Skinner Pile Driving, Inc. v. Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 20 Motion to Intervene; motion is granted as to its request for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) and denied as to its request for intervention of right under Rule 24(a). Natures Way shall file and serve its complaint of intervention by 4/7/15. Signed by Magistrate Judge Katherine P. Nelson on 3/31/2015. (srr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SKINNNER PILE DRIVING, INC.,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00329-N
This action is before the Court on the Motion for Leave to Intervene (Doc. 20)
filed by Natures Way Marine, LLC (“Natures Way”) pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24. Though given the opportunity (see Doc. 21), no party has filed
opposition to the motion. With the consent of the parties (Doc. 4), this action has
been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings in
this action, including trial; to order entry of final judgment; and to conduct all postjudgment proceedings, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 73. (See Doc. 5).
This action involves an insurance coverage dispute arising from an incident
in which a Linkbelt Crane attached to a barge was damaged while the crane and
barge were in the custody and control of Plaintiff Skinner Pile Driving, Inc.
(“Skinner”). Skinner sought coverage for the damage to the crane under its policy of
insurance with Defendant Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company (“Atlantic”). After
Atlantic denied the claim, Skinner filed the present action against Atlantic, alleging
breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, and bad faith. Atlantic filed a
counterclaim for declaratory judgment as to the rights, remedies, obligations, and
liabilities of Skinner and Atlantic under the subject insurance policy, claiming that
it owes no coverage for damage to the crane due to certain exclusions in the
insurance policy. (See Doc. 1-1; Doc. 2; Doc. 15 at 2-3).
In its motion to intervene (Doc. 20), Natures Way asserts that it is the owner
of the damaged crane and barge, which it had chartered to Skinner for use in a
project in Florida, during which the damage allegedly occurred. Natures Way has
demanded that Skinner pay for the damages to the crane, but Skinner has refused,
citing an inability to pay “and/or” its intention to seek coverage for the damage
under its insurance policy with Atlantic. In its proposed Complaint in Intervention
(Doc. 20-1), Natures Way asserts only a breach of contract claim against Skinner,
alleging that “Skinner breached its duties under the Charter Agreement by (a)
failing and refusing to pay monies due for the hire of the Barge and Crane, and b)
failing and refusing to pay monies due for the damage to the Crane.” Natures Way
demands $60,000 for “unpaid charter hire” and $30,715 for the cost of repairs to the
crane. Natures Way asserts no claim against Atlantic. Natures Way argues that it
is entitled to both intervention of right under Rule 24(a) and permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b).
Intervention of Right under Rule 24(a)
Rule 24(a)(2) provides that, “[o]n timely motion, the court must permit
anyone to intervene who claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may
as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest,
unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”1 “Rule 24(a)(2) requires
a third party moving for intervention of right show: ‘(1) his application to
intervene is timely; (2) he has an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action; (3) he is so situated that disposition of the action,
as a practical matter, may impede or impair his ability to protect that interest; and
(4) his interest is represented inadequately by the existing parties to the suit.’ ”
Huff v. Comm'r of IRS, 743 F.3d 790, 795-96 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fox v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 519 F.3d 1298, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chiles v. Thornburgh,
865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989))) (internal citation omitted). “Intervention of
right is only available if the interest asserted is ‘direct, substantial, [and] legally
protectable.’ In other words, ‘the intervenor must be at least a real party in interest
in the transaction which is the subject of the proceeding.’ ” Id. at 796 (quoting
Athens Lumber Co., Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir.
1982) (citations omitted)).2
“In deciding whether a party has a protectable
Natures Way does not argue that it has “an unconditional right to intervene by a federal
statute[,]” nor is the undersigned aware of any such right. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1).
See also In re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233, 1246 (11th Cir. 2006):
[B]oth Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b) require the prospective intervenor to anchor its
request in the dispute giving rise to the pending lawsuit. The prospective
intervenor must demonstrate “an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action” if relying on Rule 24(a), or it must show that its
“claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common”
if relying on Rule 24(b). In either case, the plain language of Rule 24 requires the
intervenor's interest to be based on the action pending before the court. See Mt.
Hawley Ins. Co. v. Sandy Lake Props., Inc., 425 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 2005)
interest,…courts must be ‘flexible’ and must ‘focus[ ] on the particular facts and
circumstances’ of the case.” Id. (quoting Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1214).
