Dawson v. Ameritox, Ltd.

Filing 34

ORDER terminating 26 Motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order. Upon consideration of the pleadings and the documents, the motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED, in part, to the extent that Dr. Dawson is enjoined from perform ing any services for any competitor of Ameritox, including Millennium Laboratories, Inc. Accordingly, the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, presently set for January 8, 2014 is cancelled. Signed by Judge Kristi K. DuBose on 1/6/2014. copies to parties. (sdb)

IN
 THE
 UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 COURT

FOR
 THE
 SOUTHERN
 DISTRICT
 OF
 ALABAMA

SOUTHERN
 DIVISION

ERIC
 DAWSON,

)

)

Plaintiff–Counterclaim
 Defendant,
  )

)

v.

)
  Civil
 Action
 No.
 13-­‐0614-­‐KD-­‐M

)

AMERITOX,
 LTD.,

)

)

Defendant–Counterclaim
 Plaintiff.
  )

ORDER

This
 action
 is
 before
 the
 Court
 on
 Defendant
 Ameritox,
 Ltd’s
 (Ameritox)
 motion
 for
 a

preliminary
 injunction
 and
 memorandum
 in
 support
 (docs.
 4,
 5);
 plaintiff
 Eric
 Dawson’s

motion
 to
 dissolve
 the
 temporary
 restraining
 order,
 memorandum,
 and
 evidence
 in

support
 (docs.
 26-­‐28);
 and
 Ameritox’s
 supplemental
 brief
 in
 support
 of
 the
 motion
 for

preliminary
 injunction
 (doc.

 29).

 Upon
 consideration
 of
 the
 pleadings
 and
 the
 documents,

the
 motion
 for
 preliminary
 injunction
 is
 DENIED,
 in
 part,
 to
 the
 extent
 that
 Dr.
 Dawson
 is

enjoined
 from
 performing
 any
 services
 for
 any
 competitor
 of
 Ameritox,
 including

Millennium
 Laboratories,
 Inc.

 Accordingly,
 the
 hearing
 on
 the
 motion
 for
 preliminary

injunction,
 presently
 set
 for
 January
 8,
 2014
 is
 cancelled.

I.

 Background

Ameritox
 provides
 specialized
 services
 for
 health
 care
 providers
 nationwide

including
 medication
 testing,
 medication
 monitoring,
 laboratory
 services,
 and
 management

tools
 for
 patient
 care.

 Dr.
 Dawson,
 a
 licensed
 Doctor
 of
 Pharmacy,
 and
 Ameritox
 negotiated

his
 employment
 with
 Ameritox
 as
 its
 “Assistant
 Director,
 Medical
 Science
 and
 Health

Outcomes
 Research”
 with
 a
 “Start
 Date”
 of
 “April
 11,
 2011”.
 (Doc.
 26-­‐5,
 Ameritox
 internal

email;
 Doc.
 1,
 p.
 40,
 Letter
 from
 Ameritox
 to
 Dr.
 Dawson
 dated
 March
 29,
 2011
 and

confirming
 the
 state
 date)

 On
 March
 29,
 2011,
 Dr.
 Dawson
 signed
 a
 one-­‐paragraph

agreement
 wherein
 he
 agreed
 that
 during
 his
 employment
 with
 Ameritox
 and
 for
 one-­‐year

thereafter,
 he
 would
 not
 solicit,
 entice,
 induce
 or
 approach
 Ameritox
 clients
 within
 the
 state

of
 Maryland
 to
 become
 clients
 for
 any
 other
 company
 with
 respect
 to
 products
 or
 services

sold
 or
 under
 development
 by
 Ameritox,
 or
 to
 reduce
 or
 cease
 doing
 business
 with

Ameritox,
 and
 would
 not
 authorize
 or
 assist
 such
 actions
 by
 any
 other
 person.

