Dean v. Lockett

Filing 24

ORDER ADOPTING 20 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Lee Vernon Dean. It is recommended that the habeas petition be DENIED and that this action be dismissed. It is further recommended that any certifi cate of appealability filed by Petitioner be denied as he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis. Finally, it is recommended that judgment be entered in favor of Respondent, Cynthia White, and against Petitioner, Lee Vernon Dean. Signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr on 6/2/2015. (mpp) Copies to counsel & Ptr

IN
 THE
 UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 COURT
 FOR
 THE

SOUTHERN
 DISTRICT
 OF
 ALABAMA

SOUTHERN
 DIVISION

VERNON
 DEAN,

Petitioner,

v.

CYNTHIA
 WHITE,

Respondent,

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CIVIL
 ACTION
 NO.

14-­‐00419-­‐CB-­‐M

ORDER

This
 matter
 is
 before
 the
 Court
 on
 Petitioner’s
 objection
 to
 the
 Magistrate

Judge’s
 Report
 and
 Recommendation
 recommending
 that
 the
 petition
 for
 habeas

corpus
 relief
 be
 denied
 and
 dismissed,
 that
 a
 certificate
 of
 appealability
 be
 denied,

and
 that
 permission
 to
 proceed
 in
 forma
 pauperis
 on
 appeal
 also
 be
 denied.

Petitioner
 has
 filed
 an
 objection
 in
 which
 he
 argues
 that
 he
 is
 entitled
 to
 an

evidentiary
 hearing.

 After
 de
 novo
 of
 the
 issues,1
 the
 Court
 adopts
 the
 Report
 and

Recommendation
 with
 the
 following
 additions.

Petitioner
 raised
 three
 claims
 in
 the
 habeas
 petition
 filed
 in
 this
 Court:

 (1)

the
 State
 relied
 on
 evidence
 obtained
 in
 violation
 of
 his
 Fourth
 Amendment
 rights;

(2)
 the
 State
 failed
 to
 disclose
 exculpatory
 information
 in
 violation
 of
 Brady
 v.

Maryland;
 and
 (3)
 ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel.

 In
 her
 answer,
 Respondent
 has

acknowledged
 all
 three
 claims
 but
 has
 specifically
 addressed
 only
 one—ineffective

assistance
 of
 counsel.

 To
 further
 complicated
 matters,
 Respondent’s
 answer

1
 Because
 Petitioner’s
 objections
 do
 not
 address
 particular
 findings
 or

conclusions
 in
 the
 Report
 and
 Recommendation,
 the
 Court
 has
 conducted
 a
 de
 novo

review
 of
 all
 issues.

erroneously
 states:

 “Dean
 appears
 to
 have
 exhausted
 his
 claims
 through
 one

complete
 round
 of
 state
 court
 review
 as
 required
 by
 28
 U.S.C.
 §
 2254(b)(1).”

(Answer
 ¶
 13,
 Doc.
 19.)

 Despite
 that
 erroneous
 acknowledgement,
 Respondent

does
 not
 address
 the
 merits
 of
 either
 claim,
 neither
 of
 which
 was
 raised
 in
 state

court.2

In
 the
 Anti-­‐Terrorism
 and
 Effective
 Death
 Penalty
 Act
 (AEDPA),
 Congress

placed
 certain
 constraints
 on
 federal
 habeas
 review,
 including
 a
 specific

requirement
 that
 no
 application
 for
 writ
 of
 habeas
 corpus
 be
 granted
 to
 a
 person
 in

state
 custody
 unless
 “the
 applicant
 has
 exhausted
 the
 remedies
 available
 in
 .
 .
 .

[S]tate
 court.”
 28

 U.S.C.
 §
 2254(b)(1)(A).3

 “Exhaustion
 of
 state
 remedies
 requires

that
 the
 state
 prisoner
 ‘fairly
 present[t]
 federal
 [constitutional]
 claims
 to
 the
 state

court
 in
 order
 to
 give
 the
 State
 the
 opportunity
 to
 pass
 upon
 and
 correct
 alleged

violations
 of
 its
 prisoners’
 federal
 rights.’”

