Stadmire v. Colvin

Filing 20

Order re: 1 Complaint filed by John H Stadmire - the decision of theCommissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiffs claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits be AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 9/12/2016. Copies to parties. (mpp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOHN H. STADMIRE,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00426-B

ORDER
Plaintiff John H. Stadmire (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) seeks
judicial

review

of

a

final

decision

of

the

Commissioner

of

Social Security denying his claim for a period of disability and
disability

insurance

benefits

under

Title

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq.

II

of

the

Social

On June 13, 2016, the

parties consented to have the undersigned conduct any and all
proceedings in this case.

(Doc. 17).

Thus, the action was

referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order
the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73.

Upon careful consideration

of the administrative record and the memoranda of the parties,
it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be
AFFIRMED.
I.

Procedural History
Plaintiff protectively filed his application for benefits

on September 20, 2012.

(Tr. 149).

Plaintiff alleged that he

has been disabled since April 1, 2011, due to back problems,
high blood pressure, and high cholesterol.

(Id. at 149, 163).

Plaintiff’s application was denied and upon timely request,
he was granted an administrative hearing before Administrative
Law Judge Linda J. Helm (hereinafter “ALJ”) on March 18, 2014.
(Id. at 31).

Plaintiff attended the hearing with his counsel

and provided testimony related to his claims.
vocational

expert

(“VE”)

provided testimony.

also

appeared

(Id. at 62).

at

(Id. at 33).
the

hearing

A
and

On April 28, 2014, the ALJ

issued an unfavorable decision finding that Plaintiff is not
disabled.

(Id. at 19).

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s

request for review on July 20, 2015.
the

ALJ’s

decision

dated

April

(Id. at 1-2).

28,

2014,

Therefore,

became

the

final

decision of the Commissioner.
Having

exhausted

his

administrative

timely filed the present civil action.

remedies,

(Doc. 1).

Plaintiff

The parties

waived oral argument on June 13, 2016 (Doc. 16), and agree that
this case is now ripe for judicial review and is properly before
this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
II.

Issues on Appeal
1. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the
opinions
of
Plaintiff’s
treating
physician, Dr. Sid Crosby, M.D., while
assigning
significant
weight
to
the
opinions
of
non-examining,
reviewing

2

State
Agency
Chang, M.D.?1
2.

physician,

Dr.

Douglas

Whether the ALJ’s RFC assessment
supported by substantial evidence?

is

III. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born on September 4, 1951, and was sixty-two
years of age at the time of his administrative hearing on March
18, 2014.

(Tr. 35, 149).

Plaintiff graduated from high school

and worked for thirty-nine and a half years (until April 2011)
for Alabama Power Company as a heavy equipment operator. 2

(Id.

at 35, 40-41).
At his hearing, Plaintiff testified that he has pain in his
back that affects his every day movement.

(Id. at 42-43).

He

testified that he wears a back brace that he got from work in
2004,

and

it

“helps

a

lot.”

(Id.

at

39).

He

also

takes

Ibuprofen every day, and it “pretty much” controls the pain with
no side effects.
for his back. 3

(Id. at 43-46).
(Id. at 46).

He takes no other medication

Plaintiff testified that he also

has high blood pressure, which is helped with medication (id. at
1

Because these issues are interrelated, the Court discusses them
together.

2

Plaintiff testified that he worked in the coal yard at Alabama
Power, lowering barges with cranes, operating a tractor, running
a bulldozer, and working in the control room. (Tr. 41).

3

Plaintiff testified that he tried to take Lyrica for his back
pain, but he did not like the way it made him feel, and he
stopped taking it. (Tr. 45-46).

3

46-47), and he has vertigo, which is “pretty much” controlled
with medication, although the medication makes him drowsy.
at 47-48, 57).

(Id.

Plaintiff testified that he has no other medical

problems that prevent him from working.4

(Id. at 50).

Plaintiff testified that he lives alone in his own home.
(Id. at 38).

He takes care of his home, cooks, does laundry,

does yard work, drives, shops, and takes care of his own banking
and finances.
getting

up

at

(Id. at 52-53).
6:00

a.m.,

His normal routine consists of

playing

games

on

the

television,

washing clothes, and going outside as much as possible.
55).

