Godwin v. Corizon Health

Filing 33

ORDER granting 22 Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed in its entirety. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 4/10/2017. Copies to parties (mpp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KIMBERLY M. GODWIN,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Plaintiff,
vs.
CORIZON HEALTH,
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-00041-B

ORDER
This action is before the Court on Defendant Corizon LLC’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 22) and Plaintiff’s response
in opposition (Doc. 28, 29).

Upon careful review of the motion,

briefs, supporting materials and the applicable case law, the
Court concludes that no material facts are in controversy and
that

Defendant

Accordingly,

is

the

entitled
Court

to

grants

judgment

as

Defendant’s

a

matter

Motion

for

of

law.

Summary

Judgment.
I.

Background

The evidence submitted by the parties shows that Defendant
Corizon

LLC

Department

(“Corizon”)

of

has

Corrections

a

contract

(“ADOC”)

to

with

provide

the

Alabama

health

care

related services to inmates incarcerated within Alabama state
correctional facilities.
M.

Godwin

nurse

for

(hereinafter
Corizon

at

(Doc. 22-2 at 23).
“Plaintiff”
various

or

Plaintiff Kimberly

“Godwin”)

correctional

worked

facilities

as

a

from

approximately September 2009 to April 29, 2014.

(Doc. 22-2 at

4, 6; Doc. 28-1 at 5-7).
In November 2011, Plaintiff was terminated by Corizon on
the ground that she had not worked for the company in over
ninety days.

(Doc. 28-1 at 6).

In 2012, Plaintiff filed an

EEOC charge alleging discrimination based on her age and race
(Caucasian).

The charge ultimately resulted in a negotiated

settlement whereby Plaintiff was reinstated by Corizon on May
14, 2012 to work at Fountain Correctional facility.

(Doc. 22-2

at 5, 7, 17, 19).
From

December

2013

through

early

February

2014,

Godwin

sought and was approved for intermittent leave under the Family
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) as a result of her contracting the
flu and then pneumonia.

(Doc. 22-2 at 8, 26-27).

Beginning

February 6, 2014 through April 28, 2014, Godwin was away from
work on FMLA leave.1

(Doc. 22-2 at 26-27).

Prior to Godwin taking her FMLA leave in February 2014,
Darrell LeGrand (“LeGrand”), an inmate at Fountain, completed a
sick call request form on January 27, 2014, in which he asked to
see a doctor and get his medication prescription renewed.
22-2 at 9-10, 31-32, 43, 53).

(Doc.

Corizon policy requires that,

1

Plaintiff’s leave was originally scheduled to end on March 27,
2014, but was extended at Plaintiff’s request to April 28, 2014.
(Doc. 22-2 at 26-27).

2

when an inmate fills out a sick call request form and requests
to see a physician, the on-call nurse must assess the inmate
(including taking the inmate’s vital signs) prior to the inmate
being

seen

by

a

physician.

(Doc.

22-2

at

25,

47,

53-54).

Corizon policy further requires that, when performing a physical
on an inmate in response to a sick call request, the nurse must
remove the inmate from his cell and take him to a screening room
or other designated area for the physical examination.
22-2 at 37, 47, 53, 58).

(Doc.

Corizon policy prohibits a nurse from

obtaining an inmate’s vital signs at the cell or through the
prison cell door for reasons of privacy and security.
2 at 34, 37, 47-48, 53, 58).

(Doc. 22-

Corizon policy, and Fountain

prison regulations, also require that an ADOC officer accompany
any nurse who enters the segregation unit to remove an inmate
from his cell in order to perform a medical assessment of that
inmate.

(Doc. 22-2 at 25, 48, 53).

On January 28, 2014, inmate LeGrand submitted a written
medical grievance to Corizon stating that, on January 27, 2014,
nothing had been done in response to his sick call request.
Inmate

LeGrand

stated:

“Nurse

Goodin

(sic)

shift and claim she did an assessment on me.

