Chambers v. Colvin

Filing 26

Order re: 1 Complaint filed by Crystal A. Chambers stating that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiffs claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income be REVERSED and REMANDED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 9/27/2016. Copies to parties. (mpp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CRYSTAL A. CHAMBERS,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00198-B

ORDER
Plaintiff

Crystal

A.

Chambers

(hereinafter

“Plaintiff”)

seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security denying her claim for a period of disability,
disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income
under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
401, et seq., and 1381, et seq.
consented

to

have

the

proceedings in this case.

On June 13, 2016, the parties

undersigned
(Doc. 23).

conduct

any

and

all

Thus, the action was

referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order
the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73.

Upon careful consideration

of the administrative record and the memoranda of the parties,
it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be
REVERSED and REMANDED.

I.

Procedural History

Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability and
disability

insurance

benefits

on

April

29,

supplemental security income on May 21, 2010.

2010,

and

for

(Tr. 223, 225) 1 .

She alleges that she has been disabled since August 2, 2008, due
to lower back injury, depression, and fibromyalgia.
257, 272).
request,

(Id. at

Plaintiff’s applications were denied and upon timely
she

was

granted

an

administrative

hearing

before

Administrative Law Judge Warren Hammond, Jr. (hereinafter “ALJ”)
on November 1, 2011.

(Id. at 53).

Plaintiff attended the

hearing with her counsel and provided testimony related to her
claims.

(Id.).

A vocational expert (“VE”) also appeared at the

hearing and provided testimony.

(Id.).

On November 10, 2011,

the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that Plaintiff is
not disabled.

(Id. at 89).

Plaintiff requested review by the

Appeals Council, and on December 21, 2012, the Appeals Council
remanded the case to the ALJ to further evaluate Plaintiff’s
depressive disorder in light of the opinion of the reviewing
State Agency psychologist, to further evaluate whether Plaintiff
is capable of performing her past relevant work, and to pose a
hypothetical to the vocational expert that corresponds with the
1

When referencing the Social Security Transcript, the Court
uses the citations found on the transcript, rather than the page
numbers utilized by CM-ECF.

2

RFC.

(Id. at 106-09).
On May 3, 2013, Plaintiff attended a second administrative

hearing with her counsel and provided testimony related to her
claims.

(Id. at 40).

A vocational expert (“VE”) also appeared

at the second hearing and provided testimony.

(Id. at 49).

On

August 23, 2013, the ALJ issued a second unfavorable decision
finding that Plaintiff is not disabled.

(Id. at 21-34).

The

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on March
8, 2015.

(Id. at 1).

Therefore, the ALJ’s decision dated

August 23, 2013, became the final decision of the Commissioner.
Having

exhausted

her

administrative

timely filed the present civil action.

remedies,

(Doc. 1).

Plaintiff

The parties

waived oral argument on June 13, 2016 (Doc. 22), and agree that
this case is now ripe for judicial review and is properly before
this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
II.

Issues on Appeal2
1.

Whether the ALJ erred in relying on the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines (grids) to
find
Plaintiff
not
disabled
after
finding that Plaintiff has the severe,
non-exertional impairment of depression?

2.

Whether

the

ALJ

erred

2

in

failing

to

On appeal, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s findings
related to her physical impairments.
Therefore, the Court’s
discussion is limited to Plaintiff’s mental impairment of
depression.

3

include Plaintiff’s
in the RFC?

mental

limitations

III. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born on September 11, 1974, and was thirtyeight years of age at the time of her second administrative
hearing on May 3, 2013.

(Tr. 43, 272).

that

twelfth

she

completed

the

completed truck driving school.

grade

Plaintiff testified
in

high

school

and

(Id. at 43).

Plaintiff testified that she last worked full time in 2004
as a truck driver.

(Id. at 44).

Plaintiff quit working in 2004

because of problems with her back.

(Id.).

At the time of her

hearing in 2013, she was working part-time (about twenty-two
hours

a

week)

at

Hertz

Rental

Car

as

a

reservations

clerk.

(Id.).
Plaintiff testified that what is keeping her from working
full time now are problems with her back and hips, making it
difficult for her to walk and sit for long periods of time.
(Id. at 45).

Plaintiff denied having any other impairments that

prevented her from working.
Plaintiff

testified

(Id. at 45, 49).

that

she

is

able

herself, that she shops, cooks, and drives.

to

take

care

of

(Id. at 47, 277).