He goes fishing every once in a while.

(Id. at

(Id.).

Plaintiff testified that he can walk about thirty minutes,
stand about fifteen minutes, sit about fifty minutes, and can
lift about ten pounds.

(Id. at 50-51).

In his Function Report,

Plaintiff stated that he needs no reminders to take care of his
personal needs, to take his medicine, or to go places (id. at
156, 158), that he visits with others (id. at 158), that he can
go out unaccompanied (id.), that he has no

problems getting

along with others (id. at 159), that he can follow written and
spoken

instructions

“fairly

well”

(id.),

that

he

gets

along

“good” with authority figures (id. at 160), and that he has

4

Plaintiff testified that he has “mild” kidney disease which has
required no treatment.
(Tr. 44, 217, 299).
He has no mental
health problems. (Id. at 51).

4

never been fired from a job because of problems getting along
with people (id.); but he cannot pay attention for long (id. at
159), and he does not handle stress or changes in routine well.
(Id. at 160).
IV.

Analysis
A.

Standard of Review

In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s
role

is

a

limited

determining

1)

one.

whether

The
the

Court’s
decision

review
of

the

is

limited

to

Secretary

is

supported by substantial evidence and 2) whether the correct
legal standards were applied.
1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).

5

Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d

A court may not decide the facts

anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that
of the Commissioner.
Cir.

1986).

The

Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th
Commissioner’s

findings

of

fact

affirmed if they are based upon substantial evidence.

must

be

Brown v.

Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth v.
Heckler,

703

F.2d

1233,

1239

(11th

Cir.

1983)

(holding

substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla, but
less

than

a

preponderance”

and

consists

of

“such

relevant

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
support

a

conclusion.”).

In

determining

5

whether

substantial

This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal
principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th
Cir. 1987).
5

evidence exists, a court must view the record as a whole, taking
into account evidence favorable, as well as unfavorable, to the
Commissioner’s decision.

Chester v. Bowen, 792 F. 2d 129, 131

(11th Cir. 1986); Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163, *4
(S.D. Ala. June 14, 1999).
B.

Discussion

An individual who applies for Social Security disability
benefits

must

prove

404.1512, 416.912.

his

or

her

disability.

20

C.F.R.

§§

Disability is defined as the “inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.”

42

U.S.C.

§§

404.1505(a),

416.905(a).

provide

five-step

a

423(d)(1)(A);
The

see

Social

sequential

also

20

Security

evaluation

§§

regulations
process

determining if a claimant has proven his disability. 6

6

C.F.R.

for

20 C.F.R.

The claimant must first prove that he or she has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity.
The second step requires the
claimant to prove that he or she has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments. If, at the third step, the claimant
proves that the impairment or combination of impairments meets
or
equals
a
listed
impairment,
then
the
claimant
is
automatically found disabled regardless of age, education, or
work experience.
If the claimant cannot prevail at the third
step, he or she must proceed to the fourth step where the
claimant must prove an inability to perform their past relevant
work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). In
evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden, the
6

§§ 404.1520, 416.920.
In the case sub judice, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 1,
2011,

the

alleged

impairments
vertigo.

of

onset

high

(Tr. 21).

date,

blood

and

that

pressure,

he

lumbar

has

the

back

severe

pain,

and

The ALJ further found that Plaintiff does

not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets
or medically equals any of the listed impairments contained in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
The

ALJ

concluded

that

Plaintiff

(Id.).
retains

the

residual

functional capacity (hereinafter “RFC”) to perform a range of
medium work, except that Plaintiff is restricted to “lifting
and/or

carrying

no

more

than

50

pounds

occasionally

and

25

pounds frequently, no overhead reaching, no climbing ladders,
scaffolds and ropes, no crawling, no work at unprotected heights
examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective
medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining
physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age,
education and work history.
Id.
Once a claimant meets this
burden, it becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove at the
fifth step that the claimant is capable of engaging in another
kind
of
substantial
gainful
employment
which
exists
in
significant
numbers
in
the
national
economy,
given
the
claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and
work history.
Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir.
1985). If the Commissioner can demonstrate that there are such
jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant must prove inability
to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v.
Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). See also Hale v.
Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v.
Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).