3

was

working

3-11

I’m stating that

Nurse Godwin never did any assessment on me.
[nor] was I taken out of my cell.”2

I was never asked

(Doc. 22-2 at 31, 65, 67).

Upon receiving LeGrand’s medical grievance, Corizon began
an investigation into the incident.

(Doc. 22-2 at 32, 54, 67).

The investigation was led by Director of Nursing Kevin Baugh and
Health Services Administrator Katherine Gibson.3 (Doc. 22-2 at
23, 26, 54).

In her capacity as Health Services Administrator,

Gibson was the highest ranking Corizon employee at Fountain.
She oversaw the entire healthcare unit at Fountain, including
the nursing and day-to-day operations of the Fountain healthcare
facilities.
of

Nursing

August 2014.

(Doc. 22-2 at 23-24).
at

Fountain

from

Kevin Baugh was the Director

August

(Doc. 22-2 at 52).

2013

until

As Director of Nursing, all of

the nursing staff at Fountain reported to him.
Corizon

began

its

approximately

investigation

into

(Id.).
inmate

LeGrand’s

2

While inmate LeGrand had never filed a grievance against
Plaintiff or any other Corizon employee before this grievance,
Plaintiff contends that LeGrand was angry with her because she
had declined to serve as a witness for him at an earlier
disciplinary proceeding.
According to Plaintiff, the alleged
violation for which LeGrand was being disciplined had not
occurred during her shift and, thus, she declined to serve as a
witness. (Doc. 22-2 at 9, 32).

3

Plaintiff identifies Katherine
Caucasian. (Doc. 1 at 3).

4

Gibson

and

Kevin

Baugh

as

medical

grievance

by

pulling

the

sick

call

log,4

LeGrand’s

medical chart, and the nursing encounter tool for LeGrand, which
was dated January 27, 2014, and signed by Godwin.
32-33, 36).

(Doc. 22-2 at

Corizon also pulled the ADOC logs for January 27,

2014, which did not reflect that a sick call was made.
22-2

at

36).

The

ADOC

logs

showed

that

ADOC

(Doc.

Correctional

Officer Larry Brooks was on duty during the same time period,
and therefore would have been the officer assigned to accompany
Godwin had she gone into the segregation unit to take LeGrand’s
vital signs.

(Doc. 22-2 at 36, 55-56, 61-62).

It is undisputed

that whenever a nurse has to go into the segregation unit, the
nurse must be accompanied by an ADOC officer.

(Doc. 22-2 at

10).
Gibson discussed the matter with the warden at Fountain.
Thereafter,

the

warden

gave

Gibson

a

statement

from

Officer

Brooks, who confirmed that he was on duty on January 27, 2014,
that he had accompanied Godwin on her rounds in the segregation
unit on that day, and that Godwin did not perform any type of
medical assessment on inmate LeGrand.

4

(Doc. 22-2 at 56, 61-62).

A sick call request is a way for inmates to report medical
issues to the staff, such as the need for a prescription refill.
(Doc. 22-2 at 25).
After the inmate completes a handwritten
form, he is seen by nursing staff if indicated. (Id.). If the
inmate is in the segregation unit, the nurse must be accompanied
by a correctional officer. (Id.).

5

Thereafter, Director of Nursing Baugh interviewed Officer
Brooks directly.

He again confirmed that Godwin did not take

inmate LeGrand’s vital signs and did not perform any kind of
medical or physical assessment on LeGrand either at cell door or
in the screening room per Corizon policy.5

(Doc. 22-2 at 55-56,

61-62).
Corizon also reviewed the security camera footage for the
lobby in the segregation unit for January 27, 2014.

It revealed

that inmate LeGrand was not removed from his cell by Godwin in
order to take his vital signs, as required by Corizon’s policies
governing medical assessments on inmates.
37, 47, 54-55, 58).
Officer

Brooks,

(Doc. 22-2 at 34-35,

According to Plaintiff, Officer Canon, not

accompanied

her

to

the

segregation

unit

on

January 27, 2014, while she performed the medical assessment on
inmate LeGrand through the cell door.

