International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, Local 1984 v. Alabama State Port Authority
Filing
20
ORDER granting 15 Motion for Summary Judgment as set out - the Court finds that none of the criteria to trigger judicial review under the Railway Labor Act § 3 First (p), 45 U.S.C. § 153 have been met. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 10/6/2016. Copies to parties. (mpp) (Main Document 20 replaced on 10/6/2016) (mpp).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO,
LOCAL 1984,
*
*
*
*
*
*
* CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00589-B
*
*
*
*
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALABAMA STATE PORT AUTHORITY,
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Alabama State
Port
Authority’s
brief
(Docs.
15,
Motion
16),
for
Summary
Plaintiff
Judgment
International
and
supporting
Longshoremen’s
Association, Local 1984’s Response in Opposition (Doc. 18), and
Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 19). Upon careful review of the motion,
briefs, supporting materials and the applicable case law, the
Court concludes that no material facts are in controversy, and
that
Defendant
Accordingly,
is
the
entitled
Court
to
grants
judgment
as
Defendant’s
a
matter
Motion
for
of
law.
Summary
Judgment.
I.
Undisputed Material Facts
The
Alabama
State
Port
Authority
(hereafter
“ASPA”
or
“Defendant”) is a state agency which operates port facilities,
including the Terminal Railway in Mobile, Alabama. (Doc. 1 at
¶5). Plaintiff International Longshoremen’s Association, Local
1984
(hereinafter
“Plaintiff”
or
“Union”)
is
a
labor
organization representing certain hourly employees at the ASPA
Terminal Railway in Mobile. (Id. at ¶ 4). ASPA is a “carrier”
subject to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. (Doc. 16 at
2; Doc. 17 at 1); See Diamond v. Terminal Ry. Alabama State
Docks, 421 F.2d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 1970).
On December 21, 2010,
the
Bargaining
parties
entered
into
(“CBA”) (Doc. 1 at ¶ 13).
a
Collective
Agreement
The parties, on May 15, 2013, entered
into an agreement to establish a Public Law Board (hereinafter
“Board” or “PLB”) under Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act. (Id.
at ¶ 6). The agreement included nine cases, titled Case 1 to
Case 9. (Doc. 16 at 2).
“The agreement also provided that the
Board would consist of a representative of the Union, ASPA, and
a neutral arbitrator and that an award on each case required two
votes
of
the
agreement
to
[“Mediation
three
the
Board”])
members.
The
National
along
parties
Mediation
with
a
submitted
Board
request
for
this
(hereinafter
an
arbitrator
strike list.” (Doc. 1 at ¶6).
The parties agreed on the neutral
arbitrator
Board,
to
serve
on
the
and
the
Mediation
approved their requests on January 16, 2014. (Id.).
Board
The Board
met on February 27, 2014, and unanimously agreed to deny case 9.
(Id. at ¶ 7).
The parties could not agree on a resolution for
the other cases. (Id.).
The Board issued final arbitration
2
awards denying or dismissing all claims except Case 8. 1 (Doc. 16
at 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13). The Union initiated this action seeking
judicial review of Awards 1-8, but later, voluntarily dismissed
Counts 2 and 8 of the Petition. (Docs. 13, 14).
Therefore, the
only awards at issue in the present action are Awards 1, 3, 4,
5, 6, and 7. Defendant’s motion seeking dismissal of this action
has been fully briefed and is ripe for resolution.
II.
Discussion
a. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); see also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91
L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158,
1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[S]ummary judgment is appropriate even if
‘some alleged factual dispute’ between the parties remains, so
long as there is ‘no genuine issue of material fact.’” (citation
omitted)(emphasis in original)).
The party asking for summary judgment “always bears
the initial responsibility of informing the district
1
The Union’s representative signed all the awards, but noted
dissention on Awards 1, 3, and 4. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 7).
3
court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” The movant can meet this burden by presenting
evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact,
or by showing, or pointing out to, the district court
that the nonmoving party has failed to present
evidence in support of some element of its case on
which it bears the ultimate burden of proof.
Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e)
“requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the
pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the
‘depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories,
and
admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” To avoid
summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more
than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts.” On the other hand, the evidence
of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable
inferences must be drawn in its favor.
ThyssenKrupp Steel USA, LLC v. United Forming, Inc., 926 F.
Supp.
2d
1286,
1289-90
(S.D.
Ala.
Jan.
29,
2013)(citations
omitted).
b. Standard of Review for a Board Award Issued Under the
Railway Labor Act.
As a carrier operating in interstate commerce, ASPA must
comply with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-188 (“RLA”). Loveless v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.
2d 1272, 1275 (llth Cir. 1982).
Congress enacted the RLA to
avoid labor-based interruptions to commerce or to the operation
of
the
railway
and
airline
industries.
Stewart
Airlines, 503 Fed. Appx. 814, 817 (llth Cir. 2013).
4
v.
Spirit
The RLA
requires every carrier and its employees to establish a board to
deal
with
grievances
relationship.
arising
out
of
the
carrier-employee
In this case, the Public Board fulfills this
role.
Under the RLA, a court may overturn a Board’s award only if
one of three circumstances exists: (1) the Board has failed to
comply with the requirements of the RLA; (2) the Board’s order
does not conform, of confine itself, to matters within the scope
of the Board’s jurisdiction; or (3) a member of the Board has
engaged in fraud or corruption.
Henry v. Delta Air Lines, 759
F. 2d 870, 872 (llth Cir. 1985).
This scope of review has been
described
as
“among
the
narrowest
known
to
the
law,”
id.
(quoting Diamond, 421 F.2d at 233), and a court may neither
review the substance of such an award for ordinary error nor
vacate an award because a judge might have reached a different
result.
Loveless,
681
F.
2d
at
1276.
(citations
omitted).
Instead, substantive grounds for vacating an award where the
Board’s order does not “conform, or confine itself, to matters
within the scope of the [Board’s] jurisdiction” exist only in
the following three situations: (1) the award is “irrational”,
meaning
“wholly
baseless
and
completely
without
reason,”
Loveless, 681 F.2d at 1276 (citations omitted); (2) the award
has no “rationally inferable” basis form the “letter or purpose
of
the
collective
bargaining
5
agreement,”
id.
(citations
omitted); (3) the arbitrator failed to conform to a specific
contractual
limitation
upon
his
authority,
id.
(citations
omitted); see also Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen
Gen. Comm. Of Adjustment CSX Transp. N. Lines, 455 F. 3d 1313,
1315-16 (llth Cir. 2006)(citation omitted).
Under the RLA, the range of judicial review in enforcement
cases is among “the narrowest known to the law.” Diamond, 421
F.2d at 232. Judicial review of orders is limited to only three
very specific grounds: (1) failure of the Board to comply with
the Act, (2) fraud or corruption, or (3) failure of the order to
conform,
or
confine
itself,
to
matters
within
the
Board’s
jurisdiction. Railway Labor Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 153 First (p)
(1964), as amended (Supp. IV, 1968). Only upon one or more of
those grounds may a court set aside an order of the Adjustment
Board. Diamond, 421 F.2d at 233.
In the arbitration context, an
award “without foundation in reason or fact” is equated with an
award
that
exceeds
the
authority
or
jurisdiction
of
the
arbitration body. Diamond, 421 F.2d at 233 (citing Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 415 F.2d 403,
411-412 (5th Cir. 1969)). The test of the Board’s jurisdiction is
not
whether
interpretation
the
of
reviewing
the
court
bargaining
agrees
contract,
with
but
the
Board’s
whether
the
remedy fashioned by the Board is rationally explainable as a
6
logically
means
of
furthering
the
aims
of
that
contract.
Diamond, 421 F.3d at 233 (citing Brotherhood, 415 F.2d at 412).
c. Analysis
1. Award 1
Award 1 involves the Union’s grievance concerning bargecleaning duties at ASPA’s McDuffie Terminal. (Doc. 16 at 6).