7

or dangerous equipment, no operating of commercial vehicles, no
working with heavy vibrations, only occasional climbing of ramps
and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, and crouching, and no
rapid production pace work defined as work that is pushed at the
individual on a conveyor belt and the individual has no control
over the pace of the work and no movement of the head more than
twice a minute to follow items.”
determined

that

while

(Id. at 22).

Plaintiff’s

medically

The ALJ also
determinable

impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged
symptoms, his statements concerning the intensity, persistence
and limiting effects of the alleged symptoms were only partially
credible for the reasons explained in the decision.
23).

(Id. at

The ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any of

his past relevant work as an operational engineer.

(Id. at 24).

However, utilizing the testimony of a VE, the ALJ concluded that
considering Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity for a range
of

medium

work,

as

well

as

his

age,

education

and

work

experience, there are jobs existing in the national economy that
Plaintiff

is

able

to

perform,

such

as

a

“kitchen

helper,”

“dining room attendant,” and a “baggage porter,” all of which
are classified as medium and unskilled.

(Id. at 25, 65).

the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled.
The

Court

now

considers

the

foregoing

record in this case and the issues on appeal.

8

in

Thus,

(Id. at 25).
light

of

the

1.

Issues

A. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the
opinions
of
Plaintiff’s
treating
physician, Dr. Sid Crosby, M.D., while
assigning
significant
weight
to
the
opinions
of
non-examining,
reviewing
State
Agency
physician,
Dr.
Douglas
Chang, M.D.?
In

this

case,

Plaintiff

argues

that

the

ALJ

erred

in

rejecting the opinions of his long time treating physician, Dr.
Sid Crosby, M.D., set forth in
completed

on September

questionnaire
would

greatly

form,

6,

Dr.

increase

a medical questionnaire form

2013.

Crosby

(Doc.
opined

Plaintiff’s

9 at 1-3).

that

symptoms

In the

physical
and

activity

would

cause

distraction from tasks or total abandonment of tasks and that
Plaintiff could not engage in any form of gainful employment as
a result of his “present back condition.”

(Tr. 284).

Plaintiff

also argues that the ALJ erred in assigning significant weight
to

the

opinions

of

non-examining,

reviewing

State

Agency

physician, Dr. Douglas Chang, M.D., that Plaintiff has the RFC
to

perform

medium

work.

(Id.

at

5-6).

The

Commissioner

counters that the medical evidence does not support Dr. Crosby’s
opinions set forth in the disability questionnaire form, and, to
the contrary, that Dr. Crosby’s opinions are inconsistent with
the substantial evidence in the case and, thus, were properly
discredited by the ALJ.

(Doc. 14 at 7-8).

The Commissioner

further argues that the ALJ assigned the proper weight to the

9

opinions of Dr. Chang, which were supported by the substantial
evidence in the case.
the

record

in

this

(Id. at 6).
case,

the

Having carefully reviewed

Court

agrees

that

Plaintiff’s

claims are without merit.
As part of the disability determination process, the ALJ is
tasked

with

examining,

weighing
and

the

opinions

non-examining

and

findings

physicians.

of

In

treating,

reaching

a

decision, the ALJ must specify the weight given to different
medical opinions and the reasons for doing so.

See Winschel v.

Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011).
The failure to do so is reversible error.

See Williams v.

Astrue, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12010, *4, 2009 WL 413541, *1
(M.D. Fla. 2009).
When
ALJ

weighing

the

opinion

of

a

treating

physician,

the

must give the opinions “substantial weight,” unless good

cause exists for not doing so.

Costigan v. Commissioner, Soc.

Sec. Admin., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 2827, *10, 2015 WL 795089, *4
(11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2015) (citing Crawford v. Commissioner of
Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004) and Broughton v.
Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 962 (11th Cir. 1985)).

The opinion of “a

one-time examining physician — or psychologist,” on the other
hand,

is

physician.

not

entitled

to

the

same

deference

as

a

treating

Petty v. Astrue, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24516, *50,

2010 WL 989605, *14 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2010) (citing Crawford,

10

363 F.3d at 1160).

An ALJ is also “required to consider the

opinions of non-examining state agency medical and psychological
consultants because they ‘are highly qualified physicians and
psychologists who are also experts in Social Security disability
evaluation.’”
(11th

Milner v. Barnhart,

Cir.

