETERNAL WORLD TELEVISION
NETWORK, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SYLVIA M. BURWELL, Secretary
of the United States Department
of Health and Human Services, et
al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 13-0521-CG-C

ORDER
This matter is before the court on the motions for summary judgment
filed by Plaintiff Eternal World Television Network, Inc. (Doc. 29) and the
State of Alabama (Doc. 27). Also before the court is a portion of the motion for
summary judgment filed by Defendants1 the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, the U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, and the secretaries of those departments in their official capacities.
(Doc. 34.) For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ motions for summary
judgment are due to be denied and Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is due to be granted in part.

1

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Sylvia M. Burwell has been
substituted in her official capacity for Kathleen Sebelius as Secretary of Health and
Human Services.

I. BACKGROUND
Under federal law, group health plans are generally required to cover
women’s health services “as provided for in comprehensive guidelines
supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration.” 42 U.S.C. §
300gg–13(a)(4). Those services “include all Food and Drug Administration
(FDA)-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient
education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity, as
prescribed by a health care provider.” 78 Fed. Reg. 39870-01, 39870. The
court will refer to those services generally as “contraceptives” and to the
contraceptive-coverage requirement as “the mandate.”
Plaintiff Eternal World Television Network, Inc. (“EWTN”), has a
problem with the mandate. As an organization whose “mission is to serve the
orthodox belief and teaching of the [Roman Catholic] Church” (Doc. 29-9 ¶ 4),
EWTN opposes the use of contraceptives in any form. That belief has led
EWTN to take “great pains through the years to ensure that its insurance
plans do not cover, or in any way facilitate access to, sterilization,
contraception, or abortion.” (Doc. 29-9 ¶ 20.) As a result, EWTN does not
believe that it can comply with the mandate without violating its religious
beliefs.
The mandate is not insensitive to such concerns. Instead, the mandate
includes an exemption for religious employers2 and an accommodation for

2

The term “religious employer” includes churches, integrated auxiliaries of
2

religious nonprofits that do not qualify for the religious-employer exemption.
Under the accommodation, eligible religious nonprofits that do not qualify as
religious employers (EWTN falls under this category) can opt out of the
mandate by signing a short form objecting to the use of contraceptives and
delivering that form to an appropriate third-party—in EWTN’s case, to its
health plan’s third-party administrator—who would then be responsible for
ensuring that the objecting organization’s employees would receive
contraceptive coverage at no cost to the organization.3
EWTN, not satisfied with the accommodation, filed this lawsuit last
October against the federal agencies and officials responsible for
implementing the mandate. Since then, EWTN and the State have filed
partial motions for summary judgment, and Defendants have responded with
a motion seeking either dismissal of or summary judgment on all counts of
the complaint. Although all of those motions are ripe, EWTN seeks expedited
consideration of its motion for summary judgment in order to meet a looming
deadline for compliance with the mandate.4 Because the court finds that

churches, conventions or associations of churches, and the exclusively
religious activities of religious orders. 78 Fed. Reg. 39870-01, 39874.
If EWTN’s third-party administrator did not want to take on this
responsibility, it would have the option of terminating its relationship with
EWTN. See 78 FR 39870-01, 39879. But there’s no evidence that that might
happen here.
3

In the same motion, EWTN requests that the court set a hearing for oral
arguments. The court finds that the briefs adequately frame the issues, so no
oral arguments are necessary.
4

3

expedited consideration of that motion is appropriate, this order will focus on
EWTN’s motion for summary judgment and will address the other pending
motions only to the extent that they are intertwined with EWTN’s motion.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment
shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail
as a matter of law.” See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52
(1986).
On a motion for summary judgment, the movant bears the initial
burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. O’Ferrell v.
United States, 253 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001). In evaluating the
movant’s arguments, the court must view all evidence and resolve all doubts
in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Burton v. City of Belle Glade,
178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999). “If reasonable minds might differ on the
inferences arising from undisputed facts, then [the court] should deny
summary judgment.” Hinesville Bank v. Pony Exp. Courier Corp., 868 F.2d
1532, 1535 (11th Cir.1989).

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III. DISCUSSION
A.

EWTN’s Motion for Summary Judgment
EWTN’s motion for summary judgment5 addresses four counts of the

complaint: (1) Count I, which alleges that the mandate violates the Religious
Freedom and Restoration Act; (2) Count II, which alleges that the mandate
violates the Free Exercise Clause; (3) Count V, which alleges that the
mandate violates the Establishment Clause; (4) and Count IX, which alleges
that the mandate violates the Free Speech Clause. For the reasons that
follow, all of those claims fail as a matter of law.
1.