The Court finds that Natures Way has not shown entitlement to intervene of
right because it has not demonstrated a direct, substantial, and legally protectable
interest “in the transaction which is the subject of this action” – the insurance policy
between Skinner and Atlantic. Natures Way, noting that “[t]he issue of how the
damage occurred – which is a threshold question to whether or not insurance
coverage exists – will be decided in this lawsuit[,]” argues that “[c]ertainly, the
owner of property has a sufficiently protectable interest in participating in such
determination.” (Doc. 20 at 4). In support of this proposition, Natures Way cites
Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1970),3 in which the former
Fifth Circuit held: “We do not believe…that the interest[ in the subject of the action]
has to be of a legal nature identical to that of the claims asserted in the main
action…All that is required by the terms of [Rule 24(a)(2)] is an interest in the
property or other rights that are at issue, provided the other elements of
intervention are present.” 427 F.2d at 1124.
(per curiam) (upholding district court's denial of a motion for permissive
intervention because the purpose of intervention was unrelated to the issues
presented by the underlying suit); S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 803
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Rule 24(a) requires a relationship between the
intervenor's legally protectable interest in the suit and the plaintiff's claims, and
that such a relationship exists “if the resolution of the plaintiff's claims actually
will affect the applicant”).
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Circuit
adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to
close of business on September 30, 1981.
Diaz, however, is distinguishable. In Diaz, the United States government
“intervened…because it wanted to assert a lien (unrelated to the underlying issues)
on a fund before the court.” Id. In finding that the government properly intervened
of right under Rule 24(a)(2), the court stated: “[T]he Government in this case is
asserting a tax lien, clearly a legally cognizable interest in property, which it seeks
to attach to a res that is before the court.
Interests in property are the most
elementary type of right that Rule 24(a) is designed to protect…We hold that the
Government is asserting an interest in the property that is the subject of the suit
within the meaning of Rule 24(a).” Id.
Natures Way has asserted no “legally cognizable interest” similar to the
government’s tax lien in Diaz (e.g., a judgment against Skinner for damages to the
Indeed, in upholding the government’s intervention in Diaz, the court
rejected application of cases cited by the appellants because they were “cases in
which intervention was denied because the interest was speculative or had no
legally protectable nature.” Id. at 1124 & n.2.
As to this line of reasoning, the
Court finds Mt. Hawley Insurance Co. v. Sandy Lake Properties, Inc., 425 F.3d 1308,
1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), to be on point.
There, an insurer, Mt. Hawley, filed a declaratory judgment action against
two insured property owners, claiming that it had no duty to defend or indemnify
the insureds under the subject policy for a drowning death occurring on the
insureds’ property. See Mt. Hawley Ins., 425 F.3d at 1309-10. After the property
owners failed to respond to the declaratory judgment action and the insurer had
moved for default judgment, Andre Rigaud, the personal representative for the
decedent, who prior to the declaratory judgment action had filed a wrongful death
action against the insureds, filed a motion to intervene in the declaratory judgment
action under both Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b), attempting to argue that Mt. Hawley
should not be able to deny coverage. See id. The Eleventh Circuit, affirming the
district court’s denial of the motion to intervene of right, rejected the personal
representative’s argument that he had “a direct, substantial, and legally protectable
interest in the subject matter of the declaratory action because if Mt. Hawley owes
neither a defense nor coverage to [the insureds], then Rigaud ‘will not have [a] pool
or fund from which to recover his damages.’ ” Id. at 1311. In so doing, the Eleventh
This Court has held that a legally protectable interest “is something more
than an economic interest.” United States v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.,
922 F.2d 704, 710 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“What is required is that the interest be one which the substantive law
recognizes as belonging to or being owned by the applicant.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Thus, a legally protectable interest is an
interest that derives from a legal right.
In this case, Rigaud's interest in the subject matter of the declaratory
action is purely economic. Rigaud is not a party to the Mt. Hawley
insurance policy and has no legally protectable interest in that insurance
policy. Rigaud fails to cite any legally protectable interest and states only
that there will be less money available from which he can recover his
wrongful death damages if Mt. Hawley is released from defending and
providing coverage to Muria International and Sandy Lake Properties.
Further, Rigaud's interest is purely speculative because it is contingent
upon his prevailing against Muria International and Sandy Lake
Properties in the wrongful death action.
Id. (footnote omitted).4 Accord Canal Indem. Co. v. Dueitt, Civil Action No. 10-0526WS-B, 2011 WL 335166, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 31, 2011) (Steele, C.J.) (“An injured
party has no legally protected interest in an insurance policy to which it is not a
party; its economic interest in having proceeds from a tortfeasor's insurance policy
available to satisfy any judgment does not satisfy this standard.” (citing Mt. Hawley
Ins., 425 F.3d at 1311))
In reaching this holding, the Mt. Hawley court noted:
Although there is no case directly on point from this Court, several district courts
from our circuit have addressed whether an interest contingent upon the
outcome of other pending litigation is a legally protectable interest, and relying
on this Court's decision in South Florida Water Management, those district
courts have decided the issue the same way we do today.
