SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Adams
ORDER GRANTING in part SEPH's #20 Motion for Entry of Default Judgment as set out. Judgment is due to be entered against Adams in the amount of $56,931.84 for deficiencies on the Loan. $25,837.87 for attorneys' fees, & $3,864.43 for costs, for a total of $86,634.14 as set out. Signed by Senior Judge Callie V. S. Granade on 3/23/2017. (copy mailed to Dft on 3/24/17) Modified on 3/23/2017 (tot).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SE PROPERTY HOLDINGS, LLC,
MICHAEL TERRY ADAMS,
) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-423-CG-C
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff SE Property Holdings,
LLC’s (“SEPH”) motion for entry of default judgment (Doc. 20) against
Defendant Michael Terry Adams (“Adams”). Having considered the record as
a whole, the Court has concluded a hearing is unnecessary and will consider
the motion purely on the record before it. For the reasons stated below, the
Court deems it proper to GRANT the motion in part.
On October 8, 2003, Vision Bank—now SEPH1—loaned Adams
$157,000.00 through Loan Number 32387 (the “Loan”). (See Doc. 20-1, ¶ 4).
Originally, the Loan was scheduled to mature on October 7, 2008, but Adams
and SEPH agree to extend the maturity date to October 7, 2013. See id. at ¶¶
4–5. Thereafter, Adams defaulted on certain amounts due under the Loan.
Id. at ¶ 6. In February 2015, after seeking advice from its attorneys, SEPH
“SEPH is the successor-in-interest to Vision Bank pursuant to a merger on
or about February 16, 2012.” (Doc. 20-1, ¶ 2).
entered into a Forbearance Agreement, but Adams still “failed to pay the
Indebtedness under the Loan.” Id. at ¶¶ 8–9.
On August 3, 2015, SEPH demanded payment in full on the Loan, but
Adams failed to cure the default. Id. at ¶¶ 11–12. Thereafter, SEPH initiated
a suit against Adams in this Court2 and foreclosed on the property securing
the Loan on October 16, 2016. Id. at ¶¶ 13–14. On that day, Adams filed a
voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the Southern District of
Alabama, and the instant case was stayed. Id. at ¶ 15; see also Doc. 13. On
February 24, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court granted SEPH’s Motion for Nunc
Pro Tunc Annulment of the Automatic Stay in that court to validate the
foreclosure. (Doc. 20-1, ¶ 17). After the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Adams’s
case for failure to pay the proscribed Chapter 13 payment plan payments,
SEPH initiated a suit in the Circuit Court of Baldwin County to eject Adams
from the property. Id. at ¶¶ 17–18. The court entered the ejectment order on
May 27, 2016. Id. at ¶ 19.
This case returned to the Court’s active docket on January 25, 2017.
(Doc. 19). SEPH seeks entry of default judgment to recover the deficiency on
the Loan as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. As of February 2, 2017, the
outstanding balance on the Loan totals $55,871.28, plus accruing per diem
interest. (See Doc. 20-1, ¶ 24; Doc. 20-2). This sum includes $43,889.18 in
SEPH filed its suit in this Court on August 20, 2015. (Doc. 1). After Adams
failed to appear or defend, SEPH sought entry of default from the Clerk (Doc.
9), which was entered against Adams on October 8, 2015 (Doc. 10).
principal, $10,280.89 in interest, $105.48 in late fees, $895.73 in force placed
insurance, and $700.00 in appraisal fees. Id. SEPH also seeks reimbursement
for its attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of $44,863.43 for work
performed and/or billed through January 31, 2017.3 (See Doc. 20-1, ¶ 30; Doc.
This Court generally requires some notice be given to defendants
between the time of the service of the summons and complaint and the entry
of a default judgment. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Surek, No.
11–263–KD–M, 2011 WL 5289254, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 4, 2011); Penn. Nat’l
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. King, No. 11–577–WS–C, 2012 WL 1712670, at *2 n.4
(S.D. Ala. May 15, 2012). At the outset, the Court is satisfied Adams had
notice of the default proceedings. He was served with the summons and the
Complaint in August 2015. (Doc. 8). The summons clearly stated, “If you fail
to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief
demanded in the complaint.” (Doc. 4). Moreover, the Clerk entered default
against Adams on October 8, 2015, approximately seventeen months before
this entry of default judgment. (See Doc. 10). Considering the length of time
of the proceedings, including summons, entry of default, and a separate
Of this amount, $1,819.30 has been labeled “Work in Progress,” which
indicates the work has been performed but has not yet been billed to SEPH.