Count I—The Religious Freedom and Restoration Act

EWTN’s first and most substantial attack on the mandate is mounted
under the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (“RFRA”). RFRA provides
that the government may not “substantially burden” a person’s religious
exercise unless it can justify that burden as the “least restrictive means” of
furthering a “compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a),
(b). To determine whether a law places a “substantial burden” on religious
exercise, the court looks for “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Employment Sec. Division, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). EWTN says that the

Although EWTN alternatively moves for a preliminary injunction, a
separate ruling on that motion is unnecessary because the parties agree that
“there are no material disputes of fact and the legal issues for either
summary judgment or a preliminary injunction are essentially identical.”
(Doc. 30 at 36.)
5

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mandate “easily qualifies as a substantial burden under this test because it
directly coerces EWTN to conform its behavior by engaging in conduct it
believes is immoral.” (Doc. 30 at 16 (quotations and alterations omitted).)
According to EWTN, the problem stems from Form 700, which EWTN
must sign in order to receive the accommodation. Or more accurately, the
problem is with the consequences that will follow after EWTN signs and
delivers Form 700. The form itself is innocuous, containing only one operative
provision, which does not conflict with EWTN’s religious beliefs:
I certify that, on account of religious objections, the organization
opposes providing coverage for some or all of any contraceptive
services that would otherwise be required to be covered; the
organization is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity, and
the organization holds itself out as a religious organization.
(Form 700 (Doc. 29-11 at 2).) But after EWTN signs and delivers that form,
the mandate will require EWTN’s third-party administrator to take on those
responsibilities that EWTN has cast off. As EWTN sees it, signing Form 700
is morally equivalent to providing contraceptive coverage directly because “by
executing [Form 700] and thereby designating its administrator to provide
contraceptive payments to its employees, EWTN would facilitate and
encourage the use of products and services in violation of its sincere religious
beliefs.” (Doc. 30 at 16.) Thus, by requiring EWTN to sign Form 700 as a
condition of the accommodation, the mandate places a substantial burden on
EWTN’s religious practice. Or so the argument goes.
But EWTN’s argument misunderstands the nature of RFRA’s

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substantial-burden inquiry. The question is not whether anything in the
mandate will offend EWTN’s religious beliefs. Instead, the focus of RFRA’s
substantial-burden inquiry is on the particular actions that the mandate
requires EWTN to perform.
On that point, the decision of Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669,
678–79 (D.C. Cir. 2008), is instructive. In Kaemmerling, the court found that
a law requiring inmates to submit to the collection of tissue samples for DNA
testing did not substantially burden an inmate’s religious practice despite the
inmate’s belief that “the collection and retention of his DNA information was
tantamount to laying the foundation for the rise of the anti-Christ.” Id. at
674. In reaching that conclusion, the court accepted “as true the factual
allegations that [the inmate’s] beliefs [were] sincere and of a religious
nature—but not the legal conclusion, cast as a factual allegation, that his
religious exercise [was] substantially burdened.” Id. at 250. The only thing
the inmate was actually required to do was cooperate when prison authorities
took a tissue sample, and because he did “not allege that his religion
require[d] him not to cooperate with collection of a fluid or tissue sample,” id.,
the court found that there was no substantial burden on his religious
practice. And the court reached that conclusion despite the inmate’s
insistence that the very act of “submitting to DNA sampling . . . [was]
repugnant to his strongly held religious beliefs,” id. at 245. Federal officers,
not the inmate, would perform the DNA analysis, so the court would not let

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that action determine whether there was a substantial burden on the
inmate’s religious exercise. See id. at 679.
The Supreme Court applied a similar line of reasoning in Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 106 S.Ct. 2147 (1986), when it decided that the
government could use a Native American child’s Social Security number
despite her father’s objection that doing so would rob her spirit and “prevent
her from attaining greater spiritual power.” Id. at 696. In so holding, the
Court balked at the notion that the father’s religious beliefs could dictate the
government’s actions, noting that such a claim held no more merit than one
founded upon “a sincere religious objection to the size or color of the
Government’s filing cabinets.” Id. at 700. Because the government’s use of the
child’s social security number did not impair the father’s “freedom to believe,
express, and exercise his religion,” Id. at 701, the Court found that his
religious practice was unimpaired.
Taken together, Kaemmerling and Bowen show that the duties the
mandate imposes on other parties are irrelevant to EWTN’s RFRA claim. All
that matters here is the action that EWTN itself is under pressure to take,
which consists solely of signing and delivering Form 700. Thus, the question
is whether that act, standing alone, substantially burdens EWTN’s religious
practice.
This court finds that it does not. As far as Form 700’s substance goes,
there’s nothing in it that is contrary to EWTN’s religious beliefs. EWTN does,

