Gipson v. Mobile County Sheriff's Office et al

Filing 67

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 54 Motion for Summary Judgment. It is denied as to Gipson's claim of sex discrimination under Title VII based upon her termination. Signed by Judge Kristi K. DuBose on 3/3/2015. (cmj)

IN
 THE
 UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 COURT

FOR
 THE
 SOUTHERN
 DISTRICT
 OF
 ALABAMA

SOUTHERN
 DIVISION

DOROTHY
 M.
 GIPSON,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)
  CIVIL
 ACTION
 NO.
 13-­‐0532-­‐KD-­‐M

)

SHERIFF
 SAM
 COCHRAN,

)

)

Defendant.

)

ORDER

This
 action
 is
 before
 the
 Court
 on
 the
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment
 and
 supporting

documents
 filed
 by
 defendant
 Sheriff
 Sam
 Cochran
 (docs.
 54-­‐57),
 the
 response
 in

opposition
 filed
 by
 plaintiff
 Dorothy
 M.
 Gipson
 and
 supporting
 documents
 (docs.
 62,
 63),

and
 Sheriff
 Cochran’s
 reply
 and
 supporting
 documents
 (doc.
 65,
 66).

 Upon
 consideration,

the
 motion
 is
 DENIED
 in
 part
 and
 GRANTED
 in
 part
 as
 set
 forth
 herein.

I.
 Procedural
 History

On
 October
 30,
 2013,
 Plaintiff
 Dorothy
 M.
 Gipson
 filed
 her
 complaint
 against
 Sheriff

Sam
 Cochran
 alleging
 violations
 of
 Title
 VII
 of
 the
 Civil
 Rights
 Act
 of
 1991,
 and
 the

Uniformed
 Services
 Employment
 and
 Reemployment
 Rights
 Act
 of
 1994
 (USERRA)
 (doc.
 1).

Gipson
 alleges
 that
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 violated
 USERRA
 by
 extending
 her
 probationary
 period

due
 to
 absences
 for
 military
 training
 and
 refusing
 to
 provide
 the
 same
 training
 as
 other

deputies,
 and
 by
 terminating
 her
 employment.
 (Count
 1)

 Gipson
 also
 alleges
 that
 Sheriff

Cochran
 discriminated
 against
 her
 on
 basis
 of
 sex
 by
 treating
 similarly
 situated
 male

officers
 differently
 in
 the
 terms
 and
 conditions
 of
 employment,
 application
 of
 work
 rules,

extension
 of
 probation
 and
 termination
 (Count
 2).
 1

 As
 relief,
 Gipson
 seeks
 declaratory
 and

injunctive
 relief
 as
 to
 the
 alleged
 sex
 discrimination
 and
 violation
 of
 USERRA,

reinstatement
 to
 the
 position
 of
 deputy,
 back-­‐pay
 plus
 interest,
 compensatory
 and

liquidated
 damages,
 costs,
 attorney’s
 fees,
 and
 expenses.

II.

 Findings
 of
 Fact

Dorothy
 Gipson,
 a
 female,
 was
 hired
 as
 a
 Deputy
 Sheriff
 on
 March
 19,
 2011.
 Gipson

was
 a
 member
 of
 the
 United
 States
 Air
 Force
 Reserve
 during
 her
 employment
 with

defendant
 Sheriff
 Cochran.

 Before
 she
 was
 hired,
 Gipson
 had
 been
 a
 police
 officer
 with
 the

City
 of
 Prichard,
 Alabama.

Gipson
 was
 required
 to
 go
 through
 a
 “Working
 Test
 Period”
 or
 probation
 for
 one

year.

 A
 deputy
 initially
 goes
 through
 Field
 Training
 and
 is
 assigned
 a
 Field
 Training
 Officer

(FTO).
 The
 FTO
 documents
 the
 deputy’s
 work
 performance
 and
 training
 on
 a
 daily
 and

weekly
 basis.
 Field
 Training
 is
 scheduled
 to
 last
 8
 weeks
 and
 at
 such
 time
 the
 new
 deputy
 is

deemed
 able
 to
 perform
 the
 job
 solo
 and
 is
 assigned
 to
 a
 squad.
 Once
 assigned
 to
 a
 squad,

the
 new
 deputy
 is
 evaluated
 quarterly
 with
 the
 expectation
 of
 completing
 the
 Working
 Test

Period
 within
 a
 year
 of
 being
 hired.

 If
 the
 Working
 Test
 Period
 is
 successfully
 completed,

the
 deputy
 then
 becomes
 a
 permanent
 deputy.

Gipson’s
 first
 FTO
 Sergeant’s
 Weekly
 Report
 is
 dated
 March
 21,
 2011
 through
 March

27,
 2011.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐12,
 p.
 1)
 During
 her
 eight
 weeks
 of
 field
 training
 her
 performance
 was

generally
 rated
 as
 “Acceptable”
 and
 during
 the
 last
 four
 weeks
 her
 performance
 was

“Acceptable”
 but
 for
 driving
 skills
 which
 were
 marked
 as
 “Unacceptable”
 (Doc.
 63-­‐12,
 p.
 7-­‐

1

 In
 the
 response
 to
 the
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment,
 Gipson
 conceded
 Count
 3
 for

retaliation
 under
 Title
 VII
 and
 42
 U.S.C.
 §
 1981.

2

10).

 Most
 of
 the
 “Comments”
 indicated
 that
 Gipson’s
 work
 was
 “Good”
 but
 for
 driving

skills.
 (Id.)

 At
 the
 8th
 week,
 Sergeant
 Lori
 O’Farrell
 indicated
 that
 Gipson
 was
 performing

at
 “solo
 deputy
 level”
 but
 recommended
 “one
 week
 of
 extended
 training
 with
 being

assigned
 to
 the
 north
 side
 to
 assure
 she
 is
 ready
 to
 be
 released
 from
 FTO
 training.”
 (Doc.

63-­‐12,
 p.
 10)2

2

 The
 Daily
 Observation
 Reports
 from
 March
 24,
 2011
 through
 June
 19,
 2011,
 indicate
 that

Gipson’s
 performance
 was
 rated
 “o.k.”
 or
 “acceptable”
 or
 “not
 observed”
 (Doc.
 63-­‐10;
 63-­‐
11).

 She
 was
 marked
 “not
 acceptable”
 for
 driving
 skills
 on
 two
 occasions
 occasion,
 which

were
 related
 to
 use
 of
 maps.
 (Id.,
 p.
 61;
 Doc.
 63-­‐11,
 p.
 36)

 She
 was
 marked
 “not
 acceptable”

for
 radio.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐11,
 p.
 36)

 The
 Daily
 Observation
 Reports
 question
 the
 FTO
 for
 “The

most
 satisfactory
 area
 of
 performance”
 and
 “The
 least
 satisfactory”.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐10)

 During

June
 2011,
 as
 to
 least
 satisfactory,
 the
 FTO
 noted
 on
 three
 days
 that
 Gipson
 was
 still

learning
 the
 area
 of
 the
 Sheriff’s
 jurisdiction
 (on
 three
 days),
 that
 she
 needed
 to
 use
 her

map
 book
 instead
 of
 GPS
 to
 learn
 the
 area
 so
 that
 she
 could
 ‘arrange
 meeting
 points
 for
 her

back
 up
 units
 before
 responding
 to
 calls”
 (once),
 and
 that
 she
 was
 “still
 learning
 the

M.C.S.O.
 procedures”
 (on
 two
 days)

 (Doc.
 63-­‐11).

Throughout
 the
 observation
 period,
 under
 the
 “most
 satisfactory”
 section,
 the
 FTO

observed
 that
 Gipson
 used
 proper
 safety
 skills
 in
 arresting
 suspects
 on
 warrants
 or
 making

traffic
 stops;
 got
 along
 well
 with
 the
 other
 officers;
 obtained
 information
 from
 a
 minor

victim
 of
 a
 sex
 crime
 and
 the
 family
 and
 “was
 professional
 and
 very
 sympathetic
 with
 the

family”;
 investigated
 a
 domestic
 violence
 call,
 determined
 that
 a
 subject
 should
 be
 arrested,

“completed
 the
 proper
 paperwork
 and
 transported
 the
 subject
 to
 jail”;
 made
 a
 traffic
 stop

for
 improper
 tag,
 ascertained
 on
 the
 NCIC
 that
 the
 driver
 had
 a
 suspended
 license
 and
 no

insurance,
 issued
 two
 citations
 and
 a
 warning
 ticket,
 and
 “was
 very
 professional
 and
 fair
 to

the
 citizen”;
 that
 she
 responded
 to
 a
 house
 fire
 call,
 spoke
 with
 complainant
 and
 the
 fire

department,
 determined
 the
 house
 was
 set
 on
 fire
 by
 a
 known
 subject,
 and
 “applied
 the

proper
 charge
 and
 completed
 the
 proper
 paperwork”;

 that
 she
 made
 several
 traffic
 stops

during
 one
 shift,
 used
 proper
 safety,
 issued
 a
 warning
 ticket,
 and
 “was
 very
 professional

and
 fair
 with
 the
 citizens”;
 that
 Gipson
 investigated
 a
 domestic
 incident
 in
 a
 bar
 and
 “was

able
 to
 maintain
 control
 of
 all
 parties
 who
 had
 been
 drinking”
 and
 “remained
 calm
 and
 was

able
 to
 handle
 the
 situation”;
 that
 Gipson
 was
 on
 her
 own
 for
 a
 shift

 and
 shadowed,
 during

which
 time
 she
 “did
 a
 good
 job
 paying
 attention
 to
 the
 radio
 traffic
 and
 knowing
 what
 was

going
 on
 with
 other
 units
 that
 she
 worked
 with”;
 and
 that
 Gipson
 served
 a
 warrant
 on
 a

female
 felony
 suspect,
 used
 proper
 safety
 skills
 in
 dealing
 with
 the
 subject,
 arrested
 her,

and
 took
 her
 to
 jail.

 (Doc.
 63-­‐10,
 63-­‐11)

The
 FTO
 also
 made
 at
 least
 three
 specific
 observations
 that
 Gipson
 wrote
 several
 reports

and
 completed
 the
 proper
 paperwork
 with
 correct
 grammar
 and
 spelling.

 The
 FTO
 made
 at

3

During
 this
 time,
 Gipson
 was
 absent
 from
 duty
 with
 the
 Sheriff’s
 Department
 for

military
 training.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐3)

 There
 are
 no
 FTO
 Weekly
 Reports
 for
 the
 four-­‐week
 time

period
 between
 April
 11,
 2011
 and
 May
 8,
 2011,
 so
 it
 appears
 this
 is
 when
 Gipson
 was
 at

military
 training.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐12)

 Her
 field
 training
 was
 extended
 to
 ensure
 that
 she
 received

eight
 weeks
 of
 field
 training.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐3)

Gipson
 returned
 from
 her
 April
 2011
 military
 leadership
 training
 in
 May
 2011.

Gipson
 testified
 that
 during
 a
 combined
 roll
 call
 for
 both
 shifts:
 “I
 basically
 just
 remember

[Lt.
 Roderick
 Bonner]
 directing
 his
 attention
 to
 me
 and
 saying
 that
 I
 needed
 to
 be
 there.”

Gipson
 refers
 to
 this
 incident
 as
 blurting
 out
 for
 no
 reason,

 “Deputy
 Gipson,
 you
 need
 to
 be

here.”

 (Doc.
 63-­‐27,
 p.
 5)

At
 the
 completion
 of
 field
 training
 in
 May
 2011,
 Gipson
 was
 first
 assigned
 to
 “the

Alpha
 part
 of
 100
 squad.”
 (Doc.
 57-­‐1,
 p.
 21,
 Bonner
 deposition)
 The
 Alpha
 squad
 Sergeants

were
 O’Farrell
 and
 Sergeant
 Robert
 Miller.
 (Id.,
 p.
 21-­‐22).

 Lt.
 Bonner,
 Captain
 Carlos

Thompson,
 Deputy
 Chief
 David
 Wilhelm
 and
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 were
 her
 chain
 of
 command.

During
 Gipson’s
 term
 with
 Alpha
 Squad,
 Lt.
 Bonner
 was
 not
 aware
 of
 any
 deficiencies

documented
 by
 Sgt.
 Miller
 as
 to
 Gipson.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐25,
 p.
 9)

 During
 this
 time,
 Gipson
 went
 on

military
 leave.
 3

least
 two
 specific
 observations
 that
 Gipson’s
 appearance
 was
 good,
 her
 equipment
 was
 in

order,
 and
 she
 was
 neat
 and
 professional
 in
 appearance.

