Pace v. Williams et al

Filing 16

Order granting 7 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Nick Williams. Plaintiff's claims against Judge Williams are dismissed with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate him as a defendant. The request for attorney's fees is denied. The 14 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel is granted in part. Plaintiff's counsel is ordered by 6/30/2015 to notify the Court as to which option she intends to pursue to remedy the ethical violation. Signed by Chief Judge William H. Steele on 6/16/2015. (tgw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SHERRY PACE,
Plaintiff,
v.
NICK WILLIAMS, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION 15-0157-WS-B

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Probate Judge Nick Williams’ Motion
to Dismiss (doc. 7) and his Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel (doc. 14). Both Motions
have been briefed and are now ripe for disposition.1
I.

Relevant Background.
On March 24, 2015, plaintiff, Sherry Pace (proceeding by and through counsel), filed her

Complaint (doc. 1) in this District Court against Nick Williams (Probate Judge of Washington
County, Alabama), Michael Goldman (the “Mental Health Representative” of Washington
County, Alabama), Johnny Pace (plaintiff’s ex-husband), and Jason Pace (plaintiff’s exhusband’s son). The crux of the Complaint is Ms. Pace’s contention that “one or more of the
Defendants act[ed] wrongfully to involuntary commit her” without complying with proper
procedures, without investigating the matter, without a factual basis, and with an improper

1

For purposes of its Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, the Court accepts as true all wellpleaded factual allegations of the Complaint, and draws all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010) (in
reviewing Rule 12(b)(6) motion, court must “accept[] the facts alleged in the complaint as true,”
“draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,” and “limit[] our review to the four
corners of the complaint”). Of course, “[l]egal conclusions without adequate factual support are
entitled to no assumption of truth.” Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011).

purpose (namely, her ex-husband’s desire “to gain an unfair tactical advantage in an ongoing
domestic relations dispute”). (Doc. 1, at 1.)2
With regard to defendant Nick Williams, the Complaint identifies him as Probate Judge
of Washington County, Alabama, and sharply criticizes his handling of a petition for involuntary
commitment filed by defendant Johnny Pace on or about August 29, 2014. According to the
Complaint, Judge Williams “wrongfully involuntarily committed [plaintiff] to a mental health
facility summarily without any due process hearing or any investigation and without any attempt
to comply with the statutory mandate for such issues.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 10.) The Complaint further
alleges that Judge Williams “could have easily … discovered” that “there was no actual need to
commit the Plaintiff who did not then and does not now suffer from any mental health
condition,” had he “conducted any investigation or a pre-commitments due process hearing as is
set out by state law.” (Id., ¶ 16.) Plaintiff’s pleading repeatedly characterizes this alleged
conduct as an “abuse of governmental power.”
In sum, Ms. Pace seeks to hold Judge Williams liable for compensatory, consequential
and punitive damages exceeding $1 million because he ordered her to be involuntary committed,
allegedly without conducting a due process hearing, performing an investigation, or otherwise
complying with Alabama law and procedure. According to the Complaint, Judge Williams’
conduct amounts to “violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, abuse of governmental power, trespass
and the wrongful taking of the Plaintiff’s person” (doc. 1, ¶ 15); as well as “violation(s) of
federal, state and municipal rights of private citizens to be free from unlawful and unauthorized
governmental interference and ‘taking’ of private property for tactical advantage in a divorce and
taking of the Plaintiff’s person without due process of law” (id., ¶ 19); and “retaliation against
the Plaintiff SHERRY PACE’s exercise of her First Amendment rights and vocal criticism of the
Defendant(s) in the recent past” (id., ¶ 22); and at least 15 separately enumerated state-law torts
(id., ¶ 25).

2

As framed, the Complaint is a textbook example of an impermissible shotgun
pleading, asserting each of at least three federal claims and at least 15 state-law tort claims
against each of four defendants in an undifferentiated mass, without identifying which facts go
with which claims and which claims go against which defendants. For purposes of the instant
Order, the Court sets this pleading defect aside, to be revisited at an appropriate time.

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Judge Williams’ response to the Complaint has been two-fold. First, he filed a Motion to
Dismiss (doc. 70) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., citing the doctrine of judicial
immunity. Second, he filed a Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel (doc. 14) based on a
conflict of interest, in that Ms. Pace’s counsel had previously represented defendant Johnny Pace
in connection with the underlying facts at issue in this litigation. Plaintiff has denied that judicial
immunity applies and has further denied that counsel labors under any conflict.
II.

