Sellers v. Colvin
Filing
23
Order re: 1 Complaint filed by Sandra L. Sellers stating that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income be AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 9/11/17. Copies to counsel (mpp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SANDRA L. SELLERS,
*
*
*
*
* CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-000165-B
*
*
*
*
*
*
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY BERRYHILL,1
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.
ORDER
Plaintiff
Sandra
L.
Sellers
(hereinafter
“Plaintiff”),
seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security denying her claim for a period of disability,
disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income
under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
401, et seq., and 1381, et seq.
consented
to
have
the
proceedings in this case.
On May 25, 2017, the parties
undersigned
(Doc. 20).
conduct
any
and
all
Thus, the action was
referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order
the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73.
1
Upon careful consideration
Nancy Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security on January 23, 2017.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy Berryhill should be substituted
for Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant in this suit. No further
action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last
sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
of the administrative record and the memoranda of the parties,
it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be
AFFIRMED.
I.
Procedural History2
Plaintiff protectively filed her application for a period
of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental
security income on April 29, 2013, alleging disability beginning
December 12, 2012, based on bipolar disorder, PTSD, high blood
pressure, diabetes, high cholesterol, depression, and anxiety.
(Doc. 13-2 at 6, 10).
Plaintiff’s application was denied and
upon timely request, she was granted an administrative hearing
before
Administrative
“ALJ”)
on
August
Law
27,
Judge
2014
David
(Doc.
Murchison
12-2
at
(hereinafter
34).
Plaintiff
attended the hearing with her counsel and provided testimony
related to her claims.
(Id.).
A vocational expert (“VE”) also
appeared at the hearing and provided testimony.
50).
On
November
7,
2014,
the
ALJ
issued
decision finding that Plaintiff is not disabled.
29).
(Doc. 12-2 at
an
unfavorable
(Doc. 12-2 at
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review
on March 30, 2016.
(Doc. 12-2 at 2).
2
Therefore, the ALJ’s
The Court’s citations to the transcript in this order refer to
the pagination assigned in CM/ECF, not the page numbers assigned
by the Agency. Because the transcript is divided into separate
documents, the Court’s citations include the appropriate CM/ECF
document number.
2
decision dated November 7, 2014, became the final decision of
the Commissioner.
Having
exhausted
her
administrative
timely filed the present civil action.
remedies,
(Doc. 1).
Plaintiff
Oral argument
was conducted on June 1, 2017 (Doc. 22), and the parties agree
that this case is now ripe for judicial review and is properly
before
this
Court
pursuant
to
42
U.S.C.
§§
405(g)
and
1383(c)(3).
II.
Issue on Appeal
Whether substantial evidence supports
RFC for a range of medium work with
stated restrictions?
the
the
III. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born on February 2, 1957, and was fifty-seven
years of age at the time of her administrative hearing on August
27, 2014.
(Doc. 12-2 at 34, 39; Doc. 13-2 at 6).
graduated from high school.
Plaintiff
operator
at
worked
Industrial
from
Plaintiff
(Doc. 12-2 at 39).
1998
Valve
and
to
2012
from
as
1995
a
to
switchboard
1998
as
switchboard operator at Spring Hill Memorial Hospital.
12-2 at 40; Doc. 13-1 at 15-17; Doc. 13-2 at 11, 46).
a
(Doc.
At the
administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that she quit work
because she felt she was being bullied at her workplace, and it
caused her to be depressed and manic.
(Doc. 12-2 at 40).
She
testified that she cannot work now due to her “bipolar disease,”
3
panic
attacks,
concentrate. 3
that
she
depression,
confusion,
(Doc. 12-2 at 41, 49).
takes
medicine
for
and
inability
to
Plaintiff also testified
bipolar
disorder
and
counseling at Alta Pointe, both of which have helped.
goes
to
(Doc. 12-
2 at 41, 45).
IV. Standard of Review
In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s
role
is
a
determining
limited
1)
one.
whether
The
the
Court’s
decision
review
of
the
is
limited
to
Secretary
is
supported by substantial evidence and 2) whether the correct
legal standards were applied.
1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).
4
Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d
A court may not decide the facts
anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that
of the Commissioner.
Cir.
1986).
The
Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th
Commissioner’s
findings
of
fact
affirmed if they are based upon substantial evidence.
must
be
Brown v.
Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth v.
Heckler,
703
F.2d
1233,
1239
(11th
Cir.
1983)
(holding
substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla, but
3
At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel advised that
Plaintiff’s claim is based solely on her mental impairments.