 On
 June
 11,
 the
 FTO
 wrote
 that

Gipson
 “was
 able
 to
 make
 her
 own
 decisions
 without
 assistance
 while
 handling
 complaints

today”
 and
 on
 June
 7,
 that
 “Gipson
 was
 able
 to
 handle
 herself
 and
 make
 decisions
 on
 calls.”

(Doc.
 63-­‐11,
 p.
 27,
 35)

3

 Gipson
 provided
 the
 Court
 with
 a
 copy
 of
 Lt.
 Bonner’s
 letter
 to
 Chief
 Deputy
 Wilhelm

wherein
 Bonner
 requests
 an
 extension
 of
 the
 Working
 Test
 Period.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐3)

 In
 the

letter,
 Lt.
 Bonner
 states
 that
 Gipson
 has
 missed
 time
 on
 duty
 for
 attending
 drills,
 and

references
 a
 copy
 of
 her
 military
 schedule
 for
 2011.
 However,
 the
 schedule
 is
 not
 attached

4

In
 September
 2011,
 Gipson
 was
 assigned
 to
 the
 Bravo
 part
 of
 100
 squad
 and
 her

Sergeants
 were
 Steven
 Hale
 and
 Todd
 Friend
 (Id.,
 p.
 23).

 Lt.
 Bonner,
 Capt.
 Thompson,

Deputy
 Chief
 Wilhelm
 and
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 remained
 her
 chain
 of
 command.

 During
 this

time
 Gipson
 went
 on
 military
 leave.

Gipson
 testified
 that
 Deputies
 Pettway,
 Watson,
 and
 Cooper
 told
 her
 that
 Lt.
 Bonner

did
 not
 like
 females
 working
 in
 law
 enforcement
 and
 would
 do
 whatever
 it
 took
 to
 get
 them

terminated.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐27,
 p.
 6)4

 In
 her
 answers
 to
 interrogatories,
 Gipson
 states
 that
 while

she
 was
 assigned
 to
 work
 with
 Deputy
 Cooper,
 Lt.
 Bonner
 called
 her
 to
 the
 Northside
 Office

and
 told
 her
 that
 she
 was
 “progressing
 well”,
 that
 he
 then
 asked
 her
 “numerous
 personal

questions
 and
 then
 commented
 that
 ‘[she]
 would
 decide
 if
 [she]
 would
 be
 treated
 as
 a
 slut

within
 the
 department.”
 (Doc.
 63-­‐28,
 p.
 4)

 At
 her
 deposition,
 Gipson
 testified
 that
 at
 the

station,
 in
 the
 roll
 call
 room,
 with
 Sgt.
 Hale
 present,
 Lt.
 Bonner
 asked
 Gipson
 where
 she

lived
 and
 “then
 he
 said
 I
 didn't
 have
 to
 answer
 the
 question.
 He
 asked
 who
 did
 I
 live
 with

and
 he
 said
 oh,
 your
 son.
 Then
 I
 think
 that's
 when
 he
 went
 into
 saying
 that
 I
 was
 black
 and

female.”

 (Doc.
 63-­‐27,
 p
 7)

 (Gipson’s
 testimony
 is
 unclear
 as
 to
 whether
 there
 were
 two

conversations
 with
 Lt.
 Bonner
 wherein
 he
 asked
 personal
 questions.)

On
 November
 9,
 2011,
 Gipson
 injured
 her
 back
 while
 getting
 into
 her
 patrol
 car
 and

was
 on
 injured
 with
 pay
 status
 until
 December
 16,
 2011,
 when
 she
 returned
 to
 full
 duty

status.

 Gipson
 was
 off
 duty
 for
 sixteen
 12-­‐hour
 days.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐3,
 Lt.
 Bonner’s
 request
 for

extension)

to
 the
 letter.
 Thus,
 the
 Court
 does
 not
 have
 information
 as
 to
 how
 many
 days
 Gipson
 missed

for
 military
 service
 before
 Lt.
 Bonner
 wrote
 the
 letter
 (Doc.
 63-­‐3).

4

 Gipson
 did
 not
 provide
 the
 Court
 with
 an
 affidavit
 or
 deposition
 testimony
 of
 Deputies

Pettway,
 Watson
 or
 Cooper
 to
 support
 this
 statement.

5

On
 December
 28,
 2011,
 Lt.
 Bonner
 wrote
 Chief
 Deputy
 Wilhelm
 to
 request
 a
 ninety-­‐

day
 extension
 of
 Gipson’s
 Working
 Test
 Period,
 which
 was
 scheduled
 to
 end
 March
 2012.

(Doc.
 63-­‐3)

 Lt.
 Bonner
 stated
 as
 follows:

After
 reviewing
 the
 work
 performance
 of
 Deputy
 Dorothy
 Gipson,
 as
 well
 as

her
 availability
 for
 duty
 since
 her
 hiring
 date
 of
 March
 21,
 2011,
 I
 am

requesting
 her
 probationary
 period
 be
 extended
 of
 a
 period
 of
 90
 days.

Deputy
 Gipson
 has
 the
 potential
 to
 be
 an
 asset
 to
 the
 Mobile
 County
 Sheriff's

Office
 however,
 due
 to
 circumstances
 which
 may
 be
 beyond
 her
 control,
 she

has
 missed
 a
 great
 deal
 of
 duty
 time.

When
 Deputy
 Gipson
 was
 hired
 by
 the
 Mobile
 County
 Sheriff's
 Office,
 she
 was

already
 a
 member
 of
 the
 United
 States
 Air
 Force
 Reserve.
 Her
 military
 drill

dates
 have
 required
 that
 she
 be
 absent
 from
 duty
 with
 the
 Mobile
 County

Sheriff's
 Office.
 Also,
 due
 to
 her
 military
 training
 dates,
 I
 was
 forced
 to
 extend

her
 field
 training
 four
 additional
 weeks
 to
 ensure
 she
 was
 trained
 the
 eight

required
 weeks.
 Deputy
 Gipson
 completed
 field
 training,
 however,
 there
 was

a
 delay
 of
 her
 release
 from
 training
 status.
 I
 have
 enclosed
 a
 copy
 of
 Deputy

Gipson's
 military
 training
 schedule
 for
 2011
 which
 reflects
 the
 dates
 she
 had

to
 report
 to
 the
 Air
 Force
 Reserve
 for
 military
 drills
 and
 training.
 Deputy

Gipson
 is
 still
 in
 the
 Reserve
 and
 will
 continue
 to
 attend
 drills
 and
 be
 forced

to
 miss
 time
 on
 duty
 with
 the
 Mobile
 County
 Sheriff's
 office.
 Using
 the
 2011

schedule
 as
 a
 reference,
 Deputy
 Gipson
 will
 miss
 at
 least
 six
 more
 working

days
 prior
 to
 completing
 her
 now
 scheduled
 Probationary
 period
 of
 March

2012.
 We
 are
 fully
 supportive
 of
 her
 mission
 with
 the
 Air
 Force
 Reserve

however,
 when
 time
 is
 missed
 with
 the
 Sheriff's
 Office
 her
 duty
 performance

can
 not
 be
 evaluated.

On
 November
 09,
 2011,
 Deputy
 Gipson
 reported
 that
 she
 injured
 her
 back

while
 getting
 into
 her
 patrol
 car
 prior
 to
 going
 on
 patrol.

 As
 a
 result
 of
 this

reported
 injury,
 Deputy
 Gipson
 was
 placed
 on
 Injured
 With
 Pay
 (IWP)
 status

from
 November
 09,
 2011
 until
 she
 was
 released
 to
 full
 duty
 status
 on

December
 16,
 2011.
 During
 this
 time,
 Deputy
 Gipson
 was
 absent
 from
 duty

sixteen
 12
 hour
 days.
 Again,
 this
 was
 time
 that
 her
 duty
 performance
 could

not
 be
 evaluated
 by
 me
 or
 her
 first
 line
 supervisor.

When
 evaluating
 Deputy
 Gipson's
 performance,
 based
 on
 the
 time
 she
 has

been
 employed
 by
 the
 Mobile
 County
 Sheriff's
 Office
 and
 been
 present
 for

duty,
 it
 becomes
 apparent
 that
 Deputy
 Gipson
 has
 a
 lack
 in
 job
 knowledge
 or

lacks
 the
 necessary
 confidence
 to
 complete
 some
 of
 her
 assigned
 tasks.

Sergeant
 Steve
 Hale
 has
 observed
 that
 Deputy
 Gipson
 will
 call
 him
 on
 nearly

all
 of
 her
 calls
 for
 service
 before
 she
 takes
 any
 action.
 While
 it
 is
 sometimes

necessary
 to
 contact
 a
 supervisor,
 her
 repeated
 calls
 tend
 to
 show
 a
 lack
 of

6

the
 basic
 working
 knowledge
 of
 the
 laws,
 rules
 and
 regulations
 needed
 by
 a

Deputy
 Sheriff
 in
 performance
 of
 his/her
 duties.
 It
 is
 also
 an
 indication
 of
 a

lack
 of
 confidence
 needed
 to
 make
 a
 decision.

A
 few
 recent
 examples
 of
 Deputy
 Gipson's
 lack
 of
 job
 knowledge,
 lack
 of

confidence
 or
 reluctance
 to
 make
 a
 decision,
 occurred
 during
 the
 month
 of

December
 2011:

I.
 12/22/2011
 -­‐
 A
 citizen
 met
 Deputy
 Gipson
 at
 the
 substation

in
 Semmes
 and
 requested
 that
 she
 inspect
 his
 car
 and
 sign
 off

on
 a
 Uniform
 Traffic
 Citation
 he
 received
 for
 No
 Tag
 Light

Deputy
 Gipson
 contacted
 Sergeant
 Hale
 to
 determine
 what

action
 to
 take.
 The
 action
 she
 took
 was
 to
 advise
 the
 citizen
 to

return
 to
 the
 location
 where
 he
 received
 the
 citation
 and
 then

call
 the
 sheriff's
 office.
 Signing
 off
 on
 an
 equipment
 violation

citations
 is
 [a]
 common
 task
 within
 law
 enforcement.
 When

Deputy
 Gipson
 was
 asked
 why
 she
 took
 the
 action
 she
 took,
 her

reply
 was
 that
 she
 did
 not
 feel
 comfortable
 signing
 off
 on
 the

citation.

2.
 12/30/2011-­‐
 Deputy
 Gipson
 issued
 a
 warrant
 slip
 to
 Mr.

Michael
 Pond
 for
 the
 arrest
 of
 Terry
 Burdett
 charging
 his
 (sic)

with
 Theft
 of
 Services
 (Case#
 Slll20847).
 The
 facts
 of
 the
 case

did
 not
 support
 the
 charge.
 Deputy
 Gipson
 indicated
 that
 Mr.

Pond
 told
 her
 that
 he
 had
 contacted
 his
 lawyer
 concerning
 the

matter.
 It
 appears
 that
 Deputy
 Gipson
 issued
 the
 warrant
 slip

because
 of
 the
 mention
 of
 the
 lawyer's
 involvement,
 not
 based

on
 the
 elements
 of
 the
 allegation.
 Deputy
 Gipson's
 action
 could

have
 caused
 Mr.
 Burdett
 to
 be
 wrongly
 arrested.

Deputy
 Gipson's
 absence
 from
 duty
 has
 impeded
 my
 ability
 to
 evaluate
 her

performance
 and
 her
 merit
 as
 a
 permanent
 employee.
 It
 can
 be
 assumed
 that

most
 of
 her
 noted
 shortcomings
 can
 be
 directed
 (sic)
 attributed
 to
 her
 lack
 of

experience.
 I
 believe
 that
 extending
 her
 probationary
 status
 an
 additional
 90

days
 from
 March
 21,
 2012
 to
 June
 21,
 2012
 would
 afford
 me
 and
 her
 first
 line

supervisor
 a
 better
 opportunity
 to
 judge
 the
 merit
 of
 Deputy
 Gipson
 and
 then

make
 a
 recommendation
 for
 her
 future
 employment
 with
 the
 Mobile
 County

Sheriff's
 Office.

(Doc.
 63-­‐3)

On
 January
 12,
 2012,
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 made
 a
 formal
 request
 to
 the
 Mobile
 County

Personnel
 Board
 stating
 as
 follows:

7

I
 am
 requesting
 an
 extension
 for
 Deputy
 Dorothy
 Gipson’s
 Working
 Test

Period.
 Deputy
 Gipson
 has
 failed
 to
 master
 basic
 job
 skills
 necessary
 to
 be
 a

successful
 Deputy
 Sheriff.

 With
 further
 training,
 it
 may
 be
 possible
 to
 assist

Deputy
 Gipson
 in
 becoming
 a
 fully
 successful
 Deputy
 Sheriff.