For example, in Ace American Insurance Co. v. Paradise Divers, Inc., 216 F.R.D.
537, 538 (S.D. Fla. 2003), the dispute between the insurer and Paradise Divers
was whether the insurance policy provided coverage to Paradise Divers for
liability arising out of work-related injuries sustained by employee Kevin Upmal.
The district court, relying on South Florida Water Management, determined that
Upmal's interests were both speculative and purely economic. Specifically, the
district court stated: “Here, Upmal's interests, while certainly not unimportant,
are affected only speculatively, and at that only economically, by the present
action. Upmal's possessing a stake in this action is contingent on first obtaining
a judgment against Paradise Divers and not based on a legally protected
ground.” Id. at 539; see also HealthSouth Corp. Ins. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 688, 692
(N.D. Ala. 2004) (“Here, Movants' interest in securing a pool of insurance money
to draw upon is not only purely economic, but also theoretical, considering no
judgments have been obtained against the insureds.”); Midwest Employers Cas.
Co. v. East Ala. Health Care, 170 F.R.D. 195, 198 (M.D. Ala.1996) (recognizing
movant's interest in insurance proceeds and in the outcome of the declaratory
action, but stating that the interest “does not rise to the level of a significant
interest”). But see TIG Speciality Ins. Co. v. Financial Web.com, Inc., 208 F.R.D.
336, 338 (M.D. Fla.2002) (“[I]f this Court declares that the insurance policy is
void in the present suit, a significant source of recovery for the intervenors would
become extinct; therefore, the Court finds that the intervenors have a direct,
significant legal interest in the insurance policy.”).
425 F.3d at 1311 n.6.
Here, it is the insured, Skinner, who initiated this action, claiming breach of
an insurance contract and related torts against its insurer, Atlantic, who
counterclaimed for declaratory judgment. Nevertheless, in essence this action, like
Mt. Hawley, “involve[s] an insurance coverage dispute.” Id. at 1310.
would-be intervenor in Mt. Hawley, Natures Way has not claimed it is a party to the
Atlantic insurance policy and has not claimed a legally protectable interest in that
policy (e.g., additional named insured; third-party beneficiary status).
Natures Way’s interest in the subject matter of this action is “purely economic” –
that is, there may be “less money available from which [it] can recover” on its claims
against Skinner for breach of the charter agreement and the damage to the crane.5
Moreover, Natures Way’s interest in the outcome of this action is “purely
speculative,” as it is “contingent upon [its] prevailing against” Skinner on its own
breach of contract and/or property damage claims.
Indeed, Natures Way’s
Complaint in Intervention appears to seek to use this action as a vehicle to litigate
those very issues, which are based on a contract entirely separate from and
independent of the insurance policy currently at issue.6
Natures Way acknowledges as much, claiming it has shown “a ‘vital interest’ in the
outcome of the instant matter[ because] Skinner has already indicated an inability to pay
for damages to the crane absent insurance coverage.” (Doc. 20 at 5).
Natures Way has also cited Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Crider, 58
F.R.D. 15 (N.D. Ill. 1973), in which the district court, relying generally on Diaz, inter alia,
found that an intervenor had a “clearly apparent” interest in an action justifying
intervention of right in an insurance declaratory judgment action because the action would
“determine whether [the] insurance policy extends to cover [the intervenor]’s claim against
[the insured].” Crider, however, is not controlling authority and appears inconsistent with
the reasoning of Mt. Hawley, which is controlling authority.
In reaching its determination, Crider also cited, generally, to Martin v. Travelers
Indemnity Co., 450 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1971). In Martin, the former Fifth Circuit held that a
Because Natures Way has not demonstrated it has an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of this action, Huff, 743 F.3d at 795, the
Court need not decide whether the other factors for intervention of right are
satisfied, and Natures Way’s motion to intervene (Doc. 20) is due to be DENIED as
to its request for intervention of right under Rule 24(a).
