Dawson v. Ameritox, Ltd.

Filing 34

ORDER terminating 26 Motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order. Upon consideration of the pleadings and the documents, the motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED, in part, to the extent that Dr. Dawson is enjoined from perform ing any services for any competitor of Ameritox, including Millennium Laboratories, Inc. Accordingly, the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, presently set for January 8, 2014 is cancelled. Signed by Judge Kristi K. DuBose on 1/6/2014. copies to parties. (sdb)

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IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  COURT   FOR  THE  SOUTHERN  DISTRICT  OF  ALABAMA   SOUTHERN  DIVISION     ERIC  DAWSON,     )     )   Plaintiff–Counterclaim  Defendant,   )     )   v.     )   Civil  Action  No.  13-­‐0614-­‐KD-­‐M     )   AMERITOX,  LTD.,     )     )   Defendant–Counterclaim  Plaintiff.   )     ORDER     This  action  is  before  the  Court  on  Defendant  Ameritox,  Ltd’s  (Ameritox)  motion  for  a   preliminary  injunction  and  memorandum  in  support  (docs.  4,  5);  plaintiff  Eric  Dawson’s   motion  to  dissolve  the  temporary  restraining  order,  memorandum,  and  evidence  in   support  (docs.  26-­‐28);  and  Ameritox’s  supplemental  brief  in  support  of  the  motion  for   preliminary  injunction  (doc.    29).    Upon  consideration  of  the  pleadings  and  the  documents,   the  motion  for  preliminary  injunction  is  DENIED,  in  part,  to  the  extent  that  Dr.  Dawson  is   enjoined  from  performing  any  services  for  any  competitor  of  Ameritox,  including   Millennium  Laboratories,  Inc.    Accordingly,  the  hearing  on  the  motion  for  preliminary   injunction,  presently  set  for  January  8,  2014  is  cancelled.       I.    Background     Ameritox  provides  specialized  services  for  health  care  providers  nationwide   including  medication  testing,  medication  monitoring,  laboratory  services,  and  management   tools  for  patient  care.    Dr.  Dawson,  a  licensed  Doctor  of  Pharmacy,  and  Ameritox  negotiated   his  employment  with  Ameritox  as  its  “Assistant  Director,  Medical  Science  and  Health   Outcomes  Research”  with  a  “Start  Date”  of  “April  11,  2011”.  (Doc.  26-­‐5,  Ameritox  internal   email;  Doc.  1,  p.  40,  Letter  from  Ameritox  to  Dr.  Dawson  dated  March  29,  2011  and   confirming  the  state  date)    On  March  29,  2011,  Dr.  Dawson  signed  a  one-­‐paragraph   agreement  wherein  he  agreed  that  during  his  employment  with  Ameritox  and  for  one-­‐year   thereafter,  he  would  not  solicit,  entice,  induce  or  approach  Ameritox  clients  within  the  state   of  Maryland  to  become  clients  for  any  other  company  with  respect  to  products  or  services   sold  or  under  development  by  Ameritox,  or  to  reduce  or  cease  doing  business  with   Ameritox,  and  would  not  authorize  or  assist  such  actions  by  any  other  person.      He  also   agreed  not  to  solicit  or  recruit  Ameritox’s  former  or  current  employees  to  work  for  a  third   party  or  engage  in  activity  that  would  violate  any  agreement  with  Ameritox.  (Doc.  1,  p.  18)         Later,  on  April  7,  2011,  Dr.  Dawson  signed  a  two-­‐page  Confidentiality  and   Noncompetition  Agreement.  (Doc.  5,  p.  52-­‐53)      Again,  he  agreed  not  to  solicit  or  approach   Ameritox  clients  to  become  clients  for  any  other  company.  (Id.,  ¶2(i))    However,  the  scope   widened  to  include  the  United  States.    Again,  he  agreed  not  to  solicit  or  recruit  Ameritox’s   former  or  current  employees.  (Id.,  ¶2(i))    Importantly,  he  also  agreed  that  during  his   employment  and  for  one-­‐year  thereafter,  he  would  not,  as  an   employee  .  .  .  