In her Function Report dated June 22, 2010, Plaintiff stated
that she lives alone in her own home, that she takes care of her
own personal needs and needs no reminders to do so, that she

4

sets an alarm to remind her to take her medication, that she
prepares her own meals, that she does house work and laundry,
that she drives and goes outside at least a couple of times each
day,

and

that

banking.

(Id.

she
at

shops

and

276-79).

handles
Plaintiff

her

own

also

finances

stated

that

and
her

social activities include visiting regularly with friends and
family in their homes and going to church.
is able to perform these
280).

(Id. at 280).

activities unaccompanied.

She

(Id. at

She reported that concentrating and completing tasks is

difficult because of her pain. (Id.)

She also reported that she

“do[es] fine” with written instructions “for the most part;” she
sometimes gets “mixed up” with spoken instructions; she gets
along “fine” with other people and with authority figures; and
she has never been fired from a job because of problems getting
along with other people.

(Id. at 281-82).

not handle stress or change well.
IV.

However, she does

(Id. at 282).

Analysis
A.

Standard of Review

In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s
role

is

a

determining

limited
1)

one.

whether

The
the

Court’s
decision

review
of

the

is

limited

to

Secretary

is

supported by substantial evidence and 2) whether the correct

5

legal standards were applied.
1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).

3

Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d

A court may not decide the facts

anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that
of the Commissioner.
Cir.

1986).

The

Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th
Commissioner’s

findings

of

fact

affirmed if they are based upon substantial evidence.

must

be

Brown v.

Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth v.
Heckler,

703

F.2d

1233,

1239

(11th

Cir.

1983)

(holding

substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla, but
less

than

a

preponderance”

and

consists

of

“such

relevant

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
support

a

conclusion.”).

In

determining

whether

substantial

evidence exists, a court must view the record as a whole, taking
into account evidence favorable, as well as unfavorable, to the
Commissioner’s decision.

Chester v. Bowen, 792 F. 2d 129, 131

(11th Cir. 1986); Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163, *4
(S.D. Ala. June 14, 1999).
B.

Discussion

An individual who applies for Social Security disability
benefits

must

prove

404.1512, 416.912.

his

or

her

disability.

20

C.F.R.

§§

Disability is defined as the “inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
3

This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal
principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th
Cir. 1987).
6

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.”

42

U.S.C.

§§

404.1505(a),

416.905(a).

provide

five-step

a

423(d)(1)(A);
The

see

Social

sequential

also

20

Security

evaluation

C.F.R.

§§

regulations
process

determining if a claimant has proven his disability. 4

for

20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520, 416.920.
In the case sub judice, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
4

The claimant must first prove that he or she has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity.
The second step requires the
claimant to prove that he or she has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments. If, at the third step, the claimant
proves that the impairment or combination of impairments meets
or
equals
a
listed
impairment,
then
the
claimant
is
automatically found disabled regardless of age, education, or
work experience.
If the claimant cannot prevail at the third
step, he or she must proceed to the fourth step where the
claimant must prove an inability to perform their past relevant
work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). In
evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden, the
examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective
medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining
physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age,
education and work history.
Id.
Once a claimant meets this
burden, it becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove at the
fifth step that the claimant is capable of engaging in another
kind
of
substantial
gainful
employment
which
exists
in
significant
numbers
in
the
national
economy,
given
the
claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and
work history.
Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir.
1985). If the Commissioner can demonstrate that there are such
jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant must prove inability
to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v.
Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). See also Hale v.
Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v.
Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).

7

has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 2,
2008,

the

alleged

onset

date,

and

that

she

has

the

severe

impairments of status post spinal fusion with residual lumbar
radiculopathy, obesity, and depression.

(Tr.

23).

The ALJ

further found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals any of
the listed impairments contained in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1.
The

ALJ

(Id. at 24).
concluded

that

Plaintiff

retains

the

residual

functional capacity (hereinafter “RFC”) to perform less than the
full range of sedentary work, with the following limitations:
“she can sit for approximately six hours and stand and walk for
about two hours in an eight-hour day.
crawl, kneel, crouch, and stoop.
ropes, or scaffolds.
avoid

being

on

She can occasionally

She cannot climb ladders,

She can frequently push or pull. She must

unprotected

elevations,

near

machinery, and excessive amounts of dust.
unskilled work.”
while

(Id. at 26).