(Doc. 12-2 at 38).
Therefore, the Court limits its discussion
to those impairments. (Id.).
4
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal
principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th
Cir. 1987).
4
less
than
a
preponderance”
and
consists
of
“such
relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
support
a
conclusion.”).
In
determining
whether
substantial
evidence exists, a court must view the record as a whole, taking
into account evidence favorable, as well as unfavorable, to the
Commissioner’s decision.
Chester v. Bowen, 792 F. 2d 129, 131
(11th Cir. 1986); Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163, *4
(S.D. Ala. June 14, 1999).
V.
Statutory And Regulatory Framework
An individual who applies for Social Security disability
benefits
must
prove
404.1512, 416.912.
his
or
her
disability.
20
C.F.R.
§§
Disability is defined as the “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.”
42
U.S.C.
§§
404.1505(a),
416.905(a).
provide
five-step
a
423(d)(1)(A);
The
see
Social
sequential
also
20
Security
evaluation
C.F.R.
§§
regulations
process
determining if a claimant has proven his disability.
for
20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920.
The
engaged
claimant
in
must
substantial
first
prove
gainful
that
activity.
he
or
The
she
has
second
not
step
requires the claimant to prove that he or she has a severe
5
impairment or combination of impairments.
If, at the third
step, the claimant proves that the impairment or combination of
impairments
claimant
meets
is
or
equals
automatically
a
listed
found
education, or work experience.
impairment,
disabled
regardless
then
the
of
age,
If the claimant cannot prevail
at the third step, he or she must proceed to the fourth step
where the claimant must prove an inability to perform their past
relevant work.
1986).
the
Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir.
In evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden,
examiner
must
consider
the
following
four
factors:
(1)
objective medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of
examining
claimant’s
physicians;
age,
(3)
education
evidence
and
work
of
pain;
history.
and
Id.
(4)
the
Once
a
claimant meets this burden, it becomes the Commissioner’s burden
to prove at the fifth step that the claimant is capable of
engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment which
exists in significant numbers in the national economy, given the
claimant’s
residual
work history.
1985).
functional
capacity,
age,
education,
and
Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir.
If the Commissioner can demonstrate that there are such
jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant must prove inability
to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled.
Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th
6
Cir. 1999).
Jones v.
See also Hale v.
Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v.
Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).
VI.
Discussion
A. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
RFC for a range of medium work with the
stated restrictions.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC for a range of medium
work is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ
failed to assign appropriate weight to the opinion of consulting
psychologist, Dr. Pamela Starkey, Psy. D., that Plaintiff would
have marked restrictions in responding appropriately to usual
work situations and to changes in routine work setting.
14 at 1-2).
(Doc.
Having reviewed the record at length, the Court
finds that Plaintiff’s claim is without merit.
Residual functional capacity is a measure of what Plaintiff
can do despite his or her credible limitations.
404.1545.
See 20 C.F.R. §
Determinations of a claimant’s residual functional
capacity are reserved for the ALJ, and the assessment is to be
based upon all the relevant evidence of a claimant’s remaining
ability to work despite his or her impairments, and must be
supported by substantial evidence.
Supp.
2d
1323,
1331 (S.D.
Ala.
See Beech v. Apfel, 100 F.
2000)
(citing
20
C.F.R.
§
404.1546 and Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir.
1997)); Saunders v. Astrue, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39571, *10,
2012 WL 997222, *4 (M.D. Ala. March 23, 2012).
7
Once the ALJ has
determined
claimant
the
plaintiff’s
residual
the
of
bears
burden
functional
demonstrating
capacity,
that
decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
the
the
ALJ’s
See Flynn v.
Heckler, 768 F.2d 1273, 1274 (11th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff has
failed to meet her burden in this case.
In
severe
his
decision,
impairments
diabetes mellitus.
the
of
ALJ
found
bipolar
that
Plaintiff
disorder,
(Doc. 12-2 at 23).
has
hypertension,
the
and
Even so, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform a range of medium work
with
the
climbing
following
of
restrictions:
ladders,
ropes,
Plaintiff
or
is
scaffolds,
limited
no
exposure
no
to
to
dangerous machinery or dangerous heights, has unlimited ability
to
understand,
instructions,
is
remember,
limited
and
to
carryout
occasional
short
and
interaction
simple
with
the
general public, co-workers, and supervisors, and is limited to
work that has minimal changes in the work setting.
at 25).
