Jones v. Myers et al

Filing 100

Order re: Bench Trial held - Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Wiley and Scarbrough under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed with prejudice. Defendants Wiley and Scarbrough are protected by sovereign immunity with respect to Joness state law tort claims. To whatever extent, if any, any of the foregoing findings of fact constitute conclusions of law and vice versa, they are adopted assuch. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 3/23/20. (mpp) Copies to counsel

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DE’ANGELO ARNEZ JONES,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN WILEY, et al.,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00268-B

ORDER
On December 3-4, 2018, this matter came before the Court for
a bench trial on Plaintiff De’Angelo Arnez Jones’s claims against
Defendants John Wiley and Gary Scarbrough.

Jones asserts that

Defendants Wiley and Scarbrough failed to intervene to protect him
when he was attacked by a fellow inmate on June 29, 2014, and that
they failed to take action to obtain medical care for him following
the attack.

(See Doc. 93 at 2).

At trial, the Court heard

testimony from Jones, Defendants Wiley and Scarbrough, Lieutenant
Deveron Brown of ADOC, and ADOC inmates Bobby Shamburger, Jr. and
Shakil

Gamble.1

After

due

consideration

of

the

witnesses’

testimony, other evidence presented, and the applicable law, the
Court enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

1

Inmates Shamburger and Gamble testified from Kilby Correctional
Facility via video conferencing.

I.

FINDINGS OF FACT2
1.

Defendants John Wiley (“Wiley”) and Gary Scarbrough

(“Scarbrough”)

were

employed

by

ADOC

and

assigned

to

Holman

Correctional Facility (“Holman”) as correctional officers on June
29, 2014, the date of the subject attack.3

At all pertinent times,

Wiley and Scarbrough were acting under color of law and in the
course and scope of their employment as correctional officers at
Holman.
2.

On

June

29,

2014,

Plaintiff

De’Angelo

Arnez

Jones

(“Jones”) was an Alabama state prisoner incarcerated at Holman.
He was assigned to and resided in housing unit C.
3.

On June 29, 2014, Shakil Gamble (“Gamble”) was an Alabama

state prisoner incarcerated at Holman.

He was assigned to and

resided in housing unit C.
4.

On June 29, 2014, Bobby Shamburger, Jr. (“Shamburger”)

was incarcerated at Holman.

He was assigned to and resided in

housing unit C.

2

All findings of fact are by a preponderance of the evidence.

3

Wiley worked as a correctional officer at Holman for
approximately eight years before he resigned in October 2015.
Scarbrough worked as a correctional officer for ADOC from July
2010 until October 2017.

2

5.

On June 29, 2014, Wiley was assigned to work as the

dormitory officer, or housing unit officer,4 for Holman housing
unit C for the shift beginning at 6:00 a.m. and ending at 6:00
p.m.

He also worked a second shift from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.

and was assigned to work as the dormitory officer for Holman
housing unit E.
6.

In his position as a dormitory officer, Wiley’s primary

responsibility was the safety and protection of inmates.
orders

in

effect

on

June

29,

2014

detailed

the

The post
duties,

responsibilities, and expectations for the position, including
requiring a dormitory officer to constantly patrol the entire
housing unit and make himself available to communicate with inmates
inside the dormitory.

A dormitory officer was also required to

remain on post in the housing unit at all times, unless relieved
by another officer or directed by a shift commander to leave the
dormitory.5

4

The terms “housing unit” and “dormitory” are used interchangeably
to describe the communal living area that includes the inmates’
beds, latrine, shower area, and TV room.
The terms “dormitory
officer” and “housing unit officer” are also used interchangeably
to denote a correctional officer assigned to patrol a dormitory.

5

The only situations in which a dormitory officer may leave the
dormitory without first getting relief or permission from a shift
commander are, first, if the officer is in pursuit of an inmate
who is in possession of contraband or is a threat to institutional
security and, second, if an officer working the dormitory hall or
another housing unit needs assistance to control a situation
(Continued)
3

7.

