Hibbett Patient Care, LLC et al v. Pharmacists Mutual Insurance Company

Filing 61

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 51 Motion to Strike. Signed by District Judge William H. Steele on 5/12/2017. (tgw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
HIBBETT PATIENT CARE, LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PHARMACISTS MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION 16-0231-WS-C

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Opinions of
Defendant’s Experts Joseph Cowan and Michael T. Ryan (doc. 51). The Motion has been
briefed and is now ripe for disposition.1
I.

Background.
Plaintiffs, Hibbett Patient Care, LLC and Hibbett Patient Care II, LLC (collectively,

“Hibbett”), brought this action against their general liability insurer, Pharmacists Mutual
Insurance Company (“PMIC”), asserting claims of breach of insurance contract, bad faith failure
to investigate, and bad faith denial of claim. All such claims arise from PMIC’s denial of
coverage, including defense and indemnification, to Hibbett with respect to an underlying
lawsuit styled Hibbett Sporting Goods, Inc. et al. v. Hibbett Patient Care, LLC, et al., filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama (the “Hibbett Sporting Goods case”).2
1

Defendant has requested oral argument on the Motion, citing the complexity and
importance of the issues. The Local Rules provide that “[i]n its discretion, the Court may rule on
any motion without oral argument.” Civil L.R. 7(h). Upon careful consideration of the parties’
written submissions, the Court determines that oral argument is unlikely to be beneficial;
therefore, defendant’s request for oral argument is denied.
2

In that action, Hibbett Sporting Goods charged Hibbett with “Lanham Act
violations, common-law trademark infringement, trademark dilution arising under Alabama law,
and other state-law claims,” and indicated that it sought “declaratory and equitable relief for
Defendants’ actual and threatened infringement of Plaintiffs’ trademarks, service marks, and
other intellectual property.” (Doc. 1, Exh. C, ¶¶ 11-12.)

Hibbett maintains that the centerpiece of its action against PMIC is “whether PMIC owed
Plaintiffs a defense for the claims asserted” in the Hibbett Sporting Goods case. (Doc. 51, at 12.) To address that issue, PMIC has designated two attorneys, Joseph Cowan and Michael Ryan,
as expert witnesses. Cowan’s report reflects that he is a partner at the Hand Arendall firm in
Birmingham, Alabama, and that he intends to offer the following expert opinions, among others:
(i) PMIC “acted reasonably and properly investigated the claim” prior to denying it; (ii) PMIC
reasonably relied on Ryan’s analysis in denying Hibbett’s claim for defense and indemnity; (iii)
none of the information provided to PMIC triggered a duty to defend; (iv) Hibbett’s coverage
arguments are “incorrect or inapplicable;” (v) PMIC’s coverage counsel’s analysis “was fair,
competent and correct;” (vi) the Hibbett Sporting Goods complaint did not assert a trade dress
claim; (v) the policy’s trademark exclusion (exclusion m) excludes all claims arising out of
allegations of trademark violations; (vii) a summary/synopsis of decisional authority on certain
legal issues; (viii) opinions as to how Alabama courts would decide certain purely legal
questions; and (ix) opinions as to the customary fees charged by Alabama firms in the
Birmingham area for intellectual property litigation. (Doc. 51, Exh. 1, at Exh. A.) As for Ryan,
he is a Michigan lawyer who served as coverage counsel for PMIC on the Hibbett claim and who
authored the May 2014 letter to Hibbett denying all defense and indemnification coverage for the
Hibbett Sporting Goods action. (Doc. 51, Exh. 1, at Exh. B.) Defendant has not submitted a
separate expert report for Ryan; however, it has identified him as an expert witness in this matter
and has explained that his May 2014 letters “regarding his coverage opinion … contain an
outline of his opinions and the bases therefor.” (Doc. 51, Exh. 1, at 2.) Thus, it appears that
PMIC intends to call Ryan at trial to testify as an expert to the opinions set forth in the denial-ofcoverage letter he wrote to Hibbett in his capacity as PMIC’s coverage counsel.
Plaintiffs now request that the opinions of both Cowan and Ryan be excluded on four
separate grounds, to-wit: their opinions are improper legal conclusions, they do not satisfy
Daubert reliability principles, Ryan’s expert opinions amount to unauthorized practice of law in
Alabama, and PMIC is barred from contesting Hibbett’s damages.
II.