 Therefore,
 I

request
 her
 Working
 Test
 Period
 be
 extended
 for
 six
 months
 commencing
 on

March
 17,
 2012
 and
 ending
 on
 September
 17,
 2012.

 (Doc.
 63-­‐4)

Sheriff
 Cochran
 testified
 that
 the
 length
 of
 the
 extension
 is
 “three
 months,
 six

months,
 depending
 on
 .
 .
 .
 whatever
 is
 recommended
 or
 just
 whatever
 my
 thoughts
 are
 at

the
 time.”
 (Doc.
 63-­‐26,
 p.
 5).

 Lt.
 Bonner
 and
 Deputy
 Chief
 Wilhelm
 were
 unaware
 of
 other

deputies
 that
 were
 given
 a
 six-­‐month
 extension.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐25,
 p.
 17-­‐18,
 Bonner
 deposition;

Doc.
 63-­‐24,
 p.
 5,
 Wilhelm
 deposition)

After
 the
 Working
 Test
 Period
 was
 extended,
 Gipson
 was
 placed
 with
 Deputy

Cooper,
 an
 experienced
 senior
 deputy
 with
 knowledge
 of
 policy,
 procedures
 and
 Alabama

law
 to
 “train
 her
 and
 answer
 all
 the
 questions
 -­‐
 -­‐
 not
 formal
 training,
 …
 but
 just
 answer
 all

the
 questions,
 show
 her
 how
 to
 do
 it
 on
 the
 job.”
 (Doc.
 63-­‐25,
 p,
 22-­‐23,
 Bonner
 deposition)5

Lt.
 Bonner
 described
 Deputy
 Cooper
 as
 Gipson’s
 “de
 facto
 Training
 Officer.”
 (Id,
 p.
 23)

No
 other
 deputies
 were
 assigned
 to
 work
 with
 Gipson
 as
 a
 “pseudo-­‐training
 Officer

or
 to
 assist
 her
 during
 this
 working
 period.”
 (Doc.
 63-­‐25,
 p.
 119,
 Bonner
 deposition)

 Sgt.

Hale
 testified
 that
 he
 believed
 that
 the
 extension
 was
 to
 provide
 the
 additional
 training
 that

Gipson
 needed
 to
 catch-­‐up
 for
 her
 absences.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐29,
 p.
 7)

 Capt.
 Thompson
 testified

Gipson’s
 lieutenant
 would
 have
 been
 the
 person
 to
 recommend
 remedial
 training
 and
 that

the
 extension
 was
 to
 provide
 the
 remedial
 training.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐30,
 p.
 16)

5

 Gipson
 stated
 that
 the
 placement
 with
 Deputy
 Cooper
 lasted
 two
 weeks,
 and
 cited
 to
 page

60
 of
 her
 deposition
 in
 support.
 However,
 that
 page
 was
 not
 included
 in
 her
 exhibits.

8

On
 March
 1,
 2012,
 Gipson
 met
 with
 Sgt.
 Hale
 and
 Lt.
 Bonner
 to
 discuss
 her
 job

performance.
 Two
 minor
 issues
 were
 discussed.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐25,
 p.
 25,
 Bonner
 deposition;
 Doc.

63-­‐5,
 Sgt.
 Hale’s
 Memorandum)
 (“I
 spoke
 with
 Deputy
 Gipson
 in
 reference
 to
 two
 minor

problems
 that
 needed
 to
 be
 addressed.”)

 Sgt.
 Hale
 testified
 that
 Gipson
 was
 “doing
 a
 little

bit
 better”
 at
 that
 time
 and
 that
 he
 made
 clear
 with
 Lt.
 Bonner
 that
 he
 believed
 Gipson
 was

improving.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐29,
 p.
 46)

 Lt.
 Bonner
 testified
 that
 he
 was
 “not
 aware
 of
 any
 major

problems
 or
 any
 deficiencies”
 in
 Gipson’s
 “work
 from
 January
 through
 March.”
 (Doc.
 63-­‐25,

p.
 25)

On
 May
 18,
 2012,
 Gipson
 met
 again
 with
 Sgt.
 Hale
 and
 Lt.
 Bonner
 to
 discuss
 her
 job

performance.

 Gipson
 was
 told
 that
 there
 were
 no
 problems
 with
 her
 work
 product
 at
 that

time.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐6,
 p.
 1;
 “We
 asked
 Deputy
 Gipson
 if
 she
 had
 any
 problems
 she
 wanted
 to

discuss
 with
 us
 and
 she
 stated
 no.

 We
 advised
 Deputy
 Gipson
 that
 we
 did
 not
 have
 any

problems
 with
 her
 work
 product
 at
 this
 time.”)

 Sgt.
 Hale
 testified
 that
 from
 March
 to
 May

2012,
 he
 “didn’t
 find
 any
 problems”
 with
 her
 work.

 (Doc.
 63-­‐29,
 p.
 11)

On
 June
 16,
 2012,
 Gipson
 responded
 to
 a
 call
 for
 back-­‐up
 from
 Senior
 Deputy

Pitzulo.
 (Doc
 63-­‐41,
 Memorandum
 from
 Sgt.
 Hale
 to
 Chief
 Deputy
 Wilhelm)

 Deputy
 Pitzulo

was
 investigating
 a
 suspicious
 vehicle.

 He
 had
 asked
 the
 driver
 for
 consent
 to
 search,

which
 was
 given,
 and
 had
 placed
 the
 driver
 in
 the
 rear
 of
 his
 patrol
 car.

 He
 asked
 the

female
 passenger
 to
 exit
 the
 car.

 When
 she
 did,
 she
 placed
 a
 backpack
 on
 her
 shoulder.

Deputy
 Pitzulo
 asked
 her
 to
 place
 the
 backpack
 on
 the
 front
 seat,
 which
 she
 did.

 He
 then

placed
 her
 in
 front
 of
 the
 vehicle.

 Deputy
 Pitzulo
 searched
 the
 car
 for
 weapons
 and
 then

when
 he
 searched
 the
 backpack
 he
 found
 a
 small
 amount
 of
 methamphetamine
 and
 some

loaded
 syringes.

 (Doc.
 63-­‐41,
 p.1)

9

Gipson
 arrived
 at
 the
 scene
 and
 walked
 up
 to
 the
 vehicle.

 Deputy
 Pitzulo
 placed
 the

female
 under
 arrest.

 When
 he
 attempted
 to
 place
 handcuffs
 on
 her,
 she
 turned
 but
 he

regained
 control
 and
 handcuffed
 her
 behind
 her
 back.

 He
 then
 asked
 Gipson
 to
 place
 the

female
 in
 her
 patrol
 car.
 Gipson
 was
 walking
 the
 female
 to
 the
 patrol
 car
 while
 holding
 her

by
 her
 right
 arm.

 As
 Gipson
 reached
 to
 unlock
 the
 patrol
 car
 door,
 the
 female
 snatched

away
 and
 ran
 into
 the
 woods.

 (Doc.
 63-­‐41,
 p.
 2)

As
 a
 result
 of
 this
 incident,
 Sgt.
 Hale
 found
 that
 Gipson
 was
 careless
 in
 the

performance
 of
 her
 duties
 and
 recommended
 a
 Letter
 of
 Reprimand.
 (Id.)

 Sgt.
 Hale

testified
 that
 he
 did
 not
 recommend
 termination
 because
 he
 believed
 a
 Letter
 of
 Reprimand

was
 appropriate.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐29,
 p.
 12)

 Lt.
 Bonner
 concurred
 with
 issuing
 a
 Letter
 of

Reprimand.
 (Id.,
 p.13)

 Lt.
 Bonner
 testified
 that
 neither
 he
 nor
 Sgt.
 Hale,
 Capt.
 Thompson,

nor
 Chief
 Deputy
 Wilhelm
 recommended
 that
 Gipson
 be
 terminated
 based
 on
 the
 escape.

(Doc.
 63-­‐25,
 p.
 33).

 Deputy
 Pitzulo
 was
 not
 counseled
 or
 reprimanded.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐25,
 p.
 34)

On
 June
 27,
 2012,
 Capt.
 Thompson
 and
 Lt.
 Bonner
 met
 with
 Gipson
 and
 presented

the
 June
 21,
 2012,
 Letter
 of
 Reprimand.

 Capt.
 Thompson
 also
 told
 Gipson
 that
 he
 had

“recommended
 termination
 .
 .
 .
 or
 he
 was
 going
 to
 terminate
 [her],
 something
 to
 that

effect.”
 (Doc.
 63-­‐26,
 p.
 14-­‐15,
 Gipson
 deposition)

 Gipson
 and
 Capt.
 Thompson
 discussed

the
 option
 of
 her
 resigning
 in
 lieu
 of
 termination.

 Capt.
 Thompson
 told
 Gipson
 “that
 the

Sheriff
 had
 offered
 him
 to
 offer
 to
 [her]
 the
 opportunity
 to
 resign
 in
 lieu
 of
 termination”

and
 that
 he
 made
 that
 offer
 to
 her.
 (Id.,
 p.
 14-­‐15)

 Gipson
 responded
 that
 she
 wanted
 to
 take

the
 decision
 to
 terminate
 her
 employment
 up
 the
 chain
 of
 command,
 but
 Capt.
 Thompson

told
 her
 that
 she
 did
 not
 have
 appeal
 rights.
 (Id.,
 p.
 15)

10

Capt.
 Thompson
 testified
 that
 the
 “subject
 of
 termination
 probably
 started
 with”

him
 and
 grew
 out
 of
 a
 conversation
 with
 Lt.
 Bonner
 wherein
 he
 was
 telling
 Sheriff
 Cochran

and
 Capt.
 Thompson
 about
 Gipson’s
 deficiencies.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐30,
 p.
 31,
 Thompson
 deposition)

Capt.
 Thompson
 stated
 that
 Gipson
 was
 not
 terminated
 because
 of
 the
 incident
 resulting
 in

the
 Letter
 of
 Reprimand,
 but
 instead
 was
 terminated
 because
 “[s]he
 didn’t
 know
 her
 area.

She
 didn’t
 have
 a
 working
 knowledge
 to
 do
 the
 job.

 She
 contacted
 her
 Supervisor
 or

another
 Deputy
 on
 every
 call
 she
 went
 on.

 She
 utilized
 her
 GPS
 to
 get
 around
 the
 County.

She
 didn’t
 have
 a
 working
 knowledge
 of
 the
 job.”
 (Doc.
 63-­‐30,
 p.
 11,
 13-­‐14)

When
 Capt.
 Thompson
 was
 asked
 for
 documentation
 to
 support
 the
 stated
 reasons

for
 the
 termination,
 he
 answered
 that
 he
 did
 not
 have
 any
 documentation
 or
 any

memorandum
 up
 the
 chain
 to
 recommend
 termination.

 (Doc.
 63-­‐30,
 p.
 12,
 20)

 When

pressed
 for
 other
 reasons,
 Capt.
 Thompson
 stated:

 “She
 didn’t
 know
 the
 job”
 because
 “she

struggled”,
 referencing
 the
 “ticket
 incident”,
 and
 also
 stated
 that
 “her
 job
 knowledge
 was

severely
 lacking
 for
 someone
 who
 should
 have
 policed
 somewhere.”
 (Doc.
 63-­‐30,
 p.
 14)

However,
 Capt.
 Thompson
 admitted
 that
 this
 conduct
 occurred
 prior
 to
 the
 decision
 to

extend
 her
 Working
 Test
 Period.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐30,
 p.
 14)

 When
 questioned
 as
 to
 “any
 other

reasons,
 other
 than
 the
 four
 areas,”
 that
 lead
 to
 termination,
 Capt.
 Thompson
 stated
 that:

“We
 didn’t
 see
 any
 improvement
 in
 her
 performance.

 There
 was
 no
 improvement.”
 (Doc.

63-­‐30,
 p.
 15)

 But,
 Capt.
 Thompson
 agreed
 that
 this
 reason
 was
 contrary
 to
 the
 May
 2012

memorandum
 indicating
 that
 Sgt.
 Hale
 and
 Lt.
 Bonner
 had
 told
 Gipson
 that
 there
 were
 no

problems
 with
 her
 work
 product.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐30,
 p.
 15)

Sgt.
 Hale
 observed
 Gipson
 when
 she
 was
 working,
 he
 reviewed
 her
 reports,

monitored
 where
 she
 was
 on
 calls,
 and
 reviewed
 her
 work
 progress
 and
 logs.

 In
 his

11

opinion,
 “she
 was
 doing
 her
 job.”

