Baldwin v. Boise Paper Holdings, L.L.C.

Filing 35

ORDER, GRANTING 20 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Boise Paper Holdings, L.L.C. and DENYING as moot 33 alternative request for extension of time. Signed by Judge Callie V. S. Granade on 8/27/2014. (copy to pltf) (mab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SYLVESTER BALDWIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
BOISE PAPER HOLDINGS, L.L.C.,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-560-CG-N

ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendant Boise Paper Holdings, L.L.C.’s
(“Boise”) motion for summary judgment with supporting brief (Docs. 20 & 21),
Plaintiff Sylvester Baldwin’s (“Baldwin”) opposition to summary judgment (Doc. 25),
Boise’s reply (Doc. 26), and Baldwin’s response thereto (Doc. 27). Also before the
court is Boise’s supplemental submission in support of its motion for summary
judgment and alternative request for extension of time. (Doc. 33). For the reasons
stated below, Boise’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted and the
alternative request for extension of time is due to be denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
Baldwin was employed by Boise at its mill in Jackson, Alabama for twentyone years. (Doc. 33-1 at 27). At all times relevant to this case, Baldwin worked as an
A Operator. (Doc. 33 at 12-15). His duties included, among other things, monitoring
the operation of the recovery boiler. Id.
A Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between Boise and Local Union

1083 covered all terms and conditions of employment at the mill. (Doc. 20-2). The
CBA vests Boise with the right to discipline or discharge employees for “just cause.”
(Doc. 20-25 at 5). Article XIII, Section 2 of the CBA protects employees from being
“unjustly reprimanded.”1
On May 10, 2011, Boise issued a Last Chance Agreement (“LCA”) to Baldwin
based on prior instances of poor job performance. (Doc. 33-1 at 5-6). The LCA
indicated that any future violations of company policy, substandard job performance
or neglect of duties would constitute “just cause” for Baldwin’s termination. Id. at 67. The LCA was signed by Baldwin, a union shop steward, and two company
representatives.2 Id. at 7. In addition, Baldwin signed an Employee Disciplinary
Notice which stated that “any future violation of Company policy or substandard job
performance will be cause for immediate termination of your employment.” Id. at
14.
On September 30, 2011, Boise discharged Baldwin because he allowed the
pressure in the recovery boiler to rise to unacceptable levels while ignoring
numerous alarms in the process. (Doc. 33-1at 12-13). A letter sent to Baldwin from
his manager explained that an investigation into the incident found that Baldwin’s
Article XIII, Section 2 of the CBA provides that “[i]f an employee is called in to be
questioned during an investigation for discipline or if an employee is to be disciplined, he
shall be accompanied by a Union shop steward or officer.” (Doc. 22-2 at 38). It further states
that “[t]he employee acknowledging receipt of the reprimand may institute grievance
proceedings, and should the employee concerned be found to have been unjustly
reprimanded, all record of such reprimand shall be removed from the personnel record.” Id.
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Article IV of the CBA provides that “[a]mendments, changes or modifications made during
the term of the Agreement shall be reduced to writing and become a part of this Agreement
effective on the date signed by the authorized agents of the parties to this Agreement.”
2

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failure to perform his job duties threatened the safety of workers and equipment in
violation of mill rules and the LCA. Id. at 7-9.
In accordance with the terms of the CBA, Baldwin filed a grievance alleging
that his discharge constituted unjust discipline. (Doc. 33-1 at 7). The claim was
processed by the union to arbitration. Id. at 10. On March 8, 2013, the arbitrator
issued a decision finding that Baldwin’s termination did not violate any provision of
the CBA, as modified by the LCA. (Doc. 33-1 at 27-37).
On October 3, 2013, Baldwin filed the instant action against Boise in state
court alleging that he was “wrongfully terminated” for “no reason whatsoever.”
(Doc. 1-1 at 4). The action was then removed to this court. (Doc. 1). On May 13,
2014, Boise filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the case is
preempted because resolution of Baldwin’s state-law claim depends upon the
meaning of “a collective bargaining agreement which has already been the subject of
an arbitration.” (Doc. 21 at 1-2).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall
be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The trial
court’s function is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter
but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “The mere existence of some evidence to
support the non-moving party is not sufficient for denial of summary judgment;

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there must be ‘sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return
a verdict for that party.’” Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249-250 (internal citations omitted).
The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252. The moving party bears the burden of proving
that no genuine issue of material fact exists. O'Ferrell v. United States, 253 F.3d
1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001). In evaluating the argument of the moving party, the
court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in its favor. Burton v. City of Belle
Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999). “If reasonable minds might differ on
the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary
judgment.” Hinesville Bank v. Pony Exp. Courier Corp., 868 F.2d 1532, 1535 (11th
Cir. 1989) (citing Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838,
841 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Once the movant satisfies his initial burden under Rule 56(a), the nonmoving party “must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of each
essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial.” Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 524 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). Otherwise stated, the nonmovant must “demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that
precludes summary judgment.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608
(11th Cir. 1991). The non-moving party “may not rely merely on allegations or
denials in its own pleading; rather, its response . . . must be by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule be set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for
trial.” Vega v. Invsco Group, Ltd., 2011 WL 2533755, *2 (11th Cir. 2011). “A mere
‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the [non-moving] party’s position will not suffice;
there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that
party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
“[T]he nonmoving party may avail itself of all facts and justifiable inferences in the
record taken as a whole.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th
Cir. 1992). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Preemption
Boise argues that Baldwin’s state-law claim is preempted by Section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”).3 “This section grants jurisdiction

