Aldridge v. Colvin

Filing 19

Order that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiffs claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits be AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 3/23/2016. Copies to parties. (mpp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CASSANDRA L. ALDRIDGE,

*
*
Plaintiff,
*
*
vs.
*
*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
*
Commissioner of Social Security,*
*
Defendant.
*

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00006-B

ORDER
Plaintiff Cassandra L. Aldridge (hereinafter “Plaintiff”)
brings this action seeking judicial review of a final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for a
period

of

disability

and

disability

insurance

benefits

under

Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq.
On

October

consented

15,
to

2015,
have

the

the

proceedings in this case.

parties

waived

undersigned

oral

conduct

(Docs. 15, 16).

argument
any

and

and
all

Thus, the action was

referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order
the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73.

Upon careful consideration

of the administrative record and the memoranda of the parties,
it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be
AFFIRMED.

I.

Procedural History
Plaintiff

filed

an

application

seeking

a

period

of

disability and disability insurance benefits on August 26, 2011
alleging disability due to rheumatoid arthritis in all joints,
severe edema, thyroid issues, diabetes, chronic sinus and lung
issues, potassium deficiency, and severe fish allergy. (Tr. 11).
The application was initially denied on November 4, 2011, and
Plaintiff timely filed a Request for Hearing on November 28,
2011. (Id. at 63, 71-72). While Plaintiff’s Request for Hearing
(on

her

application

for

disability

and

disability

insurance

benefits) was pending, she filed an application for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) on September 24, 2012.
140).

The SSI claim

(Id. at 133-

was forwarded to the Office of Disability

Adjudication and Review, and a hearing on both claims was held
before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Thomas M. Muth II in
Mobile, Alabama on January 1, 2013. (Id. at 37-61). Plaintiff
testified at the hearing as did a

vocational expert (“VE”).

(Id.).
On June 24, 2013, the ALJ issued
decision.

(Id. at 18-36).

a partially favorable

With respect to Plaintiff’s claim

for disability and disability insurance benefits, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff had sufficient quarters of coverage to remain
insured through December 31, 2010; thus, she had to establish
that she was disabled on or before that date in order to be
2

entitled

to

disability

and

disability

benefits.

The

ALJ

concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled prior to September 13,
2012, and that she became disabled on that date and continued to
be disabled through the date of his decision.

(Id. at 22).

As

a

not

to

result

of

said

findings,

Plaintiff

was

entitled

disability and disability benefits; however, she was entitled to
receive SSI benefits.

Plaintiff sought review, and the Appeals

Council denied her request on November 21, 2014.

(Id. at 1-7).

Thus, the ALJ’s decision dated June 24, 2013 became the final
decision of the Commissioner.
Having

exhausted

her

administrative

timely filed the present civil action.

remedies,

(Doc. 1).

Plaintiff

The parties

agree that this case is now ripe for judicial review and is
properly before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3).
II.

Issue on Appeal
Whether the ALJ erred by failing to
enlist the services of a medical advisor
to
determine
the
onset
date
of
Plaintiff’s disability.

III. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born on July 10, 1978, and was thirty-four
years

of

January

age
22,

at
2013.

the

time
(Tr.

of

her

28,

41).

administrative
She

testified

completed her college education in May of 2008.
3

hearing
that

on
she

(Id. at 41-42,

54).

Plaintiff has past employment as a cashier, receptionist,

and teacher. (Id. at 42-43, 46, 144-146, 160-161).
Plaintiff’s alleged onset date of disability is May 12,
2007.

(Id. at 148).

According to Plaintiff, she began having

ongoing problems with edema in 2006.
was caused by hyperaldosteronism.1
2006,

Plaintiff

also

began

Her doctors believed it

(Id. at 51).

having

problems

Around March of

with

her

thyroid

(which caused her to gain weight), and she began suffering from
severe allergies, sinus problems, infections, pneumonia, and a
potassium deficiency.

(Id. at 52-54).

In 2007, Plaintiff also

began having severe problems with rheumatoid arthritis.

(Id. at

47). Plaintiff testified that she is currently unable to work
due to rheumatoid arthritis, massive amounts of edema, potassium
deficiency,

allergies,

thyroid difficulties.

chronic

pneumonia,

sinus

issues,

and

(Id. at 45).