(See Doc. 20-3, ¶ 5).
bankruptcy proceeding, the Court finds Adams had sufficient notice of the
In this Circuit, “there is a strong policy of determining cases on their
merits[,] and we therefore view defaults with disfavor.” In re Worldwide Web
Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Varnes v. Local 91,
Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n of U.S. and Canada, 674 F.2d 1365, 1369 (11th
Cir. 1982). Nonetheless, it is well established that a “district court has the
authority to enter default judgment for failure . . . to comply with its order or
rules of procedure.” Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish a two-part process for
obtaining a default judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 55. If “a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must
enter the party’s default.” FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a). After default has been
entered, if the “claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain
by computation,” the clerk must enter default judgment. Id. at 55(b)(1). In all
other circumstances, such as here, “the party must apply to the court for a
default judgment.” Id. at 55(b)(2). Importantly, a “default judgment must not
differ in kind from, or exceed amount in, what is demanded in the pleadings.”
Id. at 54(c).
Rule 55(b)(2) also provides the Court may conduct a hearing to enter a
judgment if the Court needs to “conduct an accounting,” “determine the
amount of damages,” “establish the truth of any allegation by evidence,” or
“investigate any other matter.” FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). Upon review of the
docket, the motion for default judgment, and supporting evidence, the Court
finds a hearing is unnecessary. Securities and Exchange Comm’n v. Smyth,
420 F.3d 1225, 1231–2 & n. 13 (11th Cir. 2005) (where “all essential evidence
is already of record,” a hearing is generally not required).
The Eleventh Circuit has held, although “a default is not treated as an
absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff’s right
to recover, a defaulted defendant is deemed to admit the plaintiff’s wellpleaded allegation of fact. The defendant, however, is not held to admit facts
that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” Tyco Fire & Sec.,
LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. A’ppx 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citations
and internal quotations admitted). Moreover, “before entering a default
judgment for damages, the district court must ensure that the well-pleaded
allegations of the complaint . . . actually state a cause of action and that there
is a substantive, sufficient basis in the pleadings for the particular relief
sought.” Id. (emphasis omitted). When assessing damages in connection with
a default judgment, the Court has “an obligation to assure that there is a
legitimate basis for any damage award it enters.” Anheuser Busch, Inc. v.
Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2007). Additionally, SEPH must
establish a “prima facie liability case” against Adams. Pitts ex rel. Pitts v.
Seneca Sports, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2004) (citations
A. Claims Asserted
SEPH asserted one claim against Adams for breach of contract. (Doc.
1). Under Alabama law, loan documents are governed under contract law. See
Penick v. Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grande Lodge F & A M of Alabama,
Inc., 46 So. 3d 416, 428 (Ala. 2010) (construing terms of a mortgage, notes,
and modification agreement). In order to prevail on its claim, SEPH must
establish the following breach of contract elements: “(1) a valid contract
binding the parties; (2) the plaintiff’s performance under the contract; (3) the
defendant’s nonperformance; and (4) resulting damages.” Shaffer v. Regions
Fin. Corp., 29 So. 3d 872, 880 (Ala. 2009); Vision Bank v. Algernon Land Co.,
L.L.C., 2011 WL 1380062, at *7 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 12, 2011).
In light of the foregoing principles, the Court has reviewed the
Complaint and is satisfied SEPH has established a viable claim for breach of
contract. SEPH and Adams entered into a valid, binding contract in the
initial mortgage agreement and the subsequent modifications thereof. SEPH
clearly performed by loaning the funds to Adams, and Adams failed to
perform when he defaulted on the loan repayment. Additionally, SEPH
incurred damages, as explained below.
B. Damages Sought
“A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in
amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c). In
the instant case, the current motion seeks the same kinds of relief demanded
in the complaint’s prayer for relief, and because no amounts were specified in
the complaint, the amounts currently sought to not exceed the amounts
prayed for. SEPH’s requested default judgment thus does not violate Rule
“While well-pleaded facts in the complaint are deemed admitted,
plaintiff’s allegations relating to the amount of damages are not admitted by
virtue of default; rather, the court must determine both the amount and the
character of damages.” Capitol Records v. Carmichael, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1079,
1084 n.4 (S.D. Ala. 2007); see also Philpot, 317 F.3d at 1266 (“A court [on
entering default judgment] has an obligation to assure that there is a
legitimate basis for any damage award it enters . . . .”); Adolph Coors Co. v.
Movement Against Racism and the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985)
(on default judgment, “[d]amages may be awarded only if the record
adequately reflects the basis for award . . . .”); 10A Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2688 at 58–59 (3rd ed.