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Section 301 of the LMRA provides:
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as

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to federal courts to adjudicate employment disputes involving collective bargaining
agreements, and it embodies the policy that federal law, fashioned from national
labor law, should provide the substantive law that applies in § 301(a) suits.”
Bartholomew v. AGL Res., Inc., 361 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2004). “Section 301
of the LMRA preempts a state-law claim if resolution of the claim ‘requires the
interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.’” United Steel, Paper &
Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union AFLCIO-CLC v. Wise Alloys, LLC, 642 F.3d 1344, 1349-50 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988)). In other words,
“when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of
the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract,” state-law
claims are preempted by § 301. Allis–Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220
(1985).
Baldwin’s state-law claim of wrongful termination alleges that Boise had “no
reason whatsoever to terminate” him. Because this claim is premised on the
assertion that he was terminated without “just cause,” its resolution entails
interpretation and application of the provisions of the CBA and LCA governing
Boise’s right to discipline and discharge. Baldwin has not alleged any other
independent rights under state or federal law as the basis of his wrongful discharge

defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

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claim. Accordingly, this claim is preempted by federal law.
B. Section 301 of the LMRA
Because Baldwin’s wrongful discharge claim is substantially dependent upon
analysis of the CBA and LCA, it must be dismissed as preempted unless it can be
treated as a § 301 claim. Allis–Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 at 220
(“[W]hen the resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon
analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract,
that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim or dismissed as preempted by
federal labor-contract law.”). Even though Baldwin’s complaint names the employer,
and not the union, the Court construes the claim as a “hybrid” § 301/fair
representation claim. See Bartholomew v. AGL Res., Inc., 361 F.3d at 1342 (holding
that the district court did not err in characterizing plaintiff's state-law claims as
hybrid § 301/fair representation claims even though plaintiff's complaint only
named his employer as a defendant); see also DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983) (noting that the employee may sue the employer, the
union, or both, but that the case he must prove is the same in all circumstances).
Consequently, an employee protected by a collective bargaining agreement must
establish that the arbitrator’s decision did not draw its essence from the agreement
and that the union breached its duty of fair representation before suing his
employer under § 301. Rasheed v. International Paper Co., 826 F.Supp. 1377, 1387
(S.D. Ala. 1993).
Baldwin objects to the document attached to Boise’s motion for summary

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judgment as Exhibit D, which purports to be the arbitration decision, as
unauthentic. (Doc. 20-4). Baldwin argues that the court cannot rely on the
document because the arbitrator’s use of the phrase “this grievance must be denied”
instead of “this grievance is denied” shows that the arbitrator failed to render a
final decision. (Doc. 27 at 6). The court disagrees. Boise has since filed a notarized
letter signed by the arbitrator identifying the attached copy of the arbitration
decision as genuine. (Doc. 33-1 at 2). The fact that the arbitrator uses the phrase
“must be denied” instead of “is denied” is unpersuasive. It is clear that the
authenticated arbitration agreement attached to Boise’s supplemental submission
in support of the motion for summary judgment is the arbitrator’s true and final
decision.4
Baldwin also argues that the LCA is not a valid agreement because the union
representative that signed the agreement was not an authorized agent as required
by the CBA. Applying the terms of the CBA, the arbitrator addressed this argument
in his decision and found that the LCA was valid. See Doc. 33-1 at 37. The CBA
indicates that the decision of the arbitrator “is final and binding on the parties.”
(Doc. 20-2 at 8). It is not the province of this court to render an interpretation of the
CBA when an arbitrator has already done so. See Allis–Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
471 U.S. 202 at 219 (“A rule that permitted an individual to sidestep available
Boise also filed an alternative motion for extension of time to authenticate the arbitration
decision by way of the arbitrator’s sworn deposition testimony. (Doc. 33-1 at 1). Because the
court finds Boise’s supplemental submission in support of summary judgment is sufficient
to authenticate the arbitration agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 901,
deposition testimony further confirming the authenticity of the attached decision is
unnecessary. Therefore, Boise’s alternative motion for an extension of time is due to be
denied as moot.
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grievance procedures would cause arbitration to lose most of its effectiveness, . . . as
well as eviscerate a central tenet of federal labor contract law under § 301 that it is
the arbitrator, not the court, who has the responsibility to interpret the labor
contract in the first instance.”); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. at
411 (“Today's decision should make clear that interpretation of collective-bargaining
agreements remains firmly in the arbitral realm; judges can determine questions of
state law involving labor-management relations only if such questions do not
require construing collective-bargaining agreements.”).
Because Baldwin has made no argument that the union breached its duty of
fair representation, he cannot recast his state-law claim for wrongful discharge as a
§ 301 claim. Accordingly, Baldwin’s claim is due to be dismissed as preempted.
CONCLUSION
After due consideration of all matters presented and for the reasons set forth
herein, the court finds that Boise’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 20) is
GRANTED, and the alternative request for an extension of time (Doc. 33) is
DENIED as MOOT.

DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of August, 2014.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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