of  any  company  or  other  commercial  enterprise,  directly  or   indirectly  engage  in  any  business  or  other  activity  in  the  United  States  or   Canada  which  is  competitive  with  or  render  services  to  any  firm  or  business   organization  which  competes  with  Ameritox  in  any  activity  in  which  I  was   directly  involved  while  engaged  by  Ameritox  or  any  similar  services  being   provided  by  Ameritox  at  the  time  of  termination  of  such  employment.       (Id.,  ¶2(iii)).       The  Agreement  also  contained  a  clause  wherein  Dr.  Dawson  acknowledged  that  he   would  have  access  to  confidential  information  and  agreed  not  to  disclose,  use  or  exploit  any     2   confidential  information  obtained  during  his  employment.    Specifically,  Dr.  Dawson  agreed   that:     During  and  after  my  employment,  I  will  not  (i)  use  or  exploit  in  any  manner   the  Confidential  Information  for  myself  or  any  person,  partnership,   association,  corporation  or  other  entity  other  than  Ameritox,  or  (ii)  remove   any  Confidential  Information,  or  any  reproduction  thereof,  form  the   possession  or  control  of  Ameritox.       (Id.,  ¶3)     Dr.  Dawson’s  first  day  of  work  at  Ameritox  was  Monday,  April  11,  2011.    (Doc.  1,  p.   40)    During  his  employment,  Dr.  Dawson  worked  as  a  liaison  between  Ameritox  customers   and  its  medical  department  and  laboratory.  (Doc.  1,  p.  26,  Declaration  by  Kathryn   Bronstein,  Vice  President  of  Medical  Affairs  at  Ameritox).      He  had  access  to  confidential   and  sensitive  business  information  regarding  Ameritox’s  Rx  Guardian  CD  database  which   allows  it  to  provide  services  to  health  care  provider  customers  and  regarding  Ameritox’s   strategic  business  projects  related  to  genetic  and  mental  health  testing  protocols  and  plans   for  expansion.  (Id.,  p.  26-­‐27).    On  December  3,  2013,  Dr.  Dawson  resigned  to  take  a  position   as  National  Director  of  Clinical  Affairs  with  Millennium  Laboratories,  Inc.,  (Millennium)  a   direct  competitor  of  Ameritox.    (Doc.  1,  p.  32,  email  from  Dr.  Dawson  to  Bronstein)     After  notice  from  Ameritox  of  its  position  that  he  was  in  violation  of  the  Agreement,   Dr.  Dawson  filed  a  complaint  for  declaratory  judgment  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  Mobile   County,  Alabama,  seeking  a  declaration  that  his  employment  was  not  in  violation  of  the   Agreement  or  that  the  Agreement  was  not  enforceable.    Ameritox  removed  the  action  to   this  Court  and,  upon  information  that  Dr.  Dawson  would  begin  work  with  the  competitor   Millennium  on  December  19,  2013,  filed  its  motion  for  temporary  restraining  order  and     3   preliminary  injunction,  answer  and  counterclaim,  and  motion  for  expedited  discovery.    A   temporary  restraining  order  was  entered  on  December  20,  2013.         II.  Preliminary  injunction   A.  Statement  of  the  law     “A  district  court  may  grant  [preliminary]  injunctive  relief  only  if  the  moving   party  shows  that:  (1)  it  has  a  substantial  likelihood  of  success  on  the  merits;   (2)  irreparable  injury  will  be  suffered  unless  the  injunction  issues;  (3)  the   threatened  injury  to  the  movant  outweighs  whatever  damage  the  proposed   injunction  may  cause  the  opposing  party;  and  (4)  if  issued,  the  injunction   would  not  be  adverse  to  the  public  interest.”  Siegel  v.  LePore,  234  F.3d  1163,   1176  (11th  Cir.  2000)  (en  banc);  accord  Alabama  v.  U.S.  Army  Corps  of  Eng'rs,   424  F.3d  1117,  1128  (11th  Cir.  2005);  Schiavo  ex  rel.  Schindler  v.  Schiavo,   403  F.3d  1223,  1225–1226  (11th  Cir.  2005)  (per  curiam);  Klay  v.  United   Healthgroup,  Inc.,  376  F.3d  1092,  1097  (11th  Cir.  2004).      “A  preliminary  injunction  is  an  extraordinary  and  drastic  remedy  not  to  be   granted  unless  the  movant  clearly  establishes  the  burden  of  persuasion  as  to   the  four  requisites.”  