Plaintiff’s

reasonably

be

medically

expected

to

dangerous

moving

She is limited to

The ALJ also determined that

determinable

produce

the

impairments

alleged

could

symptoms,

her

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of the alleged symptoms were not entirely credible to
the extent they were inconsistent with the residual functional
capacity assessment.

(Id. at 27).

8

Given

Plaintiff’s

RFC

for

less

than

the

full

range

of

sedentary, unskilled work, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not
capable of performing her past work, which was medium or semiskilled.

(Id. at 32).

additional

exertional

The ALJ further found that Plaintiff’s
and

non-exertional

limitations,

as

detailed above, “have little or no effect on the occupational
base of unskilled sedentary work.”
concluded

that

appropriate
201.28].”5
The

“[a]

under

finding

the

of

framework

(Id. at 33).
‘not
of

disabled’

[Medical

The ALJ thus
is

therefore

Vocational

Rule

(Id.).
Court

now

considers

the

foregoing

in

light

of

the

record in this case and the issue on appeal.
1.

Issues

A. Whether the ALJ erred in relying on the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines (grids) to
find Plaintiff not disabled after finding
that Plaintiff has the severe, nonexertional impairment of depression?
In

this

case,

Plaintiff

claims

that

the

ALJ

erred

in

relying on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (grids) to find her

5

Medical–Vocational Rule 201.28 directs a finding of not
disabled for a younger individual aged 18–44, who was a high
school graduate, with non-transferable skills from skilled or
semiskilled past work, and capable of performing sedentary work.
See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App 2; see also
Garred v.
Astrue, 383 F. Appx. 820, 824 (11th Cir. 2010); Kerr v. Astrue,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104639, *9-10 n.4, 2010 WL 3907121, *3 n.4
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2010), report and recommendation adopted by,
2010 WL 3893922 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010).

9

not disabled, given the ALJ’s finding that she has the severe,
non-exertional

impairment

of

depression.

(Doc.

11

at

2).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding that she suffers from
this severe, non-exertional impairment precludes the use of the
grids to find her disabled.

(Id.).

Having reviewed the record

at length, the Court finds that this case must be reversed and
remanded due to the ALJ’s improper use of the grids.
It is clear in this circuit that the Commissioner of Social
Security must develop “a full and fair record regarding the
vocational opportunities available to a claimant.”

Allen v.

Sullivan,

(citation

omitted).

880

F.2d

The

ALJ

1200,
must

1201

(11th

articulate

Cir.

1989)

specific

jobs

that

the

claimant is able to perform given his or her age, education, and
work history, if any, “and this finding must be supported by
substantial evidence, not mere intuition or conjecture.”

Id.

One means by which the Commissioner meets this burden is by
reliance on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“grids”).
1201–02.

Id. at

Exclusive reliance upon the grids is inappropriate,

however, “‘either when the claimant is unable to perform a full
range of work at a given residual functional level or when a
claimant

has

a

non-exertional

limits basic work skills.’”6

impairment

that

significantly

Id. at 1202 (citations omitted).

6

Nonexertional limitations are those limitations that “‘affect
an individual’s ability to meet the nonstrength demands of jobs’
10

Where

nonexertional

impairments

are

present,

“[t]he

ALJ

must ‘make a specific finding as to whether the nonexertional
limitations

are

severe

enough

to

preclude

a

wide

range

of

employment at the given work capacity level indicated by the
exertional limitations.’”

Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559

(11th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).

Normally, when nonexertional

limitations are alleged, “the preferred method of demonstrating
that

the

claimant

can

perform

specific

testimony of a vocational expert.”
1050, 1054 (11th Cir. 1986).

work

is

through

the

MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d

“‘It is only when the claimant can

clearly do unlimited types of [work at a given level] that it is
unnecessary to call a vocational expert to establish whether the
claimant

can

economy.’”

perform
Allen,

880

work

which

F.2d

at

exists

1202

in

(emphasis

the

national

in

original)

(citations omitted); see also Garred, 383 F. Appx. at 824 (“When
a

claimant

has

non-exertional

impairments

that

significantly

limit her ability to work, the ALJ may use the Guidelines as a
framework, but should also consult with a VE to determine how

and
include
mental
limitations
and
restrictions,
pain
limitations, and all physical limitations and restrictions that
are not reflected in the seven strength demands.”
Callens v.
Astrue, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115043, *18, 2012 WL 3542200, *7
(N.D. Ala. Aug. 15, 2012) (quoting S.S.R. 96–4p). “Exertional
limitations ‘affect your ability to meet the strength demands of
jobs,’ and include ‘sitting, standing, walking, lifting,
carrying, pushing, and pulling.’” Id. at *6 (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1569(a)).