(Doc. 22-2 at 10-11).

Per Plaintiff, she did not remove inmate LeGrand from his cell
or

take

him

assessment

to

area.

the

screening

Instead,

room

she

or

completed

any
the

other

designated

entire

medical

assessment (including taking his oxygen saturation rate, blood
pressure, and temperature) through the door of the inmate’s cell
as he stuck his arm out of the cell.
5

(Doc. 22-2 at 10).

According to Officer Brooks, Plaintiff never asked for inmate
LeGrand to be removed from his cell and did not assess any vital
signs whatsoever. (Doc. 22-2 at 62).

6

As a result of its investigation, Corizon concluded that
Godwin had failed to perform a medical

assessment of inmate

LeGrand and had fraudulently completed LeGrand’s medical chart
to

cover

up

that

February

21,

Director

of

fact.

(Doc.

2014,

Health

Nursing

Baugh

22-2

Services

at

30-31,

58,

Administrator

recommended

to

69).
Gibson

Corizon’s

On
and

corporate

office that Godwin be terminated. (Doc. 22-2 at 69).
On March 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge alleging
that she had been discriminated against by two Corizon nurse
supervisors

who

were

African

American.6

(Doc.

22-2

at

71).

Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that one of the African American
supervisors yelled at her, and two African American co-workers

6

Plaintiff contends that prior to her medical leave, she
complained to Corizon management regarding unfair treatment due
to her race.
According to Plaintiff, she complained that an
African American supervisor had yelled at her, and that another
African American supervisor discriminated against her with
respect to patient assignments.
(Doc. 28-1 at 14, 18-20; Doc.
29 at 11; Doc. 22-2 at 28, 71).
The record further reflects
that Plaintiff had a number of conflicts with co-employees (not
Gibson and Baugh), including accusations by co-employees that
Plaintiff had a gun in her car and had chased one of them in the
parking lot with her car, as well as three separate instances of
Plaintiff filing criminal charges against co-employees.
(Doc.
29 at 3-8; Doc. 22-2 at 13). However, none of those individuals
is alleged to have been involved in the allegedly retaliatory
decision to terminate her employment. Rather, Plaintiff alleges
that
Gibson
and
Baugh
recommended
her
termination,
and
“[s]omeone up the corporate chain approved the termination based
on Gibson and Baugh’s recommendation.” (Doc. 29 at 10).

7

physically
action.

assaulted

(Id.)

her;

She

yet,

further

Corizon

asserted

failed

that

the

to

take

other

any

African

American supervisor assigned her more patients than her African
American co-workers because of her race.
At

the

recommendation

of

Health

(Id.)
Services

Administrator

Gibson and Director of Nursing Baugh, and upon approval from
Corizon Human Resources, Plaintiff was terminated on April 29,
2014, the day she returned from her FMLA leave.7
4, 30-31, 40, 69).

(Doc. 22-2 at

On October 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed another

EEOC charge alleging that she had been terminated for filing
previous EEOC charges and because she was disabled.
at 71, 74).

(Doc. 22-2

On or about November 2, 2015, the EEOC issued its

Notice of Dismissal of this EEOC charge.

(Doc. 22-2 at 76).

On January 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint
against

Corizon.

In

her

complaint,

Plaintiff

alleges

retaliation under the FMLA, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(hereinafter “§ 1981”).

(Doc. 1 at 3).

Defendant

retaliated

protected

activity, i.e., filing previous

taking FMLA leave.”

against

her

According to Plaintiff,
for

participating

“in

EEOC charges and

(Id.)

7

Pursuant to Corizon policy, if a decision was made to terminate
an employee while that employee was on FMLA leave, the
termination would not occur until the employee returned to work.
(Doc. 22-2 at 79).

8

II.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary

judgment

should

be

granted

only

“if

the

movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.

The party seeking summary judgment

bears

to

“the

initial

burden

show

the

district

court,

by

reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues
of material fact that should be decided at trial.”