Analysis.
A.

Objections to Cowan Expert Report.

Beginning with the Cowan report, Hibbett’s initial objection is that Cowan’s opinions are
inadmissible legal conclusions. The Eleventh Circuit has remarked that “the law in this circuit

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pertaining to the admissibility of an expert’s opinion couched in legal terms is not crystal clear.”
Hanson v. Waller, 888 F.2d 806, 811 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, there are
several well-defined guideposts to shape the analysis. The Federal Rules of Evidence specify
that “[a]n opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.” Rule 704(a),
Fed.R.Evid. That said, the general rule is that “testifying experts may not offer legal
conclusions.” Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe County, Fla., 402 F.3d 1092,
1112 n.8 (11th Cir. 2005).3 After all, “[e]ach courtroom comes equipped with a ‘legal expert,’
called a judge, and it is his or her province alone to instruct the jury on the relevant legal
standards.” Burkhart v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 112 F.3d 1207, 1213
(D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Carrier Exp., Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 860 F. Supp. 1465, 1476 (N.D.
Ala. 1994) (“Professor Hamilton’s expected testimony was a dissertation of the law as it related
to this case. … As such, this testimony was properly excluded. … The court instructs the jury
regarding the applicable law; the witnesses do not.”).
In light of these principles, expert opinions are inadmissible to the extent that they
contain legal conclusions regarding the expert’s interpretation of contracts, insurance policies, or
other legal documents.4 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
3

See also United States v. Milton, 555 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1977) (“courts
must remain vigilant against the admission of legal conclusions”); R.W. v. Board of Regents of
the University System of Georgia, 114 F. Supp.3d 1260, 1274 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“As a general
principle, testifying experts may not offer legal conclusions. … Based on this general principle,
all witnesses are prohibited from testifying as to questions of law regarding the interpretation of
a statute, the meaning of terms in a statute, or the legality of conduct.”) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); Camacho v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 13 F. Supp.3d 1343, 1365
(N.D. Ga. 2014) (“An expert may not testify regarding the legal implications of conduct because
the court must be the jury’s only source of law.”); Domercant v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.,
2013 WL 11904719, *2 (N.D. Ga. May 15, 2013) (“the court will not permit a party to cloak its
legal arguments in the garb of an expert witness”); Royal Marco Point 1 Condominium Ass’n v.
QBE Ins. Corp., 2011 WL 470561, *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2011) (“an expert witness may not offer
a legal conclusion”).
4

See, e.g., Herman v. Seaworld Parks & Entertainment, Inc., --- F.R.D. ----, 2017
WL 1304302, *5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2017) (“Courts regularly exclude expert opinions that
opine on the interpretation of written contracts.”); North American Specialty Ins. Co. v. Wells,
2013 WL 4482455, *2 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2013) (“[C]ourts within the Eleventh Circuit have
excluded expert testimony where it is simply a reiteration or recasting of … parties’
interpretation of a contract.”).

