York v. Colvin
Filing
22
Order re: 1 Complaint filed by Sherone Dennise York stating that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiffs claim for aperiod of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income be AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 5/9/2017. Copies to parties. (mpp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SHERONE DENNISE YORK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY BERRYHILL,1
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.
*
*
*
*
* CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-000312-B
*
*
*
*
*
*
ORDER
Plaintiff Sherone Dennise York (hereinafter “Plaintiff”),
seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security denying her claim for a period of disability,
disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income
under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
401, et seq., and 1381, et seq.
consented
to
have
the
proceedings in this case.
On May 2, 2017, the parties
undersigned
(Doc. 19).
conduct
any
and
all
Thus, the action was
referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order
the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
1
Nancy Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security on January 23, 2017.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy Berryhill should be substituted
for Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant in this suit. No further
action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last
sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73.
Upon careful consideration
of the administrative record and the memoranda of the parties,
it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be
AFFIRMED.
I.
Procedural History2
Plaintiff protectively filed her application for benefits
on March 6, 2013, alleging disability beginning August 12, 2010,
based on an amputated left arm from a motor vehicle accident,
swelling in her leg, and headaches.
(Doc. 14-1 at 11, 15).
Plaintiff’s application was denied and upon timely request, she
was granted an administrative hearing before Administrative Law
Judge Walter Lassiter, Jr. (hereinafter “ALJ”) on July 11, 2014.
(Doc. 13-2 at 48).
Plaintiff attended the hearing with her
counsel and provided testimony related to her claims.
2 at 50).
(Doc. 13-
A vocational expert (“VE”) also appeared at the
hearing and provided testimony.
(Doc. 13-2 at 72).
On November
24, 2014, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that
Plaintiff is not disabled.
(Doc. 13-2 at 25).
The Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on April 20, 2016.
(Doc. 13-2 at 4).
Therefore, the ALJ’s decision dated November
2
The Court’s citations to the transcript in this order refer to
the pagination assigned in CM/ECF, not the page numbers assigned
by the Agency. Because the transcript was divided into separate
documents, the Court’s citations include the appropriate CM/ECF
document number.
2
24, 2014, became the final decision of the Commissioner.
Having
exhausted
her
administrative
timely filed the present civil action.
remedies,
(Doc. 1).
Plaintiff
The parties
waived oral argument on May 2, 2017 (Doc. 18) and agree that
this case is now ripe for judicial review and is properly before
this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
II.
Issue on Appeal
1.
Whether the ALJ erred in finding that
Plaintiff does not meet the criteria for
Listing 12.05C?
III. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born on July 30, 1974 and was thirty-nine
years of age at the time of her administrative hearing on July
11,
2014.
(Doc.
14-1
at
11;
Doc.
13-2
at
48).
Plaintiff
graduated from high school and completed one and a half years of
college studies.
(Doc. 14-2 at 149).
Plaintiff worked from 1997 to 2007 as a stocker at Walmart
until she lost her arm in a motor vehicle accident.
at 149; Doc. 14 at 20; Doc. 14-1 at 3).
(Doc. 14-2
At the administrative
hearing, Plaintiff testified that she cannot work due to phantom
pain in her arm, inability to lift,
problems with balancing
while standing, and swollen knees from obesity.
(Doc. 13-2 at
59, 62-63, 65, 68-69).
IV. Standard of Review
In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s
3
role
is
a
limited
determining
1)
one.
whether
The
the
Court’s
decision
review
of
the
is
limited
to
Secretary
is
supported by substantial evidence and 2) whether the correct
legal standards were applied.
1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).
3
Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d
A court may not decide the facts
anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that
of the Commissioner.
Cir.
1986).
The
Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th
Commissioner’s
findings
of
fact
affirmed if they are based upon substantial evidence.
must
be
Brown v.
Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth v.
Heckler,
703
F.2d
1233,
1239
(11th
Cir.