Clark v.

Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991).

Once

the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden
shifts to the non-movant to show the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact.

Id.

If the nonmoving party fails to

make “a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case
with respect to which she has the burden of proof,” the moving
party

is

entitled

to

summary

judgment.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Celotex

Corp.

v.

“In reviewing whether the

nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of
weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of
the truth of the matter. . . . Instead, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to
be drawn in his favor.”

Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965

F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).

“Summary judgment is justified only for those

cases devoid of any need for factual determinations.”

9

Offshore

Aviation v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir.
1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. Analysis
Defendant

has

filed

a

motion

for

summary

judgment

on

Plaintiff’s FMLA and Title VII/§ 1981 retaliation claims based
on Plaintiff’s failure, as a matter of law, to establish the
prima facie elements of these claims, or, assuming a prima facie
case, Plaintiff’s failure to establish the essential element of
pretext.

(Doc.

22).

For

the

reasons

set

forth

below,

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
A.

Plaintiff’s FMLA Retaliation Claim

When a plaintiff asserts a claim of retaliation under the
FMLA,

in

intent,

the

the

absence

Court

of

applies

direct
the

evidence

same

of

the

employer’s

burden-shifting

framework

established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,

411

U.S.

792

discrimination claims.

(1973),

for

evaluating

Title

VII

Feise v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 2017

U.S. App. LEXIS 5222, *9, 2017 WL 1101402, *3 (11th Cir. Mar.
24, 2017) (quoting Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of City
of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2001)).

“To prove

a retaliation claim, an employee ‘must allege that: (1) [s]he
engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) [s]he suffered
an

adverse

employment

decision;

and

(3)

causally related to the protected activity.”

10

the
Id.

decision

was

“Only after

the

plaintiff

makes

this

prima

facie

case

of

discriminatory

retaliation does the burden shift to the defendant to rebut the
presumption of retaliation by producing legitimate reasons for
the adverse employment action.”

Id. (quoting Drago v. Jenne,

453 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006)).

“If the defendant does

so, the plaintiff must then show that the defendant’s proffered
reason for the adverse action is pretextual.”

Id. (quoting

Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286,
1297 (11th Cir. 2006)).
With

respect

to

Plaintiff’s

initial

burden,

Defendant

concedes that Plaintiff meets the first two elements of her
prima

facie

causation.

case

but

argues

that

Plaintiff

cannot

establish

Defendant invites the Court to require Plaintiff to

prove causation using the heightened “but-for” standard instead
of

the

traditional

“motivating

factor”

causation

standard

currently applicable to FMLA retaliation cases in the Eleventh
Circuit.
As

The Court declines Defendant’s invitation.
discussed

by

the

court

in

Corbin

v.

Medical

Navicent Health, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134159, *30,

Ctr.,

2016 WL

5724992, *10 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2016), the “current state of
the law in this Circuit only requires Plaintiff to prove her use
of FMLA leave was a motivating factor in her termination.”

Id.

(citing Coleman v. Redmond Park Hosp., LLC, 589 F. Appx. 436,
439 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished).

11

Stated differently, “to

establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, Plaintiff must
show her use of FMLA leave and her termination were not ‘wholly
unrelated.’”
WL

5724992

Corbin, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134159 at *30, 2016
at

Nationwide

*11

Mut.

1999)(“[t]o

(citations

Ins.

prove

a

Co.,

omitted);

197

causal

F.3d

see

1322,

connection

[for

also
1337

Farley
(11th

retaliation

v.

Cir.
under

Title VII], we require a plaintiff only to demonstrate that the
protected

activity

and

the

adverse

action

were

not

wholly

unrelated.”).
A

plaintiff

can

meet

this

burden

by

showing

that

“the

decision maker was aware of the protected conduct at the time of
the adverse employment action.”
134159

at

*30,

2016

WL

Corbin, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

5724992

at

*10.

