PNC Bank v. Classic Crab, Inc. et al
ORDER granting 27 Motion for Default Judgment in the amount of $230,263.24 against Defendant Classic Crab, Inc.. Signed by Judge Kristi K. DuBose on 6/6/2016. (cmj)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
SUCCESSOR TO RBC BANK (USA),
SUCCESSOR TO RBC CENTURA BANK,
SUCCESSOR TO REGIONS BANK
DOING BUSINESS AS AMSOUTH BANK
CLASSIC CRAB, INC. and
DARYL B. BRYANT A/K/A
DARYL BOYD BRYANT
CIVIL ACTION 15-00459-KD-C
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion in Support of
Attorney’s Fees. (Doc. 27). On April 18, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for default
judgment on its claim for breach of promissory note brought against Classic Crab but permitted
Plaintiff leave to supplement its request for attorney’s fees. (Doc. 26).1 As detailed in its
supplemental motion, Plaintiff has adjusted its request by eliminating any claims for billing
associated with the individual defendant in this matter. The fees claimed now pertain only to
Defendant Classic Crab. The Court has reviewed the supplemental request and has determined
that the number of hours expended in this matter are reasonable.2 Accordingly, the supplemental
This Order (Doc. 26) is incorporated by reference.
The Court previously determined reasonable hourly rates for attorneys and paralegals. (Doc. 26). The calculation
of reasonable attorney’s fees is within the sound discretion of the court. Dowdell v. City of Apopka, Fla., 698 F.2d
1181, 1187 (11th Cir.1983); Kiker v. Probate Court of Mobile Cty., 67 So.3d 865, 867 (Ala. 2010). In assessing the
reasonableness of attorney’s fee requests, courts generally apply the “lodestar” method to obtain an objective
estimate of the value of an attorney’s services. Norman v. Housing Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292,
1299 (11th Cir.1988); Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 213 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir.2000) (explaining that the
lodestar “is the number of hours (tempered by billing judgment) spent in the legal work on the case, multiplied by a
reasonable market rate in the local area”). The value of an attorney’s services is calculated by multiplying the hours
that the attorney reasonably worked by a reasonable rate of pay, defined as “the prevailing market rate in the legal
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895–896 n. 11 (1984). The party moving for fees bears the burden of establishing the
motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is awarded a judgment in its favor against the Defendant Classic
Crab, Inc. in the total amount of $230,263.24, which is comprised of damages claimed by the
Plaintiff on Count I (breach of promissory note) consisting of principal in the amount of
$199,755.83, accrued interest in the amount of $17,215.23, accrued to March 16, 2016, late
charges in the amount of $1,390.08, and attorney’s fees in the amount of $11,902.10.
A Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) will issue by separate
DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of June 2016.
/s/ Kristi K. DuBose
KRISTI K. DuBOSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
“reasonableness” of the hourly rate and number of hours expended via specific evidence supporting the hours and
rates claimed. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); American Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes,
168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999). The court may utilize its own “knowledge and expertise” to come to an
independent judgment regarding the reasonableness of requested attorney’s fees. Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d
776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994).
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