1983)
(holding
substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla, but
less
than
a
preponderance”
and
evidence as a reasonable person
support
a
conclusion.”).
In
consists
of
“such
relevant
would accept as adequate to
determining
whether
substantial
evidence exists, a court must view the record as a whole, taking
into account evidence favorable, as well as unfavorable, to the
Commissioner’s decision.
Chester v. Bowen, 792 F. 2d 129, 131
(11th Cir. 1986); Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163, *4
(S.D. Ala. June 14, 1999).
3
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal
principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th
Cir. 1987).
4
V.
Statutory And Regulatory Framework
An individual who applies for Social Security disability
benefits
must
prove
404.1512, 416.912.
his
or
her
disability.
20
C.F.R.
§§
Disability is defined as the “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.”
42
U.S.C.
§§
404.1505(a),
416.905(a).
provide
five-step
423(d)(1)(A);
a
The
see
Social
sequential
also
20
Security
evaluation
C.F.R.
§§
regulations
process
determining if a claimant has proven his disability.
for
20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920.
The
engaged
claimant
in
must
first
substantial
prove
gainful
that
activity.
he
or
The
she
has
second
not
step
requires the claimant to prove that he or she has a severe
impairment or combination of impairments.
If, at the third
step, the claimant proves that the impairment or combination of
impairments
claimant
is
meets
or
equals
automatically
a
found
education, or work experience.
listed
impairment,
disabled
regardless
then
the
of
age,
If the claimant cannot prevail
at the third step, he or she must proceed to the fourth step
where the claimant must prove an inability to perform their past
relevant work.
Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir.
5
1986).
the
In evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden,
examiner
must
consider
the
following
four
factors:
(1)
objective medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of
examining
physicians;
claimant’s
age,
(3)
education
evidence
and
work
of
pain;
history.
and
Id.
(4)
the
Once
a
claimant meets this burden, it becomes the Commissioner’s burden
to prove at the fifth step that the claimant is capable of
engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment which
exists in significant numbers in the national economy, given the
claimant’s
residual
work history.
1985).
functional
capacity,
age,
education,
and
Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir.
If the Commissioner can demonstrate that there are such
jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant must prove inability
to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled.
Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th
Cir. 1999).
Jones v.
See also Hale v.
Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v.
Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).
VI.
Discussion
A.
The ALJ did not err in finding that
Plaintiff does not meet the criteria for
Listing 12.05C.
As noted, supra, Plaintiff raises only one issue on appeal,
that is, whether the ALJ erred in finding that she does not meet
6
the criteria for Listing 12.05. 4
(Doc. 15 at 3).
According to
Plaintiff, her Full Scale IQ score of 67, combined with the
diagnosis
of
psychologist,
cognitive
mild
Dr.
criteria
(Doc. 15 at 8).
mental
Richard
of
retardation
Reynolds,
Listing
12.05C
by
Ph.D.,
(mental
consultative
satisfies
the
retardation).
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred in
finding that her IQ score was invalid.
(Id. at 9-10).
Having
carefully reviewed the record in this case, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s claim is without merit.
In
order
for
Plaintiff
to
meet
Listing
12.05C
(mental
retardation), she must present evidence of “[a] valid verbal,
performance or full scale IQ of 60-70 and a physical or other
mental impairment imposing an additional and significant workrelated limitation of function.”5
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
4
The Court notes at the outset that Plaintiff does not take
issue with the ALJ’s findings related to
her physical
impairments.
Rather, Plaintiff argues only that the ALJ erred
in finding that she does not meet cognitive criteria for Listing
12.05C.
Therefore, the Court’s discussion of the medical
evidence is limited to this issue.