Plaintiff lives with her husband and two small children,
ages twelve and three.(Id. at 45-46).

Plaintiff testified that

she homeschools both children, and that her husband was staying
home to assist her.

IV.

(Id. at 46).

Analysis

1

Hyperaldosteronism is a disorder in which the adrenal gland
releases too much of the hormone aldosterone into the blood.
See https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000330.htm.
4

A.

Standard of Review

In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s
role

is

a

limited

determining

1)

one.

whether

The
the

Court’s
decision

review
of

the

is

limited

to

Secretary

is

supported by substantial evidence and 2) whether the correct
legal standards were applied.
1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).

2

Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d

A court may not decide the facts

anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that
of the Commissioner.
Cir.

1986).

The

Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th
Commissioner’s

findings

of

fact

affirmed if they are based upon substantial evidence.

must

be

Brown v.

Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth v.
Heckler,

703

F.2d

1233,

1239

(11th

Cir.

1983)

(holding

substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla, but
less

than

a

preponderance”

and

consists

of

“such

relevant

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
support

a

conclusion.”).

In

determining

whether

substantial

evidence exists, a court must view the record as a whole, taking
into account evidence favorable, as well as unfavorable, to the
Commissioner’s decision.

Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131

(11th Cir. 1986); Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163, *4
(S.D. Ala. June 14, 1999).
2

This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal
principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th
Cir. 1987).
5

B.

Discussion

An individual who applies for Social Security disability
benefits

must

prove

404.1512, 416.912.

his

or

her

disability.

20

C.F.R.

§§

Disability is defined as the “inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.”

42

U.S.C.

§§

404.1505(a),

416.905(a).

provide

five-step

a

423(d)(1)(A);
The

see

Social

sequential

also

20

Security

evaluation

§§

regulations
process

determining if a claimant has proven his disability. 3
3

C.F.R.

for

20 C.F.R.

The claimant must first prove that he or she has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity.
The second step requires the
claimant to prove that he or she has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments. If, at the third step, the claimant
proves that the impairment or combination of impairments meets
or
equals
a
listed
impairment,
then
the
claimant
is
automatically found disabled regardless of age, education, or
work experience.
If the claimant cannot prevail at the third
step, he or she must proceed to the fourth step where the
claimant must prove an inability to perform their past relevant
work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). In
evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden, the
examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective
medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining
physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age,
education and work history.
Id.
Once a claimant meets this
burden, it becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove at the
fifth step that the claimant is capable of engaging in another
kind
of
substantial
gainful
employment
which
exists
in
significant
numbers
in
the
national
economy,
given
the
claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and
work history.
Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir.
6

§§ 404.1520, 416.920.
In the case sub judice, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 12,
2007,

the

impairments

alleged
of

onset

obesity,

date,
right

and

that

Baker’s

she

cyst,

has

the

bilateral

severe
lower

extremity pedal edema, rheumatoid arthritis, cholecystitis s/p
cholecystectomy,

muscle

sinusitis, and depression.

tension

headaches,

(Tr. 24, 148).

bronchitis,

The ALJ further

found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
any of the listed impairments contained in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1.

(Id. at 31).

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s last insured date was
December 31, 2010, and that based on the evidence before him, on
said date, she had the residual functional capacity (hereinafter
“RFC”) to perform sedentary work, except that she:
“could lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally and
items of negligible weight frequently.
She could
stand and/or walk 2 hours in an 8-hour workday and sit
6 hours in an 8-hour workday but required the option
to sit/stand every 45 minutes.
She could perform
occasional pushing and/or pulling with the upper
extremities,
bilaterally,
and
occasional
pushing
1985). If the Commissioner can demonstrate that there are such
jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant must prove inability
to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v.
Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). See also Hale v.
Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v.
Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).
7

and/or
pulling
with
the
lower
extremities,
bilaterally.
She could perform occasional balancing,
occasional stooping, occasional kneeling, occasional
crouching,
occasional
crawling,
and
occasional
climbing of ramps and stairs.
She could perform no
climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds.
She could
perform
frequent
reaching,
bilaterally;
frequent
handling,
bilaterally;
frequent
fingering,
bilaterally; and frequent feeling, bilaterally.
She
could tolerate occasional exposure to extreme cold,
occasional exposure to extreme heat, and occasional
exposure to pulmonary irritants. She was required to
avoid all exposure to unprotected heights and avoid
all exposure to dangerous machinery.
She would have
had one unplanned absence per month.”
(Id. at 25-26).
The ALJ also determined that while Plaintiff’s medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce
the alleged symptoms, her statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of the alleged symptoms were
not entirely credible to the extent that they were inconsistent
with the RFC assessment.