 Snowden
 v.
 Singletary,
 135
 F.3d
 732,
 735

(1998)
 (quoting
 Duncan
 v.
 Henry,
 513
 U.S.
 364,
 365
 (1995)).

 Furthermore,
 “[i]t
 is

2
 Neither
 claim
 was
 asserted
 in
 the
 Rule
 32
 petition.

 Facts
 similar
 to
 those

underlying
 the
 Brady
 claim
 were
 raised
 in
 support
 of
 an
 ineffective
 assistance
 of

counsel
 claim
 at
 the
 Rule
 32
 hearing.

 At
 the
 beginning
 of
 the
 hearing,
 Judge
 Lockett

stated
 that
 Petitioner
 “basically
 ha[d]
 a
 general
 contention
 of
 you
 were
 denied

effective
 assistance
 of
 counsel”
 based
 on
 “a
 photo
 spread”
 and
 “the
 lack
 of

investigation
 about
 into
 [sic]
 a
 Mr.
 Townsend.”

 (R.
 32
 Tr.
 4;
 Doc.
 19-­‐1
 at
 115.)
 Judge

Locket
 asked
 whether
 there
 was
 “[a]nything
 else
 that
 I
 missed?”

 (Id.)
 Petitioner

responded:

 “Since
 I’ve
 been
 incarcerated
 I
 also
 learned
 that
 during
 the
 day
 of
 my

trial
 there
 was
 evidence
 that
 was
 omitted
 concerning
 a
 cellphone,
 checkbook,
 and

stuff
 like
 that.”
 (Id.)

 Petitioner
 did
 not
 assert
 that
 the
 prosecution
 had
 suppressed

the
 evidence,
 and
 no
 further
 mention
 of
 that
 claim
 was
 made
 during
 the

proceedings.

 Nor
 is
 the
 claim
 mentioned
 in
 Judge
 Lockett’s
 Rule
 32
 order
 or
 in
 the

order
 issued
 by
 Alabama
 Court
 of
 Criminal
 Appeals
 affirming
 the
 Rule
 32
 denial.

3
 There
 are
 narrow
 exceptions
 to
 the
 exhaustion
 requirement
 not
 applicable

here,
 i.e,
 “an
 absence
 of
 available
 State
 corrective
 process[
 ]
 or
 [
 ]
 circumstances
 [
 ]

that
 render
 such
 process
 ineffective
 to
 protect
 the
 rights
 of
 the
 applicant.”

 28

U.S.C.A
 §
 2254(b)(1)(B).

2

well
 established
 that
 when
 a
 petitioner
 has
 failed
 to
 exhaust
 his
 claim
 by
 failing
 to

fairly
 present
 it
 to
 the
 state
 courts
 and
 the
 state
 court
 remedy
 is
 no
 longer
 available,

the
 failure
 also
 constitutes
 a
 procedural
 bar.”
 4
 McNair
 v.
 Campbell,
 416
 F.3d
 1291,

1305
 (11th
 Cir.
 2005).

 Petitioner
 ‘s
 Fourth
 Amendment
 and
 Brady
 claims
 can
 no

longer
 be
 raised
 in
 state
 court
 due
 to
 Rule
 32’s
 prohibition
 on
 successive
 petitions

and/or
 Rule
 32’s
 limitations
 period.

 See
 Ala.
 R.
 Crim.
 P.
 32(b)
 (successive
 petitions);

Ala.
 R.
 Crim.
 P.
 32(c)
 (limitations
 period).

 These
 claims
 are,
 therefore,
 procedurally

barred.
 5

With
 respect
 to
 the
 ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel
 claims,
 which
 were

exhausted
 in
 state
 court,
 the
 standard
 of
 review
 under
 AEDPA
 requires
 the
 Court
 to

“accord
 a
 presumption
 of
 correctness
 to
 the
 state
 court’s
 factual
 findings.”
 Mason
 v.

