Moore v. Colvin

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER entered that the Commissioner's final decision issued April 28, 2016, denying Moore's applications for PoD and DIB is AFFIRMED under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Signed by Magistrate Judge William E. Cassady on 8/15/2017. (eec)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROOSEVELT L. MOORE,
Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.

:

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,1

:
:
:

Defendant.

CA 16-00247-C

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Social Security Claimant/Plaintiff Roosevelt L. Moore brought this
action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a
final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (the
“Commissioner”) denying his applications for a period of disability (“PoD”)
and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. The parties have consented to the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for all
proceedings in this Court. (Doc. 19 (“In accordance with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, the parties in this case consent to have
a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all proceedings in this
case, including the trial, order the entry of a final judgment, and conduct all
Nancy A Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January
23, 2017. Pursuant to Rule 25(d), Fed. R. Civ. P., Berryhill is substituted for
Carolyn W. Covin as the proper defendant in this case.

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post-judgment proceedings.”)).
Upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, (Docs. 13 & 16), the
administrative record, (Doc. 12), (hereinafter cited as “(R. [page number(s) in
lower-right corner of transcript])”), and the arguments presented during the
hearing held on February 16, 2017, it is determined that the Commissioner’s
decision is due to be AFFIRMED.2
I.

Background

Moore was born on November 9, 1969, (R. 185 [SSA Ex. 4E]). The
highest grade of school Moore attained was eleventh grade. (R. 48; but see
also (R. 190 [SSA Ex. 4E] (indicating the highest grade of school completed
was twelfth grade in 1989)). Moore was employed from 1987 to 2012 and
performed jobs that included laborer, quality control inspector, truck driver,
and painter. (R. 177 [SSA Ex. 3E]). Most recently, he worked as a truck
driver from 2001 to 2012. (R. 190 [SSA Ex. 5E]).
Moore filed applications for PoD and DIB with the Social Security
Administration (the “SSA”), 3 on December 6, 2012.

(R. 20).

In Moore’s

Any appeal taken from this memorandum opinion and order and judgment shall be
made to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (See Docs. 19 & 20 (“An appeal from
a judgment entered by a Magistrate Judge shall be taken directly to the United
States Court of Appeals for this judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal
from any other judgment of this district court.”)).

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“The Social Security Act’s general disability insurance benefits program (‘DIB’)
provides income to individuals who are forced into involuntary, premature
retirement, provided they are both insured and disabled, regardless of indigence.
See 42 U.S.C. 423.” Sanders v. Astrue, No 11-049-N, 2012 WL 4497733, at *3 (S.D.
Ala. Sept. 28, 2012).

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2

application, he alleged disability beginning on November 30, 2012. 4 (R. 20).
After Moore’s claim was denied, he requested a hearing, which was held
before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for the SSA on June 24, 2014.
(R. 20).

On August 8, 2014, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on

Moore’s claims, finding him “not disabled” under sections 216 (i) and 223(d) of
the Social Security Act. (R. 17-35).
Moore requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council
for the SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. (R. 15-16). The
Appeals Council denied Moore’s request for review on April 28, 2016, which
made the ALJ’s the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. 1-6). On May 25,
2016, Moore filed this action pursuant to § 405(g)5 and § 1383(c)(3)6 to review
the final decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. 1, ¶ 3).
II.

Standard of Review

“In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and based on

“For DIB claims, a claimant is eligible for benefits where she demonstrates
disability on or before the last date for which she [was] insured. 42 U.S.C. §
423(a)(1)(A) (2005).” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam).

4

“Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner . . . made after a
hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may
obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after
the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the
Commissioner . . . may allow.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

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“The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing
under paragraph (1) shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g)
of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner’s final determinations under
section 405 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. 1383(c)(3).

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3

proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178
(11th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Court “may
not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment
for that of the [Commissioner].” Id. (citations omitted). “Even if the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [the Court] must affirm
if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”

Martin v.

Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Sewell v. Bowen, 792
F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986); MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053
(11th Cir. 1986); and Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.
1983)). “Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [the Court does] not
‘act as automatons.’”

Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)

(citing Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 912, 102 S. Ct. 1263, 71 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1982)).

The Court “must

scrutinize the record as a whole, [Ware, 651 F.2d at 411]; Lewis v.
Weinberger, 515 F.2d 584, 586-87 (5th Cir. 1975), to determine if the decision
reached is reasonable, Simmons v. Harris, 602 F.2d 1233, 1236 (5th Cir.
1979), and supported by substantial evidence, Scharlow v. Schweiker, 655
F.2d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 1981).” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239.
“In contrast to the deferential review accorded to the [Commissioner’s]
findings of fact, the [Commissioner’s] conclusions of law, including applicable

4

review standards are not presumed valid.” Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529 (citing
MacGregor, 786 F.2d at 1053; Smith v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 1284, 1285 (11th
Cir. 1983), Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982); Smith
v. Schweiker, 646 F.2d 1075, 1076 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981).