Permissive Intervention under Rule 24(b)
Under Rule 24(b)(1)(B), “[o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone to
intervene who has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common
question of law or fact.”7 “In exercising this discretion, the court must consider
whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). See also Mt. Hawley Ins., 425 F.3d
at 1312 (“ ‘Permissive intervention under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24(b) is appropriate
where a party's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact
in common and the intervention will not unduly prejudice or delay the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties.’ ” (quoting Georgia v. United States Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 302 F.3d 1242, 1250 (11th Cir. 2002))). “[W]hen the grounds for denying
coverage are irrelevant to the issues in the underlying action, there is no common
question of law or fact…” Reed v. Barnett, Civil Action No. 09-0200-WS-N, 2010 WL
driver claiming insured status under a vehicle owner’s liability insurance policy was
properly allowed to intervene in the injured parties’ suit against owner's insurer. Here,
Natures Way’s Complaint in Intervention asserts no claim based on the subject insurance
policy, instead attempting to enforce an entirely separate contract between it and Skinner.
Natures Way does not argue that it has “a conditional right to intervene by a federal
statute[,]” nor is the Court aware of any such right. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(A).
5239249, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 15, 2010) (Steele, C.J.) (citing generally Mt. Hawley
In Mt. Hawley, the insurer’s declaratory judgment action asserted that the
insureds’ “refusal to notify Mt. Hawley of the wrongful death action and refusal to
cooperate in their defense against the wrongful death action had so prejudiced Mt.
Hawley that coverage under the Mt. Hawley policy had been waived.” 425 F.3d at
The would-be intervenor, the personal representative of the decedent,
“argued that, contrary to Mt. Hawley's assertions, [the insureds] were cooperating
in the defense of the wrongful death suit” and “that Rigaud's counsel had notified
Mt. Hawley of the wrongful death suit, and thus, Mt. Hawley could not be
prejudiced by lack of notice.” Id.
In affirming the district court’s denial of permissive intervention, the
Eleventh Circuit stated:
The lack of cooperation that Mt. Hawley asserts in the declaratory
judgment action is irrelevant to the issue of fault in the wrongful death
action. Specifically, the primary issue in the declaratory judgment action
is whether Mt. Hawley owes insurance coverage to Muria International
and Sandy Lake Properties under the insurance agreement. The issue of
insurance coverage is unrelated to the issue of fault in the wrongful death
action. Further, we do not see how Rigaud's intervention will help resolve
the issue of whether Muria International and Sandy Lake Properties are
entitled to insurance coverage pursuant to a policy with Mt. Hawley.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rigaud's
motion for permissive intervention.
Id. at 1312.
In its declaratory judgment counterclaim, Atlantic cites the following policy
exclusions as grounds for denying coverage to Skinner:
III. Exclusions from Coverage
This insurance does not apply to loss, damage, liability, or expense
directly or indirectly caused by, or contributed to or resulting from:
A. Wear and tear, gradual deterioration, rust, corrosion, dampness
of atmosphere, freezing or extremes of temperature;
B. An original defect in the property;
C. Mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure…
(Doc. 2 at 7-8). In a letter to Skinner denying coverage (which Skinner has attached
to its Complaint), Atlantic, citing to this provision of the policy, stated: “This policy
provides coverage for fortuitous or accidental damages to the leased crane but
excludes damages resulting from mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure.”
(Doc. 1-1 at 8). In the report of the parties’ planning meeting under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(f), Atlantic asserts that “[t]he crane was in poor repair prior to
the loss resulting in the alleged damage.” (Doc. 15 at 3).
For its part, Skinner asserts that the crane was damaged when one of its
employees “accidentally failed to secure the boom before exiting the crane,”
resulting in “the boom collaps[ing] and sustaining damage.” (Doc. 1-1 at 3-4). “In
other words,” according to Skinner, “the fall was not due to a mechanical error, but
by an event that would be covered under the policy in question.” (Doc. 15 at 2).
Natures Way’s charter agreement with Skinner provides: “Throughout the
Charter Period, Charterer shall, at its sole cost and expense, maintain the Barges in
accordance with good commercial marine maintenance practices and shall maintain
and preserve the Barges, in as good condition, working order and repair as when
first delivered to Charterer for service hereunder, ordinary wear and tear (as
defined in Section 14) only excepted.”
(Doc. 20-1 at 15).
Section 14 of the
agreement defines “ordinary wear and tear” as “the wear and tear which would
normally be expected to occur during the careful, proper and prudent use of the
Barges over the period of time involved, assuming proper maintenance and
compliance with the other terms of this Charter.” (Id. at 17).
It appears, then, that the cause of the damage to the crane is a question of
fact common to both whether Skinner must pay Natures Way for the damage under
the charter agreement and whether Atlantic owes coverage for the damage under
its policy with Skinner.