 He
 also

agreed
 not
 to
 solicit
 or
 recruit
 Ameritox’s
 former
 or
 current
 employees
 to
 work
 for
 a
 third

party
 or
 engage
 in
 activity
 that
 would
 violate
 any
 agreement
 with
 Ameritox.
 (Doc.
 1,
 p.
 18)

Later,
 on
 April
 7,
 2011,
 Dr.
 Dawson
 signed
 a
 two-­‐page
 Confidentiality
 and

Noncompetition
 Agreement.
 (Doc.
 5,
 p.
 52-­‐53)

 Again,
 he
 agreed
 not
 to
 solicit
 or
 approach

Ameritox
 clients
 to
 become
 clients
 for
 any
 other
 company.
 (Id.,
 ¶2(i))

 However,
 the
 scope

widened
 to
 include
 the
 United
 States.

 Again,
 he
 agreed
 not
 to
 solicit
 or
 recruit
 Ameritox’s

former
 or
 current
 employees.
 (Id.,
 ¶2(i))

 Importantly,
 he
 also
 agreed
 that
 during
 his

employment
 and
 for
 one-­‐year
 thereafter,
 he
 would
 not,
 as
 an

employee
 .
 .
 .
 of
 any
 company
 or
 other
 commercial
 enterprise,
 directly
 or

indirectly
 engage
 in
 any
 business
 or
 other
 activity
 in
 the
 United
 States
 or

Canada
 which
 is
 competitive
 with
 or
 render
 services
 to
 any
 firm
 or
 business

organization
 which
 competes
 with
 Ameritox
 in
 any
 activity
 in
 which
 I
 was

directly
 involved
 while
 engaged
 by
 Ameritox
 or
 any
 similar
 services
 being

provided
 by
 Ameritox
 at
 the
 time
 of
 termination
 of
 such
 employment.

(Id.,
 ¶2(iii)).

The
 Agreement
 also
 contained
 a
 clause
 wherein
 Dr.
 Dawson
 acknowledged
 that
 he

would
 have
 access
 to
 confidential
 information
 and
 agreed
 not
 to
 disclose,
 use
 or
 exploit
 any

2

confidential
 information
 obtained
 during
 his
 employment.

 Specifically,
 Dr.
 Dawson
 agreed

that:

During
 and
 after
 my
 employment,
 I
 will
 not
 (i)
 use
 or
 exploit
 in
 any
 manner

the
 Confidential
 Information
 for
 myself
 or
 any
 person,
 partnership,

association,
 corporation
 or
 other
 entity
 other
 than
 Ameritox,
 or
 (ii)
 remove

any
 Confidential
 Information,
 or
 any
 reproduction
 thereof,
 form
 the

possession
 or
 control
 of
 Ameritox.

(Id.,
 ¶3)

Dr.
 Dawson’s
 first
 day
 of
 work
 at
 Ameritox
 was
 Monday,
 April
 11,
 2011.

 (Doc.
 1,
 p.

40)

 During
 his
 employment,
 Dr.
 Dawson
 worked
 as
 a
 liaison
 between
 Ameritox
 customers

and
 its
 medical
 department
 and
 laboratory.
 (Doc.
 1,
 p.
 26,
 Declaration
 by
 Kathryn

Bronstein,
 Vice
 President
 of
 Medical
 Affairs
 at
 Ameritox).

 He
 had
 access
 to
 confidential

and
 sensitive
 business
 information
 regarding
 Ameritox’s
 Rx
 Guardian
 CD
 database
 which

allows
 it
 to
 provide
 services
 to
 health
 care
 provider
 customers
 and
 regarding
 Ameritox’s

strategic
 business
 projects
 related
 to
 genetic
 and
 mental
 health
 testing
 protocols
 and
 plans

for
 expansion.
 (Id.,
 p.
 26-­‐27).

 On
 December
 3,
 2013,
 Dr.
 Dawson
 resigned
 to
 take
 a
 position

as
 National
 Director
 of
 Clinical
 Affairs
 with
 Millennium
 Laboratories,
 Inc.,
 (Millennium)
 a

direct
 competitor
 of
 Ameritox.