11

the claimant’s impairments affect her ability to perform other
jobs that exist in the national economy.”) (citing Wilson v.
Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002)).
Turning to the case at hand, the Court finds instructive
the decision, Francis v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir.
1985), in which the Eleventh Circuit held that the ALJ erred in
relying exclusively on the grids to find that the claimant was
disabled, where the ALJ had previously found that the claimant
could not perform work requiring more than “gross vision.”
Eleventh Circuit stated:
The ALJ relied exclusively on the grids to
find that there were jobs in the national
economy
which
claimant
could
perform.
Exclusive reliance on the grids is not
appropriate either when claimant is unable
to perform a full range of work at a given
residual functional level or when a claimant
has
non-exertional
impairments
that
significantly limit basic work skills. Broz
v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1361 (11th Cir.
1982), adhered to sub nom. Broz v. Heckler,
711 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1983). The ALJ was
free to rely on the grids despite certain of
Francis’s non-exertional impairments, such
as his hand tumor because it was found not
to impair function of the hand or such as
his shortness of breath which the ALJ found
not credible. However, as to Francis’s
vision problems the ALJ stated:
The Administrative Law Judge has given
careful consideration to the fact that
claimant’s
impairment
probably
precludes her [sic] from performing
work which requires her to engage in
work requiring more than gross vision.
However, the undersigned is persuaded

12

The

that
this
restriction
does
not
significantly diminish the range of
medium jobs available to the claimant
and that the Rule [the grid] cited
above remains applicable.
After acknowledging that the claimant is
limited to performing medium work requiring
only gross vision, the ALJ nevertheless
applied the grids because he was “persuaded”
that this impairment did not significantly
limit the range of medium work available to
claimant.
Yet
there
is
no
vocational
testimony upon which the ALJ could have
relied to be so persuaded. Whether the
vision problem is seen as a non-exertional
impairment or as a limitation on the range
of medium work claimant could perform,
reliance on the grid is inappropriate.
Francis, 749 F.2d at 1566-67.
In the present case, the ALJ found at step two of the
sequential evaluation process that Plaintiff’s depression was
severe, at step three that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties
with concentration, persistence or pace, and at steps four and
five that Plaintiff was limited to “unskilled work,” apparently
in

an

effort

difficulties. 7

to

account

for

(Id. at 23, 26-30).

7

Plaintiff’s

concentration

This is unlike the ALJ’s

See Scott v. Comm'r of Social Security, 495 Fed. Appx. 27, 2829(11th Cir. 2012)(ALJ’s hypothetical to VE adequately accounted
for moderate limitation in ability to maintain concentration,
persistence, and pace where ALJ asked VE to include work that
would require "low stress, simple, unskilled; one, two, or three
step instructions . . . [and] specifically noted in the
hypothetical that the person had 'psychological based symptoms
which affect[ed] his ability to concentrate upon complex or
detailed tasks; but would remain capable of carrying out simple
job instructions'"). (Tr. 32, 49).

13

findings in Francis concerning the claimant’s hand tremor and
shortness

of

breath,

which

the

ALJ

there

found

caused

no

impairment of function, and more analogous to the ALJ’s findings
in Francis related to the claimant’s vision problems, which the
ALJ found resulted in limitations to work requiring only gross
vision.
to

Thus, the ALJ was required to call a vocational expert

establish

(moderate

whether

concentration

Plaintiff’s

non-exertional

difficulties)

eroded

the

limitation
occupational

base for unskilled sedentary work.
Stated
nonexertional

differently,
limitation

because
(i.e.

the

ALJ

moderate

found

that

limitation

a
in

concentration, persistence and pace) was present in this case,
he was required to make an additional, specific finding as to
whether

the

nonexertional

limitation

was

“severe

enough

to

preclude a wide range of employment at the given work capacity
level indicated by the exertional limitations.” 8

8

Foote, 67 F.3d

Although the record contains evidence that Plaintiff’s
depression was controlled on medication and did not affect her
ability to work (Tr. 389, 449, 509, 522, 525), the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff’s depression was severe, that she had
moderate limitations in concentration, persistence or pace, and
that her RFC was limited to unskilled work. (Id. at 23, 25-26).
Under these circumstances, it is not clear that Plaintiff can
“do unlimited types of [work at a given level]” or that her nonexertional limitation (moderate concentration difficulties) does
not significantly limit her basis work skills.
See Allen, 880
F.2d at 1202. Thus, the ALJ was required to call a vocational
expert to establish whether she can perform work which exists in
the national economy. Id.

