York v. Colvin

Filing 22

Order re: 1 Complaint filed by Sherone Dennise York stating that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiffs claim for aperiod of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income be AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 5/9/2017. Copies to parties. (mpp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SHERONE DENNISE YORK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY BERRYHILL,1
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

*
*
*
*
* CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-000312-B
*
*
*
*
*
*
ORDER

Plaintiff Sherone Dennise York (hereinafter “Plaintiff”),
seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security denying her claim for a period of disability,
disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income
under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
401, et seq., and 1381, et seq.
consented

to

have

the

proceedings in this case.

On May 2, 2017, the parties

undersigned
(Doc. 19).

conduct

any

and

all

Thus, the action was

referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order
the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
1

Nancy Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security on January 23, 2017.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy Berryhill should be substituted
for Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant in this suit. No further
action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last
sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73.

Upon careful consideration

of the administrative record and the memoranda of the parties,
it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be
AFFIRMED.
I.

Procedural History2
Plaintiff protectively filed her application for benefits

on March 6, 2013, alleging disability beginning August 12, 2010,
based on an amputated left arm from a motor vehicle accident,
swelling in her leg, and headaches.

(Doc. 14-1 at 11, 15).

Plaintiff’s application was denied and upon timely request, she
was granted an administrative hearing before Administrative Law
Judge Walter Lassiter, Jr. (hereinafter “ALJ”) on July 11, 2014.
(Doc. 13-2 at 48).

Plaintiff attended the hearing with her

counsel and provided testimony related to her claims.
2 at 50).

(Doc. 13-

A vocational expert (“VE”) also appeared at the

hearing and provided testimony.

(Doc. 13-2 at 72).

On November

24, 2014, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that
Plaintiff is not disabled.

(Doc. 13-2 at 25).

The Appeals

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on April 20, 2016.
(Doc. 13-2 at 4).

Therefore, the ALJ’s decision dated November

2

The Court’s citations to the transcript in this order refer to
the pagination assigned in CM/ECF, not the page numbers assigned
by the Agency. Because the transcript was divided into separate
documents, the Court’s citations include the appropriate CM/ECF
document number.

2

24, 2014, became the final decision of the Commissioner.
Having

exhausted

her

administrative

timely filed the present civil action.

remedies,

(Doc. 1).

Plaintiff

The parties

waived oral argument on May 2, 2017 (Doc. 18) and agree that
this case is now ripe for judicial review and is properly before
this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
II.

Issue on Appeal
1.

Whether the ALJ erred in finding that
Plaintiff does not meet the criteria for
Listing 12.05C?

III. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born on July 30, 1974 and was thirty-nine
years of age at the time of her administrative hearing on July
11,

2014.

(Doc.

14-1

at

11;

Doc.

13-2

at

48).

Plaintiff

graduated from high school and completed one and a half years of
college studies.

(Doc. 14-2 at 149).

Plaintiff worked from 1997 to 2007 as a stocker at Walmart
until she lost her arm in a motor vehicle accident.
at 149; Doc. 14 at 20; Doc. 14-1 at 3).

(Doc. 14-2

At the administrative

hearing, Plaintiff testified that she cannot work due to phantom
pain in her arm, inability to lift,

problems with balancing

while standing, and swollen knees from obesity.

(Doc. 13-2 at

59, 62-63, 65, 68-69).
IV. Standard of Review
In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s

3

role

is

a

limited

determining

1)

one.

whether

The
the

Court’s
decision

review
of

the

is

limited

to

Secretary

is

supported by substantial evidence and 2) whether the correct
legal standards were applied.
1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).

3

Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d

A court may not decide the facts

anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that
of the Commissioner.
Cir.

1986).

The

Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th
Commissioner’s

findings

of

fact

affirmed if they are based upon substantial evidence.

must

be

Brown v.

Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth v.
Heckler,

703

F.2d

1233,

1239

(11th

Cir.