 (Doc.
 1,
 p.
 32,
 email
 from
 Dr.
 Dawson
 to
 Bronstein)

After
 notice
 from
 Ameritox
 of
 its
 position
 that
 he
 was
 in
 violation
 of
 the
 Agreement,

Dr.
 Dawson
 filed
 a
 complaint
 for
 declaratory
 judgment
 in
 the
 Circuit
 Court
 of
 Mobile

County,
 Alabama,
 seeking
 a
 declaration
 that
 his
 employment
 was
 not
 in
 violation
 of
 the

Agreement
 or
 that
 the
 Agreement
 was
 not
 enforceable.

 Ameritox
 removed
 the
 action
 to

this
 Court
 and,
 upon
 information
 that
 Dr.
 Dawson
 would
 begin
 work
 with
 the
 competitor

Millennium
 on
 December
 19,
 2013,
 filed
 its
 motion
 for
 temporary
 restraining
 order
 and

3

preliminary
 injunction,
 answer
 and
 counterclaim,
 and
 motion
 for
 expedited
 discovery.

 A

temporary
 restraining
 order
 was
 entered
 on
 December
 20,
 2013.

II.
 Preliminary
 injunction

A.
 Statement
 of
 the
 law

“A
 district
 court
 may
 grant
 [preliminary]
 injunctive
 relief
 only
 if
 the
 moving

party
 shows
 that:
 (1)
 it
 has
 a
 substantial
 likelihood
 of
 success
 on
 the
 merits;

(2)
 irreparable
 injury
 will
 be
 suffered
 unless
 the
 injunction
 issues;
 (3)
 the

threatened
 injury
 to
 the
 movant
 outweighs
 whatever
 damage
 the
 proposed

injunction
 may
 cause
 the
 opposing
 party;
 and
 (4)
 if
 issued,
 the
 injunction

would
 not
 be
 adverse
 to
 the
 public
 interest.”
 Siegel
 v.
 LePore,
 234
 F.3d
 1163,

1176
 (11th
 Cir.
 2000)
 (en
 banc);
 accord
 Alabama
 v.
 U.S.
 Army
 Corps
 of
 Eng'rs,

424
 F.3d
 1117,
 1128
 (11th
 Cir.
 2005);
 Schiavo
 ex
 rel.
 Schindler
 v.
 Schiavo,

403
 F.3d
 1223,
 1225–1226
 (11th
 Cir.
 2005)
 (per
 curiam);
 Klay
 v.
 United

Healthgroup,
 Inc.,
 376
 F.3d
 1092,
 1097
 (11th
 Cir.
 2004).

 “A
 preliminary
 injunction
 is
 an
 extraordinary
 and
 drastic
 remedy
 not
 to
 be

granted
 unless
 the
 movant
 clearly
 establishes
 the
 burden
 of
 persuasion
 as
 to

the
 four
 requisites.”
 All
 Care
 Nursing
 Serv.,
 Inc.
 v.
 Bethesda
 Mem'l
 Hosp.,
 Inc.,

887
 F.2d
 1535,
 1537
 (11th
 Cir.1989)
 (quotation
 marks
 omitted).
 Failure
 to

show
 any
 of
 the
 four
 factors
 is
 fatal,
 and
 the
 most
 common
 failure
 is
 not

showing
 a
 substantial
 likelihood
 of
 success
 on
 the
 merits.
 See,
 e.g.,
 Schiavo,

403
 F.3d
 at
 1226
 n.
 2,
 1237;
 Church
 v.
 City
 of
 Huntsville,
 30
 F.3d
 1332,
 1342

(11th
 Cir.
 1994);
 Cunningham
 v.
 Adams,
 808
 F.2d
 815,
 821
 (11th
 Cir.
 1987).