Thus, Natures Way has sufficiently carried its burden
under Rule 24(b)(1)(B) in showing that its claim in intervention against Skinner
shares with a common question of fact with the main action. Compare Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Bastianelli, 250 F.R.D. 82, 85-86 (D. Mass. 2008) (“Given the present
posture of this litigation, the Intervenors have an interest in establishing under
whose direction the truck was being driven at the time of the accident. This fact will
affect liability in the state court action as well as the availability of insurance
coverage… [T]his court finds that the Intervenors have satisfied the requirements of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) and have shown that their participation as defendants in this
action will promote the full development of the underlying factual issues as well as
the just and equitable adjudication of the pending coverage dispute.”) with Canal
Indem., 2011 WL 335166, at *3 (“Whether the individual was Buena Vista's
employee or an independent contractor certainly affects Buena Vista's liability to
Roberta, but Livingston has not attempted to show that his status is a question
relevant to whether Livingston is liable to Roberta or to whether Buena Vista owes
On this record, the Court must conclude that the
independent contractor issue is irrelevant to Livingston's claim or defense and thus
inadequate as a matter of law to support permissive intervention.” (footnote
A motion to intervene, whether under Rule 24(a) or Rule 24(b), must be
“timely.” As to this issue, the Eleventh Circuit has held:
In determining whether a motion to intervene was timely, we consider (1)
the length of time during which the proposed intervenor knew or
reasonably should have known of the interest in the case before moving to
intervene; (2) the extent of prejudice to the existing parties as a result of
the proposed intervenor's failure to move for intervention as soon as it
knew or reasonably should have known of its interest; (3) the extent of
prejudice to the proposed intervenor if the motion is denied; and (4) the
existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a
determination that their motion was timely. Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213.
However, we must also keep in mind that “[t]imeliness is not a word of
exactitude or of precisely measurable dimensions. The requirement of
timeliness must have accommodating flexibility toward both the court and
the litigants if it is to be successfully employed to regulate intervention in
the interest of justice.” Id. (quoting McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d
1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970)).
Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d at 1259. Rule 24(b) also requires
that a court “consider whether [permissive] intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).
Neither of the original parties have opposed Natures Way’s motion, and
considering the record, the Court finds no reason to believe that permissive
intervention will cause undue delay or prejudice to the original parties, or that the
motion is untimely. Cf. Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d at 1259-60
(“Georgia contends that SeFPC's motion is untimely because SeFPC knew of the
litigation and had copies of the papers in the case since February 2001, and did not
move to intervene until August 2001, after discovery was largely complete and the
parties had agreed upon a schedule for the briefing of the case. We do not believe
that a delay of six months in itself constitutes untimeliness. See [Chiles, 865 F.2d at
1213] (finding motion timely when filed seven months after the case was filed).
Although in Chiles we observed discovery had not yet begun, in this case SeFPC's
intervention did not delay the proceedings and the court had yet to take significant
action. Therefore, we do not believe that the existing parties will be prejudiced by
SeFPC's intervention, and SeFPC would be prejudiced if its motion is denied. See id.
Accordingly, we find that its motion to intervene was timely.”).8
Accordingly, the Court finds that Natures Way’s motion to intervene (Doc. 20)
is due to be GRANTED as to its request for permissive intervention under Rule
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that Natures
Way’s Motion for Leave to Intervene (Doc. 20) is GRANTED as to its request for
Natures Way’s Complaint in Intervention also appears to allege an independent basis for
subject matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, in that it asserts claims for breach of a maritime
charter agreement. See Sea Lane Bahamas Ltd. v. Europa Cruises Corp., 188 F.3d 1317,
1320 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Sea Lane's allegations of defendants' breaches of the charter
agreement compose the gravamen of the complaint. The complaint therefore falls within
the district court's admiralty jurisdiction. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731,
735, 81 S. Ct. 886, 890, 6 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1961) (‘Without doubt a contract for hire either of a
ship or of the sailors and officers to man her is within the admiralty jurisdiction.’); Jack
Neilson, Inc. v. Tug Peggy, 428 F.2d 54, 55 (5th Cir. 1970) (‘[T]he charter provisions of the
contract are maritime in nature ... and within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district
court.’).” (footnote omitted)).
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) and DENIED as to its request for
intervention of right under Rule 24(a).
Natures Way shall file and serve its
Complaint in Intervention no later than Tuesday, April 7, 2015.
DONE and ORDERED this the 31st day of March 2015.
/s/ Katherine P. Nelson
KATHERINE P. NELSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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