On June 29, 2014, Scarbrough was assigned to work as the

population hall officer, or hall rover, for the main hall at
Holman.
p.m.

Scarbrough’s shift began at 6:00 a.m. and ended at 6:00

The evidence established that, based on its staffing levels

at the time, Holman was short-staffed on June 29, 2014, and that
Scarbrough was the only hall rover on the day shift.6
8.

As the hall rover, Scarbrough’s duties were, inter alia,

to patrol the main hall of the facility and provide assistance in
various other details or functions, such as population feeding,
institutional counts, and pill call.

A hall rover’s duties also

included providing break relief to dormitory officers and cubicle
officers when instructed to do so by a supervisor.
9.

On the day in question, housing unit C at Holman held

114 inmates, who slept on beds that were situated in four parallel
rows inside the dormitory.

There were approximately 28 or 29 beds

in each row that went all the way back to the rear wall of the
housing unit.

The only entrance into and exit from the housing

unit is through an orange barred gate.

In addition to beds, the

housing unit includes a TV room and a shower/restroom area, which

immediately, and no other help is available. There is no evidence
that either situation occurred on June 29, 2014.
6

The day shift at Holman begins at 6:00 a.m. and ends at 6:00
p.m., and the night shift runs from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. the
following morning.

4

are located near the front of the housing unit.

There is also a

correctional officer chair in the unit. It faces the rows of beds.
10.
#1.

Outside of housing units B and C is a cubicle, Cubicle

It is manned by a correctional officer and is separated from

the housing units by a narrow hallway.

The officer inside of

Cubicle #1 operates the gates that control entrance into and exit
out of housing units B and C.

Depending on the direction an

officer inside of Cubicle #1 is facing, the officer can look down
into housing units B and C and can see all the way to the rear
wall of the housing units.
11.

Cubicle #1 is required to be manned by a correctional

officer at all times.

Generally, only one officer is permitted

inside Cubicle #1 at a time, unless the officer inside the cubicle
is in the process of being relieved by another officer for a break
or shift change.
12.

The credible evidence establishes that at the time of

the incident, Jones and Gamble were friends.

Immediately before

the June 29, 2014 assault, Jones and Gamble were observed having
a discussion that turned heated.
homemade metal knife.

Gamble stabbed Jones with a

The attack occurred without any warning,

and was over almost as soon as it started.
13.
meal,

The attack occurred not long after the end of the dinner

which

began

at

approximately 4:25 p.m.

approximately

3:10

p.m.,

and

ended

at

The attack took place in the area of the

5

dormitory where the inmate beds were located.

Jones sustained

four stab wounds to his back and rear shoulder area, and one stab
wound to his front chest or shoulder area.

The diameter of the

stab wounds was approximately the size of a pencil eraser.
14.
Unit C.

After being stabbed, Jones fled to the front of housing
Gamble gave brief chase, and then voluntarily retreated

to his bed area and smoked a cigarette.

Another inmate, Bruce

Peterson, helped to bandage Jones’s wounds using tissue and office
tape.
15.

As noted supra, Defendant Wiley was assigned as the

dormitory officer for housing unit C, on the 6:00 a.m. to 6:00
p.m. shift.

Typically, dormitory officers are provided a break

and a thirty-minute lunch outside of the housing unit.

The Holman

duty post log does not indicate the times at which Wiley took his
breaks on June 29, 2014; however, it does reflect that Wiley was
outside of housing unit C for some period of time after the dinner
meal when he was sent to the central control area of the prison to
retrieve a van key and gas card.7
16.

There was a shift change at 6:00 p.m.

At the 6:00 p.m.

shift change, Wiley’s assignment changed from dormitory officer of

7

While it was not clear why Wiley was sent to retrieve the van
key and gas card, the evidence was clear that Wiley would not have
been allowed to go through the gate and leave the unit and retrieve
the items without authorization from a supervisor.

6

housing

unit

C

to

dormitory

officer

for

housing

unit

E.