Allen,
 605
 F.3d
 1114,
 1118
 (11th
 Cir.
 2010)
 (per
 curiam).

 The
 state
 court’s
 decision

on
 the
 merits
 of
 a
 claim
 cannot
 be
 the
 basis
 for
 habeas
 relief
 unless
 the
 adjudication

of
 the
 claim
 “resulted
 in
 a
 decision
 that
 was
 contrary
 to,
 or
 involved
 an

unreasonable
 application
 of,
 clearly
 established
 Federal
 law,
 as
 determined
 by
 the

Supreme
 Court
 of
 the
 United
 States”
 or
 “resulted
 in
 a
 decision
 that
 was
 based
 on
 an

unreasonable
 determination
 of
 the
 facts
 in
 light
 of
 the
 evidence
 presented.”

 28

U.S.C.
 §
 2254(d)(1)
 &
 (2).
 A
 decision
 is
 “contrary
 to”
 federal
 law
 “if
 the
 state
 court

arrives
 at
 a
 conclusion
 opposite
 to
 that
 reached
 by
 [the
 United
 States
 Supreme

4
 It
 is
 possible
 for
 the
 State
 to
 waive
 the
 exhaustion
 requirement
 but
 only
 if

“the
 State,
 through
 counsel,
 expressly
 waives
 the
 requirement.”

 28
 U.S.C.
 §

2254(d)(3).

 The
 Court
 does
 not
 take
 Respondent’s
 erroneous
 statement
 that

Petitioner
 “appears
 to
 have
 exhausted
 his
 claims”
 as
 an
 express
 waiver.

5
 The
 Magistrate
 Judge,
 likely
 out
 of
 an
 abundance
 of
 caution,
 addressed
 the

merits
 of
 the
 Brady
 claim.

 This
 Court
 alternatively
 concludes
 that
 the
 Brady
 claim
 is

procedurally
 barred.

3

Court]
 on
 a
 question
 of
 law
 or
 if
 the
 state
 court
 decides
 a
 case
 differently
 than
 [the

United
 States
 Supreme
 Court]
 has
 on
 a
 set
 of
 materially
 indistinguishable
 facts.”

Williams
 v.
 Taylor,
 529
 U.S.
 362,
 412-­‐13
 (2000).

 A
 decision
 involves
 an

“unreasonable
 application
 “
 of
 federal
 law
 “if
 the
 state
 court
 identifies
 the
 correct

governing
 legal
 principle
 .
 .
 .
 but
 unreasonably
 applies
 that
 principles
 to
 the
 facts
 of

the
 prisoner’s
 case.”

 Id.

The
 Rule
 32
 court
 concluded
 that
 the
 Petitioner
 had
 failed
 to
 meet
 his
 burden

of
 proof
 with
 respect
 to
 his
 ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel
 claims.

 Petitioner

presented
 no
 evidence
 other
 than
 his
 own
 testimony,
 which
 the
 Rule
 32
 court
 found

to
 be
 “conclusory”
 and
 “unsupported
 by
 evidence.”

 This
 Court
 cannot
 say
 that
 the

state
 court’s
 factual
 determination
 was
 unreasonable
 in
 light
 of
 the
 evidence
 or
 lack

thereof.

 Nor
 can
 the
 Court
 say
 that
 the
 denial
 of
 the
 ineffective
 assistance
 of
 counsel

claims
 based
 on
 this
 evidence
 was
 either
 contrary
 to
 or
 involved
 an
 unreasonable

application
 of
 Strickland
 and
 its
 progeny.

For
 the
 reasons
 set
 forth
 above,
 the
 Court
 overrules
 Petitioner’s
 objections

and
 adopts
 the
 Report
 and
 Recommendation
 of
 the
 Magistrate
 Judge
 that
 the

petition
 be
 denied
 and
 that
 this
 action
 be
 dismissed
 with
 prejudice.

DONE
 and
 ORDERED
 this
 the
 2nd
 day
 of
 June,
 2015.

s/Charles
 R.
 Butler,
 Jr.

Senior
 United
 States
 District
 Judge

4