Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Jackson et al
Filing
89
ORDER, GRANTING IN PART 72 Motion to Strike the affidavits of Marcia Burrell, Sherita Burell, and Shirley Ross Brooks; GRANTING 64 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson; and DENYING the 65 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Marcia Burrell and Sherita Burrell. Designation of the distribution of the interpleaded funds, and Judgment will be entered by separate order. Signed by Senior Judge Callie V. S. Granade on 05/31/2018. (mab)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
METROPOLITAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
)
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)
)
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)
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
STORMEY D. BURROUGHS
JACKSON, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL NO. 1:16-CV-0411-CG-M
ORDER
This is an interpleader action filed by Plaintiff Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company (“MetLife”) for a determination of the proper payee(s) of
life insurance proceeds Plaintiff is holding as administrator of an ERISAregulated employee benefit plan.
The motions addressed in this Order are:
1) the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Stormey Burroughs
Jackson (“Jackson”) (Docs. 62, 63 & 64), the Response of Defendants
Marcia Burrell and Sherita Burrell (collectively “the Burrells”) (Doc. 68),
and Jackson’s Reply (Doc. 71);
2) the Burrells’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docs. 65), Jackson’s
Response (Doc. 69), and the Burrells’ Reply (Doc. 75).
3) Jackson’s Motion to Strike portions of the affidavits of Marcia Burrell (“M.
Burrell”), Sherita Burrell (“S. Burrell”), and Shirley Ross Brooks
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(“Brooks”) (Doc. 72) as well as those portions of the Burrells’ Response to
Jackson’s reliance on those affidavits, the Burrells’ Opposition to the
Motion to Strike (Doc. 81), and Jackson’s Reply (Doc. 83).
I. Background
Edward L. Burrell (“Decedent”) was a retiree from Fiat Chrysler
Automobile US and a participant in the company’s Basic Life Insurance Plan
(“Plan”), an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) regulated
employee benefit plan. Decedent was the father of the Burrells and the
alleged father of Jackson. MetLife’s records show that on October 3, 2003,
Jackson was designated the sole primary beneficiary with a 100% share of
Decedent’s life insurance benefits. (Doc. 1, p. 3 ¶ 13). Decedent died on
November 8, 2015, leaving $59,500 of life insurance benefits payable to the
proper beneficiary designated under the terms of the Plan. (Doc. 1, p. 4 ¶ 1415). Jackson paid for decedent’s funeral at Andrews Funeral Home and on
November 13, 2015 assigned benefits due from the life insurance benefits to
Andrews Funeral Home in the amount of $6,879.43. (Doc. 1, p. 4 ¶ 16).
On November 16, 2015, Marcia Burrell (“M. Burrell”) contacted
Interpleader Plaintiff Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”)
Claims Department and identified herself as a child of Decedent. (Doc. 1, p. 45 ¶ 18). M. Burrell was informed she was not listed as a beneficiary on
Decedent’s Plan. (Doc. 1, p. 5 ¶ 18). M. Burrell believed Decedent’s October 3,
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2003 beneficiary designation was fraudulently completed. Id. On January 12,
2016, MetLife received Jackson’s claim form for the Plan benefits. (Doc. 1, p.
4 ¶ 17).
On February 4, 2016, M. Burrell contacted MetLife Claims
Department to dispute the beneficiary designation. (Doc. 1, p. 4-5 ¶ 18).
MetLife received a letter from M. Burrell on February 9, 2016 and February
22, 2016 regarding the beneficiary designation. (Doc. 1, p. 5 ¶ 19). M. Burrell
stated Jackson changed the beneficiary designation without Decedent’s
consent. Id. M. Burrell also listed her sister, S. Burrell, as Decedent’s child.
Id.
On March 29, 2016, MetLife received M. Burrell’s claimant affidavit
for the Plan benefits. (Doc. 1, p. 5 ¶ 20). M. Burrell signed under oath that
she and S. Burrell are the sole children of Decedent. Id. MetLife received
Jackson’s claimant affidavit for the Plan benefits on April 15, 2016. (Doc. 1, p.
4 ¶ 17). MetLife is unable to determine whether a court would find
Decedent’s October 3, 2003 beneficiary designation as valid. (Doc. 1, p. 5 ¶
21).
II. Procedural History
On August 4, 2016, MetLife filed a Complaint in Interpleader against
Jackson, M. Burrell, S. Burrell, and Andrews in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama in the Southern Division (case no.