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after all, vocally “oppose[ ] providing coverage for some or all of” the
contraceptive services required under the mandate. (Doc. 29-11 at 2). And as
for the act of delivering Form 700 to its third-party administrator, EWTN
cannot explain how that act violates its religion without reference to the
obligation that the mandate will impose upon others after EWTN delivers the
form. As discussed above, the burdens that the mandate imposes upon other
parties cannot amount to a substantial burden on EWTN’s religious practice.
EWTN tries to avoid that conclusion by arguing that by signing Form
700, it would “‘designat[e]’ [its third-party] administrator as the ‘plan
administrator and claims administrator for contraceptive benefits’” (Doc. 29-9
¶ 17 (quoting 78 Fed. Reg. 39870-01, 39879 (first alteration in original))), an
act that would directly violate its religious beliefs. A number of district courts
have found that basic reasoning persuasive. See, e.g., S. Nazarene Univ. v.
Sebelius, No. CIV–13–1015–F, 2013 WL 6804265, at *8 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 23,
2013) (“The self certification is, in effect, a permission slip which must be
signed by the institution to enable the plan beneficiary to get access, free of
charge, from the institution’s insurer or third party administrator, to the
products to which the institution objects.”) But that argument attributes far
too great a legal effect to Form 700, which serves only to provide notice of
EWTN’s decision to opt out of the mandate’s contraceptive coverage
requirement. To the extent that EWTN’s third-party administrator is under
compulsion to act, that compulsion comes from the law, not from Form 700.

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The Seventh Circuit explained that point in a challenge to the mandate filed
by the University of Notre Dame:
Federal law, not the religious organization’s signing and mailing
the form, requires health-care insurers, along with third-party
administrators of self-insured health plans, to cover
contraceptive services. By refusing to fill out the form Notre
Dame would subject itself to penalties, but [its third-party
administrator] would still be required by federal law to provide
the services to the university’s students and employees unless
and until their contractual relation with Notre Dame
terminated.
Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 554 (7th Cir. 2014). See
also Michigan Catholic Conference and Catholic Family Services, et al
v. Burwell, Nos. 13-2723, 13-6640, 2014 WL 2596753, at *9 - *11 (6th
Cir. June 11, 2014). The court agrees with that conclusion.
Legally (if not morally) speaking, there is a world of difference between
a law that compels EWTN to provide contraceptive coverage directly and one
in which the government places that burden on someone else after EWTN
opts out. Because EWTN’s only religious objection to the mandate hinges
upon the effect it will have on other parties after EWTN signs Form 700
rather than anything inherent to the act of signing and delivering Form 700
itself, the court finds that the mandate does not impose a substantial burden
on EWTN’s religious practice within the meaning of RFRA. As a result,
EWTN’s RFRA claim fails as a matter of law.
2.

Count II—Free Exercise

EWTN’s next claim is that the mandate violates the First

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Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, which provides that Congress shall make
no law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion, U.S. Const. amend. I.
Specifically, EWTN claims that the mandate unlawfully burdens religious
exercise because it “allows massive categorical exemptions for secular
conduct that undermine the Mandate’s purposes while denying religious
exemptions to organizations like EWTN” (Doc. 30 at 29) and that the
mandate “expressly discriminates among religious objectors” (Doc. 30 at 30).
EWTN makes those claims in an effort to show that the mandate is neither
neutral nor generally applicable, which would mean the mandate would be
subject to strict scrutiny. Otherwise, the law would be subject only rationalbasis review, because laws that are “neutral and of general applicability need
not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if [they have] the
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
EWTN’s argument fails, however, because the mandate is both neutral and
generally applicable.
Beginning with neutrality, the court rejects EWTN’s claim that the
mandate is non-neutral. For a law to be non-neutral within the meaning of
the Establishment Clause, there has to be evidence of a purpose to “infringe
upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation.” Lukumi, 508
U.S. at 533. There’s nothing in the mandate that shows an attempt to restrict
EWTN’s religious practices “because of their religious motivation.” Lukumi,