American
 Civil
 Liberties
 Union
 of
 Florida,
 Inc.
 v.
 Miami-­‐Dade
 County
 School
 Bd.,
 557
 F.3d

1177,
 1198
 (11th
 Cir.
 2009)

B.
 Elements

1.
 Substantial
 likelihood
 of
 success
 on
 the
 merits

Ameritox
 asserts
 that
 Dr.
 Dawson’s
 non-­‐compete
 agreement
 prevents
 Dr.
 Dawson

from
 working
 for
 Millennium
 in
 any
 capacity.

 Dr.
 Dawson
 responds
 that
 the
 non-­‐compete

agreement
 is
 void
 under
 Alabama
 law
 for
 two
 reasons:

 1)
 Non-­‐competes
 of
 professionals,

4

like
 Dr.
 Dawson,
 are
 prohibited
 by
 Alabama
 law;
 and
 2)
 Pre-­‐employment
 non-­‐compete

agreements,
 like
 the
 one
 Dr.
 Dawson
 signed,
 are
 void
 under
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1
 Alabama
 Code
 1975.1

The
 Court
 agrees
 that
 the
 non-­‐compete
 agreement
 is
 void
 because
 it
 was
 signed

prior
 to
 his
 employment
 with
 Ameritox.

 In
 Pitney
 Bowes,
 Inc.
 v.
 Berney
 Office
 Solutions,
 823

So.2d
 659
 (Ala.
 2001),
 the
 Court
 stated
 that
 the
 “employee-­‐employer
 exception
 to
 the

voidness
 of
 noncompete
 agreements
 [§
 8-­‐1-­‐1(b)]
 does
 not
 save
 a
 noncompete
 agreement

unless
 the
 employee-­‐employer
 relationship
 exists
 at
 the
 time
 the
 agreement
 is
 executed.”

Id.,
 at
 662
 (italics
 in
 original)
 (citation
 omitted).

Ameritox
 attempts
 to
 avoid
 the
 holding
 of
 Pitney
 Bowes
 with
 two
 arguments.

 At
 the

TRO
 hearing,
 Ameritox
 argued
 that
 Pitney
 Bowes
 was
 distinguishable
 because
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1
 was

only
 applicable
 to
 merger
 situations.

 Ameritox
 has
 provided
 no
 authority
 for
 this

proposition.

 The
 argument
 is
 not
 persuasive
 as
 there
 is
 no
 indication
 from
 the
 plain

language
 of
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1
 that
 it
 was
 meant
 to
 be
 limited
 to
 only
 mergers.

Ameritox
 also
 contends
 that
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1
 does
 not
 apply
 to
 contracts
 which
 only
 partially

restrain
 trade.
 2

 Ameritox
 states
 that
 Dr.
 Dawson’s
 pre-­‐employment
 contract
 is
 only
 a

partial
 restraint
 of
 trade.

 Specifically,
 Ameritox
 argues
 that
 because
 Dr.
 Dawson
 could

work
 in
 other
 capacities
 as
 a
 pharmacist,
 banning
 him
 from
 the
 specialty
 that
 he
 has

1
 Although
 Maryland
 law
 applies
 pursuant
 to
 the
 non-­‐compete
 agreement,
 Ameritox
 does

not
 contest
 that
 the
 agreement
 is
 void
 if
 it
 violates
 public
 policy
 as
 set
 forth
 under
 Alabama

law.

 See
 Ex
 parte
 Howell
 Engineering
 and
 Surveying,
 Inc.,
 981
 So.2d
 413,
 419
 (Ala.
 2006)

(“Section
 8–1–1
 expresses
 the
 public
 policy
 of
 this
 State
 as
 to
 contracts
 restraining

employment.”)
 (citing
 Clark
 Substations,
 L.L.C.
 v.
 Ware,
 838
 So.2d
 360,
 363
 (Ala.2002)).

2

 The
 Court
 notes
 that
 the
 non-­‐compete
 agreement
 in
 Pitney
 Bowes
 was
 less
 a
 restraint
 on

trade
 than
 Dr.
 Dawson’s
 non-­‐compete
 agreement.

 However,
 the
 court
 still
 applied
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1

to
 find
 it
 void.