“The

[Commissioner’s] failure to apply the correct legal standard or to provide the
reviewing court with sufficient basis for a determination that proper legal
principles have been followed mandates reversal.” Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529
(citing Gibson v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 619, 622 (11th Cir. 1986); Bowel v.
Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635-36 (11th Cir. 1984); Smith, 707 F.2d at 1285;
Wiggins, 679 F.2d at 1389; Ambers v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 1467, 1470 (11th Cir.
1984)).
The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential
evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is
disabled: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a
severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether
the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified
impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment, whether the
claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant work
despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant
numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work
experience.
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v),
416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, at 1237-39 (11th Cir.
2004)).
III.

Claims on Judicial Review

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1.

“The [ALJ] reversibly erred in failing to assign controlling

weight to the opinion of [Moore’s] treating physicians, Jonah McIntyre,
M.D.,[,] and Steven Hankins, D.O., and instead adopted her own medical
opinion.” (Doc. 13, at 1).
2.

“The [ALJ] committed reversible error in violation of Social

Security Ruling 96-6p by failing to give adequate weight to the consulting
physician, Dr. Eyston Hunte. Dr. Hunte’s opinion should be given controlling
weight under Social Security Ruling 96-9p because it is consistent with the
medical evidence of record.” (Doc. 13, at 2).
IV.

Analysis

“At the first step, the ALJ must consider the claimant’s current
working situation. If the claimant is ‘doing substantial gainful activity, [the
ALJ] will find that [the claimant is] not disabled.’” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237
(alterations in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i) & (b)).

“If

however, the claimant is not currently ‘doing gainful activity’ then the ALJ
moves on to the second step.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237. At the first step,
the ALJ determined that Moore had “not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since November 30, 2012, the alleged onset date.” (R. 22).
At the second step, the ALJ is to “consider the medical
severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s).”
20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii).
When considering the severity of the
claimant’s medical impairments, the ALJ must determine
whether the impairments, alone or in combination, “significantly
limit” the claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work
skills.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the ALJ concludes that none
of the claimant’s impairments are medically severe, the ALJ is

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to conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii) & (c). If, however, the ALJ concludes that the
claimant’s impairments are medically severe, then the ALJ
moves on to the third step.
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237 (alterations in original). At Step Two, the ALJ
determined that Moore had the following severe impairments: “degenerative
disc disease of the lumbar spine, carpal tunnel syndrome, hypertension, and
obesity.” (R. 22).
At the third step, the ALJ again considers the “medical
severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s)” in order to determine
whether the claimant’s impairment(s) “meets or equals” one of
the listed disabilities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Although
the list is too voluminous to recite here, the idea is that the
listings “streamline[ ] the decision process by identifying those
claimants whose medical impairments are so severe that it is
likely they would be found disabled regardless of their
vocational background.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153,
107 S. Ct. 2287, 2297, 96 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1987). If the ALJ
concludes that the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of
the listed disabilities and meet the duration requirement, the
ALJ will conclude that the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iii) & (d). If, however, the ALJ concludes that the
claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal the listed
impairments, then the ALJ will move on to step four.
Phillips, 257 F.3d at 1238 (alterations in original). At Step Three, the ALJ
found that Moore “does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments” in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526. (R. 23).
At the fourth step, the ALJ must assess: (1) the claimant's
[RFC]; and (2) the claimant's ability to return to her past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). As for the
claimant's RFC, the regulations define RFC as that which an
individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his
or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). Moreover, the

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ALJ will “assess and make a finding about [the claimant's RFC]
based on all the relevant medical and other evidence” in the
case.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
Furthermore, the RFC
determination is used both to determine whether the claimant:
(1) can return to her past relevant work under the fourth step;
and (2) can adjust to other work under the fifth step . . . . 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
If the claimant can return to her past relevant work, the
ALJ will conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iv) & (f). If the claimant cannot return to her
past relevant work, the ALJ moves on to step five.
In determining whether [a claimant] can return to her
past relevant work, the ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC
using all relevant medical and other evidence in the case. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). That is, the ALJ must determine if the
claimant is limited to a particular work level. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1567. Once the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and
determines that the claimant cannot return to her prior relevant
work, the ALJ moves on to the fifth, and final, step.
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted). At
the fourth step, the ALJ assessed that Moore had the RFC:
[T]o perform less than a full range of light work as defined in 20
C.F.R. 404.1567(b). [Moore] can lift and carry 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. He can stand for one
hour at a time for a total of two hours in an eight-hour workday.
He can sit two hours at a time for a total of four hours in an
eight-hour workday. He can walk two hours at a time for a total
of two hours in an eight-hour workday. He can frequently reach,
handle, finger, and feel. He can occasionally push and pull. He
can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He
can occasionally work with moving equipment and be exposed to
temperature extremes, humidity and wetness, and concentrated
environmental pollutants such as dust, chemicals, and fumes.
He can occasionally climb stairs and ramps but is precluded
from climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. He is precluded
from working unprotected heights or around vibrations. He can
work in very quiet, quiet, and moderate hearing environments
but is precluded from loud or very loud environments, as all are
defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The claimant