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Co., 898 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1990), is instructive. In Montgomery, an insured sued his insurance
carrier for breaching its contractual duty to defend by not hiring tax counsel to represent the
insured in the underlying suit. The insured offered expert testimony “that Aetna had a duty
under the policy to provide counsel for the tax matter.” Id. at 1540. The panel explained that an
expert may not “merely tell the jury what result to reach,” and construed the proffered expert
opinion to be “a legal conclusion, and therefore should not have been admitted. The district
court abused its discretion by allowing [the expert] to testify about the scope of Aetna’s duty
under the policy.” Id. at 1541 (footnote omitted). District courts in this circuit have reached
similar conclusions in analogous circumstances. See FNB Bank v. Park Nat’l Corp., 996 F.
Supp.2d 1187, 1192 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (excluding expert testimony that a “construction loan
agreement requires an increase in construction costs to be borne by the developer” and “that the
plaintiff breached its contractual duty by failing to monitor the loan” where it is improper for
witness to posit “as an expert, an interpretation of what the contract requires”); Rosen v.
Protective Life Ins. Co., 817 F. Supp.2d 1357, 1385 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (“The proposed testimony
seeks to displace the role of the Court by offering Dr. Reavis’s opinion on the scope of the
obligations described by the unambiguous language of the Settlement Agreement, which is not
allowable under the Rules of Evidence.”); North American Specialty Ins. Co. v. Wells, 2013 WL
4482455, *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2013) (excluding expert’s “legal conclusions regarding the
interpretation of the insurance policy terms,” and particularly his opinion that the insurer “has a
duty to provide coverage for the event in question,” where such opinion “is nothing more than a
reiteration or recasting of Defendant Wells’s interpretation of the insurance contract”).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is proper for a qualified expert witness to testify about
insurance industry practices and procedures. See, e.g., Camacho v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 13
F. Supp.3d 1343, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (“[B]ecause the average juror is not likely to be familiar
with the practices and procedures involved in insurance claims handling, expert testimony on
these matters is admissible to assist the trier of fact. … An insurance expert may testify regarding
what duties are owed by an insurance company during the claims handling process and whether
the actions of the insurance company complied with those duties without offering improper legal
conclusions.”); Royal Marco Point 1 Condominium Ass’n v. QBE Ins. Corp., 2011 WL 470561,
*4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2011) (allowing expert opinions comparing defendant insurer’s claims

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handling practices to what is standard and typical in the industry).5 And an expert may properly
testify as to facts that relate to a legal standard, so long as he or she does not offer opinions as to
whether that legal standard has been met. See, e.g., Cordoves v. Miami-Dade County, 104 F.
Supp.3d 1350, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (“[A]n expert may offer his opinion as to facts that, if
found, would support a conclusion that the legal standard at issue was satisfied, but he may not
testify as to whether the legal standard has been satisfied.”); Camacho, 13 F. Supp.3d at 1366
(citing as an example of proper testimony an attorney expert opinion that a statement in a
prospectus was standard language, because such information helped the jury evaluate
defendants’ scienter).
In large part, Cowan’s proffered expert opinions “merely tell the jury what result to
reach” and recast PMIC’s own interpretation of the relevant documents. He interprets various
aspects of the insurance policy as well as the Hibbett Sporting Goods complaint.6 He opines that
PMIC’s interpretations are correct and that Hibbett’s interpretations are incorrect.7 In this
manner, Cowan simply reiterates PMIC’s interpretations of what the Hibbett Sporting Goods
complaint means and what the insurance policy’s various coverages and exclusions require.
Such legal conclusions are unhelpful to the jury and are inadmissible. See Cook, 402 F.3d at
5

The one case cited by PMIC on this issue falls neatly within this category. In
Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Brown, 832 So.2d 1 (Ala. 2001), the Alabama Supreme Court noted that
an attorney specializing in insurance-coverage matters had offered an opinion that “industry
practice required the insurer to seek a coverage opinion from an attorney before denying Gloria
Brown a defense.” Id. at 10. Far from expressing legal conclusions about policy interpretation,
the attorney-expert in Brown merely testified about industry practice, which is an entirely proper
and permissible subject for expert testimony.
6

By way of example, Cowan offers opinions as to what he says “the plain meaning
of the policy” is with respect to trade dress. (Cowan Report (doc. 51, Exh. 1 at Exh. A), at 7.)
He states his opinion as to what the “unfair competition and palming off claims” in the Hibbett
Sports complaint do or do not allege. (Id. at 7.) He talks about types of claims and allegations
that he says are “plainly” and “unambiguously” excluded under the policy. (Id. at 8, 10.)
7