 823
 So.
 2d
 at
 661.

5

pursued
 over
 the
 last
 two
 years
 (clinical
 drug-­‐testing
 and
 medical
 monitoring)
 only

partially
 restrains
 Dr.
 Dawson’s
 trade.

First,
 it
 is
 not
 likely
 that
 Dr.
 Dawson’s
 non-­‐compete
 agreement,
 which
 prevents
 him

from
 working
 in
 any
 capacity
 with
 Millennium
 anywhere
 in
 the
 United
 State
 or
 Canada,

could
 be
 considered
 a
 partial
 restraint
 of
 trade.

 The
 case
 relied
 upon
 by
 Ameritox
 for
 this

proposition,
 Akzo
 Nobel
 Coatings,
 Inc.
 v.
 Color
 &
 Equipment,
 LLC,
 451
 F.
 Appx.
 823
 (11th
 Cir.

2011),3
 is
 readily
 distinguishable.

 In
 Akzo,
 Martin,
 an
 independent
 contractor
 who
 sold

automobile
 paint,
 had
 signed
 a
 one-­‐year
 non-­‐compete
 with
 Akzo.

 Martin
 terminated
 his

contract
 with
 Akzo
 and
 wanted
 to
 sell
 a
 competitor’s
 paint.

 The
 court,
 relying
 on
 the
 fact

that
 Martin
 was
 allowed
 to
 sell
 Akzo
 paint
 during
 the
 one-­‐year
 non-­‐compete
 period,

determined
 that
 the
 non-­‐compete
 was
 not
 a
 “substantial
 limitation
 upon
 Martin’s

opportunity
 to
 continue
 the
 same
 business
 he
 previously
 pursued.”
 Id.,
 at
 825.

 Thus,
 not

only
 was
 Martin
 not
 an
 employee,
 which
 as
 explained
 below
 subjects
 the
 agreement
 to
 the

restrictions
 of
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1,
 Martin
 was
 allowed
 to
 continue
 his
 same
 business.

However,
 the
 Court
 need
 not
 decide
 whether
 the
 non-­‐compete
 agreement
 is
 a

partial
 restraint
 of
 trade
 because
 such
 a
 determination
 is
 of
 no
 consequence
 to
 the

conclusion.

 Section
 8-­‐1-­‐1
 applies
 to
 an
 employee’s
 non-­‐compete
 agreement
 whether
 that

agreement
 is
 a
 partial
 or
 total
 restraint
 of
 trade.

 In
 fact,
 it
 is
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1
 which
 allows
 for

partial
 restraint
 of
 trade
 agreements
 with
 employees.

3

 Unpublished
 opinions
 are
 not
 considered
 binding
 precedent,
 but
 may
 be
 cited
 as

persuasive
 authority.
 Rule
 36-­‐2
 of
 the
 United
 States
 Court
 of
 Appeal
 for
 the
 Eleventh

Circuit.

6

Ameritox’s
 argument
 to
 the
 contrary
 is
 based
 primarily
 on
 Ex
 parte
 Howell

Engineering
 and
 Surveying,
 Inc.,
 981
 So.
 2d
 413
 (Ala.
 2006).

 In
 Howell,
 the
 Court
 considered

whether
 a
 no-­‐hire
 agreement
 between
 employers
 violated
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1.

 The
 Court
 determined

that
 because
 the
 agreement
 was
 only
 a
 partial
 restraint
 of
 trade,
 it
 was
 “not
 void
 under
 §
 8-­‐
1-­‐1
 even
 [though
 there
 was]
 no
 corollary
 noncompetition
 agreement
 with
 an
 employee….”

Id.,
 at
 422-­‐423.

 The
 Court
 also
 stated
 that
 “to
 the
 extent
 Dyson,
 Defco,
 and
 Sevier,
 conflict

with
 this
 opinion,
 they
 are
 hereby
 overruled.”
 Id.,
 at
 423.