1:16-CV-00411). (Doc. 1). The Complaint asserts MetLife is unable to
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determine the proper beneficiary under Decedent’s benefits Plan without
exposing MetLife to the danger of double liability. (Doc. 1, p. 6 ¶ 25). MetLife
claims if Decedent’s October 3, 2003 beneficiary designation is valid, the Plan
benefits would be payable to Jackson and Andrews pursuant to the funeral
home assignment. (Doc. 1, p. 5 ¶ 22). However, if the beneficiary designation
is invalid, the Plan benefits would be payable to Decedent’s children and
potentially to Andrews, per the funeral home assignment, if Jackson was a
beneficiary with the authority to assign Plan benefits. (Doc. 1, p. 6 ¶ 23).
On December 16, 2016, MetLife filed a Motion for Leave to Interplead
Funds. (Doc. 32). MetLife sought to interplead $59,500.00 of ERISA
regulated benefits under Decedent’s Plan. Id. at p. 1. This Court granted
MetLife’s Motion for Leave to Interplead Funds on December 21, 2016. (Doc.
37). The funds were deposited into the Court Registry Interest (“CRIS”) fund
on December 27, 2016. (Doc. 39).
On July 27, 2017, Jackson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and
brief in support thereof on the grounds that there is a valid beneficiary form
naming Jackson as sole primary beneficiary of the Plan benefits at issue in
this action. (Doc. 64; Doc. 62). On July 28, 2017, the Burrells filed their
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and brief in support thereof as to
Jackson’s paternity (Doc. 65). On August 24, 2017, the Burrells filed their
Response to Jackson’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 68). Along with
other documentation, the Burrells included the affidavits of S. Burrell, M.
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Burrell, and Brooks as supporting evidence with their motion. (Doc. 68-6;
Doc. 68-7; Doc. 68-8).
On August 25, 2017, Jackson filed her Response in Opposition to the
Burrells’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. 69). On September 7,
2017, Jackson filed her Reply Brief in Support of her Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. 71). Jackson also filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavits of M.
Burrell, S. Burrell, and Brooks on September 7, 2017. (Doc. 72). On
September 8, 2017, the Burrells filed their Reply to Jackson’s Response to
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. 75). The Burrells filed
their Response in Opposition to Jackson’s Motion to Strike on September 21,
2017 (Doc. 81), and Jackson filed her Reply thereto on September 25, 2017.
(Doc. 83).
III. Jackson’s Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Marcia Burrell,
Sherita Burrell, and Shirley Ross Brooks.
A. Standard of Review for Affidavits in Support or Opposition
of Summary Judgment
When a party presents affidavit(s) to support or oppose a motion for
summary judgment, the affidavit “must be made on personal knowledge, set
out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or
declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c)(4). If the affidavit does not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(c), “the court may: (1) give an opportunity to properly
support or address the fact; (2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of
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the motion; (3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting
materials – including the facts considered undisputed – show that the
movant is entitled to it; or (4) issue any other appropriate order.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(e).
The Court has noted that when affidavits are considered for summary
judgment, they “cannot be conclusory, and must contain information that can
be reduced to admissible form at trial.” Marable v. Marion Military Institute,
906 F. Supp.2d 1237, 1249 (S.D. Ala. 2012); See, e.g., Corwin v. Walt Disney
Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir.2007) (“Even on summary judgment, a
court is not obligated to take as true testimony that is not based upon
personal knowledge.”) (citation omitted); Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d
1210 (11th Cir.2000) (“This court has consistently held that conclusory
allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.”)
(citation omitted); Rowell v. BellSouth Corp., 433 F.3d 794, 800 (11th
Cir.2005) (“On motions for summary judgment, we may consider only that
evidence which can be reduced to an admissible form.”). Statements based
only upon belief rather than personal knowledge must be disregarded. See
Marable, 906 F.Supp.2d at 1250. Affidavits may not be “so riddled-through
with irrelevant statements, conclusory assertions with no probative value,
[and] inadmissible hearsay.” Id.
“When an affidavit submitted in support of, or opposition to, a motion
for summary judgment contains inadmissible evidence, the court may strike
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the inadmissible portions of the affidavit and consider the rest.” Id.; See Lee
v. National Life Assur. Co., 632 F.2d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1980).
B. Analysis
Jackson moves to strike portions of the affidavits of M. Burrell, S.