 (Doc.
 63-­‐29,
 p.
 19)

 He
 testified
 that
 in
 the
 two-­‐month

period
 between
 March
 and
 May
 2012,
 he
 did
 not
 find
 any
 problems
 with
 her
 work.
 (Doc.

63-­‐29,
 p.
 11)

 He
 also
 testified
 that
 after
 she
 was
 assigned
 to
 work
 with
 Deputy
 Cooper

during
 the
 extension,
 he
 saw
 improvement
 with
 her
 report-­‐writing
 and
 problems
 related
 to

paperwork.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐29,
 p.
 2-­‐3).

 Sgt.
 Hale
 testified
 that
 Lt.
 Bonner
 discussed
 his
 concerns

about
 Gipson
 after
 Capt.
 Thompson
 brought
 up
 the
 escape
 at
 a
 staff
 meeting.

 (Doc.
 63-­‐29,

p.
 15-­‐16)

 Sgt.
 Hale
 testified
 that
 Lt.
 Bonner’s
 concerns
 were
 the
 escape
 and
 “some
 other

problems
 .
 .
 .
 with
 the
 paperwork
 and
 things
 like
 that.”
 (Id.,
 p.
 16)

 Sgt.
 Hale
 testified
 that
 he

was
 talking
 to
 Chief
 Deputy
 Wilhelm
 about
 the
 paperwork
 issues
 and
 that
 he
 believed
 that

Chief
 Deputy
 Wilhelm
 recommended
 termination,
 but
 did
 not
 discuss
 the
 matter
 with
 Lt.

Bonner
 or
 Sgt.
 Hale.
 (Id).

 Sgt.
 Hale
 did
 not
 recommend
 termination
 but
 only
 recommended

a
 Letter
 of
 Reprimand
 as
 to
 the
 escape.
 (Id.).

Lt.
 Bonner
 testified
 that
 he
 met
 with
 Capt.
 Thompson,
 Chief
 Deputy
 Wilhelm
 and
 Sgt.

Hale
 sometime
 prior
 to
 June
 27,
 2012
 and
 that
 the
 “reason
 for
 the
 termination”
 was
 that
 he

“expressed
 to
 them
 it
 was
 of
 [his]
 opinion
 that
 she
 was
 marginal
 at
 best,
 and
 [he]
 didn’t
 see

any
 upside,
 based
 on
 what
 he
 had
 been
 told
 by
 Sgt.
 Hale
 and
 the
 documented
 reports

leading
 up
 to
 the
 extension
 of
 the
 Working
 Test
 Period.
 (Doc.
 57-­‐1,
 p.
 25)

 Lt.
 Bonner

explained
 that
 Gipson
 “hadn’t
 gotten
 any
 better,
 hadn’t
 gotten
 any
 worse”
 and
 that

 “This

was
 the
 best
 we’re
 going
 to
 get,
 so
 I
 consider
 that
 marginal.”
 (Id.,
 p.
 26)

Sheriff
 Cochran
 testified
 that
 Gipson
 was
 not
 terminated
 because
 of
 the
 escape
 and

that
 the
 decision
 to
 terminate
 was
 made
 separately.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐26,
 p.
 7)

 Sheriff
 Cochran

testified
 that
 the
 reason
 for
 termination
 was
 that
 Gipson
 was
 not
 performing
 up
 to

standards
 and
 that
 her
 probation
 had
 already
 been
 extended.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐26,
 p.
 9)

 Sheriff

12

Cochran
 testified
 that
 it
 was
 his
 understanding
 that
 Lt.
 Bonner
 and
 Sgt.
 Hale,
 as
 her

supervisors,
 had
 recommended
 termination.
 (Id.)

When
 she
 was
 terminated,
 Gipson
 asked
 to
 go
 up
 the
 chain
 of
 command,
 but
 Capt.

Thompson
 told
 her
 that
 she
 did
 not
 have
 any
 appeal
 rights.

 (Doc.
 63-­‐27,
 p.
 14)

 Gipson
 filed

an
 appeal
 with
 the
 Mobile
 County
 Personnel
 Board
 on
 July
 6,
 2012.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐27,
 p.
 11)

 Lt.

Bonner
 testified
 that
 Gipson
 had
 the
 right
 to
 request
 to
 speak
 up
 the
 chain
 to
 Chief
 Deputy

Wilhelm
 or
 Sheriff
 Cochran,
 and
 that
 it
 would
 be
 his
 responsibility
 to
 forward
 that

information
 up
 the
 chain.

 However,
 he
 could
 not
 speak
 as
 to
 whether
 her
 request
 for
 a

meeting
 would
 be
 granted.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐25,
 p.
 30-­‐32)

 As
 to
 the
 delay
 between
 when
 she
 was

terminated
 and
 filing
 the
 appeal,
 Gipson
 testified
 that
 she
 “was
 awaiting
 the
 opportunity
 to

appeal
 to
 the
 sheriff,
 and
 .
 .
 .
 was
 advised
 to
 file
 the
 appeal.”
 (Id.,
 p.
 12)

 Gipson
 sent
 a
 letter

to
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 dated
 June
 28,
 2012,
 outlining
 the
 discrimination
 that
 she
 perceived
 she

had
 encountered
 at
 the
 Sheriff’s
 Department
 (Doc.
 63-­‐36).

 Sheriff
 Cochran
 did
 not
 meet

with
 Gipson,
 rather
 Deputy
 Chief
 Wilhelm
 met
 with
 her
 (Doc.
 63-­‐26,
 p.
 2).

 Sheriff
 Cochran

also
 indicated
 that
 by
 the
 time
 he
 received
 Gipson’s
 letter,
 he
 had
 learned
 that
 she
 filed
 a

charge
 of
 discrimination
 with
 the
 Equal
 Employment
 Opportunity
 Commission
 and
 turned

the
 letter
 over
 to
 the
 legal
 department
 (Id.
 p.
 2-­‐3).

III.

 Conclusions
 of
 law

A.
 Summary
 Judgment
 Standard

“The
 court
 shall
 grant
 summary
 judgment
 if
 the
 movant
 shows
 that
 there
 is
 no

genuine
 dispute
 as
 to
 any
 material
 fact
 and
 the
 movant
 is
 entitled
 to
 judgment
 as
 a
 matter

of
 law.”

 Fed.
 R.
 Civ.
 P.
 56(a)
 (Dec.
 2010).
 Rule
 56(c)
 provides
 as
 follows:

13

(1)
 Supporting
 Factual
 Positions.
 A
 party
 asserting
 that
 a
 fact
 cannot
 be

or
 is
 genuinely
 disputed
 must
 support
 the
 assertion
 by:

(A)
 citing
 to
 particular
 parts
 of
 materials
 in
 the
 record,
 including

depositions,
 documents,
 electronically
 stored
 information,
 affidavits
 or

declarations,
 stipulations
 (including
 those
 made
 for
 purposes
 of
 the

motion
 only),
 admissions,
 interrogatory
 answers,
 or
 other
 materials;
 or

(B)
 showing
 that
 the
 materials
 cited
 do
 not
 establish
 the
 absence
 or

presence
 of
 a
 genuine
 dispute,
 or
 that
 an
 adverse
 party
 cannot
 produce

admissible
 evidence
 to
 support
 the
 fact.

(2)
 Objection
 That
 a
 Fact
 Is
 Not
 Supported
 by
 Admissible
 Evidence.
 A

party
 may
 object
 that
 the
 material
 cited
 to
 support
 or
 dispute
 a
 fact
 cannot

be
 presented
 in
 a
 form
 that
 would
 be
 admissible
 in
 evidence.

(3)
 Materials
 Not
 Cited.
 The
 court
 need
 consider
 only
 the
 cited
 materials,

but
 it
 may
 consider
 other
 materials
 in
 the
 record.

(4)
 Affidavits
 or
 Declarations.
 An
 affidavit
 or
 declaration
 used
 to
 support

or
 oppose
 a
 motion
 must
 be
 made
 on
 personal
 knowledge,
 set
 out
 facts

that
 would
 be
 admissible
 in
 evidence,
 and
 show
 that
 the
 affiant
 or

declarant
 is
 competent
 to
 testify
 on
 the
 matters
 stated.

Fed.R.Civ.P.
 Rule
 56(c)
 (Dec.
 2010).

Sheriff
 Cochran,
 as
 the
 party
 seeking
 summary
 judgment
 bears
 “the
 initial
 burden
 to

show
 the
 district
 court,
 by
 reference
 to
 materials
 on
 file,
 that
 there
 are
 no
 genuine
 issues
 of

material
 fact
 that
 should
 be
 decided
 at
 trial.”
 Clark
 v.
 Coats
 &
 Clark,
 Inc.,
 929
 F.2d
 604,
 608

(11th
 Cir.
 1991).

 The
 party
 seeking
 summary
 judgment
 “always
 bears
 the
 initial

responsibility
 of
 informing
 the
 district
 court
 of
 the
 basis
 for
 its
 motion,
 and
 identifying

those
 portions
 of
 ‘the
 pleadings,
 depositions,
 answers
 to
 interrogatories,
 and
 admissions
 on

file,
 together
 with
 the
 affidavits,
 if
 any,’
 which
 it
 believes
 demonstrate
 the
 absence
 of
 a

genuine
 issue
 of
 material
 fact.”
 Clark,
 929
 F.2d
 at
 608
 (quoting
 Celotex
 Corp.
 v.
 Catrett,
 477

U.S.
 317,
 323,
 106
 S.
 Ct.
 2548,
 2553
 (1986)).

14

Once
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 has
 satisfied
 his
 responsibility,
 the
 burden
 shifts
 to
 Gipson,
 as

the
 non-­‐movant,
 to
 show
 the
 existence
 of
 a
 genuine
 issue
 of
 material
 fact.
 Id.
 “In
 reviewing

whether
 the
 nonmoving
 party
 has
 met
 its
 burden,
 the
 court
 must
 stop
 short
 of
 weighing
 the

evidence
 and
 making
 credibility
 determination
 of
 the
 truth
 of
 the
 matter.
 Instead,
 the

evidence
 of
 the
 non-­‐movant
 is
 to
 be
 believed,
 and
 all
 justifiable
 inferences
 are
 to
 be
 drawn

in
 his
 favor.”
 Tipton
 v.
 Bergrohr
 GMBH-­‐Siegen,
 965
 F.2d
 994,
 999
 (11th
 Cir.
 1992)
 (citing

Anderson
 v.
 Liberty
 Lobby,
 477
 U.S.
 242,
 255,
 106
 S.
 Ct.
 2505
 (1986));
 Adickes
 v.
 S.H.
 Kress
 &

Co.,
 398
 U.S.
 144,
 158-­‐159,
 90
 S.
 Ct.
 1598,
 1608-­‐1609
 (1970).

However,
 “[a]
 moving
 party
 is
 entitled
 to
 summary
 judgment
 if
 the
 nonmoving
 party

has
 ‘failed
 to
 make
 a
 sufficient
 showing
 on
 an
 essential
 element
 of
 her
 case
 with
 respect
 to

which
 she
 has
 the
 burden
 of
 proof.’”
 In
 re
 Walker,
 48
 F.
 3d
 1161,
 1163
 (11th
 Cir.
 1995)

(quoting
 Celotex
 Corp.,
 477
 U.S.
 at
 323,
 106
 S.
 Ct.
 at
 2552).
 Overall,
 the
 court
 must
 “resolve

all
 issues
 of
 material
 fact
 in
 favor
 of
 the
 [non-­‐movant],
 and
 then
 determine
 the
 legal

question
 of
 whether
 the
 [movant]
 is
 entitled
 to
 judgment
 as
 a
 matter
 of
 law
 under
 that

version
 of
 the
 facts.”
 McDowell
 v.
 Brown,
 392
 F.3d
 1283,
 1288
 (11th
 Cir.
 2004)
 (citing

Durruthy
 v.
 Pastor,
 351
 F.3d
 1080,
 1084
 (11th
 Cir.
 2003)).

However,
 the
 mere
 existence
 of
 any
 factual
 dispute
 will
 not
 automatically

necessitate
 denial
 of
 a
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment;
 rather,
 only
 factual
 disputes
 that
 are

material
 preclude
 entry
 of
 summary
 judgment.
 Lofton
 v.
 Secretary
 of
 Dept.
 of
 Children
 and

Family
 Services,
 358
 F.3d
 804,
 809
 (11th
 Cir.
 2004).