Analysis of Motion to Dismiss.
Judge Williams’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion hinges on the doctrine of judicial immunity. It is

hornbook law that “[j]udges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those
acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of
all jurisdiction.” Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 944 (11th Cir. 1985)
(“Since the seventeenth century, common law has immunized judges from suit for judicial acts
within the jurisdiction of the court.”). “The rationale is that judges should not have to fear that
unsatisfied litigants will hound them with litigation.” Weinstein v. City of North Bay Village,
977 F. Supp.2d 1271, 1281-82 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (citation and internal marks omitted).3
In applying the two-pronged test for judicial immunity, “the first question is whether the
judge dealt with the plaintiff in his judicial capacity.” William B. Cashion Nevada Spendthrift
Trust v. Vance, 552 Fed.Appx. 884, 886 (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2014). “If he did act in his judicial
capacity, then we ask whether the judge acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. If the
judge acted in his judicial capacity, and if he did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction,
then he is entitled to judicial immunity, as a matter of law. See Washington Mut. Bank v. Bush,
220 Fed.Appx. 974, 975 (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2007) (“Judicial immunity applies when (1) the judge
3

As Justice White observed some 35 years ago, “Judicial immunity arose because
it was in the public interest to have judges who were at liberty to exercise their independent
judgment about the merits of a case without fear of being mulcted for damages should an
unsatisfied litigant be able to convince another tribunal that the judge acted not only mistakenly
but with malice and corruption.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d
185 (1980); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (a
judge’s “errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied
litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden
on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation.”).

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dealt with the plaintiff in his judicial capacity and (2) the judge did not act in the clear absence of
all jurisdiction.”) (citation and internal marks omitted).
Beginning with step one, the allegations of the Complaint leave no doubt that Judge
Williams dealt with Sherry Pace in his capacity as Probate Judge of Washington County.
“Whether a judge’s actions were made while acting in his judicial capacity depends on whether:
(1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the
judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending before the judge;
and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.”
Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1070. Well-pleaded factual allegations of the Complaint reflect that Judge
Williams’ alleged wrongful act was his entry of an order of involuntary commitment and
accompanying writ on August 29, 2014, directing that Sherry Pace be taken into custody and
delivered to Eastpointe Hospital for mental health treatment. The Complaint confirms that Judge
Williams took such measures only after Johnny Pace filed a Petition for Involuntary
Commitment. Review and disposition of petitions for involuntary commitment is a normal
judicial function of an Alabama probate judge.4 Because it is an Alabama probate judge’s job to
review and decide petitions for involuntary commitment, the complained-of conduct by Judge
Williams is the embodiment of a “normal judicial function.” Plaintiff does not suggest
otherwise. Under any reasonable application of the concept, Judge Williams was acting in his
judicial capacity.
The first prong of the judicial immunity test having thus been satisfied, the analysis
proceeds to step two, which provides that judicial immunity bars Ms. Pace’s claims unless Judge
Williams acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. This is a high bar. Indeed, “[j]udges do
not lose their judicial immunity even if they act in absence of jurisdiction as long as they do not
have knowledge that they lack jurisdiction or act in the face of clearly valid statutes or case law
expressly depriving them of jurisdiction.” Franklin v. Arbor Station, LLC, 549 Fed.Appx. 831,
4

See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-52-2(a) (“[w]hen any petition is filed seeking the
involuntary commitment of a respondent, the probate judge shall immediately review the
petition”); Ala. Code § 22-52-10.1 (delineating circumstances under which probate judge may
enter an order for involuntary commitment); Ala. Code § 12-13-40(3) (specifying that probate
judges “shall have authority … [t]o appoint guardians ad litem for minors and persons of
unsound mind, when necessary”).