All  Care  Nursing  Serv.,  Inc.  v.  Bethesda  Mem'l  Hosp.,  Inc.,   887  F.2d  1535,  1537  (11th  Cir.1989)  (quotation  marks  omitted).  Failure  to   show  any  of  the  four  factors  is  fatal,  and  the  most  common  failure  is  not   showing  a  substantial  likelihood  of  success  on  the  merits.  See,  e.g.,  Schiavo,   403  F.3d  at  1226  n.  2,  1237;  Church  v.  City  of  Huntsville,  30  F.3d  1332,  1342   (11th  Cir.  1994);  Cunningham  v.  Adams,  808  F.2d  815,  821  (11th  Cir.  1987).     American  Civil  Liberties  Union  of  Florida,  Inc.  v.  Miami-­‐Dade  County  School  Bd.,  557  F.3d   1177,  1198  (11th  Cir.  2009)     B.  Elements       1.  Substantial  likelihood  of  success  on  the  merits     Ameritox  asserts  that  Dr.  Dawson’s  non-­‐compete  agreement  prevents  Dr.  Dawson   from  working  for  Millennium  in  any  capacity.    Dr.  Dawson  responds  that  the  non-­‐compete   agreement  is  void  under  Alabama  law  for  two  reasons:    1)  Non-­‐competes  of  professionals,     4   like  Dr.  Dawson,  are  prohibited  by  Alabama  law;  and  2)  Pre-­‐employment  non-­‐compete   agreements,  like  the  one  Dr.  Dawson  signed,  are  void  under  §  8-­‐1-­‐1  Alabama  Code  1975.1       The  Court  agrees  that  the  non-­‐compete  agreement  is  void  because  it  was  signed   prior  to  his  employment  with  Ameritox.    In  Pitney  Bowes,  Inc.  v.  Berney  Office  Solutions,  823   So.2d  659  (Ala.  2001),  the  Court  stated  that  the  “employee-­‐employer  exception  to  the   voidness  of  noncompete  agreements  [§  8-­‐1-­‐1(b)]  does  not  save  a  noncompete  agreement   unless  the  employee-­‐employer  relationship  exists  at  the  time  the  agreement  is  executed.”   Id.,  at  662  (italics  in  original)  (citation  omitted).           Ameritox  attempts  to  avoid  the  holding  of  Pitney  Bowes  with  two  arguments.    At  the   TRO  hearing,  Ameritox  argued  that  Pitney  Bowes  was  distinguishable  because  §  8-­‐1-­‐1  was   only  applicable  to  merger  situations.    Ameritox  has  provided  no  authority  for  this   proposition.    The  argument  is  not  persuasive  as  there  is  no  indication  from  the  plain   language  of  §  8-­‐1-­‐1  that  it  was  meant  to  be  limited  to  only  mergers.               Ameritox  also  contends  that  §  8-­‐1-­‐1  does  not  apply  to  contracts  which  only  partially   restrain  trade.  2    Ameritox  states  that  Dr.  Dawson’s  pre-­‐employment  contract  is  only  a   partial  restraint  of  trade.    Specifically,  Ameritox  argues  that  because  Dr.  Dawson  could   work  in  other  capacities  as  a  pharmacist,  banning  him  from  the  specialty  that  he  has                                                                                                                   1  Although  Maryland  law  applies  pursuant  to  the  non-­‐compete  agreement,  Ameritox  does   not  contest  that  the  agreement  is  void  if  it  violates  public  policy  as  set  forth  under  Alabama   law.      See  Ex  parte  Howell  Engineering  and  Surveying,  Inc.,  981  So.2d  413,  419  (Ala.  2006)   (“Section  8–1–1  expresses  the  public  policy  of  this  State  as  to  contracts  restraining   employment.”)  (citing  Clark  Substations,  L.L.C.  v.  Ware,  838  So.2d  360,  363  (Ala.2002)).     2    The  Court  notes  that  the  non-­‐compete  agreement  in  Pitney  Bowes  was  less  a  restraint  on   trade  than  Dr.  Dawson’s  non-­‐compete  agreement.    However,  the  court  still  applied  §  8-­‐1-­‐1   to  find  it  void.    823  So.  2d  at  661.         5   pursued  over  the  last  two  years  (clinical  drug-­‐testing  and  medical  monitoring)  only   partially  restrains  Dr.  Dawson’s  trade.   First,  it  is  not  likely  that  Dr.  