1983)

(holding

substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla, but
less

than

a

preponderance”

and

evidence as a reasonable person
support

a

conclusion.”).

In

consists

of

“such

relevant

would accept as adequate to

determining

whether

substantial

evidence exists, a court must view the record as a whole, taking
into account evidence favorable, as well as unfavorable, to the
Commissioner’s decision.

Chester v. Bowen, 792 F. 2d 129, 131

(11th Cir. 1986); Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163, *4
(S.D. Ala. June 14, 1999).

3

This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal
principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th
Cir. 1987).

4

V.

Statutory And Regulatory Framework
An individual who applies for Social Security disability

benefits

must

prove

404.1512, 416.912.

his

or

her

disability.

20

C.F.R.

§§

Disability is defined as the “inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.”

42

U.S.C.

§§

404.1505(a),

416.905(a).

provide

five-step

423(d)(1)(A);

a

The

see

Social

sequential

also

20

Security

evaluation

C.F.R.

§§

regulations
process

determining if a claimant has proven his disability.

for

20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520, 416.920.
The
engaged

claimant
in

must

first

substantial

prove

gainful

that

activity.

he

or
The

she

has

second

not
step

requires the claimant to prove that he or she has a severe
impairment or combination of impairments.

If, at the third

step, the claimant proves that the impairment or combination of
impairments
claimant

is

meets

or

equals

automatically

a

found

education, or work experience.

listed

impairment,

disabled

regardless

then

the

of

age,

If the claimant cannot prevail

at the third step, he or she must proceed to the fourth step
where the claimant must prove an inability to perform their past
relevant work.

Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir.

5

1986).
the

In evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden,

examiner

must

consider

the

following

four

factors:

(1)

objective medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of
examining

physicians;

claimant’s

age,

(3)

education

evidence
and

work

of

pain;

history.

and
Id.

(4)

the

Once

a

claimant meets this burden, it becomes the Commissioner’s burden
to prove at the fifth step that the claimant is capable of
engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment which
exists in significant numbers in the national economy, given the
claimant’s

residual

work history.
1985).

functional

capacity,

age,

education,

and

Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir.

If the Commissioner can demonstrate that there are such

jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant must prove inability
to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled.
Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th

Cir. 1999).

Jones v.

See also Hale v.

Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v.
Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).
VI.

Discussion
A.

The ALJ did not err in finding that
Plaintiff does not meet the criteria for
Listing 12.05C.

As noted, supra, Plaintiff raises only one issue on appeal,
that is, whether the ALJ erred in finding that she does not meet

6

the criteria for Listing 12.05. 4

(Doc. 15 at 3).

According to

Plaintiff, her Full Scale IQ score of 67, combined with the
diagnosis

of

psychologist,
cognitive

mild
Dr.

criteria

(Doc. 15 at 8).

mental

Richard
of

retardation
Reynolds,

Listing

12.05C

by

Ph.D.,
(mental

consultative
satisfies

the

retardation).

Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred in

finding that her IQ score was invalid.

(Id. at 9-10).

Having

carefully reviewed the record in this case, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s claim is without merit.
In

order

for

Plaintiff

to

meet

Listing

12.05C

(mental

retardation), she must present evidence of “[a] valid verbal,
performance or full scale IQ of 60-70 and a physical or other
mental impairment imposing an additional and significant workrelated limitation of function.”5

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,

4

The Court notes at the outset that Plaintiff does not take
issue with the ALJ’s findings related to
her physical
impairments.
Rather, Plaintiff argues only that the ALJ erred
in finding that she does not meet cognitive criteria for Listing
12.05C.
Therefore, the Court’s discussion of the medical
evidence is limited to this issue.