 “An
 issue
 of
 fact
 is
 material
 if
 it
 is
 a

legal
 element
 of
 the
 claim
 under
 the
 applicable
 substantive
 law
 which
 might
 affect
 the

outcome
 of
 the
 case.
 It
 is
 genuine
 if
 the
 record
 taken
 as
 a
 whole
 could
 lead
 a
 rational
 trier
 of

15

fact
 to
 find
 for
 the
 nonmoving
 party.”
 Reeves
 v.
 C.H.
 Robinson
 Worldwide,
 Inc.,
 594
 F.3d
 798,

807
 (11th
 Cir.
 2010)
 (citation
 omitted).

B.
 Analysis

1.
 Count
 I
 –
 Violation
 of
 the
 Uniformed
 Services
 Employment
 and
 Re-­‐Employment

Rights
 Act
 of
 1994
 (USERRA)

In
 Count
 I,
 Gipson
 alleges
 that
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 violated
 USERRA
 because
 he

extended
 her
 Working
 Test
 Period
 because
 of
 the
 absences
 and
 then
 terminated
 her

employment
 during
 the
 extended
 Period.

 Gipson
 also
 contends
 that
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 failed

to
 provide
 her
 with
 additional
 training
 to
 qualify
 her
 for
 the
 position.

USERRA
 prohibits
 discrimination
 against
 employees
 on
 basis
 of
 their
 military

service.
 The
 statute
 sets
 forth,
 in
 relevant
 part,
 as
 follows:

A
 person
 who
 is
 a
 member
 of,
 applies
 to
 be
 a
 member
 of,
 performs,
 has

performed,
 applies
 to
 perform,
 or
 has
 an
 obligation
 to
 perform
 service
 in
 a

uniformed
 service
 shall
 not
 be
 denied
 initial
 employment,
 reemployment,

retention
 in
 employment,
 promotion,
 or
 any
 benefit
 of
 employment
 by
 an

employer
 on
 the
 basis
 of
 that
 membership,
 application
 for
 membership,

performance
 of
 service,
 application
 for
 service,
 or
 obligation.

38
 U.S.C.
 §
 4311(a).

An
 employer
 violates
 the
 USERRA
 if
 the
 employee's
 “membership,
 …
 service,
 …
 or

obligation
 for
 service
 in
 the
 uniformed
 services
 is
 a
 motivating
 factor
 in
 the
 employer's

action
 unless
 the
 employer
 can
 prove
 that
 the
 action
 would
 have
 been
 taken
 in
 the
 absence

of
 such
 membership,
 …
 service,
 …
 or
 obligation
 for
 service[.]”
 38
 U.S.C.
 §
 4311(c)(1).

“Section
 4311
 requires
 proof
 of
 a
 discriminatory
 motive”,
 and
 the
 Eleventh
 Circuit
 Court
 of

Appeals
 employs
 the
 “but
 for”
 test.
 Landolphi
 v.
 City
 of
 Melbourne,
 Fla.,
 515
 Fed.
 Appx.
 832,

834
 (11th
 Cir.
 2013)
 (quoting
 Coffman
 v.
 Chugach
 Support
 Services,
 Inc.,
 411
 F.3d
 1231,

1238
 (11th
 Cir.2005)
 (“the
 standard
 of
 proof
 is
 the
 ‘but
 for’
 test”)).

16

“In
 order
 to
 establish
 a
 prima
 facie
 case
 of
 discrimination,
 the
 plaintiff
 must

demonstrate
 by
 a
 preponderance
 of
 the
 evidence
 that
 his
 military
 membership
 or

obligation
 was
 a
 motivating
 factor
 in
 the
 employer's
 decision.”
 Landolphi,
 515
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at

834;
 (citing
 Coffman,
 411
 F.3d
 at
 1238));
 Ward
 v.
 United
 Parcel
 Service,
 580
 Fed.
 Appx.
 735,

738
 (11th
 Cir.
 2014).
 “A
 motivating
 factor
 does
 not
 necessarily
 have
 to
 be
 the
 sole
 cause
 for

the
 employer's
 decision,
 but
 is
 defined
 as
 one
 of
 the
 factors
 that
 a
 truthful
 employer
 would

list
 as
 its
 reasons
 for
 its
 decision.”
 Id.
 “A
 court
 can
 infer
 a
 discriminatory
 motivation
 from
 a

variety
 of
 considerations,
 such
 as:
 (1)
 the
 temporal
 proximity
 between
 the
 plaintiff's

military
 activity
 and
 the
 adverse
 employment
 action;
 (2)
 inconsistencies
 between
 the

proffered
 reason
 for
 the
 employer's
 decision
 and
 other
 actions
 of
 the
 employer;
 (3)
 an

employer's
 expressed
 hostility
 toward
 members
 of
 the
 protected
 class
 combined
 with
 its

knowledge
 of
 the
 plaintiff's
 military
 activity;
 and
 (4)
 disparate
 treatment
 of
 similarly

situated
 employees.”
 Id.

Once
 Gipson
 meets
 her
 prima
 facie
 burden,
 the
 burden
 shifts
 to
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 to

“establish
 an
 affirmative
 defense
 by
 proving
 by
 a
 preponderance
 of
 the
 evidence
 that

legitimate
 reasons,
 standing
 alone,
 would
 have
 induced
 [him]
 to
 take
 the
 same
 adverse

action.
 Id.
 at
 834-­‐835
 (citing
 Coffman,
 411
 F.3d
 at
 1238-­‐1239)).

 Sheriff
 Cochran
 “does
 not

violate
 USERRA
 if
 [he]
 can
 prove
 that
 the
 action
 would
 have
 been
 taken
 in
 the
 absence
 of

the
 military
 service.”
 Preacely,
 588
 Fed.Appx.
 at
 997.6

 This
 burden-­‐shifting
 framework

6

 “The
 procedural
 framework
 and
 evidentiary
 burdens
 set
 out
 in
 §
 4311,
 as
 explained
 in

Transportation
 Management
 for
 NLRB
 rulings,
 are
 different
 from
 those
 in
 discrimination

cases
 under
 Title
 VII
 of
 the
 Civil
 Rights
 Act
 of
 1964,
 42
 U.S.C.
 §
 2000e–2(a)(1),
 as
 described

in
 McDonnell
 Douglas
 Corp.
 v.
 Green,
 411
 U.S.
 792,
 93
 S.Ct.
 1817,
 36
 L.Ed.2d
 668
 (1973),
 and

subsequent
 decisions.
 McDonnell
 Douglas,
 while
 allocating
 the
 burden
 of
 production
 of

evidence,
 does
 not
 shift
 the
 burden
 of
 persuasion
 to
 the
 employer.
 See
 Nat'l
 Labor
 Relations

17

“applies
 to
 both
 so-­‐called
 ‘dual
 motive’
 cases
 and
 so-­‐called
 ‘pretext’
 cases.”
 Coffman,
 411

F.3d
 at
 1238.

To
 rebut
 the
 proffered
 reasons,
 Gipson
 “may
 establish
 pretext
 indirectly
 by

showing”
 that
 Sheriff
 Cochran’s
 proffered
 reasons
 for
 his
 decision
 are
 “unworthy
 of

credence.”
 Landolphi,
 515
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 835.

 “Under
 this
 analysis,
 courts
 must
 evaluate

whether
 [Gipson]
 demonstrated
 such
 weaknesses,
 implausibilities,
 inconsistencies,

incoherencies,
 or
 contradictions
 in
 the
 proffered
 reason
 so
 that
 a
 reasonable
 factfinder

could
 conclude
 that
 it
 is
 unworthy
 of
 credit.”
 Id.

 Proof
 that
 Sheriff
 Cochran’s
 “justification
 is

unworthy
 of
 credence
 may
 be
 probative
 of
 discrimination,
 and
 may
 therefore,
 permit
 a

factfinder
 to
 reasonably
 find
 discrimination.”
 Id.
 (citing
 Reeves
 v.
 Sanderson
 Plumbing

Products,
 Inc.,
 530
 U.S.
 133,
 147–48,
 120
 S.Ct.
 2097,
 147
 L.Ed.2d
 105
 (2000)).

a.
 Extension
 of
 Gipson’s
 Working
 Test
 Period

Sheriff
 Cochran
 does
 not
 dispute
 that
 Gipson’s
 military
 status
 was
 a
 factor
 in

extending
 her
 Working
 Test
 Period,
 but
 argues
 that
 it
 was
 not
 a
 “motivating
 factor.”

 (Doc.

56,
 p.
 8)

 He
 explains
 that
 the
 extension
 was
 requested
 because
 of
 absences
 from
 both

Gipson’s
 military
 leave
 and
 her
 injured
 with
 pay
 status
 which
 prevented
 her
 from
 gaining

the
 necessary
 experience
 to
 become
 a
 Deputy
 Sheriff
 and
 allowing
 her
 supervisors
 time
 to

Bd.
 v.
 Weiss
 Memorial
 Hospital,
 172
 F.3d
 432,
 442
 (7th
 Cir.1999)
 (contrasting
 Wright
 Line

with
 “the
 shifting
 burdens
 of
 production
 under
 the
 ubiquitous
 McDonnell
 Douglas
 analysis,

which
 is
 merely
 a
 method
 for
 ordering
 the
 proof”);
 Walker
 v.
 Mortham,
 158
 F.3d
 1177,

1184–85
 n.
 10
 (11th
 Cir.1998),
 cert.
 denied
 528
 U.S.
 809,
 120
 S.Ct.
 39,
 145
 L.Ed.2d
 36

(1999)
 (distinguishing
 the
 employer's
 burden
 to
 prove
 its
 affirmative
 defense
 under
 the

NLRA
 from
 the
 McDonnell
 Douglas
 prima
 facie
 case,
 which
 shifts
 the
 burden
 of
 production

but
 not
 the
 risk
 of
 nonpersuasion).

 Thus
 in
 USERRA
 actions
 there
 must
 be
 an
 initial

showing
 by
 the
 employee
 that
 military
 status
 was
 at
 least
 a
 motivating
 or
 substantial
 factor

in
 the
 agency
 action,
 upon
 which
 the
 agency
 must
 prove,
 by
 a
 preponderance
 of
 evidence,

that
 the
 action
 would
 have
 been
 taken
 despite
 the
 protected
 status.
 “

 Sheehan
 v.

Department
 of
 Navy,
 240
 F.3d
 1009,
 1014
 (Fed.
 Cir.
 2001).

18

evaluate
 her
 performance.

 His
 position
 is
 supported
 by
 the
 information
 contained
 in
 Lt.

Bonner’s
 letter
 requesting
 an
 extension.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐3)

 However,

 Sheriff
 Cochran
 argues
 that

the
 extension
 was
 not
 an
 adverse
 action.

Gipson
 responds
 that
 the
 extension
 was
 adverse.
 She
 proffers
 that
 had
 her
 Working

Test
 Period
 not
 been
 extended
 for
 six
 months,
 she
 would
 have
 become
 a
 permanent

employee
 before
 she
 was
 terminated
 in
 June.7

 Thus,
 Gipson
 argues
 that
 she
 would
 have

had
 certain
 property
 rights
 in
 her
 employment
 at
 that
 time
 including
 the
 right
 to
 a
 pre-­‐
disciplinary
 hearing
 before
 her
 termination
 and
 an
 appeal,
 and
 that
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 would

have
 had
 the
 heightened
 burden
 to
 support
 her
 termination
 by
 a
 preponderance
 of
 the

evidence.8

 She
 also
 argues
 that
 the
 extension
 resulted
 in
 a
 lack
 of
 prestige
 and
 a
 lack
 of

stability.

7

 Gipson
 relies
 upon
 the
 ratings
 of
 acceptable
 and
 comments
 of
 good
 performance
 and,
 the

satisfactory
 observations
 noted
 by
 her
 Training
 Officers
 from
 March
 2011
 through
 June

2011,
 the
 absence
 of
 any
 significant
 deficiencies
 in
 performance
 noted
 in
 her
 record
 for
 the

ten
 months
 between
 hiring
 in
 March
 2011
 and
 December
 2011
 but
 for
 those
 identified
 in

the
 request
 for
 extension,
 and
 the
 absence
 of
 any
 significant
 deficiencies
 between

December
 2011
 and
 March
 2012
 –
 the
 time
 when
 her
 one-­‐year
 Working
 Test
 Period
 would

have
 ended
 -­‐
 but
 for
 the
 two
 minor
 items
 discussed
 in
 the
 March
 2012
 memorandum
 from

Lt.
 Bonner
 and
 Sgt.
 Hale
 to
 Gipson.

Gipson
 also
 relies
 on
 Chief
 Deputy
 Wilhelm’s
 testimony
 and
 argues
 that
 he
 stated
 Gipson

would
 have
 been
 a
 permanent
 employee
 in
 June
 2012
 had
 her
 Working
 Test
 Period
 not

been
 extended.