(Id. at 27).

Utilizing the testimony

of a VE, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s residual
functional capacity for a range of
stated restrictions, as well as

sedentary work, with the

her age, education and work

experience, Plaintiff is capable of performing her past work as
a data entry clerk (sedentary, skilled) and as a receptionist
(sedentary,
concluded

semi-skilled).

that

Plaintiff

(Id.
is

not

at

31).

entitled

Thus,
to

the

disability

ALJ
or

disability insurance benefits because she was not disabled on or
before her last insured date of December 31, 2010. (Id. at 318

32).
In addition, based on the evidence related to Plaintiff’s
medical condition through September 13, 2012 (the date that she
filed

her

application

for

SSI

benefits),

the

ALJ

modified

Plaintiff’s RFC and determined that she could no longer perform
her past work and in fact could not perform any jobs in the
national economy.

(Id. at 30-32).

Therefore, the ALJ concluded

that Plaintiff has been disabled beginning September 13, 2012,
and

has

continued

to

be

disabled

through

the

date

of

the

in

light

of

the

decision. (Id. at 32).
The

Court

now

considers

the

foregoing

record in this case and the issues on appeal.
1.

Issue
Whether the ALJ erred in failing to
enlist the services of a medical advisor
to
determine
the
onset
date
of
disability?

Plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal is that the ALJ erred
in

failing

determine

to
the

utilize
onset

the

date

Plaintiff argues that

services
of

her

of

a

medical

disability.

advisor

to

Specifically,

the ALJ’s decision does not provide a

sufficient explanation of why he selected the September 13, 2012
onset date, and that he was required, under SSR 83-20, to enlist
the

services

determination.

of

a

medical

advisor

(Doc. 12 at 2-3).
9

to

aid

in

making

this

The Commissioner counters

that

Plaintiff

does

not

point

to

any

relevant

evidence

contradicting the ALJ’s finding that she was not disabled prior
to December 31, 2010, and that SSR 83-20 requires medical expert
testimony only where the evidence of onset is “ambiguous or
inadequate.”
Having

(Doc. 13 at 3-4) (internal citations omitted).

reviewed

the

record

at

length,

the

Court

finds

that

Plaintiff’s claim is without merit.
The undersigned observes, as a preliminary matter that in
order to be eligible for a period of disability and disability
insurance

benefits,

the

onset

date

of

Plaintiff’s

disability

must have occurred on or before her date last insured, which is
December

31,

2010.

(Tr.

22).

The

ALJ

clearly

found

that

Plaintiff’s onset date did not occur on or before her date last
insured.

Instead, he fixed her onset date as September 13,

2012, the date that Plaintiff filed her application for SSI
benefits.

(Tr. 133-40).

As explained herein, in this case, the

precise date that Plaintiff’s impairments became disabling is
not important, as long as it did not occur prior to her date
last insured.

In other words, Plaintiff was not eligible for a

period of disability and disability insurance benefits at any
time after December 31, 2010, nor was she eligible for SSI at
any

time

before

application.

September

13,

2012,

the

date

of

her

SSI

So, if her disability onset date occurred at any

time after December 31, 2010, and September 13, 2012, it is of
10

no consequence to her appeal.

Thus, the Court will review this

case to determine if there is substantial evidence to support
the

ALJ’s

begin

determination

prior

argues,

the

to

that

December

evidence

Plaintiff’s

31,

was

2010

disability

or

whether,

or

inadequate

ambiguous

as

did

not

Plaintiff
and,

thus,

required a medical expert to answer that question.
While
medical
onset

it

undisputed

professional

date,

evidence

is

the

in

the

at

that

the

hearing

undersigned
record

the

finds

to

ALJ
to

that

enable

did

not

determine
there

the

ALJ

was

utilize

a

Plaintiff’s
sufficient

to

make

the

determination. Social Security Ruling 83-20, 1983 SSR LEXIS 25,
prescribes the policy and procedure by which the Commissioner
should determine the onset date of a disability. See SSR 83-20,
1983 SSR LEXIS 25. It defines the onset date as "the first day
an

