Harbor Communications, LLC et al v. Southern Light, LLC et al

Filing 28

ORDER granting 10 Motion to Remand. This action is hereby REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Baldwin County, Alabama. Signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr on 2/2/2015. copies to parties. (sdb)

IN
 THE
 UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 COURT
 FOR
 THE

SOUTHERN
 DISTRICT
 OF
 ALABAMA

SOUTHERN
 DIVISION

HARBOR

COMMUNICATIONS,
 LLC

BOIHEM
 INVESTMENT

COMPANY,
 LLC,
 and
 J
 &
 L,

LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SOUTHERN
 LIGHT,
 LLC,

ANDREW
 M.
 NEWTON
 and

EDWARD
 W.
 FORBESS,

Defendants,

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CIVIL
 ACTION
 NO.

14-­‐00403-­‐CB-­‐B

 ORDER

This
 matter
 is
 before
 the
 Court
 on
 Plaintiffs’
 motion
 to
 remand
 this
 action
 to

state
 court.

 After
 due
 consideration
 of
 the
 motion
 (Doc.
 10),
 Defendants
 response

(Doc.
 18)
 and
 Plaintiffs’
 reply
 (Doc.
 19),
 the
 Court
 finds
 that
 remand
 is
 required

because
 removal
 was
 untimely.

Background

This
 action
 was
 filed
 in
 the
 Circuit
 Court
 of
 Baldwin
 County,
 Alabama
 on

March
 29,
 2013
 by
 Plaintiffs
 Harbor
 Communications,
 LLC,
 (Harbor),
 Boihem

Investment
 Company,
 LLC
 and
 J
 &
 L,
 LLC.

 The
 complaint
 alleged
 only
 state
 law

causes
 of
 action
 against
 Defendants
 Southern
 Light,
 LLC,
 Andrew
 M.
 Newton
 and

Edward
 W.
 Forbess,
 arising
 from
 the
 alleged
 unauthorized
 conveyance
 of
 Harbor’s

facilities
 and
 equipment
 to
 Southern
 Light.1

 According
 to
 the
 Complaint,
 the

1
 All
 of
 the
 parties
 are
 Alabama
 citizens.

ultimate
 result
 of
 this
 wrongful
 conveyance
 was
 that
 Southern
 Light
 charged
 Harbor

approximately
 $700,000
 per
 year
 to
 use
 equipment
 that
 Harbor
 rightfully
 owned.

After
 the
 state
 court
 litigation
 was
 commenced,
 Southern
 light
 began
 refusing

to
 allow
 Harbor’s
 new
 customers
 to
 interconnect
 to
 Southern
 Lights
 fiber
 optic
 lines

and
 facilities.

 On
 June
 24,
 2014,
 Plaintiffs
 filed
 a
 Motion
 for
 Temporary
 Restraining

Order
 (TRO)
 and
 Preliminary
 Injunction
 in
 the
 state
 court
 action
 requesting
 an

order
 “prohibiting
 Southern
 Light
 from
 refusing
 interconnection
 requests
 from

Harbor
 and/or
 allowing
 Harbor
 the
 type
 of
 access
 to
 its
 equipment
 that
 would
 allow

Harbor
 to
 interconnect
 through
 an
 alternate
 network
 service
 provider.”

 (Pls.’
 Br.,
 Ex

2,
 Doc.
 1-­‐1,
 p.
 49.)

In
 its
 brief
 in
 support
 of
 the
 motion,
 Harbor
 argued
 that
 it
 met
 the

requirements
 for
 obtaining
 preliminary
 injunctive
 relief
 under
 state
 law.

 Among

those
 requirements
 was
 the
 proof
 that
 the
 movant
 “’has
 at
 least
 a
 reasonable
 chance

of
 success
 on
 the
 ultimate
 merits
 of
 his
 case.’”

 (Id.
 Ex.
 3
 )(quoting
 Holiday
 Isle,
 LLC
 v.

Adkins,
 12
 So.
 3d
 1173,
 1176
 (Ala.
 2008)).

 Because
 the
 basis
 of
 Plaintiffs’
 success-­‐
on-­‐the-­‐merits
 arguments
 is
 key
 to
 the
 removal
 issue,
 it
 is
 quoted
 verbatim:

First,
 federal
 statutes
 and
 their
 supporting
 regulations
 clearly

demonstrate
 that
 Southern
 Light
 has
 a
 duty
 to
 interconnect
 with

Harbor.