(Doc. 12-2
Based upon the testimony of the vocational expert, the
ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is unable to perform her past work
as a switchboard operator (sedentary and semi-skilled); however,
she could perform the jobs of laundry worker, dishwasher, and
recycler, all medium and unskilled.
(Doc. 12-2 at 28, 51-52).
As stated, Plaintiff argues that the RFC is not based on
substantial evidence because the ALJ discredited Dr. Starkey’s
opinion
that
Plaintiff
has
marked
8
difficulties
in
responding
appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in routine
work setting.
(Doc. 14 at 1-2).
The Court disagrees.
As part of the disability determination process, the ALJ is
tasked
with
examining,
weighing
and
the
opinions
non-examining
and
findings
physicians.
of
In
treating,
reaching
a
decision, the ALJ must specify the weight given to different
medical opinions and the reasons for doing so.
See Winschel v.
Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011).
The failure to do so is reversible error.
See Williams v.
Astrue, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12010, *4, 2009 WL 413541, *1
(M.D. Fla. 2009).
When
ALJ
weighing
the
opinion
of
a
treating
physician,
the
must give the opinions “substantial weight,” unless good
cause exists for not doing so.
Costigan v. Commissioner, Soc.
Sec. Admin., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 2827, *10, 2015 WL 795089, *4
(11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2015) (citing Crawford v. Commissioner of
Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004) and Broughton v.
Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 962 (11th Cir. 1985)).
The opinion of “a
one-time examining physician — or psychologist,” on the other
hand,
is
physician.
not
entitled
to
the
same
deference
as
a
treating
Petty v. Astrue, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24516, *50,
2010 WL 989605, *14 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2010) (citing Crawford,
363 F.3d at 1160).
An ALJ is also “required to consider the
opinions of non-examining state agency medical and psychological
9
consultants because they ‘are highly qualified physicians and
psychologists who are also experts in Social Security disability
evaluation.’”
(11th
Milner v. Barnhart,
Cir.
2008)
404.1527(f)(2)(i)).
examining
(unpublished)
“The
sources
when
examining sources.”
275 Fed. Appx. 947, 948
ALJ
they
may
do
(citing
rely
not
on
20
C.F.R.
opinions
conflict
with
of
§
non-
those
of
Id. (citing Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d
580, 584-85 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Whether considering the opinions of treating, examining, or
non-examining
physicians,
testimony
any
of
good
medical
cause
source
exists
when
it
to
is
discredit
contrary
to
the
or
unsupported by the evidence of record.
Phillips v. Barnhart,
357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004).
“Good cause may also
exist
where
a
doctor’s
opinions
are
merely
conclusory,
inconsistent with the doctor’s medical records, or unsupported
by objective medical evidence.”
Hogan v. Astrue, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 108512, *8, 2012 WL 3155570, *3 (M.D. Ala. 2012).
The ALJ is “free to reject the opinion of any physician when the
evidence supports a contrary conclusion.”
764
F.2d
834,
835
(11th
Cir.
1985)
Sryock v. Heckler,
(per
curiam)
(citation
omitted); Adamo v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 365 Fed. Appx.
209,
212
(11th
Cir.
2010)
(The
ALJ
may
reject
any
medical
opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding.).
In
determining
Plaintiff’s
10
RFC
in
this
case,
the
ALJ
considered Plaintiff’s treatment records, which included records
from Alta Pointe in December 2012, showing that she was treated
by
Dr.
Bradley
Sadler,
M.D.,
a
psychiatrist,
who
noted
her
history of bipolar disorder and post traumatic stress disorder
(from
past
abusive
relationships),
including
two
previous
hospitalizations and participation in a partial hospitalization
program in January 2012.
(Doc. 13-3 at 48, 51).
Plaintiff’s
treatment notes reflect that she reported sadness over a recent
job loss but stated that her medications were working “ok” and
that Seroquel was helping her sleep.
(Doc. 13-3 at 48).
Dr.
Sadler noted that Plaintiff’s ability to care for herself was
“good,” and on mental status examination, he noted that
her
general appearance was “appropriate” and that her behavior was
“normal and cooperative,” although she reported mood swings and
had a sad affect.
noted
normal
(Doc. 13-3 at 49).
speech,
fair
appetite
In addition, Dr. Sadler
and
sleep,
no
suicidal
thoughts, no anxiety, unimpaired memory, normal orientation and
perceptions, and fair insight and judgment, although she had
impaired concentration and thoughts of persecution.
at 49-50).