Scarbough’s shift ended at 6:00 p.m.
17.

Jones did not inform any correctional officers on the

day shift, nor on the night shift, that he had been stabbed.

Jones

testified that Defendants Wiley and Scarbrough and an unnamed cadet
were all in the cubicle observing the attack, which lasted ten to
twenty minutes, and that they heard him banging on the front gate
asking for help, yet refused to come to his aid.

He also testified

that shortly after the attack he took a shower in an effort to
slow the flow of blood.

The Court finds that Jones’s testimony

was not credible in a number of material aspects, and was not
consistent with that of other witnesses, including the inmate
witnesses. First of all, the inmate witnesses testified that Jones
and inmate Gamble were friends, that the two had been smoking
“spice” together immediately before the attack, that the attack
was unexpected, that the attack was over almost as soon as it
started, and that Jones did not take a shower after the incident.
Additionally, Gamble testified that staff learned of the attack
from

an

anonymous

inmate

tip,

and

that

when

questioned

by

authorities, both he and Jones denied that there had been an
attack.

Gamble’s testimony in this regard was consistent with

7

Lieutenant Brown’s8 testimony that prison officials only learned
of the attack through an anonymous tip, and that both Jones and
Gamble denied any knowledge of an attack.

It also adds further

credence to Defendants Scarbough and Wiley’s testimony that they
did not observe the attack or Jones pleading for help.

Moreover,

the Holman duty log records contradict Jones’s claim that a cadet
was assigned to the cubicle area, and the records place Scarbough
and Wiley handling duties outside of housing unit C around the
time of the attack.

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that

neither Scarbough nor Wiley witnessed the attack or Jones’s alleged
pleas for help on June 29, 2014.
18. Following the evening shift change on June 29, 2014,
Officer

Lee

notified

the

assistant

shift

commander,

Sergeant

Betts, that he had received an inmate tip that Jones had been
stabbed by inmate Gamble.

Sergeant Betts directed Officer Lee to

bring Jones to the shift commander’s officer.

Shortly before 9:00

p.m., Officer Lee retrieved Jones from housing unit C, and escorted
him to the shift commander’s office for questioning by Sergeant
Betts.

Upon questioning by Sergeant Betts, Jones denied that he

had been involved in an altercation with anyone and requested to

8

At the time of the incident, Lieutenant Brown was actually
Sergeant Betts. By the time of trial, she had been promoted to
Lieutenant, and she testified that her last name had changed from
“Betts” to “Brown.”

8

return to his housing unit.

Sergeant Betts directed Jones to lift

his pant legs and shirt and discovered bandages on his upper body.
As a result, she directed that he be taken to the healthcare unit
for assessment.9
19.

At the healthcare unit, Jones was examined by the nurse,

and a body chart was performed.

The records reflect that Jones

advised the nurse that he had nothing to say about his wounds.
The nurse checked Jones’s wounds for infection, treated them with
wound cleanser, re-bandaged the wounds, and gave Jones Motrin for
pain.

Jones

was

transferred

to

a

segregation

cell

for

investigation for fighting.
20.

Later that same day, Gamble was summoned to the shift

commander’s office, where Sergeant Betts questioned him about an
altercation with Jones.

Like Jones, Gamble denied that there had

been an altercation.

After being questioned, Gamble was taken to

the healthcare unit.

Upon examination, no injuries were noted.

9

Jones’s testimony about the discussion in the shift commander’s
office differed greatly from that of Lieutenant Brown. The Court
finds Lieutenant Brown’s testimony concerning the discussion far
more credible than Jones’s, as Lieutenant Brown’s testimony is
consistent with contemporary medical documentation from the date
of the incident and with inmate Gamble’s testimony that both he
and Jones refused to provide officers with any information about
the stabbing.

9

Gamble was then transferred to a segregation cell for investigation
for fighting.10
II.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over Jones’s claims asserted

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
and 1367(a), and venue is proper in this district.
2.

“Section 1983 creates a private cause of action for

deprivations of federal rights by persons acting under color of
state law.”