 The
 Howell
 opinion
 was
 based
 on

the
 decision
 in
 Southeast
 Cancer
 Network,
 P.C.
 v.
 DCH
 Healthcare
 Authority,
 869
 So.
 2d
 452

(Ala.2003).4

 A
 review
 of
 the
 cases
 on
 which
 the
 Howell
 Court
 relied
 is
 necessary
 to
 put
 the

issue
 in
 context.

Dyson
 Conveyor
 Maintenance,
 Inc.
 v.
 Young
 &
 Vann
 Supply
 Co.,
 529
 So.2d
 212

(Ala.1988)
 and
 Defco,
 Inc.
 v.
 Decatur
 Cylinder,
 Inc.,
 595
 So.2d
 1329
 (Ala.1992)
 both
 involved

a
 no-­‐hire
 provision
 between
 employers.

 The
 Court
 held
 the
 no-­‐hire
 provisions
 void

because
 there
 was
 no
 underlying
 employer
 -­‐
 employee
 non-­‐compete
 agreement
 that

complied
 with
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1.

 Then,
 in
 Southeast
 Cancer,
 the
 Court
 held
 that
 an
 agreement
 for
 the

exclusive
 practice
 of
 oncology
 at
 DCH
 Hospital
 between
 DCH
 and
 Oncology
 Associates,
 did

not
 restrain
 Southeast
 Cancer,
 or
 its
 employees,
 “in
 a
 manner
 that
 violates
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1,
 Ala.

Code
 1975.”
 Id.,
 at
 458.

The
 difference
 between
 the
 conclusions
 of
 Dyson/Delco
 and
 Southeast
 Cancer
 was

that
 Southeast
 Cancer
 allowed
 the
 agreement,
 which
 was
 determined
 to
 be
 only
 a
 partial

4
 In
 Southeast
 Cancer,
 Oncology
 Associates
 had
 an
 exclusive
 contract
 to
 practice
 oncology
 at

DCH
 Hospital.

 Southeast
 Cancer
 was
 not
 allowed
 to
 practice
 oncology
 at
 the
 hospital.

Southeast
 Cancer
 sued
 the
 hospital
 and
 alleged
 that
 the
 contract
 between
 Oncology

Associates
 and
 DCH
 violated
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1.

7

restraint
 of
 trade,
 without
 consideration
 of
 whether
 there
 was
 an
 underlying
 employer
 –

employee
 non-­‐compete
 agreement
 that
 complied
 with
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1.

 Rather,
 unlike
 Dyson/Delco,

Southeast
 Cancer
 examined
 whether
 the
 exclusivity
 agreement
 itself
 violated
 the
 principles

of
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1.

Previously,
 in
 Sevier
 Insurance
 Agency,
 Inc.
 v.
 Willis
 Corroon
 Corp.
 of
 Birmingham,

711
 So.
 2d
 995
 (Ala.
 1998),
 the
 Court
 considered
 whether
 a
 non-­‐solicitation
 agreement

between
 an
 employer/employee
 was
 valid
 under
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1.

 In
 the
 opinion,
 the
 Court

acknowledged
 a
 conflict
 in
 case
 law
 as
 to
 whether
 non-­‐solicitation
 agreements
 (in
 addition

to
 non-­‐compete
 agreements)
 were
 governed
 by
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1.

 The
 Court
 held
 that
 because
 non-­‐
solicitation
 agreements
 between
 an
 employer/employee
 restrains
 trade,
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1
 applies.

The
 Court
 also
 broadly
 stated
 that,
 “’partial
 restraint
 of
 trade’
 is
 subject
 to
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1,
 but
 will

be
 upheld
 when
 it
 is
 properly
 restricted
 as
 to
 territory,
 time
 and
 persons
 and
 where
 it
 is

supported
 by
 sufficient
 consideration.”
 Id.,
 at
 999.

Thus,
 when
 the
 Howell
 case
 was
 considered
 there
 was
 arguably
 conflicting

precedent
 regarding
 when
 a
 contract
 that
 partially
 restrains
 trade
 implicates
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1.