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834 (11th Cir. Sept. 27, 2013) (citation and internal marks omitted). Neither in her Complaint
nor in her briefing has Ms. Pace identified facts showing that Judge Williams knew he lacked
jurisdiction, much less that any Alabama statute or case law clearly deprived him of jurisdiction
to rule on Johnny Pace’s Petition for Involuntary Commitment filed against his wife in August
2014. There being no facts or circumstances presented that might support an inference that
Judge Williams acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, the Court concludes that the
doctrine of judicial immunity applies. Accordingly, Judge Williams is absolutely immune from
all claims asserted against him in this lawsuit.
In so determining, the Court has considered and rejected plaintiff’s counterarguments.
Principally, Ms. Pace asserts that judicial immunity does not apply because Judge Williams
violated state law in his handling of the Petition for Involuntary Commitment. This argument
misapprehends the breadth and scope of judicial immunity. A judge’s judicial acts are not
removed from the protections of judicial immunity merely because they are erroneous, unlawful,
or even corrupt or malicious. See, e.g., Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000)
(“This immunity applies even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of
his or her jurisdiction.”).5 So merely saying that Judge Williams contravened state or even
constitutional law does not override his protections under the doctrine of absolute judicial
immunity. For judicial immunity purposes, it makes no difference whether Judge Williams “got
it right,” or even whether he followed the law. Nor is plaintiff’s case strengthened by her
apparent allegation that Judge Williams persuaded Johnny Pace to file the Petition for
Involuntary Commitment in the first place, particularly where (as here) there is no allegation that
Judge Williams possessed any personal interest in the Paces’ domestic dispute. See Harris v.
Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911, 916 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Judges must be free to act on their convictions.
Judge Deveaux may have acted improperly in ordering the charges against Harris. We cannot
5

See also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331
(1978) (“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of
authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”); Conard v. Evans, 193
Fed.Appx. 945, 948 (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 2006) (“a judge is immune from suit even when her
exercise of authority is flawed by grave procedural errors”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); In re Lickman, 304 B.R. 897, 902 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004) (judicial immunity
“applies however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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say, however, that he was not acting in his judicial capacity.”).6 Finally, plaintiff’s reliance on
Alabama cases interpreting and delineating the limitations of other forms of immunity (such as
state-agent immunity) is unilluminating in the context of a judicial immunity analysis.
In short, the Court readily concludes that the doctrine of judicial immunity bars all of
Sherry Pace’s claims asserted against Judge Williams.7
III.

Analysis of Motion to Disqualify.
Notwithstanding the dismissal of defendant Judge Williams, the Court now turns to his

Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel (doc. 14). Ordinarily, such a motion would be rendered
moot by the dismissal of all claims against the movant; however, given the seriousness of the
allegations contained in that Motion and their obvious ramifications for plaintiff’s counsel’s
ability to proceed against the remaining defendants, the Court will consider that motion on the
merits.

6

Elsewhere, the Harris panel restated the point as follows: “Judge Deveaux
contends that Jones wanted to press charges, while Harris claims that only Judge Deveaux
wished to do so. This dispute, however, is irrelevant to our consideration of Judge Deveaux’s
claim of absolute immunity.” Id. at 914. The same is true here.
7

In addition to seeking dismissal of the claims against him on judicial immunity
grounds, Judge Williams requests an award of attorney’s fees. In § 1983 suits such as that
brought by Ms. Pace, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party … a reasonable
attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). This section “authorizes a district court
to award attorney’s fees to a defendant upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.” Fox v. Vice, --- U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2213, 180
L.Ed.2d 45 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant’s entire argument
for a fee award is “that the relevant law regarding Judge Williams’s judicial immunity has been
established since at least 1970.” (Doc. 8, at 7.) In its discretion, the Court declines to award
attorney’s fees here. To be sure, plaintiff appears not to have considered the doctrine of judicial
immunity; however, the Court cannot determine with any confidence that no colorable factual or
legal arguments could have been asserted to oppose application of judicial immunity. Stated
differently, it appears that Ms. Pace could have raised non-frivolous (albeit not successful)
counterarguments against application of judicial immunity in this case. For example, as the
Harris v. Deveaux line of authorities shows, where a judge actively becomes involved in the
charging process (which is akin to what Ms. Pace says Judge Williams did in initiating the
commitment proceeding), there may be cases where judicial immunity is called into question.
This is not one of those cases, but the Court cannot say (particularly given defendant’s
conclusory, afterthought treatment of the fee request) that it was frivolous for Ms. Pace to sue
Judge Williams in these circumstances.