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requires a cane to walk distances greater than 100 feet. The
claimant should avoid tasks involving a variety of instructions
or tasks but is able to understand and carry out simple one and
two step instructions and is able to understand and carry out
detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions involving a
few concrete variables in or from standardized situations.
(R. 24). The ALJ determined Moore is “unable to perform any past relevant
work.” (R. 29).
At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC,
age, education, and work experience to determine whether the
claimant “can make an adjustment to other work.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(v). Essentially, the ALJ must determine if there
is other work available in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant has the ability to perform. If the
claimant can make the adjustment to other work, the ALJ will
determine the claimant is not disabled. If the claimant cannot
make the adjustment to other work, the ALJ will determine that
the claimant is disabled.
There are two avenues by which the ALJ may determine
whether the claimant has the ability to adjust to other work in
the national economy. The first is by applying the Medical
Vocation Guidelines.
Social Security regulations currently contain a special
section called the Medical Vocational Guidelines. 20 C.F.R. pt.
404 subpt. P, app. 2. The Medical Vocational Guidelines
(“grids”) provide applicants with an alternate path to qualify for
disability benefits when their impairments do not meet the
requirements of the listed qualifying impairments. The grids
provide for adjudicators to consider factors such as age,
confinement to sedentary or light work, inability to speak
English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job experience.
Each of these factors can independently limit the number of jobs
realistically available to an individual. Combinations of these
factors yield a statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not
Disabled.”
The other means by which the ALJ may determine
whether the claimant has the ability to adjust to other work in
the national economy is by the use of a vocational expert. A

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vocational expert is an expert on the kinds of jobs an individual
can perform based on his or her capacity and impairments.
When the ALJ uses a vocational expert, the ALJ will pose
hypothetical question(s) to the vocational expert to establish
whether someone with the limitations that the ALJ has
previously determined that the claimant has will be able to
secure employment in the national economy.
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239-40 (footnotes omitted).

At step five, the ALJ

determined that, given Moore’s RFC, age, education, and work experience,
“there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
[Moore] can perform” based on the testimony of the vocational expert, who
opined that, based on Moore’s limitations, he could perform the jobs of bench
assembler, garment folder, and surveillance monitor. (R. 30). Accordingly,
the ALJ found that Moore “has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from November 30, 2012, through the date of [the ALJ’s]
decision.” (R. 30).
A.

Claim 1

“’Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or
other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and
severity of [the claimant’s] impairments(s), including [the claimant’s]
symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite
impairments(s), and [the claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions.’”
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79 (alterations in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)).

“The law of this circuit is clear that the

testimony of a treating physician must be given substantial or considerable

10

weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125
F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R.
404.1527(d)(2) (“Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your
treating sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals
most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence
that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from
reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or
brief hospitalizations.”).

“’[G]ood cause’ exists when the:

(1) treating

physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported
a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or
inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at
1240-41. “When electing to disregard the opinion of a treating physician, the
ALJ must clearly articulate its reasons.”

Id. at 1241.

“Where the ALJ

articulate[s] specific reasons for failing to give the opinion of a treating
physician controlling weight, and those reasons are supported by substantial
evidence, there is no reversible error.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208,
1212 (11th Cir. 2005).
Moreover, the ALJ must state with particularity the weight
given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.
Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam). “In the absence of such a statement, it is impossible for
a reviewing court to determine whether the ultimate decision on
the merits of the claim is rational and supported by substantial
evidence.” Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir.
1981). Therefore, when the ALJ fails to “state with at least

11

some measure of clarity the grounds for his decision,” we will
decline to affirm “simply because some rationale might have
supported the ALJ’s conclusion.” Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d
1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). In such a situation, “to
say that [the ALJ’s] decision is supported by substantial
evidence approaches an abdication of the court’s duty to
scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the
conclusions reached are rational.” Cowart, 662 F.2d at 735
(quoting Stawls v. Califano, 596 F.2d 1209, 1213 (4th Cir. 1979))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (alterations in original).
Moore argues the ALJ reversibly erred when she did not assign
controlling weight to the opinions of Moore’s treating physicians, Dr.
McIntyre and Dr. Hankins. (Doc. 12, at 1-2). Discharging the requirement
that the ALJ “state with particularity the weight given to different medical
opinions and the reasons therefore[,]” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179, she
assigned weight to the opinion of Dr. McIntyre, which was stated in a form
dated November 7, 2013, (R. 308 [SSA Ex. 9F]), and the reasons therefor as
follows:
The undersigned has considered but gives little weight to the
November 2013 opinion of Jonah McIntyre, M.D., who indicates
that the claimant is unable to work 40 hours per week without
missing more than two days per month and that physical
activity will increase the claimant’s symptoms and cause
distraction from or total abandonment from task (Exhibit 9F).
Additionally, Dr. McIntyre also notes, “[low back pain] disables
[the claimant] from employment.”
However, any opinion
regarding the claimant’s ability to work full-time in a
competitive environment is an opinion reserved to the
Commissioner (20 CFR 404.1513 and 404.1527). This opinion
also fails to identify functional limitations caused by the
claimant’s identified impairments, making it purely conclusory.
Further, Dr. McIntyre’s opinion is inconsistent with the overall
evidence of record, including the examination findings and

