Hudson v. University of South Alabama USA Healthcare Management

Filing 28

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 18 Motion to Dismiss and denying the Motion for More Definite Statement. Signed by Chief Judge William H. Steele on 8/3/2016. (tgw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ANNIE B. HUDSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA
HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS,
Defendant.

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) CIVIL ACTION 16-0026-WS-N
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ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the defendant’s motion to dismiss in part
or, in the alternative, motion for more definite statement. (Doc. 18). The parties
have filed briefs in support of their respective positions, (Docs. 18, 26, 27), and
the motions are ripe for resolution. After careful consideration, the Court
concludes that the motion to dismiss is due to be granted in part and denied in part
and that the motion for more definite statement is due to be denied.
BACKGROUND
According to the amended complaint, (Doc. 17), the plaintiff, an AfricanAmerican, was employed by the defendant as a billing and insurance clerk. The
amended complaint addresses events occurring between July and December 2014.
In July, the plaintiff’s workload was doubled when a temporary employee was
fired and not replaced. The day after she was informed of her increased workload,
the plaintiff received a reprimand for insubordination on three grounds: slamming
copies onto a desk, not looking supervisors in the eye, and not appearing to be
busy when they passed by. At the same time, the plaintiff received an evaluation
that was lowered due to the asserted insubordination, even though the evaluation
period had closed over six weeks earlier. A week later, the plaintiff was asked to

create a list of her job duties so as to justify her position in the face of impending
job cuts.
The plaintiff’s time (arrival, departure and breaks) was far more scrutinized
than that of any white employee in her department. In September, she was
questioned about a missing package, with her supervisors attempting for several
days to force her to admit responsibility. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed an
internal EEO complaint, which became public knowledge within the department,
with supervisors permitting white employees to openly discuss the complaint and
laugh. In October, the plaintiff was berated by a physician for being stupid, even
though she was handling both check-in and check-out by herself. The physician
also said that the department director would get her fired. In early November, the
plaintiff was reprimanded for returning late from a benefits fair, even though no
time limit had been given. A few days later, the EEO manager advised the
plaintiff that her supervisor was alleging that the plaintiff was creating a hostile
work environment. Around this time, the plaintiff sought medical attention to
address health issues arising from stress at work. On December 11, 2014, the
plaintiff was terminated, with the stated reason being her late return from the
benefits fair.
The amended complaint asserts three causes of action, all under Title VII:
(1) race discrimination; (2) hostile work environment; and (3) retaliation.
The defendant argues that the amended complaint, other than with respect
to termination, fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. With respect
to the race discrimination claim, the defendant argues that the amended complaint
fails to allege an adverse employment action. (Doc. 18 at 2-6). With respect to
the retaliation claim, the defendant argues that the amended complaint fails to
allege an adverse action meeting the standard articulated in Burlington Northern
and Santa Fe Railway v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). (Doc. 18 at 7-9). With
respect to the hostile work environment claim, the defendant argues that the
amended complaint fails to set forth facts plausibly alleging that the alleged
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harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions
of the plaintiff’s employment. (Id. at 9-11). Should its motion to dismiss fail, the
defendant argues the plaintiff should be required under Rule 12(e) to file a second
amended complaint that, for each count, specifically identifies the precise
preceding paragraphs relevant to that count. (Id. at 12-13).
DISCUSSION
“There is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential
argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on summary
judgment.” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir.
1995); accord Gennusa v. Canova, 748 F.3d 1103, 1116 (11th Cir. 2014). The
Court employs the same principle on motion to dismiss. E.g., Jurich v. Compass
Marine, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (S.D. Ala. 2012). Accordingly, the
Court will consider only those arguments the parties have expressly advanced and
will not supply legal or analytical support the parties have declined to offer
themselves.
I. Motion to Dismiss.
To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must first satisfy the
pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007). “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain … a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ….”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 establishes a regime of “notice pleading.”
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 513-14 (2002). It does not,
however, eliminate all pleading requirements.
First, the complaint must address all the elements that must be shown in
order to support recovery under one or more causes of action. “At a minimum,
notice pleading requires that a complaint contain inferential allegations from
which we can identify each of the material elements necessary to sustain a
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recovery under some viable legal theory.” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555
F.3d 949, 960 (11th Cir. 2009) (emphasis and internal quotes omitted).
Pleading elements is necessary, but it is not enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2).
The rule “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do” to satisfy that rule. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. There must in addition be a pleading of facts. Though they need not
be detailed, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level ....” Id. That is, the complaint must allege “enough facts to
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard … asks for
more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully,” and
“[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s
liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotes omitted). A complaint lacking
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” will not “survive a motion to dismiss.” Id. But so long as
the plausibility standard is met, the complaint “may proceed even if it strikes a
savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is
very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotes omitted).
These are the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), and failure to meet
them exposes a complaint to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted. But the complaint is so exposed only if the
defendant moves for dismissal under that rule, invokes the plausibility standard,
and makes a satisfactory showing that, in certain, specified respects, for certain,
specified reasons, the complaint falls short of that standard.1 “Vague, generalized
1