5
For purposes of Listing 12.05C, the second prong requirement is
met once there is a finding that the claimant has an additional
severe impairment because the requirement of “significant workrelated limitation of function” “involves something more than
‘minimal’ but less than ‘severe.’” Johnson v. Colvin, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13497, *7, 2014 WL 413492, *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 3,
2014) (quoting Edwards by Edwards v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 1513,
1515 (11th Cir. 1985)). In this case, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s
obesity and status post left arm amputation with subsequent
treatment for phantom pain to be severe, and the parties do not
dispute that finding. (Doc. 13-2 at 27). Therefore, the second
7
Appendix
1
§
12.05(C).
In
addition,
she
must
satisfy
the
“diagnostic description” of mental retardation in Listing 12.05
(the
listing
category
for
mental
retardation/intellectual
disability), 6 which provides that mental retardation “refers to
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with
deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the
developmental
period;
i.e.,
the
evidence
demonstrates
supports onset of the impairment before age 22.”
404,
Subpart
P,
Appendix
1,
§§
12.05;
see
or
20 C.F.R. Part
also
Perkins
v.
Commissioner, Soc. Sec. Admin., 553 Fed. Appx. 870, 873 (11th
Cir.
2014)
claimant
including
(Listing
meets
the
deficits
12.05(C)
“requires
diagnostic
in
adaptive
criteria
a
showing
of
functioning;
that
Listing
a
the
12.05,
qualifying
IQ
score; onset before age 22; and the requisite deficits in workprong of Listing 12.05C, requiring a physical or other mental
impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related
limitation of function, is not at issue in this case.
6
On August 1, 2013, the Social Security Administration amended
Listing 12.05 by replacing the words “mental retardation” with
“intellectual disability.”
See Hickel v. Commissioner of Soc.
Sec., 539 Fed. Appx. 980, 982 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing 78
Fed. Reg. 46,499, 46,501, to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1)).
“This change was made because the term
‘mental retardation’ has negative connotations, and has become
offensive to many people.
Id.
(citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). “The Social Security Administration
stated that the change does not affect the actual medical
definition of the disorder or available programs or services.”
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As in
Hickel, this opinion uses the term “mental retardation” and
“intellectual disability” interchangeably.
8
related functioning.”).
The law in this Circuit provides that a valid IQ score of
60-70
creates
a
rebuttable
presumption
that
the
claimant
manifested deficits in adaptive functioning prior to the age of
twenty-two.
See Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F. 3d 1265, 1268-69
(llth Cir. 2001).
Thus, “a claimant meets the criteria for
presumptive disability under section 12.05C when the claimant
presents a valid I.Q. score of 60 to 70 inclusive, and evidence
of an additional mental or physical impairment that has more
than a ‘minimal effect’ on the claimant’s ability to perform
basic work activities.”
Smith v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 535
Fed. Appx. 894, 897 (llth Cir. 2013)(quoting Lowery v. Sullivan,
979 F. 2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992)).
The presumption under 12.05C can be rebutted, however, when
the
IQ
score
is
inconsistent
with
record
evidence
claimant’s work history, daily activities, and behavior. 7
7
of
a
See
Though not at issue in this case, the Court notes that, in
addressing the “adaptive functioning” aspect of Listing 12.05C,
the Eleventh Circuit has sustained the rejection of claims under
this Listing where the claimant’s IQ score was significantly
inconsistent with his/her adaptive functioning, despite a
qualifying IQ score.
For example, in Perkins v. Commissioner,
Soc. Sec. Admin., 553 Fed. Appx. 870 (llth Cir. 2014), the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the ALJ’s finding that Listing 12.05C
was not met where the plaintiff performed skilled jobs,
including as a skilled cook, managed other workers, and made
contradictory claims regarding his education and employment
history.
Also, in Hickel v. Commissioner, 539 Fed. Appx. 980,
984 (llth Cir. 2013), the Eleventh Circuit held that the ALJ did
not err where he acknowledged that the claimant had a valid IQ
9
Popp v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1497, 1499-1500 (llth Cir. 1986).