12

opinion of Dr. Hunte, as well as the claimant’s admitted and
indicated activities and abilities, which include driving,
preparing breakfast, and shopping in stores.
(R.28). She, also, assigned weight to the opinion of Dr. Hankins, which was
stated in a form titled “Medical Examiner’s Certificate” dated May 20, 2013,
(R. 348 [SSA Ex. 14F]), and the therefore as follows:
The undersigned has also considered but gives no weight to the
May 2013 opinion of Steven Hankins, D.O., that [ ] the claimant
was unable to perform the essential functions of his job at
Reynold’s Ready Mix due to high blood pressure, limited range of
motion, an unsteady gait, and the use of pain medications
(Exhibit 14F). Again, any opinion regarding the claimant’s
ability to work full-time in a competitive environment is an
opinion reserved to the Commissioner (20 CFR 404.1513 and
404.1527).
Also, Dr. Hankins’ opinion refers only to the
claimant’s job at Reynold’s Ready Mix, not to other jobs in the
national economy, and the undersigned has determined that the
claimant is unable to perform any of his past work (See Finding
6, below). This opinion fails to identify the functional limitations,
rendering it conclusory in nature. Accordingly, the undersigned
gives it no weight.
(R. 28). Thus, the ALJ determined Dr. McIntyre’s opinion was conclusory
and not bolstered by the evidence and Dr. Hankins’s opinion was conclusory.
Moore argues the ALJ failed to show good cause for rejecting the
opinions of Drs. Hankins and McIntyre. (See Doc. 13, at 2-7). The reasons
stated by the ALJ for assigning little weight to Dr. McIntyre’s opinion are
“[Dr. McIntyre’s] opinion fails to identify functional limitations caused by
[Moore’s] identified impairments,” and “Dr. McIntyre’s opinion is inconsistent
with the overall evidence of record, including the examination findings and
opinion of Dr. Hunte, as well as the claimant’s admitted and indicated

13

activities and abilities, which include driving, preparing breakfast, and
shopping in stores.” (R. 28). The reasons stated by the ALJ for assigning no
weight to Dr. Hankins’s opinion are “Dr. Hankins’ opinion refers only to the
claimant’s job at Reynold’s Ready Mix, not to other jobs in the national
economy” and “[his opinion fails to identify the functional limitations,
rendering it conclusory in nature.” (R. 28). Drs. Hankins’s and McIntyre’s
opinions are similar in that they are conclusory, according to the ALJ.
The opinion in the form dated November 7, 2013, (R. 308 [SSA Ex.
9F]), with which the ALJ takes issue is the extent physical activity would
increase Moore’s symptoms and Moore’s ability to engage in any form of
gainful employment, (R. 28).

Specifically, Dr. McIntyre opined “physical

activity, such as walking, standing, lifting, bending, stooping, repetitive
moving of extremities, [etcetera],” “[g]reatly increase Moore’s symptoms and
cause distraction from task or total abandonment of task,” (R. 308 [SSA Ex.
9F]), and Moore cannot “engage in any form of gainful employment on a
repetitive, competitive and productive basis over an eight hour work day,
forty hours a week, without missing more than [two] days of work per month
or experiencing frequent interruptions to [his] work routine due to symptoms
of [his] disease or medical problems,” (R. 308 [SSA Ex. 9F]). Dr. McIntyre
noted Moore’s lower back pain “disables [Moore] from employment.” (R. 308
[SSA Ex. 9F]).

The opinion in the “Medical Examiner’s Certificate” form

dated May 20, 2013, (R. 348 [SSA Ex. 14F]), with which the ALJ takes issue

14

is Dr. Hankins’s opinion “[Moore] is NOT qualified to perform the essential
function of [his Reynolds Ready Mix] job” because of high blood pressure, a
limited range of motion, unsteady gait, and daily use of a cane. (R. 348 [SSA
Ex. 14F]).
At the outset, the Court notes the opinions of Drs. Hankins and
McIntyre are not accompanied by, and Drs. Hankins and McIntyre do not
note, relevant medical evidence in support of their opinions.7 (See R. 308
[SSA Ex. 9F]; R. 348 [SSA Ex. 14F]). Neither Dr. Hankins nor Dr. McIntyre
makes findings as to Moore’s functional limitations that would support their
opinions. (See R. 308 [SSA Ex. 9F]; R. 348 [SSA Ex. 14F]). Dr. Hankins’s
opinion, in particular, is restricted to Moore’s ability to perform the type of
work Moore performed at his previous place of employment, Reynolds Ready
Mix, without an opinion as to Moore’s ability to perform other work. (See R.
348 [SSA. Ex. 14F]).
As to the medical evidence, on December 9, 2012, an X-ray was
performed on Moore at Springhill Medical Center. (R. 225 [SSA Ex. 1F]).
Thomas Vanderheyden, M.D., diagnosed Moore with sciatica and found no
acute abnormality of Moore’s lumbar spine. (R. 225 [SSA Ex. 1F]).
Moore presented himself for a physical examination at Ronderos
Neurosurgery Center on December 12, 2012, where he complained to Juan F.
“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support a medical
opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will
give that medical opinion. The better an explanation a source provides for a medical
opinion, the more weight we will give that medical opinion.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(3).