This necessarily follows from the principle that the movant bears the burden of
showing that dismissal for failure to state a claim is warranted. E.g., Beck v. Deloitte &
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assertions that a claim is somehow implausible, without a clear, supported
explanation of just what is implausible and why, places no burden on the Court to
supply the deficiency or on the plaintiff to respond.” FNB Bank v. Park National
Corp., 2013 WL 1748796 at *2 (S.D. Ala. 2013).
A. Race Discrimination.
“[A]dverse employment action is an indispensable element of a Title VII
plaintiff’s case ….” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1246 (11th Cir.
2001). Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
amended complaint must contain allegations reflecting the existence of one or
more adverse employment actions. The defendant denies that the amended
complaint does so.
An adverse employment action “must impact the ‘terms, conditions, or
privileges’ of the plaintiff’s job in a real and demonstrable way.” Davis, 245 F.3d
at 1239 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). Thus, “to prove adverse employment
action in a case under Title VII’s anti-discrimination clause, an employee must
show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.” Id. (emphasis in original). “[T]he employment action must be
materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.” Id.
Other than termination, the adverse actions identified by the plaintiff in the
amended complaint are as follows: (1) carrying a double workload; (2) having her
time scrutinized more than that of white employees; (3) receiving a reprimand for
insubordination; (4) receiving an evaluation that was lowered due to
insubordination; (5) being asked to create a list of her job duties; (6) being
questioned about a missing package; (7) having her internal EEO complaint made
known and laughed at; (8) being berated by a physician; (9) being reprimanded for
Touche, 144 F.3d 732, 735-36 (11th Cir. 1998); Continental Motors, Inc. v. Jewell
Aircraft, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1314 n.26 (S.D. Ala. 2012).

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returning late from a benefits fair; and (10) being accused of creating a hostile
work environment.
1. Workload.
The defendant relies on an unpublished Fifth Circuit opinion for the
proposition that “[i]mposing a higher workload than that given to other employees
is not an adverse employment action under title VII.” Ellis v. Compass Group
USA, Inc., 426 Fed. Appx. 292, 296 (5th Cir. 2011). In the Fifth Circuit, however,
“[a]dverse employment actions include only ultimate employment actions, such as
hiring, firing, promoting, compensating, or granting leave.” Id. At least after
Davis, the standard in the Eleventh Circuit extends beyond ultimate employment
actions to any other action working a serious and material change in the plaintiff’s
terms and conditions of employment. Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970
(11th Cir. 2008).
The defendant equates a “workload” claim with a “work assignment
claim.” This may be correct, although it appears the latter term generally is
employed when a plaintiff complains of being given menial, distasteful or
otherwise unsatisfactory tasks rather than when she is given more work than her
peers. In any event, the plaintiff’s own authority states only that work assignment
claims, “absent unusual circumstances, typically do not constitute adverse
employment actions.” McCone v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 582 Fed. Appx. 798, 800
(11th Cir. 2014); accord Davis, 245 F.3d at 1244 (“We do not suggest that a
change in work assignments can never by itself give rise to a Title VII claim; in
unusual instances the change may be so substantial and material that it does indeed
alter the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of employment.”). The defendant has
not attempted to show that being required to do the work of two is not an unusual
circumstance sufficient to render the plaintiff’s workload/work assignment an
adverse employment action.