individual

is

disabled

as

defined

in

the

Act

and

the

regulations." SSR 83-20, 1983 SSR LEXIS 25. "In addition to
determining that an individual is disabled, the decisionmaker
must also establish the onset date of disability," which may be
critical to determinations such as the period for which the
individual will be paid. Id.
SSR 83-20 also provides, in relevant part, that:
In some cases, it may be possible, based on the medical
evidence to reasonably infer that the onset of a
disabling impairment(s) occurred some time prior to the
date of the first recorded medical examination, e.g.,
the date the claimant stopped working. How long the
11

disease may be determined to have existed at a disabling
level of severity depends on an informed judgment of the
facts in the particular case. The judgment, however,
must have a legitimate medical basis. At the hearing,
the [ALJ] should call on the services of a medical
advisor when onset must be inferred. If there is
information in the file indicating that additional
medical evidence concerning onset is available, such
evidence should be secured before inferences are made.
SSR 83-20.
In discussing SSR 83-20, the court, in Caces v. Comm’r,
SSA, 560 Fed. Appx. 936 (llth Cir. 2014), held that “the plain
language of SSR 83-20, 1983 SSR LEXIS 25, indicates that it is
applicable only after there has been a finding of disability and
it

is

then

necessary

to

determine

when

the

disability

began.”(citation omitted)(emphasis added). The Court held that
where the ALJ found that the claimant was not disabled prior to
the

date

last

insured

based

on

“ample,

unambiguous

medical

evidence from both before and after the date last insured”, and
said finding was supported by the evidence, the ALJ did not err
in failing to call a medical expert to determine an onset date
of such a disability. Id. at 939; See also McManus v. Barnhard,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27748, 2004 WL 3316303, *6 (M.D. Fla. Dec.
14, 2004)(court held that SSR 83–20 applies “to situations where
the ALJ is called upon to make a retroactive inference regarding
disability involving a slowly progressive impairment, and the
medical

evidence

ambiguous).

during

the

insured

period

is

inadequate

or

Thus, SSR 83-20 applies in situations where the ALJ
12

must

make

a

retroactive

inference

regarding

the

claimant’s

disability during the insured period, and the medical evidence
covering the insured period is simply inadequate or ambiguous to
enable the ALJ to made the determination.
Having reviewed the evidence in this case at length, the
Court

finds

that

the

ALJ’s

decision

that

Plaintiff

was

not

disabled before December 31, 2010 is supported by substantial
evidence that is neither ambiguous nor inadequate. The record
evidence

reflects

in

2006,

Plaintiff

received

treatment

at

Thomas Hospital for bilateral lower extremity swelling, and she
initially
reduced

reported

to

3/10.

a

pain

(Tr.

level

26,

of

7/10,

207-224).

In

but

it

2007,

was

later

Plaintiff’s

treating physician, Dr. Sullivan, noted during a new patient
physical, that Plaintiff had mild arthritis, and some swelling
in

the

hands.

(Id.

at

369).

He

further

noted

that

these

conditions had been on an “approximately 10 year course without
significant synovitis or progression”.

(Id.). He further noted

that that her conditions had not limited her activities; that
her health had otherwise been good; and that she had a good
range of motion (ROM) in her joints. (Id.).
In 2008, while Plaintiff was being treated for pregnancy,
the

medical

records

contain

various

references

to

rheumatoid

arthritis, thyroid disorder, and high potassium; however, there
is nothing in the records documenting any significant problems
13

arising

from

any

of

these

conditions.

(Id.

at

255-256).

Indeed, in 2009, Dr. Sullivan noted that while Plaintiff had
some

swelling

and

tenderness

in

areas

of

her

body,

she

demonstrated a good ROM in her joints, and she had 5/5 strength
in

her

upper

Sullivan’s
reflect

and

lower

treatment

that

the

extremities.

notes

between

Prednisone

(Id.

June

prescribed

joint pain and swelling was decreased.

at

and
to

368).

August

treat

of

Dr.
2009

Plaintiff’s

(Id. at 367).

In 2010, Plaintiff’s medical records include lab results
from a heart scan, diabetes screening, a uterine scan, a thyroid
scan, and an abdominal scan.