5

For purposes of Listing 12.05C, the second prong requirement is
met once there is a finding that the claimant has an additional
severe impairment because the requirement of “significant workrelated limitation of function” “involves something more than
‘minimal’ but less than ‘severe.’” Johnson v. Colvin, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13497, *7, 2014 WL 413492, *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 3,
2014) (quoting Edwards by Edwards v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 1513,
1515 (11th Cir. 1985)). In this case, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s
obesity and status post left arm amputation with subsequent
treatment for phantom pain to be severe, and the parties do not
dispute that finding. (Doc. 13-2 at 27). Therefore, the second
7

Appendix

1

§

12.05(C).

In

addition,

she

must

satisfy

the

“diagnostic description” of mental retardation in Listing 12.05
(the

listing

category

for

mental

retardation/intellectual

disability), 6 which provides that mental retardation “refers to
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with
deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the
developmental

period;

i.e.,

the

evidence

demonstrates

supports onset of the impairment before age 22.”
404,

Subpart

P,

Appendix

1,

§§

12.05;

see

or

20 C.F.R. Part

also

Perkins

v.

Commissioner, Soc. Sec. Admin., 553 Fed. Appx. 870, 873 (11th
Cir.

2014)

claimant
including

(Listing

meets

the

deficits

12.05(C)

“requires

diagnostic
in

adaptive

criteria

a

showing
of

functioning;

that

Listing
a

the

12.05,

qualifying

IQ

score; onset before age 22; and the requisite deficits in workprong of Listing 12.05C, requiring a physical or other mental
impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related
limitation of function, is not at issue in this case.
6

On August 1, 2013, the Social Security Administration amended
Listing 12.05 by replacing the words “mental retardation” with
“intellectual disability.”
See Hickel v. Commissioner of Soc.
Sec., 539 Fed. Appx. 980, 982 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing 78
Fed. Reg. 46,499, 46,501, to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1)).
“This change was made because the term
‘mental retardation’ has negative connotations, and has become
offensive to many people.
Id.
(citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). “The Social Security Administration
stated that the change does not affect the actual medical
definition of the disorder or available programs or services.”
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As in
Hickel, this opinion uses the term “mental retardation” and
“intellectual disability” interchangeably.

8

related functioning.”).
The law in this Circuit provides that a valid IQ score of
60-70

creates

a

rebuttable

presumption

that

the

claimant

manifested deficits in adaptive functioning prior to the age of
twenty-two.

See Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F. 3d 1265, 1268-69

(llth Cir. 2001).

Thus, “a claimant meets the criteria for

presumptive disability under section 12.05C when the claimant
presents a valid I.Q. score of 60 to 70 inclusive, and evidence
of an additional mental or physical impairment that has more
than a ‘minimal effect’ on the claimant’s ability to perform
basic work activities.”

Smith v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 535

Fed. Appx. 894, 897 (llth Cir. 2013)(quoting Lowery v. Sullivan,
979 F. 2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992)).
The presumption under 12.05C can be rebutted, however, when
the

IQ

score

is

inconsistent

with

record

evidence

claimant’s work history, daily activities, and behavior. 7

7

of

a
See

Though not at issue in this case, the Court notes that, in
addressing the “adaptive functioning” aspect of Listing 12.05C,
the Eleventh Circuit has sustained the rejection of claims under
this Listing where the claimant’s IQ score was significantly
inconsistent with his/her adaptive functioning, despite a
qualifying IQ score.
For example, in Perkins v. Commissioner,
Soc. Sec. Admin., 553 Fed. Appx. 870 (llth Cir. 2014), the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the ALJ’s finding that Listing 12.05C
was not met where the plaintiff performed skilled jobs,
including as a skilled cook, managed other workers, and made
contradictory claims regarding his education and employment
history.
Also, in Hickel v. Commissioner, 539 Fed. Appx. 980,
984 (llth Cir. 2013), the Eleventh Circuit held that the ALJ did
not err where he acknowledged that the claimant had a valid IQ
9