Johnson v. Boyd, 568 F. App’x 719, 721 (11th Cir.

2014) (per curiam) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
3.

Jones’s first constitutional claim is that Defendants

Wiley and Scarbrough violated the Eighth Amendment by acting with
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to
Jones by failing to intervene while Gamble’s attack on him was
ongoing.

The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits “cruel and unusual

punishments,”

governs

the

conditions

under

which

convicted

prisoners are confined and the treatment they receive in prison.

10

At trial, Lieutenant Brown was questioned extensively about why
no incident report was prepared in accordance with ADOC procedures.
While no incident report was prepared, Lieutenant Brown did
document that both Jones and Gamble were placed in segregation
because they were being investigated for fighting, and she
testified that she left it to her supervisors to investigate
further into the incident. Given that the staff only learned of
the incident through an anonymous tip, and both Jones and Gamble
denied that the incident ever occurred, it is plausible that no
incident report was prepared because prison staff was trying to
get to the bottom of everything.

10

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).

In DeShaney v.

Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the
Supreme Court outlined a state’s constitutional responsibilities
with regard to inmates:
[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and
holds him there against his will, the Constitution
imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some
responsibility for his safety and general well-being.
The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when
the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so
restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him
unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails
to provide for his basic human needs — e.g., food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety
— it transgresses the substantive limits on state action
set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
489 U.S. at 199–200 (citations and parenthetical omitted).
4.

It is well-established that “prison officials have a

duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.”
quotation

Farmer, 511 U.S.
marks

omitted).

at 833 (citation and internal

A

prison

official,

such

as

a

correctional officer, can be liable under the Eighth Amendment for
failing to take reasonable steps to intervene on behalf of a victim
of an ongoing assault by another inmate.

See Terry v. Bailey, 376

F. App’x 894, 895-96 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Murphy v.
Turpin, 159 F. App’x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
However,

constitutional

liability

does

not

result

from

every

injury suffered by a prisoner at the hands of another inmate.

11

Johnson v. Boyd, 701 F. App’x 841, 844 (11th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam).
5.

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation for failure

to intervene in an ongoing assault, a prisoner must prove facts
that “satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry regarding
a prison official’s conduct.”

Id. at 844-45.

For the objective

component, a prisoner must prove the existence of a condition that
is sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth Amendment, meaning
that the condition must be extreme and pose an unreasonable risk
of serious harm to the prisoner’s future health or safety.
845.

Id. at

Under the subjective component, the prisoner must prove that

the prison official, at minimum, acted with a state of mind that
constituted

deliberate

indifference.

Id.

There

are

three

components to deliberate indifference: “(1) subjective knowledge
of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by
conduct that is more than mere negligence.”

Farrow v. West, 320

F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).

The Supreme

Court has held that the “subjective recklessness” standard of
criminal law is the appropriate test to determine deliberate
indifference.

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 826.

“The known risk of

injury must be a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility
before

a

guard’s

indifference.”

failure

to

act

can

constitute

deliberate

Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir.

12

1990)

(per

curiam)

(citations

and

internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
6.

To prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim against Wiley

and Scarbrough for failure to intervene in the assault by Gamble,
Jones was required to prove (1) a substantial risk of serious harm,
(2) the Defendants’ deliberate indifference to that risk, and (3)
causation.

See Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th

Cir. 1995).
7.

Here,

there

is

no

question

that

the

challenged

condition, namely being stabbed with a knife by a fellow inmate,
was

objectively

harmful

enough

to

establish

a

constitutional

violation. Accordingly, Jones met his burden of proving that there
was a substantial risk of serious harm during Gamble’s attack on
him.
8.

However, Jones failed to carry his burden to prove that

Wiley and Scarbrough acted with deliberate indifference in failing
to take reasonable steps to intervene on his behalf during the
attack by Gamble.

As to Scarbrough, who was assigned to the

position of hall rover at the time the incident occurred, the Court
found his testimony that he was unaware of the attack on June 29,
2014, to be credible.