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2. Scrutiny and questioning.
“This court and others within this circuit have uniformly held that
heightened scrutiny, without evidence that any disciplinary action was taken
against [the plaintiff] or that he was subjected to any tangible consequence, does
not constitute an adverse employment action.” Buford-Clark v. Birmingham
Board of Education, 2015 WL 225464 at *5 (N.D. Ala. 2015); accord Perkins v.
Kushla Water District, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1262 (S.D. Ala. 2014); Gossard v. JP
Morgan Chase & Co., 612 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1250 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Little v.
Peach County School District, 2009 WL 198003 at *11 (M.D. Ga. 2009). In
Harbuck v. Teets, 152 Fed. Appx. 846 (11th Cir. 2005), the plaintiff alleged a
number of adverse actions, including that she “has been subject to heightened
scrutiny since her deposition in her previous EEOC complaint.” Id. at 847. The
Court, citing Davis, ruled that “[t]he actions about which Harbuck complains do
not constitute an adverse employment action ….” Id. at 848. Because the
amended complaint does not allege that the plaintiff received any disciplinary
action or was subjected to any tangible consequence as a result of the scrutiny of
her time or the questioning of her regarding the missing package, it does not allege
an adverse employment action and thus does not state a claim of race
discrimination based on scrutiny or questioning.
3. Evaluation.
“A lower score on [a plaintiff’s] performance evaluation, by itself, is not
actionable under Title VII unless [the plaintiff] can establish that the lower score
led to a more tangible form of adverse action, such as ineligibility for promotional
opportunities.” Brown v. Snow, 440 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing
Davis). Because the amended complaint does not allege that the plaintiff suffered
any consequence as a result of her evaluation, it does not allege an adverse
employment action and thus does not state a claim of race discrimination based on
her evaluation.
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4. Berating and reprimands.
A Title VII discrimination claim “rarely may be predicated merely on [an]
employer’s allegedly unfounded criticism of an employee’s job performance,
where that criticism has no tangible impact on the terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment.” Davis, 245 F.3d at 1242.2 Subsequent Eleventh Circuit cases
have essentially transformed “rarely” into “never.” See, e.g., Barnett v. Athens
Regional Medical Center, Inc., 550 Fed. Appx. 711, 713 (11th Cir. 2013) (“We
have held [in Davis] that memoranda of reprimand or counseling that amount to
no more than a mere scolding, without any following disciplinary action, do not
rise to the level of adverse employment actions sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Title VII.”) (internal quotes omitted); Wallace v. Georgia
Department of Transportation, 212 Fed. Appx. 799, 801 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Under
the standard articulated in Davis, [there was no] adverse employment action
[because] [t]he written reprimand did not lead to any tangible harm in the form of
lost pay or benefits [and] there is no evidence that [the plaintiff] has been denied
job promotions as a result of the written reprimand.”); Embry v. Callahan Eye
Foundation Hospital, 147 Fed. Appx. 819, 828-29 (11th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff
“failed to cite evidence showing that this reprimand resulted in her suffering any
tangible consequences in the form of loss of pay or benefits, and it, thus, was not
an ‘adverse employment action.’”) (citing Davis).
Because the amended complaint does not allege that the plaintiff’s berating
by a physician, or her reprimand for insubordination, had any tangible impact on
the terms, conditions or privileges of her employment, it does not allege an
adverse employment action and thus does not state a claim of race discrimination
2

What the amended complaint calls “berating” clearly was criticism of the
plaintiff’s job performance, since it was prompted by a “scheduling conflict, and since
0qshe objects to being called “stupid” even though she was doing the work of two. (Doc.
18 at 4).

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based on these criticisms.3 However, because the amended complaint alleges that
the plaintiff was told she was being fired due to her reprimand for returning late
from the benefits fair, that reprimand constitutes an adverse employment action.
5. Other actions.
This leaves for consideration three miscellaneous complaints: that the
plaintiff was asked to make a list of her duties; that her EEO complaint became
known and the subject of comments and laughter; and that her supervisor accused
the plaintiff of creating a hostile work environment. “Title VII is neither a general
civility code nor a statute making actionable the ordinary tribulations of the
workplace.” Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239 (internal quotes omitted). Thus, being
accused of various things does not, without a tangible consequence, amount to an
adverse employment action. Id. at 1240 (memo accusing plaintiff of ignoring a
basic aspect of his job was not an adverse employment action); Miller-Goodwin v.
City of Panama Beach, 385 Fed. Appx. 966, 970 (11th Cir. 2010) (being accused
of causing a scene was not an adverse employment action); Lamont v. City of
Albany, 2015 WL 93874 at *10 (M.D. Ga. 2015) (“The Court finds that repeated
false accusations alone, without accompanying negative employment
consequences, are not adverse employment actions.”). Similarly, being laughed is
not an adverse employment action. Medearis v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., ___ Fed.
Appx. ___, 2016 WL 1273475 at *5-6 (11th Cir. 2016). And being asked to make
a list of job duties is simply what employees frequently do as part of their jobs.
Because the amended complaint does not allege any adverse consequence to the
plaintiff’s employment flowing from these incidents, it does not allege an adverse
employment action in any of these respects.