Indeed, neither a diagnosis of mental retardation nor a valid IQ
score between 60 and 70, applied the presumption established by
Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F. 3d 1265, 1268-69 (llth Cir. 2001),
and found that the presumption was rebutted by other evidence
that showed that the claimant did not have “deficits in adaptive
functioning.” In reaching that decision, the court noted that,
although the claimant had been enrolled in special education
classes, she worked part-time in a nursery, was a high school
graduate, prepared simple meals, dressed herself, drove herself
to work, attended church regularly, and socialized with friends.
Id. at 984-985. See also Popp, 779 F.2d at 1499-1500 (affirming
finding that Listing 12.05C was not met where the plaintiff had
worked skilled jobs, obtained a college degree, and had
exaggerated his deficits when examined); White v. Colvin, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28277, 2015 WL 1013117, *4 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 9,
2015) (The ALJ properly found that, despite a Full Scale IQ
score of 63, the plaintiff did not have significant limitations
in adaptive functioning where the record reflected that,
although the plaintiff had been in special education classes, he
lived alone, maintained his financial affairs, and consistently
worked at several different jobs); Robinson v. Colvin, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43338, 2015 WL 1520431, *11 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 2, 2015)
(where the plaintiff lived independently without a highly
supportive living arrangement, cared for her personal needs, and
had a significant work history, the ALJ properly found that her
Full Scale IQ score of 60 was inconsistent with the record
evidence regarding her daily activities); Johnson, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13497, 2014 WL 413492, at *4 (although the ALJ never
stated that the claimant failed to meet Listing 12.05C, the
ALJ’s finding that, despite a Full Scale IQ score of 62, the
claimant had high adaptive skills, i.e., he had the capacity to
take care of his own needs, perform activities of daily living,
and had successfully performed four different jobs since leaving
high school, was sufficient to support his decision that the
claimant was not mentally retarded); Lyons v. Astrue, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 128950 (M.D. Fla. May 24, 2009), adopted by 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48535, 2009 WL 1657388 (M.D. Fla. June 10,
2009)(The ALJ’s finding that the claimant did not meet Listing
12.05C was supported by substantial evidence that demonstrated
that the claimant had a high school diploma, was not in special
education classes, completed his own social security forms, and
had earnings from 1983 – 1990 between $13,696 and $18,408 per
year).
10
score is conclusive of mental retardation where the diagnosis
and
IQ
score
are
inconsistent
with
other
record
evidence
regarding the claimant’s daily living activities and behavior.
See
Robinson,
2015
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
43338
at
*32,
1520431 at *11; Perkins, 553 Fed. Appx. at 873-74.
2015
WL
Accordingly,
the ALJ is tasked with determining whether there is sufficient
evidence
(relating
presumption.
to
plaintiff’s
daily
life)
to
rebut
the
See Grant v. Astrue, 255 Fed. Appx. 374, 375 (llth
Cir. 2007); Hartman v. Colvin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91467, *7,
2014 WL 3058550, *3 (S.D. Ala. July 7, 2014).
The
pivotal
issue
in
this
case
is
whether
substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s Full Scale
IQ score was invalid and, thus, that Plaintiff did not meet the
criteria of Listing 12.05C.
“[T]he ALJ is allowed some leeway
to evaluate other evidence [other then I.Q. test score] when
determining the validity of an I.Q. score. . . .”
Henry v.
Barnhart, 156 Fed. Appx. 171, 173 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting
Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992)).
“An
ALJ
are
should
examine
whether
the
results
of
an
I.Q.
test
consistent with the other medical evidence and the claimant’s
daily activities and behavior.”
Id. (citing Popp, 779 F.2d at
1499–1500).
In determining whether the ALJ in this case properly found
Plaintiff’s Full Scale IQ score of 67 to be invalid, the Court
11
is guided by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Popp, 779 F.2d
at 1500, in which the court held that the ALJ was not required
to find that the claimant met the criteria of Listing 12.05C
based on the results of his IQ test, but, rather, the ALJ was
“required
to
examine
the
[test]
results
in
conjunction
with
other medical evidence and the claimant’s daily activities and
behavior.”