According to the Union, under Article 1 §§ 1 of the parties’
CBA, “the Port Authority recognized Local 1984 as the exclusive
collective
bargaining
representative
of
all
hourly
paid
production and maintenance employees who are employed at all
public Port facilities operated by the Port Authority, excluding
salaried merit system and terminal railroad employees.” (Doc. 1
at 5-6).
barge
The Union contends that ASPA’s sub-contracting of the
cleaning
duties
at
the
McDuffie
Terminal
violated
the
exclusivity provisions of the parties’ CBA. (Id.). In support of
its
argument
that
the
cleaning
duties
constituted
bargaining
unit work covered under the parties’ agreement, the Union notes
that
ASPA
conceded
the
existence
of
a
long-standing
policy
whereby bargaining unit employees performed said duties. (Id.)
The Union further contends that the Board’s decision denying the
Union’s
claim
has
no
foundation
in
reason
or
fact,
and
impermissibly expands the CBA beyond its agreed upon terms, as
the Board acknowledged that there is an established practice of
using
bargaining
unit
employees
7
members
for
cleaning
in
conjunction with the unloading and loading of coal. (Id.).
ASPA
argues that the Union’s disagreement with the Board’s decision
is not a sufficient basis for vacating the award. (Doc. 16 at
6). According to ASPA, the Board provided a detailed lengthy
analysis that was grounded in reason and fact. (Id. at 7). ASPA
asserts that the Board properly found that the Union’s existing
practice of cleaning out unloaded barges at one location that
pose[d]
little
in
way
of
safety
hazards”
was
completely
different from sweeping decks on loaded barges at a hazardous
location. (Id.).
In
this
provisions
case,
relied
the
upon
Board
by
expressly
the
parties,
considered
and
the
determined
CBA
that
neither the exclusivity provision nor the management provision
addressed the specific issue before the Board. (Doc. 15-3). The
Board
found
that
at
one
time,
bargaining
unit
employees
performed the cleaning duties on vessels that had been unloaded
as well as the vessels that had been loaded; that the Coast
Guard began enforcing a regulation that provided that loaded
barges have no more than one gallon of coal dust on their decks;
that this resulted in the cleaning work on the loaded barges
being performed in an area exposed to tides and currents and
wave action; that this change in work environment
created a
safety hazard for ASPA employees, thus, ASPA began contracting
with barge owners to perform the work; that the Union did not
8
voice any objection until the work was subcontracted out; and
that the two bargaining unit employees who had once performed
the cleaning work at issue suffered no loss in pay. (Id.).
Upon review, the Court finds that the Board’s ruling was
not “wholly baseless and completely without reason”.
Indeed, it
is well settled that an arbitrator can review the parties’ past
practice,
usage
and
custom
in
interpreting
their
CBA.
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Rx Labor Executives’ Assn., 491 U.S.
299, 311, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2485, 105 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1989).
This
is exactly what the Board did in this case. The Board found that
a practice that developed in response to one circumstance does
not automatically extend to a different set of circumstances.
(Doc.
15-3).
Specifically,
the
Board
concluded
that
the
situation under which the cleaning of the loaded barges occurred
was
clearly
far
more
hazardous
than
the
circumstances
under
which the unloaded barges were cleaned. (Id.). The Board also
determined that the outsourcing of the hazardous work did not
negatively impact bargaining unit employees as they continued to
receive pay. (Id.). Regardless of whether the Union agrees with
the
Board’s
decision,
it
has
failed
to
proffer
facts
that
suggest that the decision was “wholly baseless and completely
without reason.” See Loveless, 681 F.2d at 1276 (“[C]ourts will
not
vacate
an
award
because
a
judge
might
have
reached
different result.”). Thus, the award will not be vacated.