 The
 controlling
 statutory
 authority
 is
 the

Telecommunications
 Act
 of
 1996.

 The
 Act
 states
 that
 “Each

telecommunications
 carrier
 has
 the
 duty…to
 interconnect
 directly
 or

indirectly
 with
 the
 facilities
 or
 equipment
 of
 other

telecommunications
 carriers.”

 47
 U.S.C.
 §
 251(a).

 The
 regulations

implementing
 that
 federal
 statute
 are
 equally
 clear
 on
 this
 duty.

 The

regulations
 define
 a
 “Telecommunications
 Carrier”
 as
 “any
 provider
 of

telecommunications
 services.”

 47
 C.F.R.
 §
 515.

 The
 regulations
 echo

the
 statutory
 text
 by
 stating,
 “Each
 telecommunications
 carrier
 has

the
 duty…to
 interconnect
 directly
 or
 indirectly
 with
 the
 facilities
 and

equipment
 of
 other
 telecommunications
 carriers.”

 Id.
 at
 §
 51.100.

 As

a
 “Telecommunications
 carrier,”
 Southern
 Light
 has
 an
 unambiguous

2

duty
 to
 interconnect
 with
 Harbor,
 just
 as
 AT&T
 has
 a
 duty
 to

interconnect
 with
 Harbor
 and
 Southern
 Light.

Second,
 Southern
 Light
 has
 repudiated
 its
 agreement
 with

Boihem
 that
 it
 would
 accept
 new
 orders
 from
 Harbor
 in
 exchange
 for

its
 infrastructure’s
 presence
 on
 Boihem’s
 tower
 sites.

Third,
 Southern
 Light
 has
 taken
 the
 position
 in
 this
 litigation

that
 the
 MSA
 is
 valid
 and
 enforceable.

 Southern
 Light
 should
 not
 be

permitted
 to
 take
 this
 position,
 yet
 simultaneously
 deny
 Harbor
 the

basic
 service
 connections
 inherent
 in
 that
 agreement.

 Southern
 Light

has
 stated
 that
 it
 will
 not
 connect
 Harbor
 “as
 long
 as
 there’s
 pending

litigation.”

 Because
 the
 MSA
 obligates
 Southern
 Light
 to
 interconnect

with
 Harbor,
 Southern
 Light
 will
 carry
 a
 duty
 of
 interconnection
 even

if
 it
 prevails
 in
 the
 underlying
 lawsuit
 and
 proves
 that
 the
 MSA
 is
 valid

and
 enforceable.

(Id.)

In
 their
 August
 25,
 2014
 response
 to
 Plaintiffs’
 motion,
 Defendants

addressed
 Plaintiffs’
 first
 success-­‐on-­‐the-­‐merits
 argument
 under
 the
 heading

“Southern
 Light
 has
 no
 statutory
 duty
 to
 provide
 service
 to
 Harbor
 [under
 47
 U.S.C.

§
 251(a)].”
 (Id.)

 On
 the
 same
 day,
 Plaintiffs
 filed
 an
 amended
 motion
 for
 TRO
 and

preliminary
 injunction
 “to
 request
 that
 the
 Court
 award,
 in
 addition
 to
 all
 other

relief
 to
 which
 Plaintiff
 is
 entitled,
 a
 reasonable
 attorney’s
 fee
 and
 costs
 of
 litigation

pursuant
 to
 47
 U.S.C.
 §
 207.”

 (Id.
 Ex.
 4.)

 A
 hearing
 was
 held
 on
 August
 26,
 2014.

 On

August
 28,
 2014,
 Defendants
 filed
 a
 “Motion
 to
 Dismiss
 or
 Strike
 Plaintiffs’
 Federal

Telecommunications
 Act
 Claim.”

 (Doc.
 1-­‐5,
 58.)

 The
 state
 court
 denied
 that
 motion

on
 August
 29,
 2014.2

 That
 same
 day,
 Defendants
 filed
 a
 Notice
 of
 Removal
 in
 this

Court.

Defendants
 invoke
 removal
 jurisdiction
 under
 28
 U.S.C
 1441(a)
 based
 on

original
 jurisdiction
 under
 28
 U.S.C.
 §
 1331,
 which
 gives
 federal
 court
 original

2
 The
 state
 court
 record
 attached
 to
 the
 Notice
 of
 Removal
 does
 not
 contain

an
 order
 or
 notice
 of
 ruling
 on
 the
 motion
 to
 dismiss
 or
 strike.

 However,
 Defendants

state
 in
 their
 Notice
 of
 Removal
 that
 the
 motion
 was
 denied
 on
 August
 29,
 2014.

