International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, Local 1984 v. Alabama State Port Authority

Filing 20

ORDER granting 15 Motion for Summary Judgment as set out - the Court finds that none of the criteria to trigger judicial review under the Railway Labor Act § 3 First (p), 45 U.S.C. § 153 have been met. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 10/6/2016. Copies to parties. (mpp) (Main Document 20 replaced on 10/6/2016) (mpp).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO,
LOCAL 1984,

*
*
*
*
*
*
* CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00589-B
*
*
*
*

Plaintiff,
vs.
ALABAMA STATE PORT AUTHORITY,
Defendant.

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Alabama State
Port

Authority’s

brief

(Docs.

15,

Motion
16),

for

Summary

Plaintiff

Judgment

International

and

supporting

Longshoremen’s

Association, Local 1984’s Response in Opposition (Doc. 18), and
Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 19). Upon careful review of the motion,
briefs, supporting materials and the applicable case law, the
Court concludes that no material facts are in controversy, and
that

Defendant

Accordingly,

is

the

entitled
Court

to

grants

judgment

as

Defendant’s

a

matter

Motion

for

of

law.

Summary

Judgment.
I.

Undisputed Material Facts
The

Alabama

State

Port

Authority

(hereafter

“ASPA”

or

“Defendant”) is a state agency which operates port facilities,
including the Terminal Railway in Mobile, Alabama. (Doc. 1 at
¶5). Plaintiff International Longshoremen’s Association, Local

1984

(hereinafter

“Plaintiff”

or

“Union”)

is

a

labor

organization representing certain hourly employees at the ASPA
Terminal Railway in Mobile. (Id. at ¶ 4). ASPA is a “carrier”
subject to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. (Doc. 16 at
2; Doc. 17 at 1); See Diamond v. Terminal Ry. Alabama State
Docks, 421 F.2d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 1970).

On December 21, 2010,

the

Bargaining

parties

entered

into

(“CBA”) (Doc. 1 at ¶ 13).

a

Collective

Agreement

The parties, on May 15, 2013, entered

into an agreement to establish a Public Law Board (hereinafter
“Board” or “PLB”) under Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act. (Id.
at ¶ 6). The agreement included nine cases, titled Case 1 to
Case 9. (Doc. 16 at 2).

“The agreement also provided that the

Board would consist of a representative of the Union, ASPA, and
a neutral arbitrator and that an award on each case required two
votes

of

the

agreement

to

[“Mediation

three
the

Board”])

members.

The

National
along

parties

Mediation

with

a

submitted

Board

request

for

this

(hereinafter
an

arbitrator

strike list.” (Doc. 1 at ¶6).

The parties agreed on the neutral

arbitrator

Board,

to

serve

on

the

and

the

Mediation

approved their requests on January 16, 2014. (Id.).

Board

The Board

met on February 27, 2014, and unanimously agreed to deny case 9.
(Id. at ¶ 7).

The parties could not agree on a resolution for

the other cases. (Id.).

The Board issued final arbitration

2

awards denying or dismissing all claims except Case 8. 1 (Doc. 16
at 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13). The Union initiated this action seeking
judicial review of Awards 1-8, but later, voluntarily dismissed
Counts 2 and 8 of the Petition. (Docs. 13, 14).

Therefore, the

only awards at issue in the present action are Awards 1, 3, 4,
5, 6, and 7. Defendant’s motion seeking dismissal of this action
has been fully briefed and is ripe for resolution.
II.

Discussion
a. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); see also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91
L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158,
1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[S]ummary judgment is appropriate even if
‘some alleged factual dispute’ between the parties remains, so
long as there is ‘no genuine issue of material fact.’” (citation
omitted)(emphasis in original)).
The party asking for summary judgment “always bears
the initial responsibility of informing the district
1

The Union’s representative signed all the awards, but noted
dissention on Awards 1, 3, and 4. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 7).