(Doc. 13-3
Dr. Sadler diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar disorder
and assigned a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) of 60. 5
5
A GAF score of 51-60 indicates that “the person has moderate
symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech or
occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social,
occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends or
11
(Doc. 13-3 at 50-51).
Dr. Sadler noted that Plaintiff was in
the midst of a manic-depressive episode due to recently losing
her job but was “calm, cooperative, and [did] not appear to be
in imminent danger.”
(Doc. 13-3 at 51).
functional limitations.
In
January
Dr. Sadler assigned no
(Id.).
2013,
Plaintiff
returned
to
Alta
Pointe
and
reported that she was “doing well” on her current medications,
that she had no problems with sleeping or eating, and that she
had no suicidal ideation.
(Doc. 13-3 at 46).
Her mental status
examination findings included appropriate appearance, normal and
cooperative
behavior,
normal
mood,
appropriate
affect,
unimpaired speech, good appetite and sleep, unimpaired memory
and concentration, logical thoughts, good insight and judgment,
and moderate anxiety.
(Doc. 13-3 at 46-47).
conflicts with peers or co-workers).”
Benison v. Berryhill,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119690 *19-20, 2017 WL 3262128, *6 (S.D.
Ala. July 31, 2017). Plaintiff is correct that the latest
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, “DSM-5,” abandoned the GAF scale as a measurement
tool.
See Hartung v. Colvin, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65855, *19
n.2, 2016 WL 2910096, *6 n.2 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2016). For that
reason, the Social Security Administration now permits ALJs to
use GAF ratings as opinion evidence when assessing disability
claims involving mental disorders but instructed that “a ‘GAF
score is never dispositive of impairment severity,’ and an ALJ
should not ‘give controlling weight to a GAF from a treating
source unless it is well supported and not inconsistent with
other evidence.’” Id.; accord Thomas v. Colvin, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 133255 *27 n.15, 2016 WL 5417202, *8 n.15 (S.D. Ala. Sept.
28, 2016).
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court finds
that Dr. Sadler’s GAF score of 60, indicating moderate symptoms,
is consistent with the substantial evidence in this case.
12
Thereafter,
treatment
notes
from
February
reflected
to
sporadic
October
2013,
reports
of
Plaintiff’s
distress
over
losing her job and fear of being around others, but, overall,
she was doing well on her medication; she had no side effects
and no hospitalizations; she was “feeling pretty good;” she had
no depression and no racing or disorganized thoughts; and her
bipolar disorder was stabilized with medication.
68, 70, 72, 74).
(Doc. 13-3 at
While Plaintiff’s treatment notes in October
2013 reflect that she was experiencing confusion and sadness and
impaired
concentration
to
and
memory,
grief
over
specifically
related
August 2013.
her
those
symptoms
boyfriend’s
were
death
in
(Doc. 13-3 at 64-67).
In November 2013, Dr. Marianne Saitz, D.O., at Alta Pointe
noted
that
Plaintiff
reported
feeling
anxious
and
depressed
about her boyfriend’s death but added that her medication was
helping and that she was sleeping well.
Plaintiff’s
normal.
mental
(Id.).
status
examination
(Doc. 13-3 at 59-61).
findings
were
largely
In December 2013, Plaintiff’s treatment notes
reflect that she was “much improved,” that she had a bright
smile with less anxiety and fear, and that she had normal memory
and concentration.
(Doc. 13-3 at 119-20, 123-24).
From February through June 2014, Plaintiff’s mental status
examination
findings
remained
largely
normal,
and
Plaintiff
reported that she was doing better, although in April 2014 she
13
reported paranoid feelings and difficulty being around people.
(Doc. 13-3 at 104-09, 117-18).
March
2014,
Plaintiff
Notably, the previous month, in
reported
visiting
a
senior
stated that she enjoyed being around others.
center
and
(Doc. 13-3 at
114).
In
May
2014,
consultative
reports
of
Dr.
Pamela
psychological
two
previous
Starkey,
examination
Psy.
and
hospitalizations
D.,
performed
noted
and
a
Plaintiff’s
three
intensive
outpatient programs for bipolar disorder, although none in the
previous eighteen months.
reported
being
in
the
(Doc. 13-3 at 91-92).
midst
of
thoughts and difficulty sleeping.
status
examination,
hypomanic
with
Dr.
euthymic
Starkey
affect,
a
manic
Plaintiff also
episode
with
(Doc. 13-3 at 92).
noted
but
that
that
she
racing
On mental
Plaintiff
was
was
and
alert
oriented and able to sustain focus and attention; her speech was
clear and coherent; her thinking was organized; and her insight
was adequate.