Id.
The court concluded that, because the results
of the IQ test were inconsistent with other evidence in the
record, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that
the IQ results were “incredible” and, thus, did not meet the
Listing.
Id.
As stated, the ALJ here found that Plaintiff’s Full Scale
IQ score of 67 was invalid and that the diagnosis of mild mental
retardation by consultative psychologist, Dr. Reynolds, which
was based on Plaintiff’s IQ score of 67, was inconsistent with
Dr. Reynolds’ own findings and opinions, as well as with the
totality
of
the
other
medical
evidence
activities of daily living and behavior. 8
and
(Doc. 13-2 at 29).
In reaching that decision, the ALJ pointed to
8
Plaintiff’s
the following
Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s finding that her
alleged impairment of mild mental retardation was “not medically
determinable.” (Doc. 13-2 at 29-30, 40). Because the Court has
found, for the reasons stated herein, that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s Full Scale IQ score
was invalid and that Dr. Reynolds’ diagnosis of mild mental
retardation was inconsistent with the totality of the evidence,
Plaintiff’s argument in this regard is without merit.
12
evidence:
Consultative
psychologist,
Dr.
Richard
Reynolds,
Ph.D., evaluated Plaintiff on February 16, 2010, and documented
that
she
graduated
from
high
school
in
regular
classes
(repeating the fifth grade), that she attended college for a
year and a half taking general studies, that she read books in
her spare time, that she managed her own finances, and that she
had a drivers license and drove.
148).
(Doc. 13-2 at 29; 14-2 at
Dr. Reynolds’ report shows that Plaintiff was seeking
disability
based
on
severe
pain
in
her
amputated
problems standing for long periods of time
clots in her legs.
(Doc. 14-2 at 149).
Dr. Reynolds that she had
arm
and
because of blood
Plaintiff reported to
problems with sadness, worry, and
trouble finishing what she started but denied any psychiatric
treatment.
(Doc. 14-2 at 149).
Plaintiff reported that she was
living in an apartment with her four children, ages ten, three,
two, and one and that she shared in the housework, cooking, and
grocery
assisted.
shopping
(Doc.
with
other
14-2
at
relatives
149).
friends and going to church.
who
Plaintiff
came
over
reported
(Doc. 14-2 at 149).
and
having
Plaintiff
reported working for Walmart from 1998 to 2007 as a stocker
until she lost her arm in a motor vehicle accident. (Doc. 14-2
at 149).
she
was
Plaintiff’s mental status examination revealed that
alert
and
oriented,
cooperative,
had
normal
speech,
logical thought content, normal thought associations and mood,
13
normal recent and remote memory, and normal judgment, insight,
and
decision
making
abilities.
(Doc.
14-2
at
149).
In
addition, Plaintiff was able to calculate three out of three
single-digit multiplication problems and two out of two simple
word problems.
(Doc. 14-2 at 149).
She correctly identified
the current and past presidents and was able to give birth dates
of significant people in her life and relevant dates of past
employment.
(Doc. 14-2 at 149).
Dr. Reynolds concluded: “In
this evaluator’s opinion the claimant’s ability to understand,
carry
out,
to
remember
instructions,
and
to
respond
appropriately to supervision, co workers, work pressures in a
work
setting
mild.”
may
be
somewhat
impaired
by
Major
(Doc. 14-2 at 150) (emphasis added).
Depression,
Dr. Reynolds
assessed no other limitations or impairments and stated that
Plaintiff
would
not
(Doc. 14-2 at 150).
need
assistance
date,
Dr.
any
awarded
funds.
Dr. Reynolds did not at any time suggest
the possibility of mental retardation.
that
with
Reynolds
also
Statement (Mental) in which he
(Doc. 14-2 at 149).
completed
a
Medical
On
Source
opined that Plaintiff had no
limitations in her ability to understand, remember, and carry
out simple instructions or to make judgments on simple workrelated
decisions
and
had
only
complex decisions and instructions.
mild
limitations
related
to
(Doc. 14-2 at 151-52).