7

15

Ronderos, M.D., of lower back pain that radiated to Moore’s right buttock;
posterior aspect of his right hip, thigh, knee, and calf; and entire right, lower
extremity. (R. 244 [SSA Ex. 3F]). An MRI was performed on Moore that
revealed lumbar intervertebral disc myelopathy and lower back pain. (R. 246
[SSA Ex. 3F]). On December 13, 2012, Dr. Ronderos performed a right L5-S1
laminotomy with a medial facetectomy and foraminotomy with microlumbar
disketomy on Moore. (R. 241 [SSA Ex. 2F]). Moore’s preoperative diagnosis
was a herniated nucleus pulposus located at right L5-S1. (R. 241 [SSA Ex.
2F]). Follow up visits to Dr. Ronderos by Moore show Moore had improved
drainage of his operation incision, (compare R. 251 [SSA Ex. 3F] with R. 254
[SSA Ex. 3F]), but complained of soreness, (R. 254 [SSA Ex. 3F]); however,
Moore’s gait and station improved to normal, his movement in and out of a
chair was smooth and well coordinated, and he had no difficulty changing
positions on the examination table, (R. 256 [SSA Ex. 3F]). This is in contrast
to a post-operation follow-up visit to Atmore Community Hospital Family
Physicians on January 17, 2013, at which Moore reported lower back pain
and a pain severity of nine out of a possible ten. (R. 265 [SSA Ex. 5F]).
Moore reported the same information to Atmore Community Hospital Family
Physicians on February 18, 2013 at From a March 6, 2013, examination visit
with Dr. Ronderos, it was noted Moore continued to complain about lower
back pack and was unable to perform physical therapy due to financial
issues, but Dr. Ronderos noted a normal gait and station. (R. 291 & 293 [SSA

16

Ex. 7F]).

Moore’s symptoms continued through his March 27, 2013,

examination visit with Dr. Ronderos, at which an MRI was performed. (R.
288 & 290 [SSA Ex. 7F]). Moore’s MRI showed his postoperative changes, no
evidence of disc abnormality, and a left lateral disc extrusion at the L3-L4
level displacing the L3 nerve root posteriorly and laterally. (R. 287 [SSA Ex.
7F]). Dr. Ronderos’s assessment of Moore’s MRI results on April 8, 2013, was
lumbar intervertebral disc without myelopathy, lower back pain, and thoracic
or lumbosacral neuritis or radiculitis.

(R. 283 [SSA Ex. 7F]).

An

electromyography (“EMG”) was performed on Moore by Theodore Kopp, M.D.,
M.S., on April 8, 2013, and Dr. Kopp noted Moore’s results were within
normal limits, and Moore exaggerated generalized lower body reactions in
anticipation of, and in reaction to, nerve conduction studies. (R. 277 [SSA Ex.
7F]).
After Moore’s operation, he visited the Atmore Community Hospital
Family Physicians from April to October 2013. (R. 295-301 [SSA Ex. 8F]).
Records of his visits show his pain levels reduced, except during the morning
hours, Moore’s pain level was increased.

(See R. 295-301 [SSA Ex. 8F]).

Otherwise, no abnormalities were noted by the Atmore Community Hospital
Family Physicians. (See R. 295-301 [SSA Ex. 8F]).
On March 12, 2014, Eyston Hunte, M.D., performed a consultative
examination of Moore. (R. 334-37 [SSA Ex. 12F]). Dr. Hunte noted in regard
to Moore’s cervical spine no deformities, spasms, tenderness, or crepitus, and

17

Moore’s range of motion was normal. (R. 335 [SSA Ex. 12F]). Moore’s range
of motion for his upper and lower extremities was normal, (R. 335-36 [SSA
Ex. 12F]). Moore’s gait was normal, squat caused him to complain about pain
in his lower back, toe walk was normal, and heel walk was normal. (R. 336
[SSA Ex. 12F]). Moore’s dorsolumbar spine range of motion was somewhat
restricted. (R. 336 [SSA Ex. 12F]). Moore reported significant pain during a
straight leg raising test. (R. 336 [SSA Ex. 12F]). Dr. Hunte noted Moore was
able to dress and undress for the exam, get on and off the examination table,
ambulate, and perform daily activities of living at home, but Moore was
unable to drive. (R. 336 [SSA Ex. 12F]). Dr. Hunte diagnosed Moore with
chronic postoperative pain, postlaminectomy syndrome to his lumbar region,
and hypertension. (R. 336 [SSA Ex. 12F]).
Dr. Hunte, in a “Medical Source Statement of Ability to do WorkRelated Activities (Physical)” form, opined Moore could frequently8 lift and
carry up to ten (10) pounds, occasionally9 lift and carry eleven (11) to twenty
(20) pounds, and never lift and carry twenty-one (21) to fifty (50) pounds and
fifty-one (51) to one hundred (100) pounds. (R. 338 [SSA Ex. 12F]). Dr.

“Frequently” is defined in the “Medical Source Statement of Ability to do WorkRelated Activities (Physical)” form as “one-third to two-thirds of the time” and “time”
defined as “8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” (R.
338 [SSA Ex. 12F]).

8

“Occasionally” is defined in the “Medical Source Statement of Ability to do WorkRelated Activities (Physical)” form as “very little to one-third of the time” and “time”
defined as “8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” (R.
338 [SSA Ex. 12F]).

9

18

Hunte opined Moore could, at one time without interruption, sit and walk for
two (2) hours and stand for one (1) hour; in an eight (8) hours work day,
Moore could sit for four (4) hours, and stand and walk for two (2) hours;
Moore would need to lie down, due to back pain, two (2) to four (4) hours in an
eight (8) hours work day10; required the use of a cane to ambulate, which was
medically necessary, but could ambulate one hundred (100) yards without the
use of a cane and could use his free hand to carry small objects. (R. 339 [SSA
Ex. 12F]).