For example, Cowan examined a letter from David Gauntlet, a Hibbett attorney
seeking reconsideration of PMIC’s coverage decision. Based on that review, Cowan would
testify that, “in my opinion the argument provided by Mr. Gauntlet is incorrect or inapplicable”
as to his interpretation of the Hibbett Sporting Goods complaint and “[i]t is also my opinion that
Mr. Gauntlet’s argument for coverage is incorrect.” (Cowan Report, at 4.) Cowan would also
testify that “it is my opinion that Mr. Ryan’s analysis was fair, competent and correct.” (Id.)

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1111 (“Proffered expert testimony generally will not help the trier of fact when it offers nothing
more than what lawyers for the parties can argue in closing arguments.”) (citations omitted).
Cowan’s expert report is also replete with analysis of what he believes applicable law says
(including lengthy citations to published decisions from other jurisdictions), and his repeated
forecasts that, “[i]n my opinion, an Alabama court deciding these issues would reach the same
conclusion.” (Cowan Report, at 5, 7, 10.) Such a dissertation on the law and how the witness
thinks Alabama courts would decide certain legal questions improperly invades the province of
this Court. Witnesses do not instruct juries on the law. Courts do. These aspects of the Cowan
report are not proper expert opinions for trial.
However, several aspects of the Cowan report do not simply parrot PMIC’s interpretation
of the policy and the Hibbett Sporting Goods complaint, and do not invade the province of the
Court by instructing the jury as to the law. In particular, Cowan’s report includes opinions
concerning PMIC’s claims handling procedures, such as where he opines that PMIC “acted
reasonably and properly investigated the claim by requesting information from [Hibbett] in
addition to the [Hibbett Sporting Goods] Complaint and obtaining a coverage opinion from
competent legal counsel prior to denying the claim.” (Cowan Report, at 3.) As noted by the
authorities cited supra, expert testimony may permissibly be used to assist the jury in
understanding insurance claims handling procedures. The Court notes that Hibbett has raised a
Daubert objection; however, nothing in Hibbett’s Daubert analysis would impugn the reliability
of this aspect of Cowan’s report. Accordingly, the Motion to Strike is denied insofar as it would
preclude Cowan from offering expert opinions as to the reasonableness and thoroughness of
PMIC’s investigation and claims handling procedures utilized in this case, relative to standard
industry practices.
Another portion of Cowan’s expert report that does not run afoul of the proscription
against legal conclusions and telling the jury what result to reach is the section in which he offers
opinions as to the customary fees charged by proficient lawyers at Alabama firms for intellectual
property litigation in the Birmingham legal market. (Cowan Report, at 11.) PMIC apparently
intends to use these opinions to show that the more than $160,000 in legal fees incurred by
Hibbett in defending the Hibbett Sporting Goods action are excessive and unreasonable, such
that any legal fees awarded to Hibbett as damages herein should be discounted to reflect
customary rates in the appropriate legal market. In its Motion to Strike, Hibbett insists that

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PMIC “is barred from contesting Plaintiffs’ damages” (doc. 51, at 6); however, the authorities it
cites do not support that proposition. Where a party seeks recovery of attorney’s fees for a
breach of contract claim, Alabama law imputes a reasonableness limitation to the resulting fee
award, as a matter of law.8 And Alabama law imposes a duty to mitigate damages on an
aggrieved party in the breach-of-contract context. See Whitney Bank v. Point Clear
Development, LLC, 2012 WL 2277597, *3 (S.D. Ala. June 18, 2012) (“As a general matter,
Alabama courts have recognized a duty to mitigate in the breach of contract context.”); see also
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Trotman, 940 F. Supp.2d 1359, 1368 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (similar). In
light of these well-entrenched legal principles, and movants’ failure to identify any authority
supporting their proposition, the Court does not find that the legal fees accrued by an insured in
securing a defense following an insurer’s breach of contract are unassailable and are immune
from any reasonableness inquiries.9 On this showing, Cowan will not be precluded from
testifying about the going rates for comparable legal services in the relevant legal market.
B.