9
a
2. Award 3
In
Award
3,
the
Board
determined
that
the
CBA
was
not
violated when the Carrier allowed an employee (who had retained
the classification of Coal Machine Operator (CMO) but had been
working
in
the
accommodation)
attempted
to
to
Equipment
perform
assign
Operator
overtime
overtime
to
(EO)
work,
other
as
position
the
employees
as
an
Carrier
had
in
the
EO
classification but no employees were available. (Doc. 15-5). The
Union argues that in issuing this award, the Board failed to
conform or confine itself to matters within the scope of its
jurisdiction, as the Board relied on an extemporaneous agreement
between
the
ASPA
and
one
of
unambiguous terms of the CBA.
its
employees,
not
the
clear,
(Doc. 1 at 8-9). ASPA counters
that the Board’s decision did not exceed it’s jurisdiction, and
even if the Board made a factual error or failed to credit some
information, that would not be reason to consider the award in
excess of their jurisdiction. (Doc. 16 at 9-10). They further
argue that the Union’s contention that the award failed to rely
on the CBA is clearly contradicted by the award itself. (Id.).
Notwithstanding the Union’s assertions to the contrary, the
Board did not exceed its jurisdiction in resolving this claim.
The Board expressly found that pursuant to Article 18, Section 8
of the parties’ CBA, ASPA was required to offer EO overtime
within the EO overtime classification; however, on the day in
10
question,
ASPA
attempted
to
follow
the
overtime
distribution
priority rules but no employee holding the EO classification was
available.
(Doc. 15-5 at 3). Thus, ASPA utilized an employee
with a special work accommodation to perform the EO overtime as
it was the work that he normally performs on his regular shift.
(Id.). As noted by ASPA, the fact that the Union takes issue
with the Board’s factual finding that no other EO employees were
available
is
of
second-guess.
shows
that
no
moment.
It
is
not
this
Court’s
role
to
Further, a review of the reward at issue clearly
the
Board
interpreted
a
specific
parties’ CBA in resolving this claim.
portion
of
the
Thus, it did not exceed
its jurisdiction.
3. Award 4
In
Award
4,
the
Board
determined
that
the
CBA
was
not
violated when two employees were permitted to work a 8 hour
overtime
shift
performing
preventive
maintenance
on
conveyor
belts during the weekend of February 11-12, 2012, though the
claimant had requested and been denied the same opportunity.
(Doc. 15-7). The Union argues that the Board’s award was wholly
baseless
and
completely
without
reason
and
that
the
Board
completely ignored the clear and unambiguous provisions of CBA,
particularly, Article 20, Section 1 of the CBA, which provides
that “[w]hen required in case of emergency, an 8 hour shift may
be started at any time.” (Doc. 1 at 10-11).
11
The Union contends
that the Board ignored this language as the claimant properly
requested
to
be
allowed
to
work
an
8-hour
overtime
shift,
instead of the required 10, and his request was denied while two
other employees were permitted to leave work after 8 hours of
the overtime work. (Id.). ASPA argues that under the RLA, the
Board’s
interpretation
controls;
thus,
the
Union
has
not
presented a valid ground for vacating the award. (Doc. 16 at 1011).
In denying Award 4, the Board noted that it was unrefuted
that
the
Carrier
had
an
approximately
40-year
practice
of
scheduling longer shifts to perform maintenance under similar
circumstances, and that Article 20 Section 1 of the parties CBA
permitted an increase in shift hours from 8 to 10 not just for
emergencies, but also in order to accommodate operational and
maintenance requirements. (Doc. 15-7). The Board further found
that
the
claimant
disqualified
himself
from
performing
the
overtime work, and that the two comparators who were permitted
to leave after 8 hours were actually working on a different
maintenance project and had more seniority than the claimant.
The
undersigned
authority
in
finds
that
interpreting
the
the
Board
contract
rationale was not wholly without reason.
did
not
exceed
provision,
its
Accordingly, the Union
has not presented a valid ground for vacating the award.
12
and
its
4. Award 5
Award 5 involved the Union’s assertion that during a safety
meeting, a management employee spoke to a shop steward in a
disrespectful manner after the shop steward, who was attending
the meeting as a member of the work crew, questioned whether the
supervisor’s
statements
regarding
the
notice
absences complied with the parties’ CBA.
required
before
(Doc. 1 at 11-12).
Following the meeting, the shop steward wrote a letter to Human
Resources complaining about the supervisor’s behavior. (Doc. 113).
Nearly two months later, the shop steward filed a written
grievance form. (Doc. 1-14).
The shop steward classified his
grievance as a “step 2” grievance, and asserted that he had not
received any response to his formal harassment complaint filed
with
Human
Resources.