3

The amended complaint alleges that the reprimand for insubordination
negatively affected her evaluation but, as discussed in Part I.A., it does not allege any
negative effect flowing from the evaluation.

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6. Summary.
The defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s race discrimination claim
is due to be granted except to the extent the plaintiff bases her claim on
termination, disparate workload, and/or reprimand for returning late from a
benefits fair.
B. Hostile Work Environment.
As noted, a complaint must address, directly or inferentially, each element
of a claim. One element of a hostile work environment claim is that the
unwelcome harassment “was severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and
conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment.”
Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1300 (11th Cir. 2010). As this Court has
recently noted, “[t]he Eleventh Circuit has, in several unpublished opinions,
indicated that, to satisfy Twombly and Iqbal, a complaint must set forth facts
plausibly suggesting that the hostile environment experienced by the plaintiff was
sufficiently severe and/or pervasive to satisfy the fourth element.” Grissett v. H.J.
Baker Brothers, 2015 WL 5734452 at *2 (S.D. Ala. 2015). The defendant denies
that the amended complaint does so.
“Determining whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive
involves both an objective and a subjective component. … In determining the
objective element, a court looks to all the circumstances, including the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee’s work performance.” McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1378
(11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotes omitted). “Any relevant factor must be taken into
account, but no single factor is dispositive.” Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683
F.3d 1283, 1299 (11th Cir. 2012).
The defendant argues that the plaintiff’s double workload was not severe or
pervasive, (Doc. 27 at 4), but the only case it cites is a trial court opinion that
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(construed generously in favor of the defendant) involved a plaintiff required to
perform her job while a co-employee was permitted to loaf, not a plaintiff required
to perform the work of two employees. Nor does the defendant’s authority offer
anything beyond a raw conclusion that the claim was inadequately pleaded.
Without addressing any specific underlying conduct, the defendant argues
generally that the amended complaint does not plausibly allege that the conduct
was frequent, threatening or humiliating or that it interfered with the plaintiff’s job
performance. (Doc. 18 at 11). But it is hard to see how being required to perform
the work of two every day for months could be considered anything other than
frequent, and it is equally hard to see how doing so could fail to plausibly suggest
a resulting negative impact on job performance. Reasonable contrary arguments
may exist, but the Court will not conjure them on its own.
Because the defendant has failed to show that the plaintiff’s double
workload cannot on its own support her hostile work environment claim, the Court
need not address the other incidents on which the plaintiff relies in support of this
claim. Based on the plaintiff’s double workload, the defendant’s motion to
dismiss is due to be denied.
C. Retaliation.
Because a defendant’s retaliatory conduct must be caused by a plaintiff’s
protected activity, only conduct occurring after the plaintiff’s opposition to an
unlawful employment practice can support a retaliation claim. The plaintiff’s first
potentially protected activity occurred in September 2014, when she filed an
internal EEO complaint. (Doc. 17 at 4).4 Subsequent conduct directed against the
plaintiff, as alleged in the amended complaint (other than her termination)
includes: her EEO complaint becoming known and laughed at; being berated by a
4

Although the amended complaint alleges that the plaintiff filed a charge with the
EEOC the day before she was fired, (Doc. 17 at 5), the plaintiff’s retaliation claim is
based only on her internal EEO complaint. (Doc. 26 at 4).
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physician; receiving a reprimand for returning late from a benefits fair; and being
accused of fostering a hostile work environment.
The defendant does not deny that the plaintiff relies on each of these
incidents in support of her retaliation claim. (Doc. 18 at 7).5 The defendant does
suggest that the amended complaint negates a retaliatory motive for the berating
and reprimand because it states the background of the berating (a scheduling
conflict) and the employer’s stated reason for the reprimand (returning late from
the benefits fair). (Id. at 7 n.2; id. at 8-9). Reciting an employer’s pretext for its
conduct, however, hardly amounts to an admission that no unlawful motive
inspired the employer.
Retaliation claims under Title VII no longer require an “adverse
employment action” as defined in Davis and like cases. “[T]he anti-retaliation
provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to ... actions that affect
the terms and conditions of employment.” Burlington Northern and Santa Fe
Railway v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006). Instead, the test is whether “a
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse,
which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 68 (internal quotes
omitted). While “normally petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of
good manners will not create such deterrence,” id. at 68, Burlington Northern
“strongly suggests that it is for a jury to decide whether anything more than the
most petty and trivial actions against an employee should be considered
‘materially adverse’ to him and thus constitute adverse employment actions.”
Crawford, 529 F.3d at 973 n.13. The defendant argues that the amended
complaint does not plausibly allege that the berating or reprimand were
sufficiently adverse to dissuade a reasonable worker from engaging in protected
activity. (Doc. 18 at 8).
5

The defendant overlooks the final listed incident.