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508 U.S. at 533. To the contrary, to the extent that the mandate imposes an
incidental burden on EWTN’s religious practices, the accommodation serves
as evidence that the government made a determined effort to mitigate that
burden. EWTN also argues that the mandate is non-neutral because it
provides a total exemption for some religious employers while others are only
eligible for the accommodation. EWTN calls this “open discrimination among
religious institutions.” (Doc. 30.) But that argument misses the mark; to the
extent that the mandate treats some religious organizations differently than
others, the difference has nothing to do with the organization’s religious
beliefs or practices; it turns upon whether the organization qualifies for taxexempt status under the Internal Revenue Code. 78 Fed. Reg. 39870-01,
39874 (defining a religious employer as an organization that is “organized
and operates as a nonprofit entity and is referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i)
or (iii) of the [Internal Revenue] Code”). That is a legitimate basis for
differential treatment, see Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397
U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (holding that the government may grant special tax
benefits to churches without running afoul of the Establishment Clause), so
the court concludes that the mandate is religiously neutral.
EWTN’s arguments about the mandate’s general applicability also fail
to persuade. To determine whether the mandate is generally applicable, the
court looks to see whether the mandate includes secular exemptions intended
to ensure that it “impose[s] burdens only on conduct motivated by religious

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belief.” See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543; accord Primera Iglesia Bautista
Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1309 (11th Cir.
2006). According to EWTN, the contraceptive-coverage regulations are not
generally applicable because they allow “massive categorical exemptions for
secular conduct . . . while denying religious exemptions to organizations like
EWTN.” (Doc. 30 at 29.)
To be fair, EWTN’s premise is factually accurate, if somewhat
overstated: the rules that apply to grandfathered health plans and small
businesses function as limited exemptions to the mandate’s contraceptivecoverage requirement. But that fact does not necessarily undermine the
mandate’s general applicability. Lawmakers are free to carve out exceptions
from a general rule without running afoul of the Establishment Clause so
long as those exceptions are equally available to secular and religious
organizations. See Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Atlanta v. Sebelius, No.
1:12-cv-03489-WSD, 2014 WL 1256373, at *24 (N.D. Ga. March 26, 2014)
(“Specific exemptions to a law that are equally available to the adherents of a
religious belief do not affect the law’s general applicability.”) The rules
applicable to grandfathered health plans and small employers are equally
available to religious and secular employers, so they do not undermine the
mandate’s general applicability.
Because the regulations are neutral and generally applicable, they are
subject only to rational-basis review. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia,

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687 F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2012) (“If a law is one that is neutral and
generally applicable, then rational basis scrutiny should be applied . . . .”).
That means the mandate is presumptively valid, and EWTN bears the
burden of proving that it is not “rationally related to a legitimate government
interest.” Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 880 (11th 2011).
Here, there’s no doubt that “[e]nsuring access to affordable healthcare
is a legitimate legislative objective.” Deen v. Egleston, 597 F.3d 1223,
1231 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). And EWTN makes no attempt to
prove that the regulations are not rationally related to that objective.
Because EWTN does not even come close to shouldering its burden of
“negat[ing] every conceivable basis that might support” the mandate, Leib v.
Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp. Com’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009),
its Free Exercise claim fails as a matter of law.
3.

Count V—Establishment Clause

EWTN’s final religious-liberty claim is that the regulations violate the
Establishment Clause because some religious employers are totally exempt
from the mandate while other nonprofits like EWTN are only eligible for an
accommodation. According to EWTN, that arrangement amounts to
“‘discrimination . . . expressly based on the degree of religiosity of the
institution and the extent to which that religiosity affects its operations.’”
(Doc. 30 at 32 (quoting Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d
1245, 1259 (10th Cir. 2008)).

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But that argument fails because the mandate does not treat religious
organizations differently based on their degree of religiosity. Instead, the
distinction between an organization that qualifies for the religious-employer
exemption and one that does not has solely to do with the organization’s tax
structure. 78 Fed. Reg. 39870-01, 39874. That is a valid basis of
differentiation, and it doesn’t implicate the establishment clause. See Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of Atlanta, 2014 WL 1256373 at *30 (“Line drawing by
the Government based on the structure and purpose of religious
organizations is permissible under the Establishment Clause.”). As a result,
EWTN’s Establishment Clause claim fails as a matter of law.
4.