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The basic problem identified in the Motion to Disqualify Counsel is that plaintiff’s
counsel has a conflict of interest in this case. As noted, Ms. Pace is suing her ex-husband,
Johnny Pace, on the theory that he “wrongfully ha[d] her involuntarily committed in order to
gain a tactical advantage in an on-going Domestic Relations dispute.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 4.) The
Complaint alleges that Johnny Pace “file[d] a false report” against Ms. Pace, then submitted “a
vindictive Petition for Involuntary Commitment.” (Id., ¶¶ 8-9.) Ms. Pace imputes a nefarious
motive to Johnny Pace, alleging that he “had planned to file for divorce agents [sic] her from her
[sic] while she was Involuntarily Committed.” (Id., ¶ 14.)
The rub is this: Back on November 24, 2014, plaintiff’s counsel sent a demand letter to
Judge Williams, seeking compensation from him on the ground that he “wrongfully committed
[Sherry Pace] to a mental health facility.” (Doc. 14, Exh. A.) The November 24 demand letter
states that plaintiff’s counsel had “spoken with both Mr. and Mrs. Pace, and each assert that this
abuse of governmental power has caused them tremendous anxiety and stress.” (Id.) The letter
proceeds with counsel’s statement that “[m]y clients have informed me that they are willing to
settle this matter” for a particular sum, barring which “the Pace family shall be forced to take
further steps to protect their legal rights.” (Id. (emphasis added).) Below the signature line is
the legend “cc: Mr. and Mrs. John Pace.” (Id.) Attached to that letter was an Affidavit of Sherry
Pace dated October 29, 2014 (and notarized on November 12, 2014), which by all appearances
was prepared by (or at least with the assistance and legal advice of) plaintiff’s counsel. (Id.) In
this lawsuit, plaintiff has offered as an exhibit a companion affidavit signed by John Pace, also
dated October 29, 2014 and notarized on November 12, 2014 by the same person as the Sherry
Pace Affidavit. (Doc. 12, Exh. 6.) Side-by-side inspection of the John Pace Affidavit and the
Sherry Pace Affidavit makes plain that they were prepared at the same time by the same
person(s). All signs point to plaintiff’s counsel.
The John Pace Affidavit delineates a version of the events leading to Sherry Pace’s
involuntary commitment which plaintiff (by and through the same attorney who represented both
Mr. and Ms. Pace in November 2014) now claims is a lie. Specifically, the John Pace Affidavit
contains averments that Johnny Pace “felted [sic] forced by the Probate Judge Nick Williams
into filing a Petition for Involuntary Commitment against my wife, even though I told him this
was not what I wanted to do;” that Johnny Pace repeatedly said “that I just wanted to have a
report or a record;” and that “at no time did I request this.” (Doc. 12, Exh. 6, ¶¶ 6-7, 9.) The

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John Pace Affidavit concludes, “I believe both mine and my wife’s civil rights have been
violated.” (Id., ¶ 12.) By contrast, Ms. Pace’s Complaint alleges that Johnny Pace rigged the
entire involuntary commitment petition in a “vindictive” attempt to get her involuntarily
committed so that he could file for divorce and obtain a strategic advantage. (Doc. 1.)
In the aggregate, then, the pertinent facts are these: Plaintiff’s counsel sent a demand
letter to Judge Williams concerning the subject matter of this lawsuit back in November 2014,
wherein she indicated that Ms. Pace and Johnny Pace were her clients. At around the same time,
plaintiff’s counsel oversaw, assisted, or otherwise participated in preparation of affidavits by
both Ms. Pace and Johnny Pace concerning the subject matter of this action. Now, the very same
attorney is representing Ms. Pace in a federal lawsuit against Johnny Pace predicated on the
theory that everything in the Johnny Pace Affidavit is a lie. If the case goes forward, plaintiff’s
counsel will no doubt examine Johnny Pace via deposition and/or trial testimony about the
contents of an affidavit that (by all appearances) she helped him prepare, and that he signed at a
time when she was holding herself out as his lawyer. In short, plaintiff’s counsel represented
Johnny Pace in connection with a particular dispute last fall, yet she now represents his ex-wife
in a lawsuit filed against him in connection with that very same dispute.
The resulting ethical dilemma is readily apparent. Rule 1.9 of the Alabama Rules of
Professional Conduct provides that “[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter
shall not thereafter: (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client, unless
the former client consents after consultation; or (b) use information relating to the representation
to the disadvantage of the former client.” Id. The present legal relationship implicates both
aspects of Rule 1.9. Unquestionably, counsel is representing Ms. Pace in a manner that is
materially adverse to Johnny Pace’s interests, in the very same (or at least a substantially related)
matter in which she previously represented him. There has been no showing that Johnny Pace
has consented to this arrangement after consultation. Moreover, counsel could not possibly
represent Ms. Pace in her suit against Johnny Pace without leveraging and utilizing confidential
information that he provided in the course of their previous attorney-client relationship. Using
that confidential information would violate Rule 1.6’s prohibition on revealing attorney-client
privileged information. But not using that confidential information would violate Rule 1.7(b)’s
provision that “[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be