2008)

404.1527(f)(2)(i)).
examining

(unpublished)
“The

sources

when

examining sources.”

275 Fed. Appx. 947, 948

ALJ

they

may
do

(citing
rely

not

on

20

C.F.R.

opinions

conflict

with

of

§
non-

those

of

Id. (citing Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d

580, 584-85 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Whether considering the opinions of treating, examining, or
non-examining

physicians,

testimony

any

of

good

medical

cause

source

exists

when

it

to

is

discredit

contrary

to

the
or

unsupported by the evidence of record.

Phillips v. Barnhart,

357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004).

“Good cause may also

exist

where

a

doctor’s

opinions

are

merely

conclusory,

inconsistent with the doctor’s medical records, or unsupported
by objective medical evidence.”

Hogan v. Astrue, 2012 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 108512, *8, 2012 WL 3155570, *3 (M.D. Ala. 2012).
The ALJ is “free to reject the opinion of any physician when the
evidence supports a contrary conclusion.”
764

F.2d

834,

835

(11th

Cir.

1985)

(per

Sryock v. Heckler,
curiam)

(citation

omitted); Adamo v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 365 Fed. Appx.
209,

212

(11th

Cir.

2010)

(The

11

ALJ

may

reject

any

medical

opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding.).
In

support

of

his

argument

that

the

ALJ

erred

in

discrediting Dr. Crosby’s opinion that Plaintiff cannot engage
in any form of gainful employment because of his “present back
condition,” Plaintiff points to the following evidence which he
alleges establishes his disability:
(1) “Dr. Crosby has been [his] primary care physician since
2003 and has treated [him] for back pain since 2010. Tr. at
241;”
(2) “On December 29, 2010, Plaintiff was assessed as having
tenderness in his midline lumbosacral area. Tr. at 242;”
(3)

“Dr.

Crosby

diagnosed

the

Plaintiff

with

a

lumbar

strain and left sided sciatica. Id.;”
(4) “On August 1, 2011 and August 16, 2011, Plaintiff was
noted as having a positive left side straight leg raise. Tr.
234, 236;”
(5) “Plaintiff was diagnosed with lumbosacral strain. Id.;”
(6)

“Plaintiff

was

noted

as

having

decreased

range

of

motion and decreased flexion on September 23, 2011. Tr. 231.;”
(7) “Plaintiff was diagnosed with lumbosacral strain. Id.;”
(8) “On September 10, 2012, Plaintiff reported worsening
lower back pain, moderate in severity. Tr. 213;”
(9) “Dr. Crosby noted decreased range of motion and very
tight hamstrings and diagnosed with low back pain. Tr. 217;”

12

(10) “Plaintiff was diagnosed with neck pain/cervicalgia on
January 18, 2012. Tr. 223;”
(11) “On January 8, 2013,

Plaintiff was evaluated in a

consultative examination by Dr. Steve Furr. Tr. 202-204,”7 and an
“x-ray of the Plaintiff’s lumbosacral spine revealed a slight
calcification of the aorta. Tr. at 202;”
(12) “Plaintiff was diagnosed with low back pain on January
8, 2013. Tr. at 202;”
(13) On

September 6, 2013,

Plaintiff was

found to have

tenderness in his midline lumbosacral area, a positive straight
leg raise on his left side, and decreased range of motion. Tr.
at 289;” and
(14) “Plaintiff was diagnosed with dizziness and low back
pain. Id.”

(Doc. 9 at 2, 4-5) (emphasis added).

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, this evidence does not
establish that his medical conditions, considered alone or in
combination, are disabling.

Indeed, with respect to his primary

medical problem (his back condition), Plaintiff’s evidence shows
nothing more than back “strain” causing tenderness, decreased
range of motion, and complaints of “moderate” back pain.
the

x-ray

of

Plaintiff’s

lumbosacral

7

spine

showed

Even
no

The record shows that Dr. Furr completed a consultative x-ray of
Plaintiff’s lumbosacral spine at the request of the Agency but
did not otherwise conduct any examinations or proffer any
opinions. (Tr. 202).