Objections to Ryan Expert Report.

As to Michael Ryan, Hibbett reiterates its objection to expert testimony concerning legal
conclusions. In the Court’s view, however, Ryan is not similarly situated to Cowan on this issue.
Here is why: Ryan’s “expert report” consists of the denial-of-coverage letter he wrote to Hibbett
on PMIC’s behalf in May 2014. That letter identifies Ryan as “coverage counsel for the
Pharmacists Mutual Insurance Company,” states that PMIC “now denies all defense and
8

See, e.g., Willow Lake Residential Ass’n, Inc. v. Juliano, 80 So.3d 226, 241 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2010) (“Alabama law reads into every agreement allowing for the recovery of
attorney’s fees a reasonableness limitation.”); Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Howard, 2013
WL 951652, *6 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 8, 2013) (“Alabama law imposes a reasonableness constraint on
all fee-shifting contracts, as a matter of public policy.”); Whitney Bank v. Point Clear
Development, LLC, 2012 WL 2277597, *7 n.11 (S.D. Ala. June 18, 2012) (“To be recoverable
under Alabama law, the attorney’s fees must be ‘reasonable.’”).
9

To hold otherwise would be to provide no check, no limits, and no boundaries of
any kind on the legal fees accrued by an insured in defending itself after the insurer declines to
provide it with a defense. It would mean that an insured could go on a reckless, irresponsible,
profligate spending spree in the underlying litigation, yet the insurer would remain on the hook
for the full amount and would be helpless to challenge it. Such a result would be incompatible
with the sound public policy underlying the Alabama principles of mitigation of damages and
recovery of only reasonable fees, as discussed supra.

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indemnification coverage for this claim,” and sets forth in some detail the grounds for that
denial-of-coverage decision. (Doc. 51, Exh. 1 at Exh. B.) Unlike Cowan, Ryan has not been
retained by PMIC to offer a post hoc justification for the challenged coverage decision; rather, he
was the lawyer who worked with PMIC to make that coverage decision in the first place.
Viewed in its proper context, then, the Ryan letter is not an expert report at all, and Ryan is not
testifying as an expert; rather, Ryan’s statements regarding the contents of the May 2014 letter
and the reasons for PMIC’s denial of the claim are fact-witness testimony. Particularly given the
bad-faith denial of coverage claim interposed by Hibbett, critical issues joined for trial in this
case include not only what actions PMIC took but why it took them. If Ryan’s May 2014 letter
were excluded and he were precluded from testifying about it, then PMIC would be effectively
prevented from explaining its coverage decision to the jury. The result of the evidentiary ruling
sought by Hibbett is that PMIC would be stripped of its ability to defend against the bad faith
claims at all. PMIC must be allowed to tell its story at trial, and Ryan (who, again, acted as
PMIC’s coverage counsel in this matter) is the proper fact witness to tell that story, explaining
the analytical steps PMIC took, the results it reached, and the reasons for those decisions. This is
fact, not expert, testimony that bears directly on Hibbett’s bad faith claim. See, e.g., State Farm
Fire and Cas. Co. v. Brechbill, 144 So.3d 248, 258 (Ala. 2013) (“Of course, if a lawful basis for
denial actually exists, the insurer, as a matter of law, cannot be held liable in an action based
upon the tort of bad faith.”) (citation and emphasis omitted); Coleman v. Unum Group Corp.,
207 F. Supp.3d 1281, 1284 (S.D. Ala. 2016) (“the existence of a debatable reason for denying
the claim at the time the claim was denied defeats a bad faith failure to pay the claim”) (citation
omitted).
Next, Hibbett challenges Ryan’s opinions as failing to satisfy Daubert reliability
standards.10 This argument is unpersuasive because, as noted, Ryan is testifying as a fact