In addition, there was no evidence or even

allegation that Scarbrough had knowledge prior to the commencement
of the attack that Gamble posed a substantial threat to Jones.
Accordingly, the Court cannot find deliberate indifference on the

13

part of Scarbrough to a substantial risk of serious harm to Jones
posed by Gamble on the date in question.
9.

With regard to Wiley, the Court has found that he did

not witness the incident or become aware of the incident on June
29, 2014.

As with Scarbrough, there was no evidence that Wiley

could have known that Gamble posed a substantial risk of serious
harm to Jones unless Wiley actually witnessed the incident or
otherwise became aware of the occurrence of the incident.

By all

accounts, Jones and Gamble were on good terms until their verbal
dispute just prior to the stabbing, and Jones himself was caught
by surprise when Gamble stabbed him.

Further, there was no

evidence of prior incidents or disciplinary problems involving
Gamble.

Thus, from the evidence presented, Wiley could reasonably

have only become aware that Gamble posed a substantial risk of
serious harm to Jones by witnessing or otherwise becoming aware of
the incident after it began.

As the Court has found that Wiley

did not witness or become aware of the attack while it was ongoing,
the Court cannot find that Wiley was deliberately indifferent when
he did not intervene during the assault.
10.

Jones

also

failed

to

prove

causation

between

the

officers’ allegedly deliberately indifferent failure to intervene
during the attack and Jones’ injuries.

Causation requires a

plaintiff to demonstrate a link between a defendant’s act or
omission and the excessive risk of harm, and a link between the

14

risk of harm and the plaintiff’s injury.

LaMarca v. Turner, 995

F.2d 1526, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1993). The more believable testimony
establishes that the incident began and ended too quickly for
officers to effectively intervene to prevent any of the injuries
suffered by Jones.
11.

Because he did not meet his burden of demonstrating

deliberate indifference or causation, Jones has failed to prove
his Eighth Amendment claim for failure to intervene against Wiley
and Scarbrough.
12.

Thus, Defendants have prevailed on that claim.

Jones’s second constitutional claim is that Defendants

Wiley and Scarbrough violated the Eighth Amendment by acting with
deliberate indifference to his medical needs after the June 29,
2014 stabbing by failing to obtain medical treatment for him after
the attack.

“The Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and

unusual punishments prohibits prison officials from exhibiting
deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs.”
Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
13.
“(1)

a

To establish such a claim, Jones was required to prove
serious

indifference

to

medical
that

need;
need;

(2)
and

[a]
(3)

defendant’s
causation

deliberate

between

defendant’s indifference and the plaintiff’s injury.”

the

McDaniels

v. Lee, 405 F. App’x 456, 458 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing
Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir.

15

2009)).

To satisfy the first objective element, a plaintiff must

prove his condition was, in fact, a serious medical need.

“A

‘serious medical need’ is one that is diagnosed by a physician as
requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person
would recognize the need for medical treatment.”

Pourmoghani-

Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotations omitted).
14.

There are three components to the element of deliberate

indifference: “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm;
(2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere
negligence.”
1999).

McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir.

“[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
837.

Farmer, 811 U.S. at

A corrections officer “acts with deliberate indifference

when he or she knows that an inmate is in serious need of medical
care, but he fails or refuses to obtain medical treatment for the
inmate.”

McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).
“medical

care

nonetheless

is

act

Even where, as in the instant case,

ultimately

with

provided,

deliberate

a

prison

indifference

by

official

may

delaying

the

treatment of serious medical needs, even for a period of hours,
though the reason for the delay and the nature of the medical need

16

is relevant in determining what type of delay is constitutionally
intolerable.”
15.

Id.

The presence of holes on Jones’s body, which bled and

required bandaging, undoubtedly constituted a serious medical need
that was so obvious that even a layperson would recognize the need
for treatment.

Therefore, Jones established the first element of

his claim.
16.

However, Jones did not meet his burden to prove that

Wiley and Scarbrough were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical need.