13

abnormalities with his back and only a “slight” calcification of
his aorta.

(Tr. 204).

A review of the record further shows that Dr. Crosby began
treating Plaintiff for low back pain on December 29, 2010, when
Plaintiff injured his back “checking coon traps.”

(Id. at 241).

Plaintiff presented on that date with complaints of a sudden
onset of “mild” “aching” on both sides of his back.

(Id.).

His

physical examination revealed “normal” range of motion and a
negative straight leg raise, with “tenderness” along the midline
lumbosacral
Plaintiff

spine.
with

(Id.

at

“lumbosacral

242).
strain,”

“responded well to manipulation.”

Dr.
noting

(Id.).

Crosby

diagnosed

that

Plaintiff

Dr. Crosby assigned

no functional limitations and prescribed no medical treatment.
(Id.).

Four months later, on April 1, 2011, Plaintiff stopped

working, alleging disability based on back problems, high blood
pressure, and high cholesterol.

(Id. at 41, 149, 163).

Over the next three years, Dr. Crosby continued to treat
Plaintiff for low back strain, sometimes causing “moderate” pain
and

decreased

range

of

motion

positive straight leg raise.
289).

and

occasionally

causing

a

(Id. at 43, 213, 216, 231, 233-36,

Dr. Crosby routinely refilled Plaintiff’s prescription

for 800 mg Ibuprofen, which Plaintiff testified provided some
relief.
for

pain

(Id.).
but

Dr. Crosby also prescribed Lorcet and Lyrica
discontinued

the

14

medication

when

Plaintiff

complained that it made him feel strange.
234).

Dr.

Crosby

also

recommended

(Id. at 45-46, 222,

physical

therapy

on

two

occasions, but it appears that Plaintiff never followed through
with scheduling.
prior

to

(Id. at 217, 231).

September

6,

2013,

did

In any event, at no time

Dr.

Crosby

ever

assign

any

functional limitations as a result of Plaintiff’s back condition
or even order an x-ray or MRI.
Dr. Crosby also treated Plaintiff from 2002 to 2013 for
other medical conditions including vertigo, high blood pressure,
and high cholesterol.

The record shows that these conditions

were largely controlled with medication, and at no time did Dr.
Crosby or any other medical source ever opine that any of these
conditions resulted in functional limitations.

(Id. at 47-48,

210-11, 225, 234, 290, 297-99).
As

discussed

above,

on

September

6,

2013,

Dr.

Crosby

completed a disability questionnaire form opining that physical
activity would greatly increase Plaintiff’s symptoms and cause
distraction from tasks or total abandonment of tasks and that
Plaintiff could not engage in any form of gainful employment due
to his “present back condition.” 8
Crosby’s

examination

findings

on

8

(Id. at 284).
that

same

Curiously, Dr.

date

reflect

no

Dr. Crosby also opined that Plaintiff may need an MRI or
epidural steroid treatment within the following year.
(Tr.
284).

15

musculoskeletal problems, “normal” muscle mass and tone, no bony
abnormalities, and only “tenderness” in the midline lumbosacral
spine with a positive straight leg raise on the left side and
decreased

range

of

motion.

(Id.

at

286,

289).

These

examination findings, as well as Dr. Crosby’s treatment records
as a whole, are clearly inconsistent with the severity of Dr.
Crosby’s opinions set forth in the September 6, 2013, disability
questionnaire
Plaintiff

form,

cannot

particularly

engage

in

any

Dr.

Crosby’s

form

of

because of his “present back condition.”

opinion

gainful

that

employment

(Id. at 284).

In addition to being inconsistent with his own treatment
records,
remaining

Dr.

Crosby’s

substantial

opinions
evidence

are
in

inconsistent

this

case,

with

the

including

the

January 8, 2013, consultative x-ray of Plaintiff’s lumbosacral
spine taken by Dr. Steven Furr, M.D., which showed a completely
“normal” spine.
argument,

the

(Id. at 202, 204).
only

abnormal

finding

“slight” calcification of the aorta.
Dr.