Popp v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1497, 1499-1500 (llth Cir. 1986).
Indeed, neither a diagnosis of mental retardation nor a valid IQ
score between 60 and 70, applied the presumption established by
Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F. 3d 1265, 1268-69 (llth Cir. 2001),
and found that the presumption was rebutted by other evidence
that showed that the claimant did not have “deficits in adaptive
functioning.” In reaching that decision, the court noted that,
although the claimant had been enrolled in special education
classes, she worked part-time in a nursery, was a high school
graduate, prepared simple meals, dressed herself, drove herself
to work, attended church regularly, and socialized with friends.
Id. at 984-985. See also Popp, 779 F.2d at 1499-1500 (affirming
finding that Listing 12.05C was not met where the plaintiff had
worked skilled jobs, obtained a college degree, and had
exaggerated his deficits when examined); White v. Colvin, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28277, 2015 WL 1013117, *4 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 9,
2015) (The ALJ properly found that, despite a Full Scale IQ
score of 63, the plaintiff did not have significant limitations
in adaptive functioning where the record reflected that,
although the plaintiff had been in special education classes, he
lived alone, maintained his financial affairs, and consistently
worked at several different jobs); Robinson v. Colvin, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43338, 2015 WL 1520431, *11 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 2, 2015)
(where the plaintiff lived independently without a highly
supportive living arrangement, cared for her personal needs, and
had a significant work history, the ALJ properly found that her
Full Scale IQ score of 60 was inconsistent with the record
evidence regarding her daily activities); Johnson, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13497, 2014 WL 413492, at *4 (although the ALJ never
stated that the claimant failed to meet Listing 12.05C, the
ALJ’s finding that, despite a Full Scale IQ score of 62, the
claimant had high adaptive skills, i.e., he had the capacity to
take care of his own needs, perform activities of daily living,
and had successfully performed four different jobs since leaving
high school, was sufficient to support his decision that the
claimant was not mentally retarded); Lyons v. Astrue, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 128950 (M.D. Fla. May 24, 2009), adopted by 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48535, 2009 WL 1657388 (M.D. Fla. June 10,
2009)(The ALJ’s finding that the claimant did not meet Listing
12.05C was supported by substantial evidence that demonstrated
that the claimant had a high school diploma, was not in special
education classes, completed his own social security forms, and
had earnings from 1983 – 1990 between $13,696 and $18,408 per
year).

10

score is conclusive of mental retardation where the diagnosis
and

IQ

score

are

inconsistent

with

other

record

evidence

regarding the claimant’s daily living activities and behavior.
See

Robinson,

2015

U.S.

Dist.

LEXIS

43338

at

*32,

1520431 at *11; Perkins, 553 Fed. Appx. at 873-74.

2015

WL

Accordingly,

the ALJ is tasked with determining whether there is sufficient
evidence

(relating

presumption.

to

plaintiff’s

daily

life)

to

rebut

the

See Grant v. Astrue, 255 Fed. Appx. 374, 375 (llth

Cir. 2007); Hartman v. Colvin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91467, *7,
2014 WL 3058550, *3 (S.D. Ala. July 7, 2014).
The

pivotal

issue

in

this

case

is

whether

substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s Full Scale
IQ score was invalid and, thus, that Plaintiff did not meet the
criteria of Listing 12.05C.

“[T]he ALJ is allowed some leeway

to evaluate other evidence [other then I.Q. test score] when
determining the validity of an I.Q. score. . . .”

Henry v.

Barnhart, 156 Fed. Appx. 171, 173 (11th Cir. 2005)

(quoting

Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992)).

“An

ALJ

are

should

examine

whether

the

results

of

an

I.Q.

test

consistent with the other medical evidence and the claimant’s
daily activities and behavior.”

Id. (citing Popp, 779 F.2d at

1499–1500).
In determining whether the ALJ in this case properly found
Plaintiff’s Full Scale IQ score of 67 to be invalid, the Court

11

is guided by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Popp, 779 F.2d
at 1500, in which the court held that the ALJ was not required
to find that the claimant met the criteria of Listing 12.05C
based on the results of his IQ test, but, rather, the ALJ was
“required

to

examine

the

[test]

results

in

conjunction

with

other medical evidence and the claimant’s daily activities and
behavior.”