Dawson’s  non-­‐compete  agreement,  which  prevents  him   from  working  in  any  capacity  with  Millennium  anywhere  in  the  United  State  or  Canada,   could  be  considered  a  partial  restraint  of  trade.    The  case  relied  upon  by  Ameritox  for  this   proposition,  Akzo  Nobel  Coatings,  Inc.  v.  Color  &  Equipment,  LLC,  451  F.  Appx.  823  (11th  Cir.   2011),3  is  readily  distinguishable.    In  Akzo,  Martin,  an  independent  contractor  who  sold   automobile  paint,  had  signed  a  one-­‐year  non-­‐compete  with  Akzo.    Martin  terminated  his   contract  with  Akzo  and  wanted  to  sell  a  competitor’s  paint.      The  court,  relying  on  the  fact   that  Martin  was  allowed  to  sell  Akzo  paint  during  the  one-­‐year  non-­‐compete  period,   determined  that  the  non-­‐compete  was  not  a  “substantial  limitation  upon  Martin’s   opportunity  to  continue  the  same  business  he  previously  pursued.”  Id.,  at  825.      Thus,  not   only  was  Martin  not  an  employee,  which  as  explained  below  subjects  the  agreement  to  the   restrictions  of  §  8-­‐1-­‐1,  Martin  was  allowed  to  continue  his  same  business.     However,  the  Court  need  not  decide  whether  the  non-­‐compete  agreement  is  a   partial  restraint  of  trade  because  such  a  determination  is  of  no  consequence  to  the   conclusion.    Section  8-­‐1-­‐1  applies  to  an  employee’s  non-­‐compete  agreement  whether  that   agreement  is  a  partial  or  total  restraint  of  trade.    In  fact,  it  is  §  8-­‐1-­‐1  which  allows  for   partial  restraint  of  trade  agreements  with  employees.                                                                                                                       3    Unpublished  opinions  are  not  considered  binding  precedent,  but  may  be  cited  as   persuasive  authority.  Rule  36-­‐2  of  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeal  for  the  Eleventh   Circuit.             6   Ameritox’s  argument  to  the  contrary  is  based  primarily  on  Ex  parte  Howell   Engineering  and  Surveying,  Inc.,  981  So.  2d  413  (Ala.  2006).    In  Howell,  the  Court  considered   whether  a  no-­‐hire  agreement  between  employers  violated  §  8-­‐1-­‐1.    The  Court  determined   that  because  the  agreement  was  only  a  partial  restraint  of  trade,  it  was  “not  void  under  §  8-­‐ 1-­‐1  even  [though  there  was]  no  corollary  noncompetition  agreement  with  an  employee….”   Id.,  at  422-­‐423.      The  Court  also  stated  that  “to  the  extent  Dyson,  Defco,  and  Sevier,  conflict   with  this  opinion,  they  are  hereby  overruled.”  Id.,  at  423.    The  Howell  opinion  was  based  on   the  decision  in  Southeast  Cancer  Network,  P.C.  v.  DCH  Healthcare  Authority,  869  So.  2d  452   (Ala.2003).4    A  review  of  the  cases  on  which  the  Howell  Court  relied  is  necessary  to  put  the   issue  in  context.       Dyson  Conveyor  Maintenance,  Inc.  v.  Young  &  Vann  Supply  Co.,  529  So.2d  212   (Ala.1988)  and  Defco,  Inc.  v.  Decatur  Cylinder,  Inc.,  595  So.2d  1329  (Ala.1992)  both  involved   a  no-­‐hire  provision  between  employers.    The  Court  held  the  no-­‐hire  provisions  void   because  there  was  no  underlying  employer  -­‐  employee  non-­‐compete  agreement  that   complied  with  §  8-­‐1-­‐1.    Then,  in  Southeast  Cancer,  the  Court  held  that  an  agreement  for  the   exclusive  practice  of  oncology  at  DCH  Hospital  between  DCH  and  Oncology  Associates,  did   not  restrain  Southeast  Cancer,  or  its  employees,  “in  a  manner  that  violates  §  8-­‐1-­‐1,  Ala.   Code  1975.”  Id.,  at  458.   The  difference  between  the  conclusions  of  Dyson/Delco  and  Southeast  Cancer  was   that  Southeast  Cancer  allowed  the  agreement,  which  was  determined  to  be  only  a  partial                                                                                                                   4  In  Southeast  Cancer,  Oncology  Associates  had  an  exclusive  contract  to  practice  oncology  at   DCH  Hospital.    