3

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” The movant can meet this burden by presenting
evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact,
or by showing, or pointing out to, the district court
that the nonmoving party has failed to present
evidence in support of some element of its case on
which it bears the ultimate burden of proof.
Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e)
“requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the
pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the
‘depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories,
and
admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” To avoid
summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more
than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts.” On the other hand, the evidence
of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable
inferences must be drawn in its favor.
ThyssenKrupp Steel USA, LLC v. United Forming, Inc., 926 F.
Supp.

2d

1286,

1289-90

(S.D.

Ala.

Jan.

29,

2013)(citations

omitted).
b. Standard of Review for a Board Award Issued Under the
Railway Labor Act.
As a carrier operating in interstate commerce, ASPA must
comply with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-188 (“RLA”). Loveless v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.
2d 1272, 1275 (llth Cir. 1982).

Congress enacted the RLA to

avoid labor-based interruptions to commerce or to the operation
of

the

railway

and

airline

industries.

Stewart

Airlines, 503 Fed. Appx. 814, 817 (llth Cir. 2013).
4

v.

Spirit
The RLA

requires every carrier and its employees to establish a board to
deal

with

grievances

relationship.

arising

out

of

the

carrier-employee

In this case, the Public Board fulfills this

role.
Under the RLA, a court may overturn a Board’s award only if
one of three circumstances exists: (1) the Board has failed to
comply with the requirements of the RLA; (2) the Board’s order
does not conform, of confine itself, to matters within the scope
of the Board’s jurisdiction; or (3) a member of the Board has
engaged in fraud or corruption.

Henry v. Delta Air Lines, 759

F. 2d 870, 872 (llth Cir. 1985).

This scope of review has been

described

as

“among

the

narrowest

known

to

the

law,”

id.

(quoting Diamond, 421 F.2d at 233), and a court may neither
review the substance of such an award for ordinary error nor
vacate an award because a judge might have reached a different
result.

Loveless,

681

F.

2d

at

1276.

(citations

omitted).

Instead, substantive grounds for vacating an award where the
Board’s order does not “conform, or confine itself, to matters
within the scope of the [Board’s] jurisdiction” exist only in
the following three situations: (1) the award is “irrational”,
meaning

“wholly

baseless

and

completely

without

reason,”

Loveless, 681 F.2d at 1276 (citations omitted); (2) the award
has no “rationally inferable” basis form the “letter or purpose
of

the

collective

bargaining
5

agreement,”

id.

(citations

omitted); (3) the arbitrator failed to conform to a specific
contractual

limitation

upon

his

authority,

id.

(citations

omitted); see also Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen
Gen. Comm. Of Adjustment CSX Transp. N. Lines, 455 F. 3d 1313,
1315-16 (llth Cir. 2006)(citation omitted).
Under the RLA, the range of judicial review in enforcement
cases is among “the narrowest known to the law.” Diamond, 421
F.2d at 232. Judicial review of orders is limited to only three
very specific grounds: (1) failure of the Board to comply with
the Act, (2) fraud or corruption, or (3) failure of the order to
conform,

or

confine

itself,

to

matters

within

the

Board’s

jurisdiction. Railway Labor Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 153 First (p)
(1964), as amended (Supp. IV, 1968). Only upon one or more of
those grounds may a court set aside an order of the Adjustment
Board. Diamond, 421 F.2d at 233.

In the arbitration context, an

award “without foundation in reason or fact” is equated with an
award

that

exceeds

the

authority

or

jurisdiction

of

the

arbitration body. Diamond, 421 F.2d at 233 (citing Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 415 F.2d 403,
411-412 (5th Cir. 1969)). The test of the Board’s jurisdiction is
not

whether

interpretation

the
of

reviewing
the

court

bargaining

agrees
contract,

with
but

the

Board’s

whether

the

remedy fashioned by the Board is rationally explainable as a

6

logically

means

of

furthering

the

aims

of

that

contract.