Dyson/Defco
 prohibited
 any
 type
 of
 contract
 that
 partially
 restrained
 trade
 unless
 the

employee/individual
 affected
 had
 signed
 a
 non-­‐compete
 that
 complied
 with
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1.

Southeast
 Cancer
 allowed
 a
 contract
 that
 partially
 restrained
 trade,
 and
 indicated
 that
 §
 8-­‐
1-­‐1
 was
 not
 implicated
 because
 “DCH
 and
 Oncology
 Associates'
 agreement
 does
 not
 on
 its

face
 prohibit
 Southeast's
 physicians—who
 are
 not
 parties
 to
 the
 agreement—from

practicing
 oncology”.

 Southeast
 Cancer,
 869
 So.
 2d
 at
 457.

 Sevier,
 which
 did
 not
 otherwise

discuss
 partial
 restraint
 of
 trade
 contracts
 outside
 the
 employer-­‐employee
 context,

seemingly
 held
 that
 all
 partial
 restraint
 of
 trade
 contracts
 were
 subject
 to
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1.

8

As
 previously
 stated,
 Howell
 overruled
 Dyson,
 Defco,
 and
 Sevier
 to
 the
 extent
 they

were
 inconsistent
 with
 Howell.

 Thus,
 the
 context
 of
 Howell
 is
 crucial
 to
 understand
 what

was
 overruled.

 Howell
 involved
 a
 no-­‐hire
 agreement
 between
 employers,
 not
 an

agreement
 between
 an
 employee/employer.

 Howell
 made
 clear
 that
 no-­‐hire
 agreements

between
 employers
 did
 not
 run
 afoul
 of
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1.

 Howell
 did
 not
 address
 partial
 restraint
 in

the
 context
 of
 employee-­‐employer
 agreements.

 Thus,
 the
 Court
 is
 not
 convinced
 that

Howell
 counsels
 that
 employee
 non-­‐compete
 agreements,
 that
 only
 partially
 restrain
 trade,

are
 exempt
 from
 the
 restrictions
 of
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1.

As
 stated
 in
 Sevier,
 “[i]t
 would
 make
 no
 sense
 for
 the
 Legislature
 to
 draft
 an

exception
 …
 but
 not
 intend
 for
 either
 the
 statute
 or
 the
 exception
 to
 apply….”
 711
 So.
 2d
 at

1000.

 Section
 8-­‐1-­‐1
 clearly
 applies
 to
 non-­‐compete
 agreements
 between
 employers-­‐
employees
 and
 provides
 for
 an
 exception
 to
 their
 voidness
 if
 the
 non-­‐compete
 agreement

only
 restrains
 trade
 within
 a
 certain
 territory,
 i.e.,
 partially.

 The
 extent
 of
 restraint
 of
 trade

allowed
 is
 defined
 by
 the
 exception;
 employees
 may
 agree
 to
 not
 engage
 in
 similar
 business

or
 solicit
 old
 customers
 within
 a
 specified
 county,
 city
 or
 part
 thereof.

 Thus,
 it
 is

nonsensical
 to
 say
 that
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1
 does
 not
 apply
 to
 employee
 non-­‐compete
 agreements
 that

only
 partially
 restrain
 trade.

Thus,
 because
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1
 is
 applicable
 to
 Dr.
 Dawson’s
 non-­‐compete
 agreement,
 it
 must

be
 determined
 whether
 Dr.
 Dawson’s
 non-­‐compete
 violates
 §
 8-­‐1-­‐1.

 As
 previously
 stated,

Pitney
 Bowes
 answers
 this
 question.

 Non-­‐compete
 agreements
 are
 valid
 only
 if
 signed
 by

an
 employee.

 Prospective
 employment
 is
 not
 sufficient
 because
 a
 person
 that
 has
 been

offered
 employment
 to
 begin
 in
 the
 future
 does
 not
 have
 an
 employer-­‐employee

9

relationship.

 Pitney
 Bowes,
 823
 So.
 2d
 at
 662
 (“Absent
 the
 employee-­‐employer
 relationship

when
 the
 agreement
 is
 executed,
 the
 agreement
 is
 void.”)
 (citation
 omitted).