 (See
 Doc.
 63-­‐24,
 p.
 167-­‐168)

 It
 is
 too
 far
 of
 a
 stretch
 to
 say
 that
 this

testimony
 supports
 this
 conclusion.

 The
 question
 began
 with
 “if”,
 was
 compound
 and

ended
 like
 the
 previous
 question,
 with
 a
 query
 whether
 a
 permanent
 employee
 would
 have

been
 due
 a
 disciplinary
 hearing.

8

 Gipson
 references
 Personnel
 Board
 Rule
 XI,
 which
 states
 that
 during
 a
 working
 test

period,
 an
 employee
 does
 not
 have
 the
 right
 to
 a
 pre-­‐disciplinary
 hearing,
 the
 right
 to
 file
 a

grievance
 or
 appeal
 a
 dismissal
 and
 does
 not
 have
 a
 property
 interest
 in
 the
 position.
 (Doc.

63-­‐35)

 She
 also
 asserts
 that
 probationary
 employees
 may
 be
 terminated
 on
 lesser
 grounds

and
 without
 any
 supporting
 evidence.

19

The
 Court
 finds
 that
 Gipson’s
 extension
 of
 her
 Working
 Test
 Period
 was
 not
 an

adverse
 employment
 action.

 Specifically,
 the
 extension
 did
 not
 alter
 in
 any
 way
 Gipson’s

employment
 status.

 It
 is
 too
 speculative
 to
 assume
 that
 she
 would
 have
 become
 a

permanent
 employee
 at
 the
 conclusion
 of
 her
 Working
 Test
 Period
 in
 March
 2012.

Moreover,
 USERRA
 was
 certainly
 never
 intended
 to
 allow
 a
 person
 to
 be
 exempt
 from

necessary
 and
 important
 training
 for
 a
 job.

 Thus,
 extending
 a
 training
 period,
 in
 part,
 to

make
 up
 for
 absences
 due
 to
 military
 leave,
 does
 not
 violate
 USERRA,
 and
 in
 fact
 is

contemplated
 by
 USERRA.
 See
 38
 U.S.C.
 §
 4313(a)(1)(B)
 (requiring
 an
 employer
 to
 make

reasonable
 efforts
 to
 qualify
 an
 employee
 that
 has
 been
 absent
 for
 military
 service).

b.
 Termination

Sheriff
 Cochran
 argues
 that
 there
 is
 no
 evidence
 that
 Gipson’s
 military
 leave

factored
 in
 to
 her
 termination
 and
 that
 even
 if
 it
 did,
 she
 would
 have
 been
 terminated

anyway.

 Sheriff
 Cochran
 states
 that
 Gipson
 had
 three
 years
 prior
 experience
 as
 a
 police

office
 and
 was
 given
 over
 a
 year
 to
 develop
 the
 experience
 and
 expertise
 to
 be
 a
 Deputy

Sheriff,
 but
 the
 “consensus
 was
 that
 she
 was
 just
 not
 cutting
 it”
 (doc.
 56,
 p.
 9).

 Sheriff

Cochran
 stated
 that
 Gipson
 was
 a
 “marginal
 employee”
 and
 there
 was
 no
 reason
 to

continue
 her
 employment.
 (Id.)

Gipson
 responds
 that
 this
 assertion
 is
 false
 and
 not
 supported
 by
 the
 evidence.
 She

argues
 that
 the
 reasons
 for
 termination
 are
 contrary
 to
 the
 evidence,
 because
 in
 May
 2012,

a
 month
 before
 her
 termination
 in
 June
 2012,
 Sgt.
 Hale
 and
 Lt.
 Bonner
 stated
 that
 she
 had

no
 work-­‐related
 problems.

 Gipson
 argues
 that
 the
 reasons
 Capt.
 Thompson
 gave
 to

support
 his
 opinion
 that
 she
 could
 not
 do
 the
 job
 were
 reasons
 alleged
 in
 support
 of

extending
 her
 Working
 Test
 Period
 in
 December
 2011.

 Then,
 when
 Capt.
 Thompson
 stated

20

that
 she
 had
 shown
 no
 improvement
 since
 that
 time,
 Gipson
 pointed
 out
 that
 in
 May
 2012,

just
 a
 month
 before
 her
 termination,
 Lt.
 Bonner
 and
 Sgt.
 Hale
 informed
 her
 that
 they
 had
 no

problems
 with
 her
 work.

 Gipson
 also
 argues
 that
 Capt.
 Thompson
 never
 personally

observed
 her
 work
 whereas
 her
 immediate
 supervisor
 Sgt.
 Hale
 testified
 that
 she
 was

improving.

 Gipson
 also
 points
 out
 the
 absence
 of
 any
 written
 documentation
 to
 support

Capt.
 Thompson’s
 decision.

 Gipson
 also
 argues
 that
 Deputy
 Chief
 Wilhelm
 testified
 that
 the

only
 documentation
 between
 January
 2012
 and
 June
 2012,
 are
 the
 March
 2012
 and
 May

2012
 memoranda,
 and
 neither
 indicate
 that
 Gipson
 was
 below
 standard
 and
 needed
 to
 be

terminated.

The
 Court
 finds
 that
 Gipson
 has
 failed
 to
 show
 by
 a
 preponderance
 of
 the
 evidence

that
 her
 military
 service
 was
 a
 factor
 in
 the
 decision
 to
 terminate
 her
 employment,
 and

therefore,
 she
 has
 failed
 to
 make
 her
 prima
 face
 case.
 Landolphi,
 515
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 834
 (“In

order
 to
 establish
 a
 prima
 facie
 case
 of
 discrimination,
 the
 plaintiff
 must
 demonstrate
 by
 a

preponderance
 of
 the
 evidence
 that
 his
 military
 membership
 or
 obligation
 was
 a

motivating
 factor
 in
 the
 employer's
 decision.”)

 There
 is
 simply
 no
 evidence
 that
 Gipson’s

military
 service
 factored
 in
 to
 Capt.
 Thompson’s
 decision,
 such
 as
 was
 shown
 in
 Lt.

Bonner’s
 request
 for
 an
 extension
 of
 the
 Working
 Test
 Period.

 Nor
 can
 the
 Court
 infer
 a

discriminatory
 motivation
 based
 on
 the
 temporal
 proximity
 between
 Gipson’s
 military

activity
 and
 the
 adverse
 employment
 action.

 Gipson
 has
 failed
 to
 present
 any
 evidence
 as

to
 whether
 she
 may
 have
 been
 on
 military
 leave
 in
 close
 temporal
 proximity
 to
 June
 27,

2012.

 Moreover,
 although
 “an
 employer's
 expressed
 hostility
 toward
 members
 of
 the

protected
 class
 combined
 with
 its
 knowledge
 of
 the
 plaintiff's
 military
 activity”,
 id.,
 may

give
 rise
 to
 an
 inference,
 Gipson
 presents
 only
 Lt.
 Bonner’s
 one
 statement
 at
 roll
 call
 in
 May

21

2011
 –
 “Deputy
 Gipson,
 you
 need
 to
 be
 here”.

 This
 statement
 alone,
 made
 over
 a
 year

before
 termination
 is
 not
 sufficiently
 hostile
 to
 support
 an
 inference
 that
 Gipson’s
 military

service
 was
 a
 factor
 in
 her
 termination.

Lastly,
 “disparate
 treatment
 of
 similarly
 situated
 employees”,
 id.,
 may
 give
 rise
 to
 an

inference
 that
 military
 service
 was
 a
 factor
 in
 the
 decision.

 In
 this
 regard,
 Gipson

references
 the
 Court
 to
 her
 argument
 in
 support
 of
 her
 sex
 discrimination
 claim
 under
 Title

VII,
 that
 male
 patrol
 officers
 were
 treated
 more
 favorably
 although
 they
 had
 similar

deficiencies
 in
 performance.

 However,
 Gipson
 fails
 to
 explain
 how
 these
 are
 similar

comparators
 under
 her
 USERRA
 claim;
 that
 is
 that
 other
 probationers
 had
 periods
 of

absence,
 and
 had
 deficiencies
 in
 performance,
 but
 their
 Working
 Test
 Period
 was
 not

extended.

 The
 Court
 sees
 no
 reason
 to
 do
 that
 for
 her.

c.
 Additional
 training
 required
 under
 USERRA

Gipson
 alleges
 that
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 violated
 USERRA
 because
 after
 her
 military

service,
 he
 failed
 to
 provide
 her
 with
 additional
 training
 necessary
 to
 qualify
 her
 as
 a

permanent
 deputy.
 (Doc.
 1)

 Sheriff
 Cochran
 argues
 that
 Gipson
 received
 the
 additional

training
 in
 that
 her
 Working
 Test
 Period
 was
 extended
 for
 six
 months
 in
 lieu
 of
 terminating

her
 and
 to
 provide
 her
 the
 opportunity
 to
 gain
 the
 necessary
 experience;
 and
 thus
 the

extension
 was
 a
 reasonable
 effort
 to
 qualify
 her.

 He
 also
 argues
 that
 assigning
 Gipson
 to

work
 with
 a
 more
 experienced
 Deputy
 was
 a
 reasonable
 effort.
 (Doc.
 56,
 p.
 9)

Gipson
 disagrees
 with
 Sheriff
 Cochran.
 She
 argues
 that
 a
 permanent
 deputy
 position

is
 the
 position
 she
 would
 have
 had
 at
 the
 end
 of
 Working
 Test
 Period
 in
 March
 2012,
 if
 she

had
 not
 taken
 military
 leave.

 Thus,
 if
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 thought
 she
 was
 not
 qualified
 for
 a

permanent
 position,
 he
 should
 have
 provided
 her
 with
 additional
 or
 specific
 training
 in

22

addition
 to
 the
 extension
 and
 assignment.
 She
 argues
 summary
 judgment
 should
 be
 denied

because
 there
 is
 an
 issue
 of
 fact
 as
 to
 whether
 his
 actions
 were
 reasonable.

 If
 the
 period
 of
 service
 was
 91
 days
 or
 less,
 USERRA
 requires
 that
 the
 service

member
 be
 “reemployed”
 in
 “the
 position
 of
 employment
 in
 which
 the
 person
 would
 have

been
 employed
 if
 the
 continuous
 employment
 of
 such
 person
 with
 the
 employer
 had
 not

been
 interrupted
 by
 such
 service,
 the
 duties
 of
 which
 the
 person
 is
 qualified
 to
 perform[.]”

38
 U.S.C.
 §
 4313(a)(1)(A).

 But
 if
 the
 employer
 finds
 the
 person
 is
 not
 qualified
 for
 the

position,
 then
 USERRA
 requires
 the
 employer
 to
 make
 “reasonable
 efforts”
 to
 qualify
 the

employee.
 Id.
 at
 (B);
 20
 C.F.R.
 §
 1002.198;
 20
 C.F.R.
 1002.196(a).
 20
 C.F.R.
 1002.5(I)

“Reasonable
 efforts,
 in
 the
 case
 of
 actions
 required
 of
 an
 employer,
 means
 actions,

including
 training
 provided
 by
 an
 employer
 that
 do
 not
 place
 an
 undue
 hardship
 on
 the

employer.”

 20
 CFR
 §
 1002.5(i).

Viewing
 the
 evidence
 in
 the
 light
 most
 favorable
 to
 Gipson,
 the
 Court
 finds
 that
 there

is
 no
 material
 dispute
 of
 fact
 that
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 made
 reasonable
 efforts
 to
 qualify
 Gipson

for
 the
 permanent
 deputy
 position
 and
 therefore,
 summary
 judgment
 is
 granted
 in
 favor
 of

Sheriff
 Cochran
 as
 to
 this
 claim.

 Lt.
 Bonner
 noted
 in
 his
 request
 for
 extension
 that
 Gipson

when
 evaluating
 Gipson's
 performance,
 “based
 on
 the
 time
 she
 has
 been
 employed
 .
 .
 .
 by

and
 been
 present
 for
 duty”
 he
 found
 that
 she
 “has
 a
 lack
 in
 job
 knowledge
 or
 lacks
 the

necessary
 confidence
 to
 complete
 some
 of
 her
 assigned
 tasks.”
 (Doc.
 63-­‐3)
 In
 response,
 her

Working
 Test
 Period
 was
 extended
 to
 allow
 her
 more
 time
 to
 gain
 the
 necessary

experience9
 and
 she
 was
 assigned
 to
 work
 with
 a
 more
 senior
 deputy
 who
 could
 function

9

 Sgt.
 Hale
 and
 Capt.
 Thompson
 both
 testified
 that
 the
 extension
 was
 to
 provide
 the

additional
 or
 remedial
 training
 that
 Gipson
 needed.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐29,
 p.
 7;
 Doc.
 63-­‐30,
 p.
 16)

23

as
 her
 Training
 Officer
 and
 answer
 her
 questions.10
 Gipson
 has
 not
 sufficiently
 rebutted
 this

evidence.