“Close

temporal

proximity between protected conduct and an adverse employment is
generally

‘sufficient

circumstantial

evidence

to

create

genuine issue of material fact of a causal connection.’”

a

Id.;

see also Darring v. DailyAccess Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17326, *30, 2006 WL 779868, *11 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 27, 2006) (If a
plaintiff provides “sufficient evidence that the decision maker
became aware of the protected conduct and that there was close
temporal

proximity

between

this

awareness

and

the

adverse

employment action,” she can prove the causal connection).
In the present case, there is no dispute that Plaintiff was
terminated on the day that she returned from taking FMLA leave.

12

Plaintiff

argues

that

the

close

temporal

proximity

of

the

statutorily protected activity and the adverse action satisfy
her prima facie case of retaliation.
Court agrees.

(Doc. 29 at 17-18).

The

Based on the close temporal proximity of her

returning from taking FMLA leave and her termination, i.e., the
same day, Plaintiff has established a prima facie claim for FMLA
retaliation.
To rebut Plaintiff’s prima facie case, Defendant must only
meet the “exceedingly light” burden of presenting a legitimate
and

nondiscriminatory

reason

for

its

employment

action.

Darring, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17326 at *30-31, 2006 WL 779868
at *11) (quoting Perryman v. Johnson Products, Inc., 698 F.2d
1138,

1142

(11th

Cir.

1983)).

In

satisfying

this

burden,

Corizon points to evidence that Plaintiff was terminated after
an internal investigation into an inmate grievance revealed that
Plaintiff
required

had
sick

violated
call

company

examination

records to cover it up.8

policy
and

by

then

not

conducting

falsifying

a

medical

(Doc. 22-2 at 30-31, 34-35, 37, 39-40,

53-54, 58, 61-62, 67, 69; Doc. 28-2 at 83).

8

Corizon’s policy provided that an employee may be recommended
for immediate termination due to serious misconduct such as the
falsification of patient medical records.
(Doc. 22-2 at 40,
69).
According to Corizon, Plaintiff was fired for violating
this policy. (Id.).

13

The question, then, is whether Plaintiff has put forward
sufficient evidence indicating that Defendant’s putative reason
for termination was mere pretext for its true intention to fire
her for having taken FMLA leave.

The Court concludes that she

has not.
In

establishing

pretext,

absent

direct

evidence

of

retaliation, a plaintiff must present circumstantial evidence
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s
proffered reason for terminating the plaintiff was mere pretext
for discrimination.

Feise, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 5222 at *9,

2017 WL 1101402 at *3.

To that end, “a plaintiff must adduce

evidence not only that the employer’s proffered reason is false,
but

also

motive.”

that

unlawful

was

the

employer’s

true

Id. (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.

502, 514-15 (1993)).
either

retaliation

that

credence”
[Defendant]

Stated differently, Plaintiff must show

Defendant’s

or
to

that
fire

proffered

retaliation
[her].”

reason

“more
Id.

than

(quoting

“is

unworthy

likely
Elrod

of

motivated
v.

Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991)).

Sears,
Having

reviewed the record at length, the Court finds that the evidence
proffered by Plaintiff would not permit a reasonable jury to
find that Defendant’s reason for terminating her was unworthy of
credence, or that retaliation more likely than not motivated
Defendant to terminate her.

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim fails.

14

As

previously

stated,

Plaintiff

relies

proximity to establish pretext in this case.

on

temporal

However, “temporal

proximity alone generally is insufficient to establish pretext.”
Id.

(citing

Hurlbert,

439

F.3d

at

1298).

Moreover,

it

is

undisputed in this case that Corizon had a policy that, if it
made a decision to terminate an employee while that employee was
on

FMLA

employee

leave,

the

returned

precisely

what

to

termination
work.

happened

would

(Doc.

not

22-2

here.

at

occur

until

79).