3

jurisdiction
 over
 civil
 actions
 arising
 under
 federal
 laws.

 The
 federal
 question
 claim

or
 claims
 giving
 rise
 to
 jurisdiction,
 according
 to
 the
 Notice
 of
 Removal,
 are
 found
 in

the
 Amended
 Motion
 for
 TRO
 wherein
 “Harbor
 is
 pursuing
 claims
 under
 the

Telecommunications
 Act
 of
 1996,”
 which
 include
 attorney’s
 fees
 and
 costs
 pursuant

to
 47
 U.S.C.
 §
 207
 and
 allegations
 that
 Southern
 Light
 violated
 47
 U.S.C.
 §§
 251,
 201

and
 202.”

 (Doc.
 1
 ¶
 15.)

Legal
 Analysis

The
 question
 before
 the
 Court
 is
 whether
 the
 notice
 of
 removal
 was
 timely.

The
 procedure
 for
 removal
 is
 governed
 by
 28
 U.S.C.
 §
 1446,
 which
 sets
 a
 30-­‐day

removal
 window.

 If
 the
 case
 was
 not
 initially
 removable,
 “a
 notice
 of
 removal
 may

be
 filed
 within
 30
 days
 after
 [the
 defendant’s
 receipt]
 .
 .
 .
 of
 a
 copy
 of
 an
 amended

pleading,
 motion
 order,
 or
 other
 paper
 from
 which
 it
 may
 first
 be
 ascertained
 that

the
 case
 is
 one
 which
 is
 or
 has
 become
 removable.”

 28
 U.S.C.
 §
 1446(b)(3).

 Because

removal
 jurisdiction
 raises
 significant
 federalism
 concerns,
 federal
 courts
 are

directed
 to
 construe
 removal
 statutes
 strictly.

 Univ.
 of
 S.
 Alabama
 v.
 Am.
 Tobacco
 Co.,

168
 F.3d
 405,
 411
 (11th
 Cir.
 1999).

 Though
 not
 jurisdictional,
 the
 30-­‐day
 removal

period
 is
 “a
 strictly
 applied
 rule
 of
 procedure
 that
 may
 not
 be
 extended
 by
 the

court.”

 BBC
 Apartments,
 Ltd.
 v.
 Browning,
 994
 F.
 Supp.
 1440,
 1442
 (S.D.
 Fla.
 1997).

The
 removing
 party
 has
 the
 burden
 of
 demonstrating
 that
 removal
 was
 proper.

 Id.

“[F]ederal-­‐question
 jurisdiction
 is
 invoked
 by
 and
 large
 by
 plaintiffs
 pleading

a
 cause
 of
 action
 created
 by
 federal
 law.”

 Grable
 &
 Sons
 Metal
 Prods.,
 Inc.
 v.
 Darue

Eng'g
 &
 Mfg.,
 545
 U.S.
 308,
 312
 (2005).

 Plaintiffs
 argue
 that
 notice
 of
 the

Telecommunications
 Act
 claim
 was
 contained
 in
 the
 original
 Motion
 for

4

TRO/Preliminary
 Injunction
 (“the
 Motion”)
 which
 Defendants
 received
 more
 than

30
 days
 prior
 to
 removal.

 Defendants
 counter
 that
 they
 did
 not
 receive
 notice
 of
 a

cause
 of
 action
 made
 under
 the
 Telecommunications
 Act
 until
 Plaintiffs
 filed
 their

Amended
 Motion
 for
 TRO/Preliminary
 Injunction
 (“the
 Amended
 Motion”)
 adding
 a

claim
 for
 attorney’s
 fees
 under
 the
 Act.
 More
 specifically,
 Defendants
 contend
 the

Motion
 did
 not
 assert
 a
 cause
 of
 action
 at
 all,
 and,
 if
 it
 did,
 the
 cause
 of
 action
 was

actually
 a
 state
 law
 claim
 for
 preliminary
 injunctive
 relief.

 These
 arguments
 twist

the
 traditional
 definition
 of
 a
 motion
 for
 preliminary
 injunction.

A
 motion
 for
 preliminary
 injunction
 is
 a
 pleading
 by
 which
 a
 party
 seeks
 “an

extraordinary
 and
 drastic
 remedy”
 when
 “drastic
 relief
 is
 necessary
 to
 preserve
 the

status
 quo.”