(Id.).
Subsequent
thereto,
the
shop
steward filed two additional written grievance forms, and he
classified them as “step 3” and “step 4” grievance. (Docs. 1-15,
1-16).
The parties submitted the following statement of claim to
the Board:
“Union member Brandon Harris alleged discrimination against
union officials and harassment.”
The
Board
determined
that
it
had
jurisdiction
over
the
dispute, and “[a]fter review of the submissions”, concluded that
“no issues remain in this dispute that require resolution by the
13
Board.” (Doc. 15-9 at 2).
Therefore, the Board dismissed the
claim. (Id.)
The Union contends that the arbitrator did more than just
interpret the parties’ agreement, “he flat out went rouge in
suggesting that there was not a valid grievance.” (Doc. 18 at
8).
According to the Union, in the parties’ CBA, at Article 3,
§ 2, the parties set a pretty low standard with respect to
defining what constitutes a grievance. (Id.). As a result, the
Board’s
determination
that
there
was
no
grievance
is
“inconceivable” under the CBA. (Id.).
The
clear
concluding
that
gist
there
of
the
were
Union’s
no
issues
argument
to
is
resolve,
that
the
in
Board
implicitly found that there was no valid grievance under the
CBA, and this finding is wrong.
The Court finds that, assuming
arguendo that the Union is correct in its assertion that the
Board did not properly construe the shop steward’s letter as a
grievance under Article 3 § 2, that does not provide a basis for
setting aside the award.
The law is firmly established that
courts must defer entirely to the arbitrator’s interpretation of
the underlying contract no matter how wrong the Court believes
it
to
be.
Wiregrass
Metal
Trades
Council
AFL-CIO
v.
Shaw
Environmental & Infrastructure, Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16535
(llth Cir. 2016).
“[b]ecause
the
Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that
parties
bargained
14
for
the
arbitrator’s
construction
arguably
of
their
construing
or
agreement,
an
applying
arbitral
the
contract
regardless of a court’s view of its (de)meits.”
Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. ---
decision
must
even
stand,
Oxford Health
, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068, 186
L. Ed. 2d 113 (2013)(quotation marks omitted). Thus, “the sole
question
for
[the
Court]
is
whether
the
arbitrator
(even
arguably) interpreted the parties’ contract, not whether he got
its
meaning
right
or
wrong.”
Id.
at
2068.
If
the
Court
determines that “the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the
parties’ contract”, the Court must end its inquiry and deny a
motion for vacatur.
S. Commc’ns Servs., Inc. v. Thomas, 720 F.
3d 1352, 1359 (llth Cir. 2013).
In
this
case,
it
is
undisputed
that
the
shop
steward
initially wrote a letter to Human Resources complaining about
the alleged disrespectful treatment he received during a safety
meeting.
taken
He did not contend that any tangible action had been
against
him
nor
did
he
request
any
specific
remedy.
Nearly two months later, he submitted a formal grievance form
complaining that the Company had not responded to his letter.
Against this backdrop of facts, the Board considered the Union’s
challenge, and concluded that “no issues remain in this dispute
that require resolution by the Board.” (Doc. 15-9). There is
nothing before the Court that suggests that the Board simply
ignored the parties’ CBA, and this Court cannot second guess the
15
Board’s implicit finding that the shop steward’s letter did not
rise to the level of a
grievance under the CBA.
Thus, the
award is due to be upheld.
5. Awards 6 and 7
Award 6 involved a challenge by the Union alleging unjust
discipline
based
on
“counseling”
issued
to
employees
for
purportedly failing to timely notify the company of absences.
(Doc.
15-11).
Award
7
involved
a
discipline
in
the
form
of
counseling and a letter that was placed in the personnel file of
employee Tracy Higgins, who at the request of the Port police
chief, entered a confined space in violation of the Company’s
confined space entry program and OSHA training. (Doc. 1 at 15).