10

The Federal Rules of Evidence “require[] expert scientific evidence to be both
reliable and relevant pursuant to Rule 702,” such that it “appropriately assists the trier of fact.”
United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005). In that regard, “[t]he court
serves as a gatekeeper, charged with screening out experts whose methods are untrustworthy or
whose expertise is irrelevant to the issue at hand.” Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239,
1250 (11th Cir. 2007). “In determining the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702, a
district court considers whether (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the
matter he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is
(Continued)
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witness, not an expert witness. At any rate, even if Ryan were testifying as an expert, the
reliability objections posited by Hibbett would go to the testimony’s weight rather than its
admissibility. In particular, Hibbett posits that Ryan’s deposition testimony contradicts his
written report (i.e., the denial-of-coverage letter) in multiple respects; however, each of the
purported “contradictions” either is not a fundamental inconsistency at all, or is a discrepancy
that the witness may be able to harmonize.11 Even in the aftermath of Daubert, it remains true
that “vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on
the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.” Rosenfeld v. Oceana Cruises, Inc., 654 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted). The purported infirmities identified by Hibbett may be fertile ground for crossexamination of Ryan, but they do not fairly implicate Daubert gatekeeping principles.
Finally, Hibbett objects to Ryan testifying at trial on the grounds that he is a Michigan
lawyer who “is not licensed to practice law in the State of Alabama.” (Doc. 51, at 6.) Hibbett’s
position is that Ryan’s appearance and testimony at trial in this case would be tantamount to
“practicing law in the State of Alabama.” (Id.) Plaintiffs cite no authority for the dubious

sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the
testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized
expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” United States v. Douglas,
489 F.3d 1117, 1124-25 (11th Cir. 2007).
11

For example, Hibbett argues that Ryan acknowledged in his deposition that
Alabama law and Eleventh Circuit law control, yet his coverage letter failed to cite Alabama or
Eleventh Circuit authority. (Doc. 51, at 4.) That is not a fundamental contradiction, particularly
if (as PMIC represents) Ryan researched Alabama law in formulating the opinions expressed in
that letter. Hibbett also insists that Ryan testified in his deposition that he relied solely on the
intellectual property exclusion as a basis for denying coverage, whereas his coverage letter
discusses multiple other exclusions (doc. 51, at 4); however, the cited deposition excerpt contains
no such limiting statement. And Hibbett leans on Ryan’s testimony that “if this Complaint is
construed to assert a trade dress claim, there was a duty to defend it and I was wrong.” (Doc. 51,
Exh. 3, at 51.) Hibbett says “it is undisputed that Count IV of the [Hibbett Sporting Goods]
Complaint asserts … a claim for trade dress infringement.” (Doc. 51, at 4-5.) In fact, it appears
to be hotly contested whether the Hibbett Sporting Goods Complaint implicates a duty to defend
based on a claim for trade dress infringement. Whatever else may be said about Hibbett’s
identified “contradictions,” they do not render Ryan’s opinions so unreliable as to warrant
Daubert gatekeeping exclusion.

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proposition that a lawyer licensed to practice in one state cannot testify in a different state about
certain legal conclusions he has reached. The Court is aware of none. Even if Hibbett were
correct that Ryan’s testimony at this trial amounts to the practice of law in Alabama, the
appropriate remedy would not be wholesale exclusion of his testimony, but the ministerial action
of having the witness complete a pro hac vice application and submit it to the Clerk of Court.
The Court will not devote further attention to this baseless objection.
III.

Conclusion.
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike the Opinions of Defendant’s Experts Joseph Cowan
and Michael T. Ryan (doc. 51) is granted in part, and denied in part;

2.

The Motion to Strike is denied as to the portions of Cowan’s expert report
opining as to PMIC’s claims handling practices and procedures, and as to
customary and applicable rates for legal services, but is in all other respects
granted as to Cowan; and

3.

The Motion to Strike is denied as to Ryan.

DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of May, 2017.
s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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