As detailed above, the Court has found that Wiley

and Scarbrough were not aware on June 29, 2014, that Jones had
been stabbed.

Authorities only learned of the stabbing through an

anonymous inmate tip during the night shift.

Without knowledge

that Jones had been stabbed, Wiley and Scarbrough likewise had no
knowledge that Jones needed medical attention.

Thus, they did not

act with deliberate indifference by failing to obtain medical
treatment for him.

Accordingly, Jones failed to prove all of the

necessary elements of his Eighth Amendment claim against Wiley and
Scarbrough for failure to obtain medical care after the attack,
and Defendants have prevailed on that claim.
17. In addition to the § 1983 claims discussed above, Jones
also arguably alleged state law negligence claims against Jones
and Wiley.

Defendants contend that they are entitled to sovereign

immunity on Jones’s state law tort claims because Ala. Code § 14-

17

6-1 insulates them from liability under state law.

As amended by

the Jailer Liability Protection Act, which came into effect in
2011,

§

14-6-1

“provides

correctional

officers

the

‘same

immunities and legal protections granted to the sheriff under the
general laws and the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, as long as
such persons are acting within the line and scope of their duties
and are acting in compliance with the law.’”

Foster v. Maloney,

785 F. App’x 810, 818 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Ala.
Code § 14-6-1);11 see also Johnson v. Connor, 754 F.3d 918, 920
(11th Cir. 2014).

“Among those ‘protections’ granted sheriffs

under the Alabama Constitution is sovereign immunity from suit
‘when they are executing their law enforcement duties.’”

Maloney,

785 F. App’x at 818 (citing Connor, 754 F.3d at 919).
There is no dispute that Jones and Wiley were acting within
the line and scope of their duties at all times relevant.

Thus,

whether the Defendants, as Alabama correctional officers, are
entitled to immunity under state law depends on whether they were

11

See also Ala. Code § 36-22-3(b) (“Any of the duties of the
sheriff set out in subsection (a) or as otherwise provided by law
may be carried out by deputies, reserve deputies, and persons
employed as authorized in Section 14-6-1 as determined appropriate
by the sheriff in accordance with state law. Persons undertaking
such duties for and under the direction and supervision of the
sheriff shall be entitled to the same immunities and legal
protections granted to the sheriff under the general laws and the
Constitution of Alabama of 1901, as long as he or she is acting
within the line and scope of his or her duties and is acting in
compliance with the law.”).

18

“acting in compliance with the law” for purposes of § 14-6-1.

See

Young v. Myhrer, 243 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1254 (N.D. Ala. 2017).
“[O]nly when sufficient evidence exists that [an officer] has
violated a criminal statute, a civil statute, or a constitutional
principle

does

he

lose

the

Jailer

Act’s

sovereign

protection and become subject to Alabama tort laws.”

immunity

Id. at 1258;

see also Dowdell v. Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41657, at *2829, 2019 WL 1436385, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 13, 2019) (“Because
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint does not present plausible
allegations of fact showing that Welch was not in compliance with
criminal statutes, civil statutes, or constitutional standards,
Plaintiff’s state law tort claim for false imprisonment is subject
to

the

immunity

afforded

by

[§

14-6-1].”),

report

and

recommendation adopted as modified, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54149,
2019 WL 1440286 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2019).

In this case, Jones

has failed to show that Defendants Wiley and Scarbrough acted in
violation of criminal statutes, civil statutes, or constitutional
standards; thus, Wiley and Scarbrough are entitled to sovereign
immunity pursuant to § 14-6-1 with respect to Jones’s state law
tort claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Wiley and Scarbrough
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed with prejudice.

19

Further,

Defendants

Wiley

and

Scarbrough

are

protected

by

sovereign

immunity with respect to Jones’s state law tort claims.

To

whatever extent, if any, any of the foregoing findings of fact
constitute conclusions of law and vice versa, they are adopted as
such.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.

DONE this 23rd day of March, 2020.
__
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
__
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

20