Southeast  Cancer  was  not  allowed  to  practice  oncology  at  the  hospital.     Southeast  Cancer  sued  the  hospital  and  alleged  that  the  contract  between  Oncology   Associates  and  DCH  violated  §  8-­‐1-­‐1.         7   restraint  of  trade,  without  consideration  of  whether  there  was  an  underlying  employer  –   employee  non-­‐compete  agreement  that  complied  with  §  8-­‐1-­‐1.    Rather,  unlike  Dyson/Delco,   Southeast  Cancer  examined  whether  the  exclusivity  agreement  itself  violated  the  principles   of  §  8-­‐1-­‐1.       Previously,  in  Sevier  Insurance  Agency,  Inc.  v.  Willis  Corroon  Corp.  of  Birmingham,   711  So.  2d  995  (Ala.  1998),  the  Court  considered  whether  a  non-­‐solicitation  agreement   between  an  employer/employee  was  valid  under  §  8-­‐1-­‐1.    In  the  opinion,  the  Court   acknowledged  a  conflict  in  case  law  as  to  whether  non-­‐solicitation  agreements  (in  addition   to  non-­‐compete  agreements)  were  governed  by  §  8-­‐1-­‐1.    The  Court  held  that  because  non-­‐ solicitation  agreements  between  an  employer/employee  restrains  trade,  §  8-­‐1-­‐1  applies.       The  Court  also  broadly  stated  that,  “’partial  restraint  of  trade’  is  subject  to  §  8-­‐1-­‐1,  but  will   be  upheld  when  it  is  properly  restricted  as  to  territory,  time  and  persons  and  where  it  is   supported  by  sufficient  consideration.”  Id.,  at  999.       Thus,  when  the  Howell  case  was  considered  there  was  arguably  conflicting   precedent  regarding  when  a  contract  that  partially  restrains  trade  implicates  §  8-­‐1-­‐1.       Dyson/Defco  prohibited  any  type  of  contract  that  partially  restrained  trade  unless  the   employee/individual  affected  had  signed  a  non-­‐compete  that  complied  with  §  8-­‐1-­‐1.     Southeast  Cancer  allowed  a  contract  that  partially  restrained  trade,  and  indicated  that  §  8-­‐ 1-­‐1  was  not  implicated  because  “DCH  and  Oncology  Associates'  agreement  does  not  on  its   face  prohibit  Southeast's  physicians—who  are  not  parties  to  the  agreement—from   practicing  oncology”.    Southeast  Cancer,  869  So.  2d  at  457.      Sevier,  which  did  not  otherwise   discuss  partial  restraint  of  trade  contracts  outside  the  employer-­‐employee  context,   seemingly  held  that  all  partial  restraint  of  trade  contracts  were  subject  to  §  8-­‐1-­‐1.         8   As  previously  stated,  Howell  overruled  Dyson,  Defco,  and  Sevier  to  the  extent  they   were  inconsistent  with  Howell.    Thus,  the  context  of  Howell  is  crucial  to  understand  what   was  overruled.    Howell  involved  a  no-­‐hire  agreement  between  employers,  not  an   agreement  between  an  employee/employer.    Howell  made  clear  that  no-­‐hire  agreements   between  employers  did  not  run  afoul  of  §  8-­‐1-­‐1.    Howell  did  not  address  partial  restraint  in   the  context  of  employee-­‐employer  agreements.    Thus,  the  Court  is  not  convinced  that   Howell  counsels  that  employee  non-­‐compete  agreements,  that  only  partially  restrain  trade,   are  exempt  from  the  restrictions  of  §  8-­‐1-­‐1.   As  stated  in  Sevier,  “[i]t  would  make  no  sense  for  the  Legislature  to  draft  an   exception  …  but  not  intend  for  either  the  statute  or  the  exception  to  apply….”  711  So.  2d  at   1000.    Section  8-­‐1-­‐1  clearly  applies  to  non-­‐compete  agreements  between  employers-­‐ employees  and  provides  for  an  exception  to  their  voidness  if  the  non-­‐compete  agreement   only  restrains  trade  within  a  certain  territory,  i.e.,  partially.    The  extent  of  restraint  of  trade   allowed  is  defined  by  the  exception;  employees  may  agree  to  not  engage  in  similar  business   or  solicit  old  customers  within  a  specified  county,  city  or  part  thereof.      