Diamond, 421 F.3d at 233 (citing Brotherhood, 415 F.2d at 412).
c. Analysis
1. Award 1
Award 1 involves the Union’s grievance concerning bargecleaning duties at ASPA’s McDuffie Terminal. (Doc. 16 at 6).
According to the Union, under Article 1 §§ 1 of the parties’
CBA, “the Port Authority recognized Local 1984 as the exclusive
collective

bargaining

representative

of

all

hourly

paid

production and maintenance employees who are employed at all
public Port facilities operated by the Port Authority, excluding
salaried merit system and terminal railroad employees.” (Doc. 1
at 5-6).
barge

The Union contends that ASPA’s sub-contracting of the

cleaning

duties

at

the

McDuffie

Terminal

violated

the

exclusivity provisions of the parties’ CBA. (Id.). In support of
its

argument

that

the

cleaning

duties

constituted

bargaining

unit work covered under the parties’ agreement, the Union notes
that

ASPA

conceded

the

existence

of

a

long-standing

policy

whereby bargaining unit employees performed said duties. (Id.)
The Union further contends that the Board’s decision denying the
Union’s

claim

has

no

foundation

in

reason

or

fact,

and

impermissibly expands the CBA beyond its agreed upon terms, as
the Board acknowledged that there is an established practice of
using

bargaining

unit

employees
7

members

for

cleaning

in

conjunction with the unloading and loading of coal. (Id.).

ASPA

argues that the Union’s disagreement with the Board’s decision
is not a sufficient basis for vacating the award. (Doc. 16 at
6). According to ASPA, the Board provided a detailed lengthy
analysis that was grounded in reason and fact. (Id. at 7). ASPA
asserts that the Board properly found that the Union’s existing
practice of cleaning out unloaded barges at one location that
pose[d]

little

in

way

of

safety

hazards”

was

completely

different from sweeping decks on loaded barges at a hazardous
location. (Id.).
In

this

provisions

case,

relied

the

upon

Board
by

expressly

the

parties,

considered
and

the

determined

CBA
that

neither the exclusivity provision nor the management provision
addressed the specific issue before the Board. (Doc. 15-3). The
Board

found

that

at

one

time,

bargaining

unit

employees

performed the cleaning duties on vessels that had been unloaded
as well as the vessels that had been loaded; that the Coast
Guard began enforcing a regulation that provided that loaded
barges have no more than one gallon of coal dust on their decks;
that this resulted in the cleaning work on the loaded barges
being performed in an area exposed to tides and currents and
wave action; that this change in work environment

created a

safety hazard for ASPA employees, thus, ASPA began contracting
with barge owners to perform the work; that the Union did not
8

voice any objection until the work was subcontracted out; and
that the two bargaining unit employees who had once performed
the cleaning work at issue suffered no loss in pay. (Id.).
Upon review, the Court finds that the Board’s ruling was
not “wholly baseless and completely without reason”.

Indeed, it

is well settled that an arbitrator can review the parties’ past
practice,

usage

and

custom

in

interpreting

their

CBA.

Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Rx Labor Executives’ Assn., 491 U.S.
299, 311, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2485, 105 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1989).

This

is exactly what the Board did in this case. The Board found that
a practice that developed in response to one circumstance does
not automatically extend to a different set of circumstances.
(Doc.

15-3).

Specifically,

the

Board

concluded

that

the

situation under which the cleaning of the loaded barges occurred
was

clearly

far

more

hazardous

than

the

circumstances

under

which the unloaded barges were cleaned. (Id.). The Board also
determined that the outsourcing of the hazardous work did not
negatively impact bargaining unit employees as they continued to
receive pay. (Id.). Regardless of whether the Union agrees with
the

Board’s

decision,

it

has

failed

to

proffer

facts

that

suggest that the decision was “wholly baseless and completely
without reason.” See Loveless, 681 F.2d at 1276 (“[C]ourts will
not

vacate

an

award

because

a

judge

might

have

reached

different result.”). Thus, the award will not be vacated.
9

a

2. Award 3
In

Award

3,

the

Board

determined

that

the

CBA

was

not

violated when the Carrier allowed an employee (who had retained
the classification of Coal Machine Operator (CMO) but had been
working

in

the

accommodation)
attempted

to

to

Equipment
perform

assign

Operator

overtime

overtime

to

(EO)

work,
other

as

position
the

employees

as

an

Carrier

had

in

the

EO

classification but no employees were available. (Doc. 15-5). The
Union argues that in issuing this award, the Board failed to
conform or confine itself to matters within the scope of its
jurisdiction, as the Board relied on an extemporaneous agreement
between

the

ASPA

and

one

of

unambiguous terms of the CBA.