Crosby’s

opinions

Contrary to Plaintiff’s

are

from

the

x-ray

was

a

(Id.).

also

inconsistent

with

the

opinions of State Agency reviewer, Dr. Douglas Chang, M.D., that
Plaintiff has an RFC for medium work.

(Id. at 74-75, 283).

Dr.

Chang affirmed findings that Plaintiff can frequently lift/carry
twenty-five pounds and can stand and/or walk and sit with normal
breaks for a total of six hours in an eight-hour work day.

16

(Id. at 74-75).
In addition, Dr. Crosby’s opinions are inconsistent with
Plaintiff’s reported activities of daily living, which include
living on his own, cooking, doing laundry, going outside as much
as

possible,

doing

yard

work,

fishing,

driving,

shopping,

visiting others, taking care of his own banking and finances,
and walking for thirty minutes at a time.

(Id. at 38, 50-55,

156-58).
Having reviewed the record at length, the Court finds that
the

ALJ

had

good

cause

to

reject

Dr.

Crosby’s

opinion

that

Plaintiff’s “present back condition” prevents him from any type
of gainful employment, as that opinion is inconsistent with the
substantial evidence in the case.

In addition, the Court finds

that the ALJ properly assigned substantial weight to the opinion
of Dr. Chang that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform medium work,
as

Dr.

Chang’s

opinion

did

not

opinion of an examining physician.
at 948.

conflict

with

any

credible

See Milner, 275 Fed. Appx.

Accordingly, for each of these reasons, Plaintiff’s

claims must fail.
B.

Whether the ALJ’s RFC assessment
supported by substantial evidence?

is

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in finding that he
has

the

residual

functional

capacity

to

perform

a

range

of

medium work, except that Plaintiff is restricted to “lifting

17

and/or

carrying

no

more

than

50

pounds

occasionally

and

25

pounds frequently, no overhead reaching, no climbing ladders,
scaffolds and ropes, no crawling, no work at unprotected heights
or dangerous equipment, no operating of commercial vehicles, no
working with heavy vibrations, only occasional climbing of ramps
and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, and crouching, and no
rapid production pace work defined as work that is pushed at the
individual on a conveyor belt and the individual has no control
over the pace of the work and no movement of the head more than
twice a minute to follow items.”
Commissioner
ALJ’s

RFC

reviewed

counters

that

assessment.
the

record

substantial

(Doc.
in

(Tr. 22; Doc. 9 at 7).

14

this

evidence

at

10).

case,

the

supports

Having
Court

The
the

carefully

finds

that

Plaintiff’s claim is without merit.
Residual functional capacity is a measure of what Plaintiff
can do despite his or her credible limitations.
404.1545.

See 20 C.F.R. §

Determinations of a claimant’s residual functional

capacity are reserved for the ALJ, and the assessment is to be
based upon all the relevant evidence of a claimant’s remaining
ability to work despite his or her impairments, and must be
supported by substantial evidence.
Supp.

2d

1323,

1331 (S.D.

Ala.

See Beech v. Apfel, 100 F.
2000)

(citing

20

C.F.R.

§

404.1546 and Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir.
1997)); Saunders v. Astrue, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39571, *10,

18

2012 WL 997222, *4 (M.D. Ala. March 23, 2012).
determined
claimant

the

Plaintiff’s
the

bears

residual
of

burden

Once the ALJ has

functional

demonstrating

capacity,

that

decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
Heckler, 768 F.2d 1273, 1274 (11th Cir. 1985).

the

the

ALJ’s

See Flynn v.
Plaintiff has

failed to meet his burden in this case.
Based

on

(specifically

the

evidence

including

Dr.

set

forth

Crosby’s

in

detail

treatment

herein

records,

Dr.

Chang’s opinion that Plaintiff can perform medium work, and the
evidence of Plaintiff’s activities of daily living), the Court
finds that the substantial evidence in this case supports the
ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can perform a range of medium work,
with the stated restrictions.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim is

without merit.
V.

Conclusion
For

the

reasons

set

forth

herein,

and

upon

careful

consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the
parties,

it

is

hereby

ORDERED

that

the

decision

of

the

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for a
period

of

disability

and

disability

insurance

benefits

be

AFFIRMED.
DONE this 12th day of September, 2016.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

19