Thus,  it  is   nonsensical  to  say  that  §  8-­‐1-­‐1  does  not  apply  to  employee  non-­‐compete  agreements  that   only  partially  restrain  trade.         Thus,  because  §  8-­‐1-­‐1  is  applicable  to  Dr.  Dawson’s  non-­‐compete  agreement,  it  must   be  determined  whether  Dr.  Dawson’s  non-­‐compete  violates  §  8-­‐1-­‐1.    As  previously  stated,   Pitney  Bowes  answers  this  question.    Non-­‐compete  agreements  are  valid  only  if  signed  by   an  employee.      Prospective  employment  is  not  sufficient  because  a  person  that  has  been   offered  employment  to  begin  in  the  future  does  not  have  an  employer-­‐employee     9   relationship.    Pitney  Bowes,  823  So.  2d  at  662  (“Absent  the  employee-­‐employer  relationship   when  the  agreement  is  executed,  the  agreement  is  void.”)  (citation  omitted).               Accordingly,  as  to  the  enforceability  of  the  non-­‐compete  agreement  between   Ameritox  and  Dr.  Dawson,  the  Court  finds  that  Ameritox  does  not  have  a  substantial   likelihood  of  succeeding  on  this  breach  of  contract  claim.    Therefore,  the  Court  finds  that   the  Temporary  Restraining  Order  should  be  terminated  to  the  extent  it  prohibits  Dr.   Dawson  from  performing  any  services  for  any  competitor  of  Ameritox,  including   Millennium  Laboratories,  Inc.                           2.  Remaining  elements     Since  Ameritox  has  failed  to  meet  its  burden  as  to  the  first  of  the  four  prerequisites   for  entry  of  a  preliminary  injunction,  the  Court  need  not  address  the  remaining  three.       C.    Confidentiality  provisions     The  parties  do  not  dispute  that  Dr.  Dawson  is  subject  to  the  confidentiality   provisions  of  the  employment  agreement  and  that  a  preliminary  injunction  is  appropriate   as  to  those  provisions.    Therefore,  it  is  ORDERED,  ADJUDGED  and  DECREED  as  follows:     1.  Dr.  Dawson  is  enjoined  from  using  or  disclosing  any  of  Ameritox’s  proprietary   and/or  confidential  business  information.     2.  Dr.  Dawson  is  directed  to  immediately  return  to  Ameritox  all  Company   documents  and  information,  with  the  exception  of  documents  and  information  pertaining   to  his  personal  compensation.       3.  Dr.  Dawson  is  enjoined  from  deleting,  destroying,  erasing,  modifying,  or   otherwise  altering  any  and  all  electronic  media,  including,  but  not  limited  to,  work  and   personal  e-­‐mail  accounts,  external  hard  drives,  thumb  drives,  or  other  portable  media,     10   Dropbox  accounts,  network  drives,  computers,  cellular  phones,  smart  phones,  and  personal   digital  assistants,  that  have  stored  Ameritox’s  documents  or  information,  or  were  used  to   transfer  or  temporarily  store  Ameritox’s  documents,  data,  or  information,  or  that  referred   or  related  to  Ameritox,  Ameritox’s  business,  Ameritox’s  employees  or  existing  or   prospective  customers,  or  work  completed  to  date,  until  such  time  that  this  Court  gives  him   leave  to  so  do.     4.    Dr.  Dawson  is  directed  to  preserve  all  documents,  data,  and  information   pertaining  to  the  offer  of  employment  extended  to  him  by  Millennium,  communications   between  Dr.  Dawson  and  Millennium  and/or  with  other  individuals  regarding  his   prospective  employment  and  employment  with  Millennium,  and  communications  between   Dr.  Dawson  and  Millennium  and/or  with  other  individuals  regarding  their  knowledge  of   and/or  access  to  Ameritox’s  confidential  business  or  proprietary  information.     DONE  this  the  6th  day  of  January  2014.                                             s/  Kristi  K.  DuBose   KRISTI  K.  DuBOSE   UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  JUDGE   11  

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