its

employees,

not

the

clear,

(Doc. 1 at 8-9). ASPA counters

that the Board’s decision did not exceed it’s jurisdiction, and
even if the Board made a factual error or failed to credit some
information, that would not be reason to consider the award in
excess of their jurisdiction. (Doc. 16 at 9-10). They further
argue that the Union’s contention that the award failed to rely
on the CBA is clearly contradicted by the award itself. (Id.).
Notwithstanding the Union’s assertions to the contrary, the
Board did not exceed its jurisdiction in resolving this claim.
The Board expressly found that pursuant to Article 18, Section 8
of the parties’ CBA, ASPA was required to offer EO overtime
within the EO overtime classification; however, on the day in
10

question,

ASPA

attempted

to

follow

the

overtime

distribution

priority rules but no employee holding the EO classification was
available.

(Doc. 15-5 at 3). Thus, ASPA utilized an employee

with a special work accommodation to perform the EO overtime as
it was the work that he normally performs on his regular shift.
(Id.). As noted by ASPA, the fact that the Union takes issue
with the Board’s factual finding that no other EO employees were
available

is

of

second-guess.
shows

that

no

moment.

It

is

not

this

Court’s

role

to

Further, a review of the reward at issue clearly

the

Board

interpreted

a

specific

parties’ CBA in resolving this claim.

portion

of

the

Thus, it did not exceed

its jurisdiction.
3. Award 4
In

Award

4,

the

Board

determined

that

the

CBA

was

not

violated when two employees were permitted to work a 8 hour
overtime

shift

performing

preventive

maintenance

on

conveyor

belts during the weekend of February 11-12, 2012, though the
claimant had requested and been denied the same opportunity.
(Doc. 15-7). The Union argues that the Board’s award was wholly
baseless

and

completely

without

reason

and

that

the

Board

completely ignored the clear and unambiguous provisions of CBA,
particularly, Article 20, Section 1 of the CBA, which provides
that “[w]hen required in case of emergency, an 8 hour shift may
be started at any time.” (Doc. 1 at 10-11).
11

The Union contends

that the Board ignored this language as the claimant properly
requested

to

be

allowed

to

work

an

8-hour

overtime

shift,

instead of the required 10, and his request was denied while two
other employees were permitted to leave work after 8 hours of
the overtime work. (Id.). ASPA argues that under the RLA, the
Board’s

interpretation

controls;

thus,

the

Union

has

not

presented a valid ground for vacating the award. (Doc. 16 at 1011).
In denying Award 4, the Board noted that it was unrefuted
that

the

Carrier

had

an

approximately

40-year

practice

of

scheduling longer shifts to perform maintenance under similar
circumstances, and that Article 20 Section 1 of the parties CBA
permitted an increase in shift hours from 8 to 10 not just for
emergencies, but also in order to accommodate operational and
maintenance requirements. (Doc. 15-7). The Board further found
that

the

claimant

disqualified

himself

from

performing

the

overtime work, and that the two comparators who were permitted
to leave after 8 hours were actually working on a different
maintenance project and had more seniority than the claimant.
The

undersigned

authority

in

finds

that

interpreting

the
the

Board
contract

rationale was not wholly without reason.

did

not

exceed

provision,

its

Accordingly, the Union

has not presented a valid ground for vacating the award.

12

and

its

4. Award 5
Award 5 involved the Union’s assertion that during a safety
meeting, a management employee spoke to a shop steward in a
disrespectful manner after the shop steward, who was attending
the meeting as a member of the work crew, questioned whether the
supervisor’s

statements

regarding

the

notice

absences complied with the parties’ CBA.

required

before

(Doc. 1 at 11-12).

Following the meeting, the shop steward wrote a letter to Human
Resources complaining about the supervisor’s behavior. (Doc. 113).

Nearly two months later, the shop steward filed a written

grievance form. (Doc. 1-14).

The shop steward classified his

grievance as a “step 2” grievance, and asserted that he had not
received any response to his formal harassment complaint filed
with

Human

Resources.