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materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person.” Id.
Thus, if plaintiff’s counsel uses information that Johnny Pace provided during their prior
attorney-client relationship, then she is violating the prohibitions against revealing privileged
communications and using information relating to a previous representation to the disadvantage
of the former client. If she does not use that information, however, then the resulting limitation
on her representation of Ms. Pace would run afoul of Rule 1.7(b)’s prohibition against
representing a client when that representation is materially constrained by obligations to
someone else. This is an ethical minefield through which there can be no safe passage.
Faced with these allegations in the Motion to Disqualify, counsel’s response is to deny
having ever represented Johnny Pace. According to plaintiff’s counsel, Johnny Pace was simply
“a witness to verify that [Ms. Pace] had been mistreated by” Judge Williams. (Doc. 15, ¶ 3.)
She insists that Johnny Pace has never “asked her to represent him verbally or by written letter of
contract.” (Id.) The November 12, 2014 demand letter is unequivocal. It references anxiety and
stress that Judge Williams’ conduct has caused “both Mr. and Mrs. Pace.” It professes to make a
specific monetary demand on behalf of “[m]y clients.” It states that, in the absence of amicable
resolution, “the Pace family shall be forced to take further steps to protect their legal rights.”
And it reflects that courtesy copies were sent to “Mr. & Mrs. John Pace.” There is no rational
way to read the November 12 demand letter except as one made on behalf of both Sherry Pace
and Johnny Pace. Plaintiff’s counsel held herself out as Johnny Pace’s lawyer. She must live
with the consequences of that representation today.8
The remaining question is what is to be done. It is well settled that “a District Court is
obliged to take measures against unethical conduct occurring in connection with any proceeding
before it.” Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Sahyers
v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L., 560 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that
“court has power to supervise professional conduct of lawyers who practice before it”) (citation
omitted). The Court therefore will not pretend that the conflict does not exist merely because
8

Furthermore, it is inconceivable that counsel could have supervised / assisted /
participated in preparation of the Johnny Pace Affidavit notarized on November 12, 2014 (the
same day as the demand letter) without giving him legal advice. In that event, whether he had
signed a formal retainer agreement or not, Johnny Pace received legal advice from plaintiff’s
counsel about the very matter in which she is now suing him on behalf of his ex-wife.

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Johnny Pace has not raised the issue himself. Instead, the Court will allow plaintiff’s counsel to
select from three options, any one of which appear adequate to cure the ethical violation. Option
One is that plaintiff’s counsel and her law firm (under the imputed disqualification principles
found at Rule 1.10) withdraw from representing Ms. Pace in this matter. In that event, the Court
would afford Ms. Pace a window of time to retain substitute counsel, or to elect to proceed pro
se. Option Two is that counsel obtain knowing, voluntary, valid consent from both Ms. Pace and
Johnny Pace to proceed with this representation in its present form. Such consent would not be
sufficient unless it specifically encompassed all of the sub-issues identified supra, and plaintiff’s
counsel would need to file appropriate, sufficient proof of such consent for both persons. Option
Three is that plaintiff keeps counsel as her lawyer, dismisses all claims against Johnny Pace
without prejudice, and proceeds only against the remaining defendants, Michael Goldman and
Jason Pace (as to whom there is, at present, no indication of any conflict). Plaintiff’s counsel
must notify the Court in writing within two weeks of which option she intends to pursue.
IV.

Conclusion.
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows:
1.

Defendant Probate Judge Nick Williams’ Motion to Dismiss (doc. 7) is granted
pursuant to the doctrine of judicial immunity. Plaintiff’s claims against Judge
Williams are dismissed with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is directed to
terminate him as a party defendant;

2.

Judge Williams’ request for attorney’s fees embedded in his Motion to Dismiss is
denied in the Court’s discretion for lack of the requisite showing by movant; and

3.

Defendant Probate Judge Nick Williams’ Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel
(doc. 14) is granted in part. To remedy the ethical quandary identified in the
Motion, plaintiff’s counsel must notify the Court in writing, on or before June 30,
2015, as to which of the three options delineated above she intends to pursue.
Upon receiving such notice, the Court will enter an appropriate follow-up order.

DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of June, 2015.
s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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