Three years later, on September 9, 2013, Plaintiff returned
14
to Dr. Reynolds for a Vocational Rehabilitation Psychological
Evaluation.
denied
(Doc. 14-2 at 210).
any
psychiatric
At that time, Plaintiff again
treatment
and
described
living
independently with her children, while needing some help with
bathing and dressing.
(Doc. 14-2 at 210-11).
Plaintiff’s
mental status examination again revealed that she was alert,
cooperative, and oriented, that she had normal speech, normal
thought associations, logical thought content, good recent and
remote
memory,
decision
making
occasion,
test,
normal
and
indicating
Dr.
abilities.
Reynolds
Plaintiff
mild
judgment,
(Doc.
14-2
administered
received
mental
normal
a
the
Full
insight,
at
211).
WAIS-IV
normal
On
that
Intelligence
Scale
IQ
(Doc.
retardation.
and
score
14-2
at
of
67,
211-12).
Plaintiff also took the WRAT-III and scored at the seventh grade
level in reading and at the sixth grade level in spelling and
math.
(Doc.
14-2
at
212-13).
Dr.
Reynolds
observed
that
Plaintiff had exhibited appropriate effort and motivation during
testing, and, thus, he considered the results to be a valid
estimate of her intellectual functioning and academic abilities.
(Doc.
14-2
at
213).
Dr.
Reynolds
diagnosed
Plaintiff
with
adjustment disorder with disturbance of mood and mild mental
retardation.
(Doc. 14-2 at 210).
Despite his diagnosis of mild
mental retardation, Dr. Reynolds nonetheless recommended that
Plaintiff complete a job survey inventory to help her decide
15
what
occupations
she
may
be
interested
in
and
capable
of
performing and documented that Plaintiff stated that she was
capable of doing housework and answering the telephone and would
be interested in doing that type of work.
In
his
decision,
the
ALJ
(Doc. 14-2 at 213).
discussed
the
obvious
contradictions in Dr. Reynolds’ two assessments
9
Plaintiff’s
inconsistencies
between
IQ
the
scores
scores
and
as
invalid
the
given
evidence
the
related
to
and rejected
Plaintiff’s
cognitive abilities, her activities of daily living, and her
behavior.
Specifically, the ALJ noted the inconsistency between
Plaintiff’s Full Scale IQ score of 67 (indicating mild mental
retardation) and Dr. Reynolds’ first report in which he clearly
opined that Plaintiff could work and had no limitations related
to simple instructions and work-related decisions and only mild
limitations
related
to
complex
9
instructions
and
work-related
The record shows that the ALJ assigned great weight to Dr.
Reynolds’ opinion in his first assessment that Plaintiff had
essentially average intelligence and little weight to Dr.
Reynolds’ opinion in his second assessment that Plaintiff’s Full
Scale IQ score of 67 was valid and that she was mildly mentally
retarded.
(Doc. 13-2 at 40).
Based on the evidence detailed
herein, the ALJ had good cause to reject Dr. Reynolds’ opinions
in the second assessment as they were inconsistent with his own
examination findings as well as with Plaintiff’s activities of
daily living and her behavior.
See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357
F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004)(whether considering the
opinions of treating, examining, or non-examining physicians,
good cause exists to discredit the testimony of any medical
source when it is contrary to or unsupported by the evidence of
record).
16
decisions.
(Doc.
13-2
at
30;
Doc.
14-2
at
151-52).
In
addition, Dr. Reynolds’ examination findings in both the first
and second assessments were essentially “normal.”
(Doc. 14-2 at
149, 211; Doc. 13-2 at 29-30).