Count IX—Compelled Speech

EWTN’s final claim accuses the mandate of violating the First
Amendment right to be free from compelled speech, which prohibits the
government from “telling people what they must say.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic and Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006). According to EWTN,
the regulations amount to compelled speech because the accommodation is
only available to an organization after it makes “certifications about its
religious objections to its insurer in a form and manner specified by” the
government. (Doc. 30 at 34 (quotations omitted).)
But EWTN’s argument rests on an overly broad understanding of the
compelled-speech doctrine. Properly understood, the right to be free from
compelled speech “prohibits the government from compelling citizens to

15

express beliefs that they do not hold,” Foley v. Orange County, No. 6:12–cv–
269–Orl–37KRS, 2013 WL 4110414, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2013)
(emphasis removed). But when the government sets out to regulate conduct,
the fact that “the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed,” is not sufficient to
show a compelled-speech violation. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490, 502 (1949). When compelled speech is purely incidental to the
government’s regulation of conduct, there is no First Amendment problem.
Here the accommodation’s certification requirement does not compel
EWTN to express any opinions or beliefs that it does not hold. To the
contrary, EWTN is not even allowed to sign Form 700 unless it believes that
the form’s contents are “true and correct.” (Doc. 29-11 at 2.) And to the extent
the accommodation requires EWTN to certify its beliefs in a particular form,
that requirement is meant only to facilitate appropriate notice of EWTN’s
decision to opt out of the mandate’s requirements. That notice requirement is
a regulation of conduct, not speech, and the fact that Form 700 uses written
words to facilitate that notice is purely incidental. See, e.g., Univ. of Notre
Dame, 2013 WL 6804773, at *20 (“[T]he certification requirement regulates
conduct, not speech.”); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Atlanta v. Sebelius,
2014 WL 1256373, at *29 (N.D. Ga. March 26, 2014) (“The compulsion to fill
out a form and express statements that are consistent with Plaintiffs’ beliefs
is merely incidental to the regulation of conduct . . . .”). As a result, EWTN’s

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compelled-speech claim fails as a matter of law.
Before moving on, the court notes that EWTN raised a new First
Amendment claim in its reply brief. Under the heading “Compelled Silence,”
EWTN argues that the accommodation’s so-called gag order violates the First
Amendment by prohibiting organizations that seek the accommodation from
interfering with or influencing their third-party administrator’s
arrangements for contraceptive coverage, 26 C.F.R. 54.9815-2713A(b)(iii).
That argument has succeeded in other lawsuits challenging the mandate.
See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Atlanta, 2014 WL 1256373, at *29
(granting summary judgment in favor of a Free Speech challenge to the gag
order). But it is not properly at issue in this lawsuit. The only Free Speech
claim in EWTN’s complaint is the compelled-speech claim addressed above,
and EWTN has not amended its complaint to add a challenge to the gag
order. As a result, despite EWTN’s effort to raise the issue in its reply brief,
there is no compelled-silence claim properly before the court at this time. See
Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1435, 1446 (11th Cir.
1987) (“It is well settled that a party cannot argue an issue in its reply brief
that was not preserved in its initial brief.”); Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald and
Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A plaintiff may not amend her
complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”).
B.

The State’s Motion for Summary Judgment
As the State points out, Defendants give “no real response to the

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State’s claims or its motion for summary judgment.” (Doc. 48.) But that’s only
because the State made no real arguments. Instead, the State’s motion for
summary judgment does little more than incorporate EWTN’s arguments by
reference and ask for an additional form of relief. (Doc. 28 at 7.) As a result,
the success of the State’s motion depends on the merits of EWTN’s. And
because EWTN’s motion for summary judgment is due to be denied, the
State’s is, too.
C.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
As discussed above, there are no genuine issues of material fact on

Counts I, II, V, and IX, and all of those claims fail as a matter of law. As a
result, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted on
those counts. The court will address the remainder of Defendants’ motion in a
separate order.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED as follows:
(1)

EWTN’s motion to expedite summary judgment proceedings
(Doc. 55) is GRANTED;

(2)

EWTN’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 29) is DENIED;

(3)

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 34) is
GRANTED with respect to Counts I, II, V, and IX of the
complaint.

The court will address EWTN’s motion for discovery under 56(d) and the

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remainder of Defendants’ dispositive motion in a separate order.
DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of June, 2014.
/s/ Callie V. S. Granade
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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