(Doc. 13-3 at 92-95).
Plaintiff
only
had
mildly
impaired
Dr. Starkey found that
performance
on
specific
mental tasks, with adequate recent and remote memory functions,
mildly impaired fund of knowledge, marginally adequate reasoning
skills, and low average intellectual functioning.
94-95).
(Doc. 13-3 at
Dr. Starkey diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar disorder
and unspecified anxiety disorder, mild.
(Doc. 13-3 at 95).
Dr.
Starkey opined that Plaintiff had moderate to marked limitations
14
in her ability to understand and remember simple and complex
instructions, carry out complex instructions, make judgments on
complex work-related decisions, and interact appropriately with
the public, with supervisors, and coworkers, but that she had
marked limitations in her ability to respond appropriately to
usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting.
(Doc. 13-3 at 88-89).
Dr. Starkey also opined that Plaintiff’s
prognosis for a favorable response to treatment for psychiatric
problems within the next six to twelve months was “guarded.”
(Doc. 13-3 at 95).
As Plaintiff acknowledges, the ALJ gave significant weight
to the vast majority of Dr. Starkey’s opinions.
27;
Doc.
13-3
at
88-89).
However,
the
ALJ
(Doc. 12-2 at
rejected
Dr.
Starkey’s opinion that Plaintiff had marked limitations in her
ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations and to
changes
in
a
routine
work
setting,
finding
that
the
latter
opinion was inconsistent with the substantial medical evidence
in the case.6
(Doc. 12-2 at 27; Doc. 13-3 at 89).
Specifically,
the ALJ noted that Dr. Starkey’s opinion was inconsistent with
Dr.
Sadler’s
opinion
that
Plaintiff
6
had
a
GAF
of
60,
which
As discussed herein, the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Starkey’s
opinions that Plaintiff has marked limitations in her ability to
respond appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in
a routine work setting is the only basis for Plaintiff’s
challenge to the RFC. (Doc. 14 at 1-2).
15
indicated no more than moderate symptoms; it was inconsistent
with
Plaintiff’s
frequent
reports
of
improvement
with
medication; and it was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s treatment
notes which regularly showed intact memory and concentration,
general stability, and no need for recent hospitalization or
inpatient care.
(Doc. 12-2 at 27-28; Doc. 13-3 at 46-51, 60,
68-74, 104-05, 109, 114, 117-20, 123-24).
The
ALJ
further
noted
that
Dr.
Starkey’s
opinion
was
inconsistent with Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, which
included living alone, handling her own personal care needs,
preparing
simple
meals,
gardening,
shopping,
driving,
doing
laundry, going to restaurants, visiting residents at a senior
center, texting her daughter-in-law, spending time with her son,
watching television, handling her own finances, and walking her
dog.
(Doc. 12-2 at 27-28; Doc. 13-2 at 17-20; Doc. 13-3 at 95,
114).
While there is no question in this case that Plaintiff has
bipolar disorder and that she experiences fluctuating mood and
behavior as a result of that condition, the substantial evidence
detailed above supports the ALJ’s findings that her condition
has improved significantly with medication.
Plaintiff’s
treating
limitations
as
a
physicians
result
of
has
her
Indeed, none of
indicated
impairments.
any
functional
Because
the
severity of Dr. Starkey’s opinions regarding Plaintiff’s marked
16
limitations is inconsistent with the substantial evidence in the
case, the ALJ had good cause to discredit those opinions.
The Court further finds that substantial evidence supports
the
ALJ’s
RFC
for
a
range
of
medium
work
with
the
stated
restrictions, namely, the restrictions to work involving only
short and simple instructions, occasional interaction with the
general public, co-workers, and supervisors, and minimal changes
in the work setting.
these
restrictions
impairments.
7
Based on the evidence detailed above,
fully
accommodate
Plaintiff’s
mental
Indeed, Plaintiff has failed to show that any
limitations caused by her impairments exceed the RFC and are not
accommodated
by
the
stated
restrictions.
Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s claim is without merit.
VII.
Conclusion
For
the
reasons
set
forth
herein,
and
upon
careful
consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the
parties,
it
is
hereby
ORDERED
that
the
decision
of
the
Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for a
period
of
disability,
disability
insurance
benefits,
and
supplemental security income be AFFIRMED.
7
As discussed, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s findings
related to her physical impairments in this case.
17
DONE this 11th day of September, 2017.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
18
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