1998) (“If the court determines that [the] defendant is in default, the factual
allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages,
will be taken as true.”). Thus, the mere granting of default judgment does
not establish the plaintiff’s entitlement to any quantum of damages.
SEPH submits it suffered damages from the unpaid loan and
associated costs, including attorneys’ fees and costs: $55,871.28 on the loan
(including principal, interest, late fees, forced place insurance, and appraisal
fees) and $44,863.43 in attorneys’ fees and costs. (Doc. 20-1, ¶¶ 24, 30). In
addition, SEPH seeks per diem interest, calculated from February 3, 2017
through the date of judgment, at $21.644 per day. (See Doc. 20-2, p. 2). To
date, the additional interest amounts to $1,060.56 ($21.644 x 49 days =
$1,060.56). As a matter of law, the Court AWARDS SEPH $56,931.84 as the
total damages for the unpaid loan and the additional per diem interest
($55,871.28 + $1,060.56 = $56,931.84). The Court will consider the
reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees and costs separately.
C. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
1. Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
In a diversity action where Alabama is the forum state, the Court
applies the law of the State of Alabama to determine whether a party is
entitled to fees and to resolve disputes as to the reasonableness of fees.
Kearney v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1373 (M.D. Fla. 2010)
(citing Trans Coastal Roofing Co., Inc. v. David Boland, Inc., 309 F.3d 759,
760 (11th Cir. 2002)). Generally, Alabama follows the American rule for
attorney fees, “which does not require a losing party to pay the attorney fees
of the winning party . . . .” Classroomdirect.com, LLC v. Draphix, LLC, 992
So. 2d 692, 710 (Ala. 2008). This rule, however, is not without exception:
“‘[A]ttorney fees may be recovered if they are provided for by . . . contract[.]’”
Id. (quoting City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So. 2d 1061, 1078 (Ala. 2006)).
In the original Loan document, the parties agreed to the following
COLLECTION COSTS AND ATTORNEY’S FEES – I
[Adams] agree to pay all costs of collection, replevin or
any other or similar type of cost if I am in default. In
addition, if you [SEPH] hire an attorney to collect this
note, I also agree to pay any fee you incur with such
attorney plus court costs (except where prohibited by law).
To the extent permitted by the United States Bankruptcy
Code, I also agree to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees
and cost you incur to collect this debt as awarded by any
court exercising jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Code.
(Doc. 1-1, p. 3). Under Alabama law, “[a] mortgagee . . . may recover the
attorney fees incurred in the enforcement of the mortgage where the
mortgage contractually imposes a duty on the mortgagor to pay those fees.”
Austin Apparel, Inc. v. Bank of Prattville, 872 So. 2d 158, 166 (Ala. Civ. App.
2003). Because Adams defaulted on his Loan repayment and because SEPH
hired Phelps Dunbar to collect on the note, in addition to other actions, the
Court finds this provision authorizes the recovery of reasonable attorneys’
fees and costs.
2. Reasonableness of Fees
It is well-settled that “[t]he determination of whether [ ] attorney[s’]
fee[s] [are] reasonable is within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .”
Kiker v. Probate Court of Mobile Cnty., 67 So. 3d 865, 867 (Ala. 2010)
(internal quotations and citation omitted). In assessing the reasonableness of
an attorneys’ fees request, courts generally apply the “lodestar” method to
obtain an objective estimate of the value of an attorney’s services. Norman v.
Housing Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988).
The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the hours that each attorney
reasonably worked by a reasonable rate of pay, defined as the prevailing
market rate in the “legal community for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 895–96 n. 11 (1984). In this case, the relevant legal community
is Mobile, Alabama. See American Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168
F.3d 423, 437 (11th Cir. 1999) (providing that “the ‘relevant market’ for
purposes of determining the reasonable hourly rate for an attorney's services
is the place where the case is filed”) (citations omitted). The party moving for
fees bears the burden of establishing the “reasonableness” of the hourly rate
and number of hours expended via specific evidence supporting the hours and
rates claimed. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Barnes, 168
F.3d at 427
When seeking attorneys’ fees, the movant must not request fees for
hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” or request
fees for unsuccessful claims. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434–35. When awarding
attorneys’ fee, “[c]ourts are not authorized to be generous with the money of
others, and it is as much the duty of the courts to see that excessive fees and
expenses are not awarded as it is to see that an adequate amount is
awarded.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428. When a request for attorneys’ fees is
unreasonably high, the court may “conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it
may reduce the requested hours with an across-the-board cut.” Bivins v.