(Id.).

Subsequent

thereto,

the

shop

steward filed two additional written grievance forms, and he
classified them as “step 3” and “step 4” grievance. (Docs. 1-15,
1-16).
The parties submitted the following statement of claim to
the Board:
“Union member Brandon Harris alleged discrimination against
union officials and harassment.”
The

Board

determined

that

it

had

jurisdiction

over

the

dispute, and “[a]fter review of the submissions”, concluded that
“no issues remain in this dispute that require resolution by the
13

Board.” (Doc. 15-9 at 2).

Therefore, the Board dismissed the

claim. (Id.)
The Union contends that the arbitrator did more than just
interpret the parties’ agreement, “he flat out went rouge in
suggesting that there was not a valid grievance.” (Doc. 18 at
8).

According to the Union, in the parties’ CBA, at Article 3,

§ 2, the parties set a pretty low standard with respect to
defining what constitutes a grievance. (Id.). As a result, the
Board’s

determination

that

there

was

no

grievance

is

“inconceivable” under the CBA. (Id.).
The

clear

concluding

that

gist
there

of

the

were

Union’s

no

issues

argument
to

is

resolve,

that
the

in

Board

implicitly found that there was no valid grievance under the
CBA, and this finding is wrong.

The Court finds that, assuming

arguendo that the Union is correct in its assertion that the
Board did not properly construe the shop steward’s letter as a
grievance under Article 3 § 2, that does not provide a basis for
setting aside the award.

The law is firmly established that

courts must defer entirely to the arbitrator’s interpretation of
the underlying contract no matter how wrong the Court believes
it

to

be.

Wiregrass

Metal

Trades

Council

AFL-CIO

v.

Shaw

Environmental & Infrastructure, Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16535
(llth Cir. 2016).
“[b]ecause

the

Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that
parties

bargained
14

for

the

arbitrator’s

construction
arguably

of

their

construing

or

agreement,

an

applying

arbitral

the

contract

regardless of a court’s view of its (de)meits.”
Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. ---

decision
must

even
stand,

Oxford Health

, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068, 186

L. Ed. 2d 113 (2013)(quotation marks omitted). Thus, “the sole
question

for

[the

Court]

is

whether

the

arbitrator

(even

arguably) interpreted the parties’ contract, not whether he got
its

meaning

right

or

wrong.”

Id.

at

2068.

If

the

Court

determines that “the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the
parties’ contract”, the Court must end its inquiry and deny a
motion for vacatur.

S. Commc’ns Servs., Inc. v. Thomas, 720 F.

3d 1352, 1359 (llth Cir. 2013).
In

this

case,

it

is

undisputed

that

the

shop

steward

initially wrote a letter to Human Resources complaining about
the alleged disrespectful treatment he received during a safety
meeting.
taken

He did not contend that any tangible action had been

against

him

nor

did

he

request

any

specific

remedy.

Nearly two months later, he submitted a formal grievance form
complaining that the Company had not responded to his letter.
Against this backdrop of facts, the Board considered the Union’s
challenge, and concluded that “no issues remain in this dispute
that require resolution by the Board.” (Doc. 15-9). There is
nothing before the Court that suggests that the Board simply
ignored the parties’ CBA, and this Court cannot second guess the
15

Board’s implicit finding that the shop steward’s letter did not
rise to the level of a

grievance under the CBA.

Thus, the

award is due to be upheld.
5. Awards 6 and 7
Award 6 involved a challenge by the Union alleging unjust
discipline

based

on

“counseling”

issued

to

employees

for

purportedly failing to timely notify the company of absences.
(Doc.

15-11).

Award

7

involved

a

discipline

in

the

form

of

counseling and a letter that was placed in the personnel file of
employee Tracy Higgins, who at the request of the Port police
chief, entered a confined space in violation of the Company’s
confined space entry program and OSHA training. (Doc. 1 at 15).
In

its

letters

award,
of

the

Board

counseling

noted

do

not

that

the

constitute

parties

agreed

discipline,

and

that
the

Board urged the carrier and the union to make clear to all
supervisors

of

hourly

employees

and

all

hourly

employees

represented by the Union that counseling is not to be considered
discipline and will not be considered as part of progressive
discipline at the Port. (Doc. 15-11 at 3).