2.
 Count
 II
 –
 Gipson’s
 claim
 of
 sex
 discrimination
 pursuant
 to
 Title
 VII

Gipson
 alleges
 that
 she
 was
 subjected
 to
 disparate
 treatment
 on
 basis
 of
 her
 sex.

She
 alleges
 that
 similarly
 situated
 male
 deputy
 sheriffs
 were
 treated
 differently
 in
 regard
 to

the
 terms
 and
 conditions
 of
 employments,
 application
 of
 work
 rules,
 extension
 of

probation,
 and
 termination.
 (Doc.
 1)

Under
 Title
 VII,
 it
 is
 unlawful
 for
 Sheriff
 Cochran,
 an
 employer,
 “to
 discharge
 any

individual,
 or
 otherwise
 to
 discriminate
 against
 any
 individual
 with
 respect
 to
 his

compensation,
 terms,
 conditions,
 or
 privileges
 of
 employment,
 because
 of
 such
 individual’s

…
 sex.”
 42
 U.S.C.
 §
 2000e–2(a)(1)).

 “In
 order
 to
 establish
 a
 case
 under
 Title
 VII,
 a
 plaintiff

may
 use
 three
 different
 kinds
 of
 evidence
 of
 discriminatory
 intent:
 direct
 evidence,

circumstantial
 evidence
 or
 statistical
 evidence.”
 Standard
 v.
 A.B.E.L.
 Services,
 Inc.,
 161
 F.3d

1318,
 1330
 (11th
 Cir.1998).

 Gipson
 relies
 upon
 circumstantial
 evidence.

In
 Title
 VII
 disparate
 treatment
 actions
 based
 upon
 circumstantial
 evidence,
 the

burden
 lies
 first
 with
 Gipson
 to
 establish
 a
 prima
 facie
 case.

 Wilson
 v.
 B/E
 Aerospace,
 Inc.,

376
 F.3d
 1079,
 1087
 (11th
 Cir.
 2004)
 (citing
 McDonnell
 Douglas
 Corp.
 v.
 Green,
 411
 U.S.

792,
 93
 S.Ct.
 1817
 (1973)
 and
 Texas
 Department
 of
 Community
 Affairs
 v.
 Burdine,
 450
 U.S.

248,
 101
 S.Ct.
 1089
 (1981).

 Gipson
 may
 establish
 a
 prima
 facie
 case
 of
 sex
 discrimination

by
 showing
 that:
 (1)
 she
 was
 a
 member
 of
 a
 protected
 class;
 (2)
 she
 was
 qualified
 to
 do
 the

10

 Lt.
 Bonner
 testified
 that
 Deputy
 Cooper
 was
 an
 experienced
 senior
 deputy
 with

knowledge
 of
 policy,
 procedures
 and
 Alabama
 law
 and
 could
 train
 Gipson
 “and
 answer
 all

the
 questions
 -­‐
 -­‐
 not
 formal
 training,
 …
 but
 just
 answer
 all
 the
 questions,
 show
 her
 how
 to

do
 it
 on
 the
 job.”
 (Doc.
 63-­‐25,
 p,
 22-­‐23,
 Bonner
 deposition)

24

job;
 (3)
 she
 was
 subjected
 to
 an
 adverse
 employment
 action
 by
 her
 employer;
 and
 (4)

similarly
 situated
 employees
 outside
 of
 the
 protected
 class
 were
 treated
 more
 favorably.

Wilson,
 376
 F.
 3d
 at
 1091.

 As
 to
 the
 third
 element,
 an
 “adverse
 employment
 action
 is
 not
 only
 an
 element
 of

the
 prima
 facie
 case,
 but
 an
 element
 of
 the
 claim
 itself.”

 McCone
 v.
 Pitney
 Bowes,
 Inc.,
 582

Fed.Appx.
 798,
 800
 (11th
 Cir.
 2014)
 (quoting
 Holland
 v.
 Gee,
 677
 F.3d
 1047,
 1056
 (11th
 Cir.

2012).
 An
 adverse
 employment
 action
 is
 “a
 serious
 and
 material
 change
 in
 the
 terms,

conditions,
 or
 privileges
 of
 employment.”
 Id.
 (internal
 citation
 and
 emphasis
 omitted).

 “The

employee's
 subjective
 view
 of
 the
 significance
 and
 adversity
 of
 the
 employer's
 action
 is
 not

controlling.
 Rather,
 the
 employment
 action
 must
 be
 materially
 adverse
 as
 viewed
 by
 a

reasonable
 person
 under
 the
 same
 circumstances.”
 Id.
 (internal
 citation
 omitted).

Generally,
 firing
 an
 employee
 is
 a
 significant
 change
 in
 employment
 status
 that
 is
 an

adverse
 employment
 action.

 See
 Davis
 v.
 Town
 of
 Lake
 Park,
 Fla.,
 245
 F.3d
 1232,
 1239

(11th
 Cir.2001).

 However,
 “[c]riticisms,
 negative
 evaluations
 and
 temporary
 and
 non-­‐
substantial
 changes
 in
 work
 assignments
 are
 not
 actions
 that
 have
 a
 ‘serious
 and
 material

effect’
 on
 the
 terms
 and
 conditions
 of
 employment.”
 White
 v.
 Hall,
 389
 Fed.
 Appx.
 956,
 960

(11th
 Cir.
 2010)
 (citation
 omitted).

Additionally,
 “memoranda
 of
 reprimand
 or
 counseling
 that
 amount
 to
 no
 more
 than

a
 mere
 scolding,
 without
 any
 following
 disciplinary
 action,
 do
 not
 rise
 to
 the
 level
 of

adverse
 employment
 actions
 sufficient
 to
 satisfy
 the
 requirements
 of
 Title
 VII.”

 Barnett
 v.

Athens
 Regional
 Medical
 Center
 Inc.

 550
 Fed.
 Appx.
 711,
 713-­‐714
 (11th
 Cir.
 2013)
 (citing

Davis,
 245
 F.
 3d
 at
 1236).

 “The
 negative
 evaluation
 must
 actually
 lead
 to
 a
 material
 change

in
 the
 terms
 or
 conditions
 of
 employment[.]”
 Id.
 “Although
 proof
 of
 direct
 economic

25

consequences
 is
 not
 required
 in
 all
 cases,
 ‘the
 asserted
 impact
 cannot
 be
 speculative
 and

must
 at
 least
 have
 a
 tangible
 adverse
 effect”
 on
 the
 employment.
 Id.

As
 to
 the
 fourth
 element,
 Gipson
 and
 the
 similarly
 situated
 employees
 she
 identifies

as
 her
 comparators,
 “must
 be
 similarly
 situated
 ‘in
 all
 relevant
 respects.’”
 Wilson,
 376
 F.
 3d

at
 1091.

 “The
 comparator
 must
 be
 nearly
 identical
 to
 the
 plaintiff
 to
 prevent
 courts
 from

second-­‐guessing
 a
 reasonable
 decision
 by
 the
 employer.”
 Id.
 (citation
 omitted).

 Where

there
 are
 allegations
 of
 discriminatory
 discipline,
 establishing
 the
 fourth
 element
 “requires

showing
 a
 similarly
 situated
 employee,
 who
 was
 engaged
 in
 the
 same
 or
 similar

misconduct
 but
 did
 not
 receive
 similar
 discipline.”
 Archie
 v.
 Frank
 Cockrell
 Body
 Shop,
 Inc.,

581
 Fed.
 Appx.
 795,
 798
 (11th
 Cir.
 2014)
 (citation
 omitted).

 The
 “quantity
 and
 quality
 of

the
 comparator's
 misconduct”
 must
 be
 “
 ‘nearly
 identical’
 ”
 to
 prevent
 judges
 from
 second-­‐
guessing
 employers'
 reasonable
 decisions.”

 Archie,
 581
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 798.

If
 Gipson
 establishes
 her
 prima
 facie
 case,
 then
 she
 creates
 a
 rebuttable

presumption
 of
 unlawful
 sex
 discrimination
 and
 the
 burden
 of
 production
 shifts
 to
 Sheriff

Cochran
 to
 articulate
 legitimate,
 nondiscriminatory
 reasons
 for
 his
 actions.
 Wilson,
 376

F.3d
 at
 1087.

 If
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 meets
 this
 burden,
 then
 the
 presumption
 of
 discrimination

is
 rebutted,
 and
 the
 burden
 shifts
 back
 to
 Gipson
 to
 show
 that
 the
 Sheriff’s
 proffered

reasons
 are
 a
 pretext
 for
 illegal
 discrimination.
 Id.

To
 do
 so,
 Gipson
 must
 show
 both
 that
 the
 reasons
 were
 false,
 and
 that

discrimination
 was
 the
 real
 reason.

 “A
 ‘new
 level
 of
 specificity’
 applies
 to
 the
 inquiry
 at
 this

step,
 in
 which
 the
 plaintiff
 must
 demonstrate
 ‘such
 weaknesses,
 implausibilities,

inconsistencies,
 incoherencies,
 or
 contradictions
 in
 the
 employer's
 proffered
 legitimate

reasons
 for
 its
 action
 that
 a
 reasonable
 factfinder
 could
 find
 them
 unworthy
 of
 credence.’”

26

Archie,
 581
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 798.

 “If
 the
 proffered
 reason
 might
 motivate
 a
 reasonable

employer,
 a
 plaintiff
 cannot
 merely
 recast
 the
 reason,
 but
 must
 ‘meet
 the
 reason
 head
 on

and
 rebut
 it.’”
 Id,
 at
 798-­‐799
 (quoting
 Chapman
 v.
 AI
 Transp.,
 229
 F.3d
 1012,
 1030
 (11th

Cir.2000)
 (en
 banc).

If
 Gipson
 makes
 her
 prima
 facie
 case,
 and
 a
 reasonable
 jury
 could
 disbelieve
 Sheriff

Cochran’s
 proffered
 legitimate
 reasons
 for
 the
 alleged
 discriminatory
 actions,
 the
 “court

cannot
 grant
 summary
 judgment
 to
 the
 defendants.”
 Keene
 v.
 Prine,
 477
 Fed.
 Appx.
 575,

581
 (11th
 Cir.
 2012)
 (citing
 Reeves
 v.
 Sanderson
 Plumbing
 Products,
 Inc.,
 530
 U.S.
 133,
 148,

120
 S.Ct.
 2097,
 2109
 (2000)
 (“[A]
 plaintiff's
 prima
 facie
 case,
 combined
 with
 sufficient

evidence
 to
 find
 that
 the
 employer's
 asserted
 justification
 is
 false,
 may
 permit
 the
 trier
 of

fact
 to
 conclude
 that
 the
 employer
 unlawfully
 discriminated.”).

a.
 Extension
 of
 the
 Working
 Test
 Period

Sheriff
 Cochran
 argues
 that
 the
 extension
 was
 not
 an
 adverse
 employment
 action;

therefore,
 Gipson
 cannot
 meet
 the
 third
 element
 of
 her
 prima
 facie
 case.
 He
 argues
 that
 in

the
 face
 of
 the
 absences
 caused
 not
 only
 by
 military
 leave
 but
 also
 due
 to
 Gipson’s
 Injured-­‐
with-­‐Pay
 status
 resulting
 from
 her
 back
 injury,
 his
 options
 were
 to
 extend
 the
 Working
 Test

Period
 or
 terminate
 her,
 based
 upon
 the
 opinions
 of
 her
 Supervisors
 that
 she
 was
 not

satisfactorily
 performing
 her
 duties
 at
 that
 time.

Alternatively,
 assuming
 the
 extension
 was
 an
 adverse
 employment
 action,
 Cochran

argues
 that
 there
 were
 legitimate,
 non-­‐discriminatory
 reasons
 for
 the
 extension.

Specifically,
 Gipson
 had
 not
 had
 a
 sufficient
 training
 period
 as
 evidenced
 by
 Lt.
 Bonner’s

request
 for
 an
 extension
 and
 documentation
 of
 two
 instances
 of
 lack
 of
 job
 skills.

 Sheriff

Cochran
 also
 argues
 that
 Gipson
 had
 no
 right
 to
 permanent
 status
 at
 the
 end
 of
 the
 Working

27

Test
 Period
 and
 that
 it
 is
 only
 speculation
 on
 her
 part
 that
 she
 would
 have
 achieved
 that

status
 at
 the
 end
 of
 one
 year
 or
 at
 the
 end
 of
 any
 extension.