 All
 Care
 Nursing
 Serv.,
 Inc.
 v.
 Bethesda
 Mem.
 Hosp.,
 Inc.,
 887
 F.2d
 1536,

1537
 (11th
 Cir.
 1989);
 see
 also
 Spinks
 v.
 Automation
 Personnel
 Servs.,
 Inc.,
 49
 So.3d

186
 (Ala.
 2010).

 Whether
 a
 motion
 for
 preliminary
 injunction
 is
 brought
 in
 state
 or

federal
 court,
 relief
 will
 be
 granted
 only
 if
 the
 movant
 shows,
 inter
 alia,
 a
 substantial

likelihood
 of
 success
 on
 the
 merits
 of
 his
 underlying
 claim.

 Siegel
 v.
 LaPore,
 234
 F.3d

1163,
 1176
 (11th
 Cir.
 2000)
 (per
 curiam)
 (en
 banc);

 Barber
 v.
 Cornerstone

Community
 Outreach,
 Inc.,
 42
 So.3d
 65,
 78
 (11th
 Cir.
 2009).

 “[A]ny
 motion
 or
 suit
 for

a
 traditional
 injunction
 must
 be
 predicated
 upon
 a
 cause
 of
 action.
 .
 .
 .
 regarding

which
 a
 plaintiff
 must
 show
 a
 likelihood
 or
 actuality
 of
 success
 on
 the
 merits.”

Klay
 v.
 United
 Healthgroup,
 Inc.,
 376
 F.3d
 1092,
 1097
 (11th
 Cir.
 2004).

5

Plaintiffs’
 Motion
 was
 not
 tied
 to
 any
 cause
 of
 action
 asserted
 in
 the

complaint,
 but
 that
 does
 not
 mean
 there
 was
 no
 underlying
 cause
 of
 action.3

 The

Motion
 cited
 three
 claims
 that
 allegedly
 entitled
 Plaintiffs
 to
 preliminary
 injunctive

relief:

 a
 cause
 of
 action
 arising
 from
 the
 Telecommunications
 Act
 and
 two
 state-­‐law

causes
 of
 action.4

Defendants,
 however,
 do
 not
 concede
 that
 Plaintiffs’
 reliance
 on
 federal
 law

as
 a
 basis
 for
 success
 on
 the
 merits
 is
 the
 same
 as
 alleging
 a
 cause
 of
 action
 under

federal
 law.

 Instead,
 they
 point
 out
 that
 “asserting
 the
 violation
 of
 a
 federal
 statute

in
 connection
 with
 a
 state
 law
 claim
 is
 not
 the
 same
 thing
 as
 alleging
 a
 cause
 of

action
 created
 by
 federal
 law.”

 (Defs.’
 Rsp.
 8,
 Doc.
 18
 (emphasis
 omitted)).

 Next,

they
 argue
 that
 the
 motion
 for
 preliminary
 injunction
 is,
 itself,
 the
 state
 law
 cause
 of

action
 and
 imply
 that
 the
 alleged
 Telecommunications
 Act
 violation
 is
 nothing
 more

than
 an
 element
 of
 that
 claim.

 The
 fallacy
 in
 this
 argument
 is
 clear.

 A
 motion
 for

preliminary
 injunction
 is
 not
 a
 cause
 of
 action.

 It
 is
 a
 procedural
 mechanism
 by

which
 a
 party
 may
 obtain
 relief.

 In
 the
 Motion,
 Plaintiffs
 sought
 a
 preliminary

injunctive
 relief
 based
 on
 both
 federal
 and
 state
 law
 causes
 of
 action.

 Defendants

should
 have
 removed
 this
 action
 within
 thirty
 days
 after
 receiving
 notice
 of
 the

Motion.

3
 It
 would
 certainly
 have
 simplified
 matters
 if
 Plaintiffs
 had
 amended
 their

complain
 to
 include
 the
 claims
 asserted
 in
 the
 Motion
 for
 TRO/Preliminary

Injunction.

 Nevertheless,
 the
 Motion
 was
 sufficient
 to
 put
 Defendants
 on
 notice
 of
 a

federal-­‐law
 cause
 of
 action.

 Furthermore,
 Defendants’
 argument
 is
 undercut
 by
 the

fact
 that
 the
 Notice
 of
 Removal
 was
 based
 on
 the
 Amended
 Motion
 for
 TRO

Preliminary
 Injunction,
 which
 also
 is
 not
 tied
 to
 any
 claim
 asserted
 in
 the
 Complaint.