Wrap it Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008). Likewise, where the
rates or hours claimed seem excessive or lack the appropriate documentation,
a court may calculate the award based on its own experience, knowledge, and
observations. See, e.g., Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. Notably, “[t]he court,
either trial or appellate, is itself an expert on the question and may consider
its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonableness and proper fees
and may form an independent judgment either with or without the aid of
witnesses.” Id. at 1303 (citations omitted).
Further, the lodestar figure established by the reviewing court may be
adjusted by consideration of various factors including the following:
(1) the nature and value of the subject matter of the
employment; (2) the learning, skill, and labor requisite to its
proper discharge; (3) the time consumed; (4) the professional
experience and reputation of the attorney; (5) the weight of
his responsibilities; (6) the measure of success achieved; (7)
the reasonable expenses incurred; (8) whether a fee is fixed
or contingent; (9) the nature and length of a professional
relationship; (10) the fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services; (11) the likelihood that a particular
employment may preclude other employment; and (12) the
time limitations imposed by the client or by the
Van Schaack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 530 So. 2d 740, 749 (Ala. 1988). See
also Pharmacia Corp. v. McGowan, 915 So. 2d 549, 552–54 (Ala. 2004); Lolley
v. Citizens Bank, 494 So. 2d 19 (Ala. 1986). These criteria are for purposes of
evaluating whether the attorneys’ fees are reasonable but are not an
exhaustive list of specific criteria that must be met. Beal Bank, SSB v.
Schilleci, 896 So. 2d 395, 403 (Ala. 2004).
In support of its request for attorneys’ fees, SEPH submitted the
affidavit of one of its attorneys, I. Danielle Mashburn-Myrick, and the
affidavit of Charles J. Fleming, a local attorney who reviewed the billing
statements and provided a third-party opinion as to the reasonableness of the
fees. (See Docs. 20-3, 20-5). Ms. Mashburn-Myrick testified Phelps Dunbar
represented SEPH in this matter by “assisting SEPH with a forbearance
agreement; foreclosing the mortgage; prosecuting the deficiency action;
representing SEPH in [Adam’s] chapter 13 bankruptcy, in which SEPH
successfully moved to annul the automatic stay; and successfully
representing SEPH in a post-foreclosure ejectment action.” (Doc. 20-3, ¶ 3).
She further indicated she charged an “average hourly rate of $201.06” for her
work and reported the following hourly rates for other legal professionals who
worked on this matter:
Allen (“Teeto”) Graham, a partner, charged an hourly rate
of $290.00. Ashley E. Swink, formerly of counsel, but no
longer employed with Phelps Dunbar, charged an hourly
rate of $295.00. Our paralegals, Rachel DeHora and Vicky
Lundy, charged a rate [of] $130.00 per hour. These hourly
rates were usual and customary for these individuals
when handling similar matters[ ] and are in the range of
usual and customary [rates] for employees working at the
Mobile office of Phelps handling similar matters.
Id. at ¶ 4. Ms. Mashburn-Myrick did not, however, provide any details about
her or the others’ professional experience or other relevant details.
In his affidavit, Mr. Fleming indicated he has practiced law in the
Mobile, Alabama area since 1971 and has extensive experience in civil
litigation before federal courts. (See Doc. 20-5, ¶ 3). Based on his familiarity
with the firm’s reputation, and those of the individuals in question, Mr.
Fleming opined, “[t]he hourly rates charged by the attorneys and paralegals
of Phelps Dunbar are comparable to or lower than the rates charged for
similar services in Mobile and Baldwin Counties by attorneys of similar
experience.” Id. at ¶ 9. He pronounced the number of hours billed “were
reasonably and necessarily expended” and endorsed the expenses as
“reasonable expenditures . . . and necessarily incurred.” Id. at ¶¶ 10–11. Mr.
Fleming charges an hourly rate of $275 and billed Phelps Dunbar for one
hour of work to review the file. Id. at ¶ 13.
1. Reasonable Rate
As the party requesting the fees, SEPH has the burden of supplying
the Court with specific and detailed evidence from which the Court can
determine the reasonable hourly rate for the work performed by its attorneys
and paralegals. Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427. Unfortunately, other than
designating attorneys as “partner,” “counsel,” and “of counsel,” SEPH has not
presented any evidence indicating the level of experience or training
possessed by any of the billing individuals, making difficult the Court’s own
determinations of reasonableness. This Court, however, has previously found
Graham’s and Swink’s4 billable rates of $250 per hour and $225 per hour,
respectively, to be reasonable and appropriate when performing work for the
same client. See SE Prop. Holding, LLC v. 145, LLC, No. 10–521–KD–B, 2012
WL 6681784, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 21, 2012); see also Garrett Investments,
LLC v. SE Prop. Holdings, LLC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1340 (S.D. Ala. 2013)
(finding the same rates to be reasonable). Based upon the Court’s
consideration of the opinions of Ms. Mashburn-Myrick and Mr. Fleming, its
own knowledge and experience, and the factors enunciated, supra, the Court
finds these rates to be reasonable in this case as well.