Notably, despite Plaintiff’s
Full
the
Scale
Reynolds’
IQ
score
still
of
67
recommended
in
that
she
second
assessment,
complete
a
job
Dr.
survey
inventory to assess her employment interests, and noted that she
was capable of, and interested in, performing housekeeping and
telephone work. (Doc. 14-2 at 213).
The ALJ also pointed to the inconsistency between the Full
Scale
IQ
score
of
67
and
the
evidence
that
Plaintiff
had
graduated from high school in regular (not special education)
classes, had completed a year and a half of college, and had
worked for ten years in semi-skilled work.
40,
72;
Doc.
14-1
at
3;
Doc.
14-2
at
(Doc. 13-2 at 30,
149).
The
ALJ
also
discussed Plaintiff’s activities of daily living which included
independent
house
living,
cleaning,
caring
laundry,
for
four
shopping,
finances, and attending church.
young
driving,
children,
handling
(Doc. 13-2 at 32).
cooking,
her
own
Plaintiff
also reported getting along with others and following written
and spoken instructions okay.
The
Court
has
(Doc. 13-2 at 32).
considered
Plaintiff’s
evidence
that
she
repeated the fifth grade and that she scored at the seventh
grade level in reading and at the sixth grade level in spelling
17
and math.
(Doc. 14-2 at 212-13).
evidence,
the
Plaintiff’s
substantial
daily
However, notwithstanding this
medical
activities
and
evidence
behavior
and
in
evidence
this
inconsistent with a finding of mental retardation.
case
of
is
Therefore,
the ALJ properly found Plaintiff’s Full Scale IQ score of 67 to
be invalid.
Cf., Reid v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 187808, *18, 2012 WL 7682813, *6 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 14,
2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 960814 (S.D.
Ga. Mar. 12, 2013) (the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s IQ score
was invalid was supported by substantial evidence that Plaintiff
lived independently while raising three children and a six–year–
old
granddaughter;
graduated
high
school
without
any
special
services; worked for over ten years as a longshoreman; and had
the ability to drive and make financial decisions); Anderson v.
Astrue, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124827, *14-18, 2012 WL 3834838,
*4-6 (D.S.D. Sept. 4, 2012) (the ALJ’s decision to discredit
Plaintiff’s IQ score was supported by substantial evidence that
the psychologist who administered the IQ examination only met
with
claimant
claimant’s
on
affect
one
occasion;
and/or
there
motivation
was
evidence
difficulties
may
that
have
affected her performance on the examination; there were no other
medical records illustrating claimant’s cognitive difficulties;
claimant could read and understand short newspaper or magazine
articles, count out change; claimant was capable of cooking,
18
cleaning, and shopping; and while claimant only completed the
tenth grade in special education, the record suggested that she
discontinued school for personal reasons, not because of mental
difficulties).
In summary, the ALJ was not required to find that Plaintiff
was mentally retarded based on the results of her IQ test.
Popp, 779 F.2d at 1500.
See
Rather, the ALJ was required to examine
the results in conjunction with other medical evidence and the
claimant’s daily activities and behavior.
Id.
Based on the
evidence detailed above, there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the ALJ’s finding that the results of the IQ
test lacked validity.
Given the absence of a valid Full Scale IQ score of 60-70
in this case, no further 12.05C analysis was required.
See Reid
v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187808, *18,
2012
WL
7682813,
*6
(S.D.
Ga.
Dec.
14,
2012),
report
and
recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 960814 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2013)
(“Without credible, valid IQ scores below 70, the ALJ was not
required to find Plaintiff mentally retarded pursuant to Listing
12.05(B) or (C)”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ
erred in failing to find that she met Listing 12.05C is without
merit.
VII.
Conclusion
For
the
reasons
set
forth
19
herein,
and
upon
careful
consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the
parties,
it
is
hereby
ORDERED
that
the
decision
of
the
Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for a
period
of
disability,
disability
insurance
benefits,
and
supplemental security income be AFFIRMED.
DONE this 9th day of May, 2017.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
20
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