Id.

The court concluded that, because the results

of the IQ test were inconsistent with other evidence in the
record, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that
the IQ results were “incredible” and, thus, did not meet the
Listing.

Id.

As stated, the ALJ here found that Plaintiff’s Full Scale
IQ score of 67 was invalid and that the diagnosis of mild mental
retardation by consultative psychologist, Dr. Reynolds, which
was based on Plaintiff’s IQ score of 67, was inconsistent with
Dr. Reynolds’ own findings and opinions, as well as with the
totality

of

the

other

medical

evidence

activities of daily living and behavior. 8

and

(Doc. 13-2 at 29).

In reaching that decision, the ALJ pointed to
8

Plaintiff’s

the following

Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s finding that her
alleged impairment of mild mental retardation was “not medically
determinable.” (Doc. 13-2 at 29-30, 40). Because the Court has
found, for the reasons stated herein, that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s Full Scale IQ score
was invalid and that Dr. Reynolds’ diagnosis of mild mental
retardation was inconsistent with the totality of the evidence,
Plaintiff’s argument in this regard is without merit.

12

evidence:

Consultative

psychologist,

Dr.

Richard

Reynolds,

Ph.D., evaluated Plaintiff on February 16, 2010, and documented
that

she

graduated

from

high

school

in

regular

classes

(repeating the fifth grade), that she attended college for a
year and a half taking general studies, that she read books in
her spare time, that she managed her own finances, and that she
had a drivers license and drove.
148).

(Doc. 13-2 at 29; 14-2 at

Dr. Reynolds’ report shows that Plaintiff was seeking

disability

based

on

severe

pain

in

her

amputated

problems standing for long periods of time
clots in her legs.

(Doc. 14-2 at 149).

Dr. Reynolds that she had

arm

and

because of blood

Plaintiff reported to

problems with sadness, worry, and

trouble finishing what she started but denied any psychiatric
treatment.

(Doc. 14-2 at 149).

Plaintiff reported that she was

living in an apartment with her four children, ages ten, three,
two, and one and that she shared in the housework, cooking, and
grocery
assisted.

shopping
(Doc.

with

other

14-2

at

relatives

149).

friends and going to church.

who

Plaintiff

came

over

reported

(Doc. 14-2 at 149).

and

having

Plaintiff

reported working for Walmart from 1998 to 2007 as a stocker
until she lost her arm in a motor vehicle accident. (Doc. 14-2
at 149).
she

was

Plaintiff’s mental status examination revealed that
alert

and

oriented,

cooperative,

had

normal

speech,

logical thought content, normal thought associations and mood,

13

normal recent and remote memory, and normal judgment, insight,
and

decision

making

abilities.

(Doc.

14-2

at

149).

In

addition, Plaintiff was able to calculate three out of three
single-digit multiplication problems and two out of two simple
word problems.

(Doc. 14-2 at 149).

She correctly identified

the current and past presidents and was able to give birth dates
of significant people in her life and relevant dates of past
employment.

(Doc. 14-2 at 149).

Dr. Reynolds concluded: “In

this evaluator’s opinion the claimant’s ability to understand,
carry

out,

to

remember

instructions,

and

to

respond

appropriately to supervision, co workers, work pressures in a
work

setting

mild.”

may

be

somewhat

impaired

by

Major

(Doc. 14-2 at 150) (emphasis added).

Depression,
Dr. Reynolds

assessed no other limitations or impairments and stated that
Plaintiff

would

not

(Doc. 14-2 at 150).

need

assistance

date,

Dr.

any

awarded

funds.

Dr. Reynolds did not at any time suggest

the possibility of mental retardation.
that

with

Reynolds

also

Statement (Mental) in which he

(Doc. 14-2 at 149).

completed

a

Medical

On

Source

opined that Plaintiff had no

limitations in her ability to understand, remember, and carry
out simple instructions or to make judgments on simple workrelated

decisions

and

had

only

complex decisions and instructions.

mild

limitations

related

to

(Doc. 14-2 at 151-52).