The Board then

concluded that the claim was resolved in accordance with the
finding. (Id.).
Plaintiff argues that Award 6 only partially resolved one
dispute,

but

letters

from

did

not

address

employees’

the

files,
16

removal
and

of

that

the
ASPA

counseling
did

not

unilaterally agree to do so. (Doc. 1 at 14). The Union contends
that this fails to comply with the requirements of the RLA and
that the Board failed to confine itself to matters within its
jurisdiction; thus, the award should be remanded to the Board
for further consideration. (Doc. 1 at 14-15). In Award 7, the
Board dismissed Case 7 on the basis that Case 6 had addressed
the underlying issue present in both cases by stating counseling
is not considered discipline. (Doc. 15-13).

Plaintiff asserts

that the board failed to address the Union’s requested remedy in
Case 7; therefore, the Board failed to conform or confine itself
to

matters

within

the

scope

of

the

Board’s

jurisdiction

in

violation of the RLA. (Doc. 1 at 15-16). Defendant counters that
both parties agreed that letters of counseling do not constitute
discipline under well-settled labor law, and the Board found
that the claims were therefore resolved by agreement. (Doc. 16
at 12). According to Defendant, the Board was not required to
expressly address each argument of the Union, or, indeed, give
any reason for an award at all. (Doc. 16 at 12-13).
Generally,

arbitrators

are

not

required

to

include

explanations, much less detailed ones, and they often do not.
Wiregrass, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16535 at *13 (quoting United
Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. &
Serv. Works Int’l Union AFL-CIO-CLC v. Wise Alloys, LLC., 807 F.
3d 1258, 1275 (11th Cir. 2015))(“Unless the parties stipulate
17

otherwise. . .an arbitrator is under no obligation to provide
explanations

with

his

award.”);

Cat

Charter,

LLC

v.

Schurtenberger, 646 F. 3d 836, 844 (llth Cir. 2011)(“Generally,
an arbitrator need not explain her decision; thus, in a typical
arbitration

where

no

specific

form

of

award

is

requested,

arbitrators may provide a ‘standard award’ and simply announce a
result.”)). As observed by the Court in Wiregrass:
“[W]hen
it
is
“not
apparent”
from
the
arbitrator’s
stated
reasoning
(or
lack
thereof)
whether [he] permissibly interpreted a collective
bargaining agreement or impermissibly modified it, and
one can plausibly read the award either way, the court
must resolve the ambiguity by finding that the award
is an interpretation of the contract and enforcing it.
The rule reflects a strong, albeit not irrebuttable,
presumption that the arbitrator has interpreted the
agreement instead of modifying it.”
Wiregrass, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16535 at *17.

The Court in

Wiregrass noted that if the arbitrator in that labor arbitration
case had issued a standard award, simply announcing a result
without explanation, there would not have been any grounds for
vacating

the

award,

and

that

the

fact

that

the

arbitrator

provided an incomplete explanation for the award, instead of
none at all, should not be a basis for vacating an award because
it would discourage “arbitrators from saying anything beyond who
won and how much”. Wiregrass, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16535 at *19.
The Union’s challenge to Awards 6 and 7 is essentially that
the Board provided an incomplete award, and left unresolved some

18

issues. Given the undisputed evidence that the Board (along with
the

parties)

found

that

the

letters

of

counseling

do

not

constitute discipline, and that the Board concluded that all
issues were resolved, one can rationally interpret the Board’s
decision

to

include

violate the CBA.

an

implicit

finding

that

ASPA

did

not

Thus, the Board award must be upheld.

III. Conclusion
Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments at
length, the Court finds that none of the criteria to trigger
judicial review under the Railway Labor Act § 3 First (p), 45
U.S.C. § 153 have been met. Accordingly, the undersigned finds
the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED, and this
action dismissed with prejudice.
ORDERED this 6th day of October, 2016.
/s/ Sonja F. Bivins
*
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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