4
 Defendants
 argue
 that
 they
 were
 not
 on
 notice
 of
 a
 federal
 cause
 of
 action

until
 Plaintiffs
 amended
 the
 Motion
 to
 assert
 a
 claim
 for
 attorney’s
 fees
 under
 the

Telecommunications
 Act.

 This
 argument
 undermines
 Defendants’
 argument
 that

the
 Motion
 did
 not
 plead
 a
 cause
 of
 action.

6

Even
 if
 removal
 was
 untimely,
 Defendants
 alternatively
 argue,
 this
 Court

should
 ignore
 the
 30-­‐day
 removal
 requirement
 because
 the
 state
 court
 has
 no

jurisdiction
 over
 the
 federal
 claim.

 Defendants
 point
 out
 that
 only
 federal
 district

courts
 and
 the
 Federal
 Communications
 Commission
 have
 jurisdiction
 over

Telecommunications
 Act
 claims.

 AT&T
 Corp.
 v.
 Coeur
 d’Alene
 Tribe,
 295
 F.3d
 899,

905
 (9th
 Cir.
 2002).

 Defendants
 rely
 on
 three
 cases
 in
 which
 district
 courts
 have

used
 exclusive
 federal
 jurisdiction
 as
 a
 basis
 for
 ignoring
 the
 removal
 statute’s

procedural
 requirements.

 In
 Barefield
 v.
 State
 Farm
 &
 Cas.
 Co.,
 296
 F.Supp.2d
 741

(S.D.
 Tex.
 2003),
 the
 court
 concluded
 that
 timeliness
 of
 removal
 was
 irrelevant

because
 federal
 courts
 had
 original
 exclusive
 jurisdiction
 over
 the
 plaintiff’s
 claim

under
 the
 National
 Flood
 Insurance
 Program.

 Unfortunately,
 Barefield
 creates
 an

exception
 to
 the
 removal
 statute
 without
 actually
 addressing
 the
 statute
 itself.

Section
 1446(b)
 makes
 no
 distinction
 between
 cases
 involving
 exclusive
 jurisdiction

and
 those
 involving
 concurrent
 jurisdiction.

 It
 simply
 and
 clearly
 requires
 that
 the

notice
 of
 removal
 be
 filed
 within
 30
 days
 after
 receipt
 of
 the
 complaint
 or,
 as
 in
 the

instant
 case,
 the
 paper
 from
 which
 the
 basis
 for
 removal
 can
 be
 ascertained.

 See
 28

U.S.C.
 §
 1446(b)(1)
 and
 (b)(3).

 The
 other
 cases
 cited
 by
 Defendant
 are
 similarly

flawed.

 Morris
 v.
 Simsol
 Ins.
 Servs.,
 2013
 WL
 6590584
 (W.D.
 La.
 Dec.
 16,
 2013),

followed
 Barefield
 without
 discussion.

 In
 Fitzgerald
 v.
 Bestway
 Servs.,
 Inc.
 284

F.Supp.2d
 1311
 (N.D.
 Ala.
 2003),
 the
 court
 actually
 found
 that
 removal
 was
 timely

under
 the
 last-­‐served
 defendant
 rule
 but
 stated
 in
 dicta
 that
 it
 “would
 be
 required
 to

exercise
 jurisdiction
 over
 the
 explicit
 ERISA
 claim
 even
 if
 [
 ]removal
 had
 not
 been

timely.”
 Id.
 at
 1317.

 Like
 the
 Barefield
 decision,
 Fitzgerald
 does
 not
 discuss
 the

7

removal
 statute
 or
 provide
 any
 analysis
 to
 support
 this
 de
 facto
 exception
 to
 the

removal
 statute.

The
 cases
 cited
 above,
 which
 represent
 the
 minority
 view,
 run
 contrary
 to

the
 longstanding
 principle
 that
 “all
 rules
 governing
 removal.
 .
 .
 must
 be
 strictly

interpreted
 and
 enforced
 because
 of
 the
 significant
 federalism
 concerns
 arising
 in

the
 context
 of
 federal
 removal
 jurisdiction.”

 Russell
 Corp
 v.
 American
 Home
 Assur.

Co.,
 264
 F.3d
 1040,
 1049
 (11th
 Cir.
 2001).

 Thus,
 the
 majority
 of
 courts
 that
 have

addressed
 the
 issue
 have
 concluded
 that
 “removal
 is
 permitted
 only
 if
 the
 statutory

requirements
 have
 been
 satisfied
 and
 the
 fact
 that
 the
 Court
 might
 have
 exclusive

jurisdiction
 does
 not
 dispense
 with
 the
 necessity
 of
 complying
 with
 the
 statutory

requirements.”