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In support of its argument, the defendant relies primarily on a lower court
opinion that erroneously utilized the “adverse employment action” standard
applicable to discrimination cases (and that expressly relied on Davis). The only
other authority the defendant cites is an unpublished Eleventh Circuit opinion that,
while it acknowledged Burlington Northern and Crawford, mistakenly required
the plaintiff to show something like “a decrease in salary,” despite Burlington
Northern’s holding that a materially adverse action for retaliation purposes need
not affect the terms and conditions of employment.6 Because the defendant has
neither articulated the correct standard nor relied on cases applying the correct
standard, it has failed to demonstrate that the amended complaint fails to state a
claim of retaliation.
Without citation to authority, the defendant asserts that laughing at an
employee’s EEO complaint cannot satisfy Burlington Northern, brushing it off as
a mere “lack of good manners.” (Doc. 18 at 8). But the defendant overlooks that
the plaintiff’s EEO complaint was laughed about because the complaint was made
known to begin with, and the defendant has neither argued nor shown that a
reasonable employee would not be dissuaded from making or pursuing an EEO
complaint knowing the employer will make it public and invite employees to
ridicule it.
The defendant’s motion to dismiss by its express terms seeks dismissal of
the retaliation claim “based on any alleged adverse actions other than her
termination.” (Doc. 18 at 13 (emphasis added)). Nevertheless, in its reply brief
the defendant seeks dismissal as to termination as well, on the grounds that neither
the amended complaint nor the plaintiff’s opposition brief clearly alleges that the
termination was retaliatory. (Doc. 27 at 3). “District courts, including this one,
6

“Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and are persuasive only
insofar as their legal analysis warrants.” Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Construction, Inc.,
487 F.3d 1340, 1345 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007). For reasons discussed in text, the Court does
not find the defendant’s unpublished authority persuasive.

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ordinarily do not consider arguments raised for the first time on reply.” GrossJones v. Mercy Medical, 874 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1330 n.8 (S.D. Ala. 2012) (citing
cases and explaining rationale). The defendant offers, and the Court discerns, no
reason not to apply the rule in this case.7
II. Motion for More Definite Statement.
The defendant objects that the amended complaint is an impermissible
“shotgun pleading” because each count incorporates all preceding paragraphs and
because it is “replete” with facts not obviously connected to any particular cause
of action. As a result, the defendant says it has difficulty perceiving how the
plaintiff contends the defendant wronged her. As a remedy, the defendant asks the
Court to order the plaintiff to file a second amended complaint to “identify which
facts support which cause of action.” Without this relief, the defendant says it
cannot “adequately identify and respond to her claims.” (Doc. 18 at 12-13).
Shotgun pleadings are certainly a bane of modern federal practice, but
labels alone do not entitle a defendant to relief under Rule 12(e). That rule is
triggered only when the complaint “is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot
reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The amended complaint
consists of 20 numbered paragraphs, only nine of which address the conduct of
which the plaintiff complains. Even before the instant ruling on the motion to
dismiss, the amended complaint was sufficiently short and clear to permit the
defendant to prepare an appropriate response. To the extent that any residual
ambiguity remains as to what conduct is challenged under which claims, the
defendant can eliminate it through discovery.

7

Similarly, the defendant in its reply for the first time raises a causation
argument. (Doc. 27 at 3 n.1). The Court declines to entertain this tardy argument.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s race
discrimination claim is granted to the extent the claim is based on scrutiny of the
plaintiff’s time, her reprimand for insubordination, her negative evaluation, asking
her to create a list of job duties, questioning her regarding a missing package,
making her EEO complaint known, discussion and laughing regarding the EEO
complaint, berating the plaintiff, or accusing the plaintiff of creating a hostile work
environment, and is otherwise denied; the motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s hostile
work environment claim is denied; and the motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
retaliation claim is denied. The motion for more definite statement is denied.
DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of August, 2016.
s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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