The Court further finds Ms. Mashburn-Myrick’s rate at an “average” of
$201.06 per hour to be unreasonable. “In the past, this Court has awarded
the rate of $150 per hour for associates’ time when their expertise is
indeterminate.” See SE Prop. Holdings, 2012 WL 6681784 at *4. Because
SEPH (and Ms. Mashburn-Myrick herself) provided no evidence of her
expertise and experience, the Court finds she is due to be awarded a billable
rate of $150 per hour.
Further, “[w]ork that may be appropriately performed by paralegals
and billed to a client or a losing party includes ‘factual investigation,
including locating and interviewing witnesses; assistance with depositions,
The billing statements reference an attorney charging $295 per hour as “A.
Fincher.” (See Doc. 20-4). The Court construes Fincher’s charges to be those
of Ms. Swink, based on Ms. Mashburn-Myrick’s affidavit testimony.
interrogatories, and document production; compilation of statistical and
financial data; checking legal citations; and drafting correspondence.’” Id.
(citing Missouri v. Jenkins ex rel. Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n. 10 (1989)).
SEPH requests $130 per hour for paralegals’ work on this matter, but the
Court finds that rate to be unreasonable. “In several recent cases, this Court
has found $75/hour to be a reasonable rate for paralegal work.” Id. (citing
case law from this district). As SEPH has not stated the paralegals’ level of
experience and has not demonstrated they possess qualifications that merit
high rates, which have been approved in the past, the Court finds the
paralegal time in this case will be billed at $75 per hour.
2. Recoverable Time
SEPH seeks recovery of time billed from August 2015 through
February 2017. (See Doc. 20-4). In general, the majority of the work
performed and time expended was not overly excessive or redundant and was
adequately supported by the descriptions in the invoices. After studiously
reviewing the billing statements submitted, however, the Court has
discovered a number of billing entries that are “excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary,” as well as paralegal entries that appear to be clerical
or secretarial in nature. For example, the invoices indicate Mr. Graham and
Ms. Swink invoiced time to review and revise Ms. Mashburn-Myrick’s and
paralegals’ work. (See, e.g., Doc. 204, pp. 3, 13, 27–29, 37–39, 46–47, 65).
They also reflect conferences among counsel for routine matters and
redundant billing for the attorneys to receive and review filed documents. See
id. at 8–9, 11, 23, 33, 43, 47, 50. Further, the billing statements reference
review of the damage caused by Adams to the property, as well efforts to
repair the property before the foreclosure sale. See id. at 53, 56. While these
efforts might have been necessary in the furtherance of that sale, they are not
properly billed in this matter.
Upon consideration of the foregoing, and acknowledging the reduced
hourly rates for the attorneys and paralegals, the Court finds an across-theboard reduction of 15% in this action is appropriate. See, e.g., Garrett
Investments, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 1343–44; SE Prop. Holding, LLC v. Green,
2013 WL 790902 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 1, 2013) (applying an across-the-board
reduction of 15%); Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 (“If fee applicants do not exercise
billing judgment, courts are obligated to do it for them, to cut the amount of
hours for which payment is sought, pruning out those that are excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”) (citations omitted).
3. Calculation of the Lodestar
In consideration of the above findings, the following amount will be awarded:
Total Attorneys’ Fees Allowed
3. Reasonable Costs
In support of the requests for expenses, SEPH submits the billing
statements it received from Phelps Dunbar. These expenditures total
$3,864.43. (Doc. 20-4). After reviewing the descriptions, the correlating billing
statements, and Mr. Fleming’s assessment of the necessity and
reasonableness of the expenditures, the Court finds the expenses to be
adequately documented and reasonable. Accordingly, the Court approves
expenses in the amount of $3,864.43.
Upon consideration of the foregoing, judgment in the amount of
$56,931.84 for deficiencies on the Loan, $25,837.87 for attorneys’ fees, and
$3,864.43 for costs, for a total of $86,634.14, is due to be entered against
Adams. Accordingly, SEPH’s motion for entry of default judgment is
GRANTED in part.
DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of March, 2017.
/s/ Callie V. S. Granade
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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