Further, Dr. Hunte opined Moore could frequently reach

(overhead), reach (all other), handle, finger, and feel with his right and left
hands; occasionally push/pull with his right and left hands; never operate foot
controls with his left and right feet; occasionally climb stairs and ramps,
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, and never climb ladders or scaffolds.
(R. 340-41 [SSA Ex. 12F]). Dr. Hunte opined Moore could never tolerate
unprotected heights and vibrations, and occasionally tolerate moving
mechanical parts, operating a motor vehicle, humidity and wetness, extreme
cold and heat, and dust, odors, fumes, and pulmonary irritants. (R. 342 [SSA
Ex. 12F]).

Finally, Dr. Hunte opined Moore could perform activities like

shopping; travel without a companion for assistance; ambulate without using
However, the “Medical Source Statement of Ability to do Work-Related Activities
(Physical)” form prompt for Dr. Hunte’s opinion that Moore needs to lie down for two
(2) to four (4) hours reads: “If the total time for sitting, standing and walking does
not equal or exceed 8 hours, what activity is the individual performing for the rest of
the 8 hours?” (R. 339 [SSA Ex. 12F]). The total time for sitting (4), standing (2), and
walking (2) Dr. Hunte indicated Moore could perform in an eight (8) hour work day
equals eight (8), so Dr. Hunte’s note that Moore would need to lie down for two (2) to
four (4) in an eight (8) hours work day is inexplicable.

10

19

a wheelchair, walker, or two (2) canes or two (2) crutches; walk a block at a
reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces; use standard public
transportation; climb a few steps at a reasonable pace with the use of a single
hand rail; prepare a simple meal and feed himself; care for his personal
hygiene; and sort, handle, or use paper/files; but stated Moore should not
participate in manual labor, bending, lifting or carrying. (R. 343 [SSA Ex.
12F]).
Office visit records for Moore from the Atmore Family Physicians for
visits that occurred on March 18, 2014, and April 24, 2014, show Moore was
diagnosed with lower back pain, hypertension, and carpal tunnel syndrome in
his wrists. (R. 349-50 [SSA Ex. 15F]).
At the oral hearing held on June 24, 2014, Moore testified he is able to
shop in stores, (R. 52); is able to walk for between ten (10) and twenty (20)
minutes, (R. 52); stand for thirty (30) minutes, (R. 53); sit for between one (1)
and two (2) hours, (R. 53); prepare simple meals, (R. 65); and perform
household tasks for between ten (10) and thirty (30) minutes at a time, (R.
66). Moore testified he does not feel pain from his ailments when he takes
his medication, which causes drowsiness. (R. 52, 62-63, & R. 176 [SSA Ex.
2E]).
In sum, the medical evidence of record, Moore’s reported capabilities,
and the functional capacities determined by Dr. Hunte, do not support the
opinion of Dr. McIntyre, which was stated in a form dated November 7, 2013,

20

(R. 308 [SSA Ex. 9F]), that Moore is not able to engage in any form of gainful
employment without missing more than two (2) days of work per month or
experiencing frequent interruptions to his work routine due to symptoms of
his medical problems. Dr. Hankins’s opinion, which was stated in a form
titled “Medical Examiner’s Certificate” dated May 20, 2013, (R. 348 [SSA Ex.
14F]), that Moore is unable to perform the functions of his job at Reynolds
Ready Mix is not, necessarily, contradicted by the evidence of record but does
not foreclose Moore’s ability to perform the functions of other jobs in the
economy.
As to Moore’s argument the ALJ adopted her own medical opinion
when she failed to assign controlling weight to the opinions of Moore’s
treating physicians, the Court rejects this assertion.

While the Social

Security regulations require ALJs to consider all medical opinions in the
record when making a disability determination, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(b)
& 416.927(b), “[n]othing in the regulations requires the ALJ to accept at least
one medical opinion before rendering a decision—indeed, an ALJ may make a
disability determination without any medical opinion in the record.” Hale v.
Colvin, Civil Action No. 14-00222-CG-N, 2015 WL 3397939, at *11 (S.D. Ala.
Apr. 24, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 3397628 (S.D.
Ala. May 26, 2015); see also Packer v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 11-0084-CG-N,
2013 WL 593497, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2013) (“[T]he ALJ is not precluded
from making a proper RFC determination in the absence of an opinion from

21

an acceptable medical source.” (quotation omitted)), aff'd, Packer v. Comm'r,
Soc. Sec. Admin., 542 F. App’x 890 (11th Cir. Oct. 29, 2013) (per curiam);
Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1288 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[T]here is no
requirement in the regulations for a direct correspondence between an RFC
finding and a specific medical opinion on the functional capacity in question.
The ALJ, not a physician, is charged with determining a claimant's RFC from
the medical record.” (quotation omitted)); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2) &
416.927(a)(2) (“Evidence that you submit or that we obtain may contain
medical opinions.” (emphasis added)); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546 & 416.946 (“If
your case is at the [ALJ] hearing level . . . , the [ALJ] . . . is responsible for
assessing your residual functional capacity.”). The ALJ properly assigned
little and no weight to Dr. McIntyre’s and Dr. Hankins’s opinions,
respectively, see supra, and as the Court will discuss, infra, the ALJ properly
assigned no weight to the opinion of the state agency consultant, Dr. Hunte.11
Accordingly, the ALJ was not required to “fully reflect” those opinions in the
RFC.
“A clear articulation of both fact and law is essential to our ability to
conduct a review that is both limited and meaningful.” Owens v. Heckler, 748
F.2d 1511, 1514-15 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).