Accordingly,
 as
 to
 the
 enforceability
 of
 the
 non-­‐compete
 agreement
 between

Ameritox
 and
 Dr.
 Dawson,
 the
 Court
 finds
 that
 Ameritox
 does
 not
 have
 a
 substantial

likelihood
 of
 succeeding
 on
 this
 breach
 of
 contract
 claim.

 Therefore,
 the
 Court
 finds
 that

the
 Temporary
 Restraining
 Order
 should
 be
 terminated
 to
 the
 extent
 it
 prohibits
 Dr.

Dawson
 from
 performing
 any
 services
 for
 any
 competitor
 of
 Ameritox,
 including

Millennium
 Laboratories,
 Inc.

2.
 Remaining
 elements

Since
 Ameritox
 has
 failed
 to
 meet
 its
 burden
 as
 to
 the
 first
 of
 the
 four
 prerequisites

for
 entry
 of
 a
 preliminary
 injunction,
 the
 Court
 need
 not
 address
 the
 remaining
 three.

C.

 Confidentiality
 provisions

The
 parties
 do
 not
 dispute
 that
 Dr.
 Dawson
 is
 subject
 to
 the
 confidentiality

provisions
 of
 the
 employment
 agreement
 and
 that
 a
 preliminary
 injunction
 is
 appropriate

as
 to
 those
 provisions.

 Therefore,
 it
 is
 ORDERED,
 ADJUDGED
 and
 DECREED
 as
 follows:

1.
 Dr.
 Dawson
 is
 enjoined
 from
 using
 or
 disclosing
 any
 of
 Ameritox’s
 proprietary

and/or
 confidential
 business
 information.

2.
 Dr.
 Dawson
 is
 directed
 to
 immediately
 return
 to
 Ameritox
 all
 Company

documents
 and
 information,
 with
 the
 exception
 of
 documents
 and
 information
 pertaining

to
 his
 personal
 compensation.

3.
 Dr.
 Dawson
 is
 enjoined
 from
 deleting,
 destroying,
 erasing,
 modifying,
 or

otherwise
 altering
 any
 and
 all
 electronic
 media,
 including,
 but
 not
 limited
 to,
 work
 and

personal
 e-­‐mail
 accounts,
 external
 hard
 drives,
 thumb
 drives,
 or
 other
 portable
 media,

10

Dropbox
 accounts,
 network
 drives,
 computers,
 cellular
 phones,
 smart
 phones,
 and
 personal

digital
 assistants,
 that
 have
 stored
 Ameritox’s
 documents
 or
 information,
 or
 were
 used
 to

transfer
 or
 temporarily
 store
 Ameritox’s
 documents,
 data,
 or
 information,
 or
 that
 referred

or
 related
 to
 Ameritox,
 Ameritox’s
 business,
 Ameritox’s
 employees
 or
 existing
 or

prospective
 customers,
 or
 work
 completed
 to
 date,
 until
 such
 time
 that
 this
 Court
 gives
 him

leave
 to
 so
 do.

4.

 Dr.
 Dawson
 is
 directed
 to
 preserve
 all
 documents,
 data,
 and
 information

pertaining
 to
 the
 offer
 of
 employment
 extended
 to
 him
 by
 Millennium,
 communications

between
 Dr.
 Dawson
 and
 Millennium
 and/or
 with
 other
 individuals
 regarding
 his

prospective
 employment
 and
 employment
 with
 Millennium,
 and
 communications
 between

Dr.
 Dawson
 and
 Millennium
 and/or
 with
 other
 individuals
 regarding
 their
 knowledge
 of

and/or
 access
 to
 Ameritox’s
 confidential
 business
 or
 proprietary
 information.

DONE
 this
 the
 6th
 day
 of
 January
 2014.

s/
 Kristi
 K.
 DuBose

KRISTI
 K.
 DuBOSE

UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 JUDGE

11