Three years later, on September 9, 2013, Plaintiff returned

14

to Dr. Reynolds for a Vocational Rehabilitation Psychological
Evaluation.
denied

(Doc. 14-2 at 210).

any

psychiatric

At that time, Plaintiff again

treatment

and

described

living

independently with her children, while needing some help with
bathing and dressing.

(Doc. 14-2 at 210-11).

Plaintiff’s

mental status examination again revealed that she was alert,
cooperative, and oriented, that she had normal speech, normal
thought associations, logical thought content, good recent and
remote

memory,

decision

making

occasion,
test,

normal

and

indicating

Dr.

abilities.

Reynolds

Plaintiff
mild

judgment,

(Doc.

14-2

administered

received

mental

normal

a

the

Full

insight,
at

211).

WAIS-IV

normal
On

that

Intelligence

Scale

IQ

(Doc.

retardation.

and

score

14-2

at

of

67,

211-12).

Plaintiff also took the WRAT-III and scored at the seventh grade
level in reading and at the sixth grade level in spelling and
math.

(Doc.

14-2

at

212-13).

Dr.

Reynolds

observed

that

Plaintiff had exhibited appropriate effort and motivation during
testing, and, thus, he considered the results to be a valid
estimate of her intellectual functioning and academic abilities.
(Doc.

14-2

at

213).

Dr.

Reynolds

diagnosed

Plaintiff

with

adjustment disorder with disturbance of mood and mild mental
retardation.

(Doc. 14-2 at 210).

Despite his diagnosis of mild

mental retardation, Dr. Reynolds nonetheless recommended that
Plaintiff complete a job survey inventory to help her decide

15

what

occupations

she

may

be

interested

in

and

capable

of

performing and documented that Plaintiff stated that she was
capable of doing housework and answering the telephone and would
be interested in doing that type of work.
In

his

decision,

the

ALJ

(Doc. 14-2 at 213).

discussed

the

obvious

contradictions in Dr. Reynolds’ two assessments

9

Plaintiff’s

inconsistencies

between

IQ

the

scores

scores

and

as

invalid

the

given

evidence

the

related

to

and rejected

Plaintiff’s

cognitive abilities, her activities of daily living, and her
behavior.

Specifically, the ALJ noted the inconsistency between

Plaintiff’s Full Scale IQ score of 67 (indicating mild mental
retardation) and Dr. Reynolds’ first report in which he clearly
opined that Plaintiff could work and had no limitations related
to simple instructions and work-related decisions and only mild
limitations

related

to

complex

9

instructions

and

work-related

The record shows that the ALJ assigned great weight to Dr.
Reynolds’ opinion in his first assessment that Plaintiff had
essentially average intelligence and little weight to Dr.
Reynolds’ opinion in his second assessment that Plaintiff’s Full
Scale IQ score of 67 was valid and that she was mildly mentally
retarded.
(Doc. 13-2 at 40).
Based on the evidence detailed
herein, the ALJ had good cause to reject Dr. Reynolds’ opinions
in the second assessment as they were inconsistent with his own
examination findings as well as with Plaintiff’s activities of
daily living and her behavior.
See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357
F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004)(whether considering the
opinions of treating, examining, or non-examining physicians,
good cause exists to discredit the testimony of any medical
source when it is contrary to or unsupported by the evidence of
record).

16

decisions.

(Doc.

13-2

at

30;

Doc.

14-2

at

151-52).

In

addition, Dr. Reynolds’ examination findings in both the first
and second assessments were essentially “normal.”

(Doc. 14-2 at

149, 211; Doc. 13-2 at 29-30).