14

at 1559.

Absent clear evidence that Plaintiff can do unlimited

types of work at the given level, the ALJ was required to call a
vocational

expert

to

establish

whether

Plaintiff

work which exists in the national economy.
1202.

Although

the

ALJ

found

that

can

perform

Allen, 880 F.2d at

Plaintiff’s

“additional

limitations have little or no effect on the occupational base of
unskilled
vocational

sedentary
expert

work,”

on

which

there
to

was

base

no

that

reliance on the grid was inappropriate.

evidence

from

conclusion.

a

Thus,

See Francis, 749 F.2d

at 1566-67.
Interestingly, the record shows that the ALJ did obtain
evidence from a vocational expert at Plaintiff’s hearing that
there were jobs in the national economy that an individual with
Plaintiff’s limitations could perform.

(Id. at 50).

However,

the ALJ decided to instead rely exclusively on the grids instead
of the VE’s testimony.
doing

so,

the

ALJ’s

(Id. at 33).
exclusive

Whatever his reason for

reliance

on

the

grids

was

inappropriate.9

9

The Court rejects the Commissioner’s implication that any error
by the ALJ in failing to rely on the VE’s testimony in this case
was harmless. First, it appears that the hypothetical question
posed to the vocational expert was flawed, as the ALJ expressly
stated in his hypothetical that “there would be no mental
limitations.”
(Tr. 50).
Furthermore, as aptly stated by the
Court in Harrell v. Colvin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68739, *12,
2014 WL 2093961, *4 (S.D. Ala. May 20, 2014), “[t]he ALJ failed
to carry her burden ‘to establish that [Harrell] could perform
other work that exists in the national economy. . . . It is to
15

The ALJ’s findings leave no question that Plaintiff cannot
perform unlimited types of work at the sedentary level because
of her nonexertional impairment.

Thus, absent testimony from a

vocational expert that Plaintiff’s nonexertional limitation does
not significantly limit her basic work skills or preclude her
from

performing

a

wide

range

of

sedentary

work,

decision is not supported by substantial evidence.

the

ALJ’s

See Francis,

749 F.2d at 1567 (absent vocational expert testimony on which
the

ALJ

could

base

his

decision

that

the

claimant’s

vision

impairment did not significantly limit the range of medium work
available, the ALJ’s reliance on the grids was inappropriate);
Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992) (the ALJ
erred in relying on the grids where claimant was not able to do
unlimited types of light work, i.e., he could not work around
dangerous machinery or at unprotected heights; in such cases,
expert testimony was required to determine whether claimant’s
limitations were severe enough to preclude him from performing a
wide range of light work.).
no avail that the ALJ may have elicited testimony from a VE at
the hearing regarding work Harrell could perform because the
ALJ, for whatever reason, chose not to rely on that testimony in
her decision denying Harrell’s benefits. . . . For that reason,
the Commissioner’s argument that this Court should ‘read between
the lines’ and affirm the ALJ’s decision anyway because ‘the ALJ
already obtained vocational expert testimony, which [counsel for
the Commissioner on appeal, not the ALJ, believes] clearly
established that [Harrell] was not disabled’ . . . must be
rejected.” (Emphasis omitted, brackets in original).

16

In sum, the ALJ did not fulfill his duty to develop a full
and fair record with substantial evidence showing that there
were specific jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform.

On remand, in accordance with Francis v. Heckler, 749

F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1985), the Commissioner should utilize the
services of a vocational expert to identify what sedentary jobs,
if any, Plaintiff can perform in light of

her nonexertional

limitation. See Gray v. Massanari, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6619, *9
(April 17, 2001), report and recommendation adopted by 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6544, *1, 2001 WL 530704, *2 (S.D. Ala. May 1,
2001).
V.

Conclusion
For

the

reasons

set

forth

herein,

and

upon

careful

consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the
parties,

it

is

hereby

ORDERED

that

the

decision

of

the

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for a
period

of

disability,

disability

insurance

benefits,

and

supplemental security income be REVERSED and REMANDED.10
DONE this 27th day of September, 2016.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

10

Having determined that this case must be remanded because of
the ALJ’s erroneous reliance on the grids, the Court need not
address Plaintiff’s remaining arguments on appeal.

17