Therefore,

the

That
under

is
the

circumstances of this case, temporal proximity, alone, does not
establish pretext.
While Plaintiff contends that she did not violate Corizon’s
policies

by

assessment;
Officer

failing
that

Brooks)

she
to

to
was

conduct

a

required

accompanied

inmate

LeGrand’s

by

inmate

Officer

cell

to

medical

Canon

(not

conduct

the

assessment; that she did perform a medical assessment on inmate
LeGrand at his cell;9 and that she did not falsify LeGrand’s
medical records, these assertions are not sufficient to create a
jury question.

(Doc. 29 at 19; Doc. 22-2 at 11; Doc. 28-2 at

83).

9

It is undisputed that it was also against Corizon policy to
conduct an inmate medical assessment at the cell. (Doc. 22-2 at
34, 37, 47, 58).

15

It is undisputed that Director of Nursing Baugh and Health
Services

Administrator

investigation

into

Gibson

inmate

conducted

LeGrand’s

a

lengthy,

grievance

and

in

depth

ultimately

concluded that Plaintiff did not conduct the inmate’s medical
assessment as Plaintiff claimed and that Plaintiff falsified the
inmate’s medical records to cover up her failure.

(Doc. 22-2 at

30-31, 34-35, 37, 39-40, 53-54, 58, 61-62, 64, 69; Doc. 28-2 at
83).
line

Therefore, “[t]his case . . . fits comfortably in the
of

cases

indicating

that

‘[t]he

inquiry

into

pretext

centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s beliefs
and, to be blunt about it, not on reality as it exists outside
of the decision maker’s head.”

Feise, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS

5222, *16, 2017 WL 1101402 at *6 (quoting Alvarez v. Royal Atl.
Developers,

Inc.,

610

F.3d

1253,

1266

(11th

Cir.

2010)).

“Indeed, an employer can hardly be said to have discriminated or
retaliated against an employee if it terminated the employee
based on a good faith belief that she violated a rule, even if
the

purported

violation

never

actually

occurred.”

Id.

Therefore, “[a]bsent evidence of discrimination or retaliation,
our employment discrimination statutes do not interfere with an
employer’s ability to manage its personnel, ‘[n]o matter how
medieval

a

firm’s

practices,

no

matter

how

high-handed

its

decisional process, no matter how mistaken the firm’s managers.”
Id. (citing Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470).

16

Indeed, “[i]t matters not

that [a plaintiff’s] termination might have been unexpected or
unfair; FMLA simply does not afford relief in the absence of
evidence of retaliation.”

Id.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff has failed to present
evidence

that

would

allow

a

reasonable

jury

to

find

that

Corizon’s decision to terminate her, which was consistent with
Corizon’s written policy that falsification of medical records
constituted grounds for immediate termination (Doc. 22-2 at 3031, 34-35, 37, 39-40, 53-54, 58, 61-62, 69), was merely pretext.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim fails as a matter
of law.
B.

Plaintiff’s Title VII/§ 1981 Retaliation Claims

For

the

same

reasons

discussed

above

in

relation

to

Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim, the Court finds that Corizon
is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII/§ 1981
retaliation claims.

The legal standard applicable to Title VII,

§ 1981, and FMLA retaliation claims is identical and requires
that a plaintiff make a showing of circumstantial evidence that
satisfies

the

test

set

forth

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

in

McDonnell

Douglas

Corp.

v.

See Johnson v. Mobile Infirmary

Med. Ctr., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44990, *26-27, 2015 WL 1538774,
*7 n.12 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 7, 2015).