Notably, despite Plaintiff’s

Full

the

Scale

Reynolds’

IQ

score

still

of

67

recommended

in
that

she

second

assessment,

complete

a

job

Dr.

survey

inventory to assess her employment interests, and noted that she
was capable of, and interested in, performing housekeeping and
telephone work. (Doc. 14-2 at 213).
The ALJ also pointed to the inconsistency between the Full
Scale

IQ

score

of

67

and

the

evidence

that

Plaintiff

had

graduated from high school in regular (not special education)
classes, had completed a year and a half of college, and had
worked for ten years in semi-skilled work.
40,

72;

Doc.

14-1

at

3;

Doc.

14-2

at

(Doc. 13-2 at 30,

149).

The

ALJ

also

discussed Plaintiff’s activities of daily living which included
independent
house

living,

cleaning,

caring

laundry,

for

four

shopping,

finances, and attending church.

young
driving,

children,
handling

(Doc. 13-2 at 32).

cooking,
her

own

Plaintiff

also reported getting along with others and following written
and spoken instructions okay.
The

Court

has

(Doc. 13-2 at 32).

considered

Plaintiff’s

evidence

that

she

repeated the fifth grade and that she scored at the seventh
grade level in reading and at the sixth grade level in spelling

17

and math.

(Doc. 14-2 at 212-13).

evidence,

the

Plaintiff’s

substantial

daily

However, notwithstanding this

medical

activities

and

evidence
behavior

and
in

evidence

this

inconsistent with a finding of mental retardation.

case

of
is

Therefore,

the ALJ properly found Plaintiff’s Full Scale IQ score of 67 to
be invalid.

Cf., Reid v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 2012 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 187808, *18, 2012 WL 7682813, *6 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 14,
2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 960814 (S.D.
Ga. Mar. 12, 2013) (the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s IQ score
was invalid was supported by substantial evidence that Plaintiff
lived independently while raising three children and a six–year–
old

granddaughter;

graduated

high

school

without

any

special

services; worked for over ten years as a longshoreman; and had
the ability to drive and make financial decisions); Anderson v.
Astrue, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124827, *14-18, 2012 WL 3834838,
*4-6 (D.S.D. Sept. 4, 2012) (the ALJ’s decision to discredit
Plaintiff’s IQ score was supported by substantial evidence that
the psychologist who administered the IQ examination only met
with

claimant

claimant’s

on

affect

one

occasion;

and/or

there

motivation

was

evidence

difficulties

may

that
have

affected her performance on the examination; there were no other
medical records illustrating claimant’s cognitive difficulties;
claimant could read and understand short newspaper or magazine
articles, count out change; claimant was capable of cooking,

18

cleaning, and shopping; and while claimant only completed the
tenth grade in special education, the record suggested that she
discontinued school for personal reasons, not because of mental
difficulties).
In summary, the ALJ was not required to find that Plaintiff
was mentally retarded based on the results of her IQ test.
Popp, 779 F.2d at 1500.

See

Rather, the ALJ was required to examine

the results in conjunction with other medical evidence and the
claimant’s daily activities and behavior.

Id.

Based on the

evidence detailed above, there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the ALJ’s finding that the results of the IQ
test lacked validity.
Given the absence of a valid Full Scale IQ score of 60-70
in this case, no further 12.05C analysis was required.

See Reid

v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187808, *18,
2012

WL

7682813,

*6

(S.D.

Ga.

Dec.

14,

2012),

report

and

recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 960814 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2013)
(“Without credible, valid IQ scores below 70, the ALJ was not
required to find Plaintiff mentally retarded pursuant to Listing
12.05(B) or (C)”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ

erred in failing to find that she met Listing 12.05C is without
merit.
VII.

Conclusion
For

the

reasons

set

forth

19

herein,

and

upon

careful

consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the
parties,

it

is

hereby

ORDERED

that

the

decision

of

the

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for a
period

of

disability,

disability

insurance

benefits,

and

supplemental security income be AFFIRMED.
DONE this 9th day of May, 2017.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

20