The only tests relevant to her

impairments are the thyroid scan, which was “normal” (id. at
377-86)

and

the

abdominal

scan,

which

was

noted

as

“unremarkable,” but for an obscuring of the pancreas and hepatic
steatosis (fatty liver disease).

(Id. at 385).

After Plaintiff’s date last insured, December 31, 2010, the
evidence reflects that Plaintiff had several appointments with
Dr. Thomas Sapp, M.D., in 2011.

(Id. at 396).

notes

expressed

reflect

that

Plaintiff

The June 2011

concern

regarding

continued weight gain, and Dr. Sapp diagnosed Plaintiff with
hypothyroidism,
hormone

obesity,

deficiency,

hypercholesterolemia.

weight
marked
(Id.

at

related

diabetes

libido
395).

Dr.

mellitus,

decrease,
Sapp

and

instructed

Plaintiff to start walking, and Plaintiff reported that she was
14

capable of walking two miles a day, which was the course of
action then prescribed by Dr. Sapp. (Id.) Medical records from
later in 2011 list acute generalized myositis (inflammation and
degeneration of muscle tissues), pain due to a proximal Achilles
tear, respiratory illnesses, and continued hypothyroidism.(Id.
at 390-394).
While

Plaintiff

argues

that

the

evidence

in

this

case

related to her onset date is insufficient or ambiguous, she does
not indicate in what respect the records are insufficient or
ambiguous. The only document Plaintiff appears to rely upon to
support her assertion is a July 30, 2012 assessment prepared by
her treating physician, Dr. Sapp. In the document, Dr. Sapp
avers that he had been seeing Plaintiff for over two years, and
that it was his opinion that Plaintiff could not engage in any
form of gainful employment “on a repetitive, completive, and
productive basis over an eight hour work day, forty hours a
week, without missing more than 2 days of work per month or
experiencing frequent interruptions to his/her work routine” due
to her condition.
letter,

nor

in

(Tr. 508).
the

record

There is nothing in Dr. Sapp’s
evidence,

that

indicates

that

Plaintiff’s inability to work began nineteen months earlier, on
or

before

December

31,

2010.

To

the

contrary,

the

record

evidence reflects that while Plaintiff claims a disability onset
date

of

2007,

in

2008,

she

was
15

able

to

obtain

her

college

degree, and in June 2011, she reported to Dr. Sapp that she was
still capable of walking two miles a day.
Based

on

the

foregoing,

the

(Id. at 54, 395).

undersigned

finds

that

the

record contains substantial evidence, that is both adequate and
unambiguous, and that enabled the ALJ to make the disability
determination; thus, he was not required to consult a medical
advisor

on

the

question

of

whether

Plaintiff

was

disabled

ability prior to December 31, 2010, the date last insured.

See

Caces v. Commissioner, Soc. Sec. Admin., 560 Fed. Appx. 936,
937-939 (11th Cir. Mar. 27, 2014) (holding that the ALJ did not
err in failing to consult a medical advisor where the medical
records showed that the plaintiff’s condition improved after his
surgery, that medication and physical therapy proved successful
in improving the plaintiff’s condition, and no additional relief
was sought until after the date last insured); Wright v. Colvin,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38182, 2015 WL 1346043, *6 (S.D. Ala.
March 24, 2015) (holding that the ALJ did not err in failing to
consult

a

medical

advisor

where

the

plaintiff

only

required

treatment for his condition for a few weeks prior to the date
last insured; no serious complaints related to the condition
were discussed in follow up appointments; and the plaintiff did
not take any medication for the relevant condition); Gregory v.
Astrue, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37106, 2011 WL 1100292, *6 (M.D.
Fla.

Mar.

23,

2011)

(holding

that
16

the

ALJ

did

not

err

in

discounting retrospective opinions by the treating physician or
failing to consult a medical advisor where the evidence showed
only “intermittent acute symptoms” relating to the plaintiff’s
condition through the date last insured).
V.

Conclusion

For

the

reasons

set

forth

herein,

and

upon

careful

consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the
parties,

it

is

hereby

ORDERED

that

the

decision

of

the

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for a
period

of

disability

and

disability

insurance

benefits

be

AFFIRMED.
DONE this 23rd day of March, 2016.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17