 Bradwell
 v.
 Silk
 Greenhouse,
 Inc.,
 828
 F.Supp.
 940,
 944
 (M.D.
 Fla.

1993);
 accord
 Pix
 v.
 Alper,
 2014
 WL
 3927536
 (W.D.
 Wash.
 Aug.
 12,
 2014)
 (“courts

have
 consistently
 rejected
 the
 argument
 that
 a
 removing
 defendant
 does
 not
 have
 to

comply
 with
 the
 rule
 of
 unanimity
 simply
 because
 exclusive
 federal
 jurisdiction

exists”);
 Nichols
 v.
 HealthSouth
 Corp.,
 2012
 WL
 3929797
 (N.D.
 Ala.
 Sept.
 10,
 2012)

(recognizing
 that
 “a
 claim
 providing
 for
 exclusive
 federal
 jurisdiction
 does
 not

exempt
 defendants”
 from
 removal
 statute’s
 procedural
 requirements);
 Harbour

Light
 Towers
 Assoc.
 v.
 Ameriflood,
 LLC,

 2011
 WL
 2517222
 (M.D.
 Fla.
 June
 23,
 2011)

(granting
 motion
 to
 remand
 based
 on
 defect
 in
 removal
 procedure
 even
 though

federal
 court
 had
 exclusive
 jurisdiction
 based
 on
 National
 Flood
 Insurance
 Act);

Malone
 v.
 Malone,
 2007
 WL
 789449
 (D.
 Or.
 Mar.
 13,
 2007)
 (“the
 court
 would
 add
 this

case
 to
 the
 apparent
 majority”
 requiring
 remand
 in
 cases
 of
 defective
 removal
 even

if
 exclusive
 ERISA
 jurisdiction
 existed);
 Viala
 v.
 Owens-­‐Corning
 Fibeglas
 Corp.,
 1994

8

WL
 139287,
 *2
 n.
 3
 (N.D.
 Cal.
 Apr.
 13,
 1994)
 (“nothing
 in
 the
 language
 of
 sections

1441
 or
 1446
 or
 in
 the
 case
 law
 surrounding
 these
 sections
 lends
 credence”
 to

defendant’s
 claim
 that
 procedural
 removal
 requirement
 need
 not
 be
 met
 if
 the

federal
 question
 is
 one
 over
 which
 the
 federal
 court
 has
 exclusive
 jurisdiction);

Samuel
 v.
 Langham,
 780
 F.Supp.
 424,
 427
 (N.D.
 Tex
 1992)
 (remanding
 case
 based
 on

removal
 defect
 even
 if
 exclusive
 ERISA
 jurisdiction
 applied);
 McCain
 v.
 Cahoj,
 794

F.Supp.
 1061
 (D.
 Kan.
 1992)
 (assuming
 existence
 of
 exclusive
 federal
 jurisdiction

over
 federal
 crop
 insurance
 claim
 and
 nevertheless
 remanding
 for
 defect
 in
 removal

procedures).

While
 it
 may
 seem
 counterintuitive
 to
 remand
 a
 case
 over
 which
 the
 state

court
 arguably
 has
 no
 jurisdiction,
 a
 defendant
 in
 this
 situation
 “may
 bring
 whatever

motions
 it
 deems
 appropriate
 in
 the
 state
 court
 proceeding.”

 Harbor
 Light,
 2011
 WL

2517222
 at
 *6.

 This
 Court
 has
 been
 informed
 that
 the
 state
 court
 denied

Defendants’
 motion
 to
 dismiss
 the
 Federal
 Telecommunications
 Act
 claim.

Apparently,
 only
 after
 that
 order
 was
 entered
 did
 the
 Defendants
 remove
 this

action.

 However,
 this
 Court
 is
 not
 a
 state
 appellate
 court,
 and
 removal
 is
 not
 the

appropriate
 method
 for
 challenging
 a
 state
 court’s
 ruling.

Conclusion

For
 the
 reasons
 set
 forth
 above,
 the
 motion
 to
 remand
 is
 GRANTED.

 This

action
 is
 hereby
 REMANDED
 to
 the
 Circuit
 Court
 of
 Baldwin
 County,
 Alabama.

DONE
 and
 ORDERED
 this
 the
 2nd
 day
 of
 February,
 2015.

s/Charles
 R.
 Butler,
 Jr.

Senior
 United
 States
 District
 Judge

9