Gipson
 argues
 that
 the
 6-­‐month
 extension
 is
 an
 adverse
 employment
 action
 and

thus
 she
 meets
 the
 third
 element
 of
 her
 prima
 facie
 case.

 Gipson
 argues
 that
 if
 her
 Working

Test
 Period
 had
 not
 been
 extended
 for
 six
 months
 or
 extended
 for
 only
 90
 days,
 then
 based

on
 her
 record

 she
 would
 have
 become
 a
 permanent
 deputy
 June
 21,
 2012.

 Gipson
 argues

that
 because
 she
 was
 not
 made
 permanent,
 she
 was
 precluded
 from
 receiving
 a
 property

interest
 in
 her
 job
 and
 certain
 rights
 and
 benefits.
 Specifically
 that
 she
 would
 have
 been

entitled
 to
 a
 pre-­‐disciplinary
 hearing
 before
 she
 was
 terminated
 on
 June
 27,
 2012,
 Sheriff

Cochran
 would
 have
 to
 meet
 a
 higher
 burden
 to
 terminate
 her,
 and
 she
 could
 have

appealed
 that
 decision.

 She
 also
 argues
 that
 the
 extension
 and
 denial
 of
 a
 permanent

position
 resulted
 in
 a
 lack
 of
 stability
 and
 loss
 of
 prestige.

Overall,
 Gipson’s
 adverse
 component
 is
 based
 on
 the
 premise
 that
 she
 would
 have

been
 a
 permanent
 employee
 in
 June
 2012
 when
 she
 was
 terminated
 and
 would
 have
 had
 a

property
 interest
 in
 her
 position
 and
 certain
 rights
 and
 protections.

 Under
 the
 Mobile

County
 Personnel
 Board
 Rule
 XI,
 an
 employee
 in
 a
 working
 test
 period
 does
 not
 have
 a

right
 to
 a
 pre-­‐disciplinary
 hearing
 and
 does
 not
 have
 a
 property
 interest
 in
 his
 or
 her

position
 until
 the
 working
 test
 period
 “has
 been
 successfully
 completed.”
 (Doc.
 63-­‐35,
 Rule

XI
 “Working
 Test
 Period”)

 The
 Rule
 also
 provides
 that
 “The
 [Personnel
 Board]
 Director

may
 extend
 the
 working
 test
 period
 of
 any
 appointee
 upon
 the
 request
 of
 the
 Appointing

Authority.

 .
 .
 .

 If
 not
 removed
 during
 the
 working
 test
 period
 or
 any
 extension
 thereof,
 the

employee
 shall
 be
 deemed
 to
 have
 earned
 permanent
 status.”
 (Id.)

 The
 Rule
 contemplates

28

a
 successful
 completion
 of
 the
 Working
 Test
 Period
 and
 “if
 not
 removed,”
 the
 employee
 will

earn
 permanent
 status.

For
 reason
 previously
 stated,
 the
 Court
 finds
 that
 the
 extension
 of
 Gipson’s
 Working

Test
 Period
 was
 not
 an
 adverse
 employment
 action.

 Accordingly,
 Gipson
 fails
 to
 establish

her
 prima
 facie
 case
 of
 discrimination.

However,
 assuming
 for
 purpose
 of
 this
 summary
 judgment
 that
 Gipson
 could
 make
 a

prima
 facie
 case,
 the
 burden
 of
 production
 shifts
 to
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 to
 articulate
 legitimate,

nondiscriminatory
 reasons
 for
 his
 actions.
 Wilson,
 376
 F.3d
 at
 1087.

 If
 Sheriff
 Cochran

meets
 this
 burden,
 then
 the
 presumption
 of
 discrimination
 is
 rebutted,
 and
 the
 burden

shifts
 back
 to
 Gipson
 to
 show
 that
 the
 Sheriff’s
 proffered
 reasons
 are
 a
 pretext
 for
 illegal

discrimination.
 Wilson,
 376
 F.3d
 at
 1087.

 Gipson
 must
 show
 both
 that
 the
 reasons
 were

false,
 and
 that
 discrimination
 was
 the
 real
 reason
 for
 the
 decision
 to
 terminate
 her

employment.

 She
 must
 “demonstrate
 ‘such
 weaknesses,
 implausibilities,
 inconsistencies,

incoherencies,
 or
 contradictions
 in
 the
 employer's
 proffered
 legitimate
 reasons
 for
 its

action
 that
 a
 reasonable
 factfinder
 could
 find
 them
 unworthy
 of
 credence.’”
 Archie,
 581
 Fed.

Appx.
 at
 798.

 If
 Sheriff
 Cochran’s
 “proffered
 reason
 might
 motivate
 a
 reasonable

employer”,
 Gipson
 “cannot
 merely
 recast
 the
 reason,
 but
 must
 ‘meet
 the
 reason
 head
 on

and
 rebut
 it.’”
 Id.,
 at
 798-­‐799.

In
 that
 regard,
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 states
 that
 the
 extension
 was
 necessary
 for
 Gipson
 to

have
 time
 on
 duty
 to
 gain
 more
 experience
 and
 to
 allow
 her
 Supervisors
 an
 appropriate

amount
 of
 time
 to
 observe
 and
 evaluate
 her
 work.

 Sheriff
 Cochran
 states
 that
 Gipson
 was

not
 performing
 as
 evidenced
 by
 Lt.
 Bonner’s
 statements
 in
 the
 request
 for
 extension
 that

Gipson
 lacked
 knowledge
 of
 the
 procedures
 and
 lacked
 confidence.

 He
 points
 out
 that
 Sgt.

29

Hale
 and
 Lt.
 Bonner
 both
 believed
 that
 part
 of
 the
 reason
 Gipson
 was
 not
 performing
 was

because
 of
 the
 time
 away
 from
 work.

In
 rebuttal,
 Gipson
 argues
 that
 there
 is
 no
 factual
 basis
 for
 the
 extension
 because
 she

had
 no
 documented
 deficiencies
 during
 the
 ten-­‐month
 period
 between
 her
 employment
 in

March
 2011
 and
 the
 request
 in
 December
 2011,
 that
 the
 two
 December
 incidents
 outlined

in
 the
 request
 for
 extension
 were
 minor,
 and
 that
 she
 had
 been
 rated
 as
 acceptable
 and
 had

good
 comments
 during
 her
 initial
 training
 period.

 Gipson
 also
 argues
 that
 the
 fact
 that
 her

extension
 was
 for
 six-­‐months
 as
 opposed
 to
 the
 customary
 90
 days
 coupled
 with
 the
 lack
 of

an
 explanation11
 as
 to
 why
 she
 was
 extended
 for
 6
 months
 is
 evidence
 that
 Sheriff

Cochran’s
 reasons
 are
 false.

The
 Court
 finds
 that
 Gipson
 has
 failed
 to
 proffer
 sufficient
 evidence
 from
 which
 a

reasonable
 jury
 could
 find
 that
 Sheriff
 Cochran’s
 reasons
 were
 false
 and
 his
 real
 reason
 for

the
 extension
 was
 sex
 discrimination.

 Although
 Gipson
 argues
 that
 there
 are
 no

documented
 deficiencies,
 Lt.
 Bonner’s
 request
 for
 the
 extension
 contains
 sufficient

documentation
 of
 two
 specific
 issues
 –
 lack
 of
 knowledge
 and
 lack
 of
 confidence
 -­‐
 that
 he

and
 Sgt.
 Hale
 observed
 that
 may
 motivate
 a
 reasonable
 employer
 to
 extend
 the
 Working

Test
 Period
 in
 order
 to
 further
 evaluate
 a
 probationary
 employee.

 Accordingly,
 summary

judgment
 is
 granted
 in
 favor
 of
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 as
 to
 Gipson’s
 claim
 of
 sex
 discrimination

under
 Title
 VII
 as
 to
 the
 extension
 of
 her
 Working
 Test
 Period.

b.
 Termination

11

 Sheriff
 Cochran
 testified
 that
 the
 length
 of
 the
 extension
 is
 “three
 months,
 six
 months,

depending
 on
 .
 .
 .
 whatever
 is
 recommended
 or
 just
 whatever
 my
 thoughts
 are
 at
 the
 time.”

(Doc.
 63-­‐26,
 p.
 5)

30

Sheriff
 Cochran
 acknowledges
 that
 Gipson
 is
 a
 member
 of
 a
 protected
 class
 and
 that

she
 was
 subject
 to
 an
 adverse
 employment
 action,
 i.e.,
 a
 termination.

 Sheriff
 Cochran

argues
 that
 Gipson
 cannot
 meet
 the
 fourth
 element
 of
 her
 prima
 facie
 case
 that
 she
 was

terminated
 on
 basis
 of
 her
 sex,
 because
 she
 cannot
 identify
 any
 comparators
 that
 are

similar
 situated
 who
 were
 treated
 differently.

 He
 argues
 that
 because
 the
 deputies

identified
 were
 not
 similarly
 situated
 or
 did
 not
 engage
 in
 similar
 conduct,
 the
 application

of
 different
 work
 place
 rules
 does
 not
 constitute
 discrimination.
 12

The
 Court
 finds
 that
 Gipson
 has
 presented
 sufficient
 evidence
 to
 create
 an
 issue
 of

material
 fact
 as
 to
 whether
 she
 was
 terminated
 based
 on
 her
 sex.

 Accordingly,
 Sheriff

12

 Gipson
 proffered
 Officer
 Pitzulo,
 but
 he
 is
 not
 similarly
 situated
 in
 that
 he
 was
 a

permanent
 Deputy
 and
 did
 not
 engage
 in
 substantially
 the
 same
 conduct
 as
 Gipson.

 Also,

there
 is
 no
 evidence
 that
 he
 had
 problems
 with
 decision-­‐making
 or
 general
 knowledge
 of

the
 criminal
 code
 or
 was
 a
 marginal
 employee.

Gipson
 proffers
 Deputy
 William
 Pines.
 However,
 Sheriff
 Cochran
 states
 that
 Deputy
 Pines

did
 not
 make
 permanent
 status
 and
 was
 terminated.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐25,
 p.
 62-­‐63,
 Bonner

deposition)

 Thus,
 Pines
 was
 not
 treated
 more
 favorably
 than
 Gipson.

Gipson
 proffers
 Deputy
 Wesley
 Barnett.

 However,
 Deputy
 Barnett
 was
 offered
 the
 option

of
 either
 resigning
 or
 being
 terminated
 and
 he
 resigned.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐25,
 p.
 62-­‐63,
 Bonner

deposition)
 Thus,
 Barnett
 was
 not
 treated
 more
 favorably
 than
 Gipson.

Gipson
 proffers
 Deputy
 Demetrius
 Watts
 who
 was
 hired
 on
 October
 3,
 2011,
 and
 was
 also

subject
 to
 a
 Working
 Test
 Period
 and
 the
 same
 chain
 of
 command.

 Deputy
 Watts
 received

reprimands
 for
 reckless
 driving,
 failure
 to
 report
 to
 work,
 a
 citizen
 complaint,
 failure
 to

write
 a
 report
 and
 a
 suspension
 for
 unauthorized
 leave.

 However,
 despite
 his
 issues,

Deputy
 Watts
 resigned
 in
 lieu
 of
 termination,
 before
 his
 Period
 ended.

 Thus,
 Watts
 was
 not

treated
 more
 favorably
 than
 Gipson.
 (Doc.
 63-­‐25,
 p.
 67-­‐68;
 Doc.
 66,
 Exhibit
 9,
 excerpts
 from

Watts’
 personnel
 file)

Gipson
 proffers
 Deputy
 Darryl
 Gomien.

 However,
 the
 deposition
 testimony
 to
 which
 she

cites,
 page
 223
 of
 Lt.
 Bonner’s
 deposition
 is
 not
 in
 the
 record
 and
 the
 Court
 cannot
 verify

whether
 Gomien
 was
 terminated
 for
 his
 infractions
 or
 insufficiencies.

31

Cochran’s
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment
 is
 denied
 as
 to
 Gipson’s
 claim
 of
 sex

discrimination
 based
 on
 her
 termination.

IV.
 Conclusion

Upon
 consideration
 of
 the
 evidence
 and
 for
 the
 reasons
 set
 forth
 herein,
 Sheriff

Cochran’s
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment
 is
 GRANTED
 in
 part,
 but
 DENIED,
 as
 to
 Gipson’s

claim
 of
 sex
 discrimination
 under
 Title
 VII
 based
 upon
 her
 termination.

DONE
 and
 ORDERED
 this
 3rd
 day
 of
 March
 2015.

s/
 Kristi
 K.
 DuBose

KRISTI
 K.
 DuBOSE

UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 JUDGE

32