See also Freeman v.

Barnhart, 220 F. App'x 957, 959-60 (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2007) (per curiam)

Moreover, the opinion of a non-examining physician “is entitled to little weight
and taken alone does not constitute substantial evidence to support an
administrative decision.” E.g., Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 n.3 (11th Cir.
1990) (per curiam).

11

22

(“The ALJ has a duty to make clear the weight accorded to each item of
evidence and the reasons for the decision so that a reviewing court will be
able to determine whether the ultimate decision is based on substantial
evidence.” (citing Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981))).
Nevertheless, “there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to
every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ’s decision . . . is not
a broad rejection which is not enough to enable the district court . . . to
conclude that [the ALJ] considered her medical condition as a whole.” Dyer v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In formulating the RFC at Step Four, the ALJ
thoroughly discussed and weighed the evidence of record and drew
conclusions from that evidence. Apart from the weight the ALJ assigned the
three above-mentioned medical opinions, Moore points to no evidence the
ALJ allegedly incorrectly or insufficiently assessed. Rather, Moore appears
to assert only that the ALJ failed to adequately show her work in applying
Social Security Ruling 96-8p. However, both this Circuit and others have
repeatedly rejected similar contentions that an ALJ’s failure to expressly
show his or her work under SSR 96-8p is automatic grounds for reversal. See
Freeman, 220 F. App'x at 959-60 (“Freeman contends that the ALJ failed to
identify her functional limitations and work-related abilities on a functionby-function basis . . . . While the ALJ could have been more specific and
explicit in his findings, he did consider all of the evidence and found that it

23

did not support the level of disability Freeman claimed.

Only after he

determined that she failed to carry her burden of showing that she had
become disabled from performing any of her work-related activities did he
state that she could perform light exertional activity. Therefore, the ALJ
complied with SSR 96–8p by considering Freeman's functional limitations
and restrictions and, only after he found none, proceeding to express her
residual functional limitations in terms of exertional levels. Furthermore,
the ALJ’s analysis of the evidence and statement that Freeman could perform
light work indicated how much work-related activity she could perform
because ‘light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of
approximately 6 hours of an 8–hour workday.’

SSR 83–10.”); Castel v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 355 F. App'x 260, 263 (11th Cir. Nov. 30, 2009) (“Castel
argues that the ALJ reached an RFC determination without going through a
function-by-function analysis. Specifically, Castel claims that the ALJ did not
perform the function-by-function analysis to determine Castel's ability to
handle strength demands. This argument is unfounded. The ALJ made a
determination of Castel's RFC at step four of the function-by-function
analysis. The ALJ considered two disability examiners' reports, Castel's
testimony, and two Disability Determination Services’ (‘DDS’) reports in
arriving at Castel's RFC.

See SSR 96–8p . . . (advising that the RFC

assessment must consider all relevant evidence, including medical history,
medical evaluations, daily activities, and lay evidence). The ALJ ultimately

24

decided that Castel was capable of medium exertion level work and thus was
capable of performing past relevant work . . . . We do not require the ALJ to
‘specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision,’ so long as the
decision is sufficient to allow us to conclude that the ALJ considered the
claimant's medical condition as a whole. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206,
1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). The ALJ found that the medium level
work determination was consistent with the medical evidence and found
Castel’s RFC to be at a medium level of work. The ALJ performed a proper
RFC function analysis, based on substantial evidence, and we shall defer to
his conclusions.”); Carson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 440 F. App'x 863, 864 (11th
Cir. Sept. 21, 2011) (per curiam) (“Following [SSR 96-8p’s ‘function-byfunction’] rubric, the ALJ fully discussed and evaluated the medical evidence,
Mr. Carson’s testimony, and the effect each impairment has on his daily
activities. While, the ALJ did not specifically refer to Mr. Carson’s ability to
walk or stand, the ALJ did limit Mr. Carson’s exertional level of work to ‘light
work.’ ‘Light work’ by definition limits the amount an individual can walk or
stand for approximately six hours in an eight-hour work day. See SSR 83–10,
1983 WL 31251 (S.S.A.). Furthermore, the ALJ’s thorough evaluation of Mr.
Carson’s case led the ALJ to adopt additional limitations to Mr. Carson's
ability to perform light work. Simply because the ALJ chose not to adopt
further limitations on Mr. Carson's ability to walk or stand, does not mean
the ALJ did not properly consider the alleged limitations.”); Cichocki v.