In
its
letters
award,
of
the
Board
counseling
noted
do
not
that
the
constitute
parties
agreed
discipline,
and
that
the
Board urged the carrier and the union to make clear to all
supervisors
of
hourly
employees
and
all
hourly
employees
represented by the Union that counseling is not to be considered
discipline and will not be considered as part of progressive
discipline at the Port. (Doc. 15-11 at 3).
The Board then
concluded that the claim was resolved in accordance with the
finding. (Id.).
Plaintiff argues that Award 6 only partially resolved one
dispute,
but
letters
from
did
not
address
employees’
the
files,
16
removal
and
of
that
the
ASPA
counseling
did
not
unilaterally agree to do so. (Doc. 1 at 14). The Union contends
that this fails to comply with the requirements of the RLA and
that the Board failed to confine itself to matters within its
jurisdiction; thus, the award should be remanded to the Board
for further consideration. (Doc. 1 at 14-15). In Award 7, the
Board dismissed Case 7 on the basis that Case 6 had addressed
the underlying issue present in both cases by stating counseling
is not considered discipline. (Doc. 15-13).
Plaintiff asserts
that the board failed to address the Union’s requested remedy in
Case 7; therefore, the Board failed to conform or confine itself
to
matters
within
the
scope
of
the
Board’s
jurisdiction
in
violation of the RLA. (Doc. 1 at 15-16). Defendant counters that
both parties agreed that letters of counseling do not constitute
discipline under well-settled labor law, and the Board found
that the claims were therefore resolved by agreement. (Doc. 16
at 12). According to Defendant, the Board was not required to
expressly address each argument of the Union, or, indeed, give
any reason for an award at all. (Doc. 16 at 12-13).
Generally,
arbitrators
are
not
required
to
include
explanations, much less detailed ones, and they often do not.
Wiregrass, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16535 at *13 (quoting United
Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. &
Serv. Works Int’l Union AFL-CIO-CLC v. Wise Alloys, LLC., 807 F.
3d 1258, 1275 (11th Cir. 2015))(“Unless the parties stipulate
17
otherwise. . .an arbitrator is under no obligation to provide
explanations
with
his
award.”);
Cat
Charter,
LLC
v.
Schurtenberger, 646 F. 3d 836, 844 (llth Cir. 2011)(“Generally,
an arbitrator need not explain her decision; thus, in a typical
arbitration
where
no
specific
form
of
award
is
requested,
arbitrators may provide a ‘standard award’ and simply announce a
result.”)). As observed by the Court in Wiregrass:
“[W]hen
it
is
“not
apparent”
from
the
arbitrator’s
stated
reasoning
(or
lack
thereof)
whether [he] permissibly interpreted a collective
bargaining agreement or impermissibly modified it, and
one can plausibly read the award either way, the court
must resolve the ambiguity by finding that the award
is an interpretation of the contract and enforcing it.
The rule reflects a strong, albeit not irrebuttable,
presumption that the arbitrator has interpreted the
agreement instead of modifying it.”
Wiregrass, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16535 at *17.
The Court in
Wiregrass noted that if the arbitrator in that labor arbitration
case had issued a standard award, simply announcing a result
without explanation, there would not have been any grounds for
vacating
the
award,
and
that
the
fact
that
the
arbitrator
provided an incomplete explanation for the award, instead of
none at all, should not be a basis for vacating an award because
it would discourage “arbitrators from saying anything beyond who
won and how much”. Wiregrass, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16535 at *19.
The Union’s challenge to Awards 6 and 7 is essentially that
the Board provided an incomplete award, and left unresolved some
18
issues. Given the undisputed evidence that the Board (along with
the
parties)
found
that
the
letters
of
counseling
do
not
constitute discipline, and that the Board concluded that all
issues were resolved, one can rationally interpret the Board’s
decision
to
include
violate the CBA.
an
implicit
finding
that
ASPA
did
not
Thus, the Board award must be upheld.
III. Conclusion
Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments at
length, the Court finds that none of the criteria to trigger
judicial review under the Railway Labor Act § 3 First (p), 45
U.S.C. § 153 have been met. Accordingly, the undersigned finds
the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED, and this
action dismissed with prejudice.
ORDERED this 6th day of October, 2016.
/s/ Sonja F. Bivins
*
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
19
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