As this Court discussed in

Johnson when addressing Plaintiff’s Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
and FMLA retaliation claims:

17

Under this familiar [McDonnell Douglas]
burden-shifting
analysis,
plaintiff
is
required to make out a prima facie case of
unlawful discrimination or retaliation. If
she does so, that showing “creates a
rebuttable presumption that the employer
acted illegally.” Underwood v. Perry County
Comm’n, 431 F.3d 788, 794 (11th Cir. 2005).
At that point, “the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.... If the employer does
this,
the
burden
shifts
back
to
the
plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated
reason was a pretext for discrimination.”
Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 976 (11th
Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Holifield v. Reno,
115 F.3d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir.
1997)
(outlining similar procedure for Title VII
retaliation
claims).
A
plaintiff
may
establish
pretext
“either
directly
by
persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer’s
proffered
explanation
is
unworthy
of
credence.”
Brooks
v.
County
Comm’n
of
Jefferson County, Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163
(11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). “The
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
fact
that
the
defendant
intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff remains
at all times with the plaintiff.” Springer
v. Convergys Customer Management Group Inc.,
509 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007).
Johnson, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44990 at *26-27, 2015 WL 1538774
at *7.
In

this

case,

the

only

additional

facts

alleged

with

respect to Plaintiff’s Title VII and § 1981 claims are that
Corizon retaliated against her for filing previous EEOC charges,
namely, one charge filed in 2012 and a second charge filed on

18

March

10,

2014.10

(Doc.

22-2

at

17,

71).

However,

it

is

undisputed that Corizon made the decision to terminate Plaintiff
on February 21, 2014, before she filed her EEOC charge on March
10, 2014.

(Doc. 22-2 at 69, 71).

Thus, Corizon’s decision

could not have been based on the March 10, 2014, EEOC charge.
Cf., Smith v. City of Fort Pierce, Fla., 565 F. Appx. 774, 779
(11th

Cir.

Recor

had

2014)

(“Smith

already

cannot

contemplated

establish

causation

disciplining

Smith

because

before

she

filed her Charge.”).
Likewise,

reference

to

the

earlier

2012

EEOC

charge

is

unavailing as it is too remote in time to establish a causal
connection

between

the

decision

to

terminate

February 2014 and the 2012 EEOC charge.

Plaintiff

in

Cf., Thomas v. Cooper

Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (collecting
cases

and

between

the

holding

that

statutorily

“[a]

three

protected

10

to

four

expression

month
and

disparity

the

adverse

Although Plaintiff also alleges that she complained to Corizon
management regarding alleged discrimination against her by two
African American supervisors, she has nevertheless failed to
offer facts to suggest that the decision to terminate her was
pretextual.
As noted supra, while Plaintiff may quarrel with
the reasonableness of the decision to terminate her, the pretext
inquiry focuses on the employer’s beliefs.
Because Plaintiff
has not proffered any evidence suggesting that Corizon did not
have a good faith belief that Plaintiff had violated its
policies, her claim must fail.

19

employment action is not enough” to infer causation based on
temporal proximity for the purpose of establishing a prima facie
case

of

tending

retaliation).
to

show

“[I]n

causation,

the

if

absence

there

is

of

a

other

evidence

substantial

delay

between the protected expression and the adverse action, the
complaint of retaliation fails as a matter of law.”

Thomas, 506

F.3d

VII/§

at

1364.

retaliation

Therefore,

claims

Plaintiff’s

fail

matter

as

a

of

Title
law

for

1981

failure

to

present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find any
causal connection between her EEOC charges and her termination
of employment.
Moreover,

assuming,

arguendo,

that

Plaintiff

could

establish a prima facie case based on these additional facts,
her Title VII/§ 1981 retaliation claims still ultimately fail as
a

matter

of

reasonable

law

jury

to

for

lack

find

of

that

evidence
Corizon’s

that

would

proffered

allow

reason

a

for

terminating her (falsification of medical records in violation
of company policy) (Doc. 22-2 at 30, 34-35, 37, 39-40, 53-54,
58, 61-62, 67, 69), was merely pretext.
reasons

discussed

authorities,

in

Corizon

detail
is

above

entitled

Therefore, for the same
and

to

based
summary

on

the

judgment

same
on

Plaintiff’s Title VII/§ 1981 retaliation claims for this reason
as well.

20

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Defendant Corizon’s
motion

for

summary

judgment

is

GRANTED,

and

Plaintiff’s

complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
DONE this 10th day of April, 2017.
/S/ SONJA F. BIVINS
>
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

21