25

Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Where an ALJ’s analysis at Step
Four regarding a claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions affords an
adequate basis for meaningful judicial review, applies the proper legal
standards, and is supported by substantial evidence such that additional
analysis would be unnecessary or superfluous, we agree with our sister
Circuits that remand is not necessary merely because an explicit function-byfunction analysis was not performed.” (citing Zatz v. Astrue, 346 F. App’x
107, 111 (7th Cir. Oct. 5, 2009) (per curiam); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d
1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); Depover v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 563, 567–68 (8th
Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 30 F. App’x 542, 547 (6th Cir.
Mar. 4, 2002) (per curiam)); Chavez v. Astrue, 276 F. App'x 627, 627-28 (9th
Cir. May 1, 2008) (per curiam) (“Chavez claims that the ALJ committed legal
error by determining his mental residual functional capacity without
performing a function-by-function assessment as required by Social Security
Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *3 (July 2, 1996). This claim fails because
the ALJ considered and noted ‘all of the relevant evidence’ bearing on
Chavez's ‘ability to do work-related activities,’ as required by the function-byfunction analysis. See [SSR] 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *3.”); Hendron v.
Colvin, 767 F.3d 951, 956-57 (10th Cir. 2014) (rejecting claimant’s contention
that the ALJ’s “RFC is not in the proper form” because the ALJ did not
“separately discuss and make findings regarding her abilities to sit, stand,
walk, lift, carry, push, or pull” (citing Keyes–Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d

26

1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Where, as here, we can follow the adjudicator’s
reasoning in conducting our review, and can determine that correct legal
standards have been applied, merely technical omissions in the ALJ's
reasoning do not dictate reversal. In conducting our review, we should,
indeed must, exercise common sense . . . . [W]e cannot insist on technical
perfection.”))).
Therefore, the Court finds good cause for the ALJ’s decision to assign
minimal weight to the opinion of Moore’s treating physicians, Drs. Hankins
and McIntyre, set forth in a form titled “Medical Examiner’s Certificate”
dated May 20, 2013, (R. 348 [SSA Ex. 14F]), and a form dated November 7,
2013, (R. 308 [SSA Ex. 9F]), and the Court finds the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES
Moore’s assertions of error in Claim 1.
B.

Claim 2

Under Social Security Ruling 96-6p:
The opinions of State agency medical and psychological
consultants and other program physicians and psychologists can
be given weight only insofar as they are supported by evidence
in the case record, considering such factors as the supportability
of the opinion in the evidence including any evidence received at
the Administrative Law Judge and Appeals Council levels that
was not before the State agency, the consistency of the opinion
with the record as a whole, including other medical opinions,
and any explanation for the opinion provided by the State
agency medical or psychological consultant or other program
physician or psychologist.

27

SSR 96-6p rescinded and replaced by SSR 17-2p.12 However, only a treating
physician’s opinion may be given controlling weight.

See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(c)(2) (“If we find that a treating source’s medical opinion on the
issue(s) of the nature and severity of your impairment(s) is well-supported, . .
. we will give it controlling weight.”); see also id. (“Generally, we give more
weight to opinions from your treating sources, since these sources are likely
to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal
picture of your medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to
the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical
findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as
consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.”).

Additionally, if a

treating source’s opinion is not given controlling weight:
[T]he [ALJ] must explain in the decision the weight given to the
opinions of a State agency medical or psychological consultant or
other program physician or psychologist, as the [ALJ] must do
for any opinions from treating sources, nontreating sources, and
other nonexamining sources who do not work for [the SSA].
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(f)(2)(ii).
On March 12, 2014, Dr. Hunte performed a consultative examination
of Moore. (R. 333-43 [SSA Ex. 12F]). The ALJ found persuasive Dr. Hunte’s
opinion that Moore can perform a reduced range of light work, which is found
in a “Medical Source Statement of Ability to do Work-Related Activities
(Physical)” form. (R. 27). The ALJ stated the limitations Dr. Hunte indicated

12

Social Security Ruling 17-2p became effective on March 27, 2017.

28

of Moore were consistent with much of the evidence of record, but Dr. Hunte’s
opinion that Moore would need to lie down for two (2) to (4) hours per day due
to back pain was not consistent with his examination findings or the evidence
of record. (R. 27-28). Therefore, the ALJ assigned no weight to Dr. Hunte’s
opinion. (R. 28).
The Court previously summarized Dr. Hunte’s findings in a “Medical
Source Statement of Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Physical)” form,
supra at 18-20, and noted Dr. Hunte’s opinion that Moore needs to lie down
for two (2) to four (4) hours during an eight (8) hour work day, supra note 10,
at 19, was an inappropriate response to the prompted question since Dr.
Hunte indicated Moore could sit, stand, and walk for a total of eight (8) hours
during an eight (8) hour work day, (R. 339 [SSA Ex. 12F]).

There is no

additional medical evidence in the record that Moore needs to lie down
throughout the day. (See Doc. 12). Dr. Hunte, also, noted Moore could not
perform work-related manual labor that included bending, lifting, and
carrying, but Dr. Hunte’s note contradicts the functional limitations and
postural activities that Dr. Hunte indicated Moore could perform. (Compare
R. 338 & 341 [SSA Ex. 12F] with R. 343 [SSA Ex. 12F]).
Therefore, the Court finds good cause for the ALJ’s decision to assign
no weight to the opinion of Moore’s consulting, examining physician, Dr.
Hunte, and the Court finds the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Moore’s assertion of error in

29

Claim 2.
V.

Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the
Commissioner’s final decision issued April 28, 2016, denying Moore’s
applications for PoD and DIB is AFFIRMED under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and
1383(c)(3).
Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order
and Rule 58, FED. R. CIV. P.
DONE and ORDERED this the 15th day of August 2017.
s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

30