Burrell, and Brooks because they contain conclusory allegations, speculation,
and conjecture that lack any evidentiary foundation; they are immaterial or
irrelevant; or they are hearsay. The Court examines each affidavit in turn.
C. Affidavit of Marcia Burrell (Doc. 68-7)
Jackson contends that portions of M. Burrell’s affidavit should be
stricken because they contain conclusory allegations, speculation, and
conjecture that lack any evidentiary foundation; they are immaterial or
irrelevant; and they are hearsay.
Specifically, Jackson contends a portion of M. Burrell’s affidavit is
immaterial or irrelevant. M. Burrell asserts the following in paragraph 2 of
her affidavit:
I maintained a close relationship with my father until his
death in 2015. On Father’s Day in 2000, when I was only
18 years old, I rescued my father from a drug house. I was
held at gunpoint and begged for my father’s life. My
father was forever grateful and called me every year on
Father’s Day to thank me for saving him. (Doc. 68-7 ¶ 2)
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 states, “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”
FED. R. EVID. 401. However, this Court must not determine “the probative
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value of any evidence presented to it, for this would be an unwarranted
extension of the summary judgment device.” Allen-Sherrod v. Henry Cty. Sch.
Dist., 248 Fed.Appx. 145, 147 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
The primary issue surrounding this litigation is the validity of
Decedent’s beneficiary designation. (Doc. 62; Doc. 68). Jackson argues this
portion of M. Burrell’s affidavit is irrelevant because “an event between
Decedent and Marcia Burrell over 17 years ago and Decedent’s alleged
gratefulness to Marcia Burrell has no bearing on the issue at hand.” (Doc. 72,
p. 3-4). In response, the Burrells argue “[t]he fact that the Decedent felt
indebted to Marcia Burrell for saving his life makes it less probable that he
would effectuate a change stripping her of her beneficiary rights.” (Doc. 81, p.
1-2).
This Court will stop short of assessing the probative value of M.
Burrell’s assertion at this stage of the litigation. In doing so, this Court finds
that M. Burrell’s assertions in paragraph 2 of her affidavit have some
tendency to make it more probable that Decedent would leave the policy to
the Burrells. Though Jackson takes issue with the alleged event occurring
“over 17 years ago,” the beneficiary designation at the center of this litigation
took place fourteen years ago. (Doc. 1, p. 3 ¶ 13). The relevant time frame is
not the time between the onset of this litigation and M. Burrell’s alleged
event, but rather, the timing between the October 2003 beneficiary
designation and the date of the incident M. Burrell discusses. Whether or not
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Decedent was grateful or felt indebted to M. Burrell for three years preceding
the beneficiary designation is relevant to the issue at hand. Accordingly, the
Court finds paragraph 2 of M. Burrell’s affidavit should not be stricken.
Additionally, Jackson objects to M. Burrell’s statement in paragraph 3
that Decedent “did not change the beneficiary of his Chrysler life insurance
policy in 2003 to Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson” because Decedent assured
her “numerous times, both before 2003 and after 2003” that she was
beneficiary of the policy. (Doc. 68-7 ¶ 3). Jackson argues that this portion is a
conclusory allegation. Jackson notes M. Burrell’s admission that M. Burrell
was never identified as a beneficiary under Decedent’s life insurance policy.
(Doc. 72, p. 2).
In response, the Burrells contest that Jackson’s argument is deceptive.
The Burrells explain they were never listed as a “named” beneficiary under
the policy, but they are residual beneficiaries in accordance with the terms of
Decedent’s Plan. (Doc. 81, p. 2). The Burrells argue they are residual
beneficiaries because Decedent’s Plan specifies that if Decedent did not
designate a beneficiary, his benefits would be distributed to his children if he
did not have a surviving spouse. (Doc. 63-1, p. 2; Doc. 63-1, p.60). The
Burrells argue that Decedent was unmarried at the time of his death, and the
beneficiary designation to Jackson is invalid so, therefore, the benefits should
be awarded to them.
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Though M. Burrell’s assertion (“My father did not change the
beneficiary”) is based on personal knowledge of her conversations with
Decedent (“I know this because my father assured me numerous times”), the
conclusion she draws regarding Decedent’s changing of the beneficiary is
speculative. As such, M. Burrell’s statement, “My father did not change the
beneficiary of his Chrysler life insurance policy in 2003 to Stormey D.
Burroughs Jackson” is conclusory and speculative and is due to be stricken.
(Doc. 68-7, ¶ 3).
In addition, Jackson contends paragraph 3 of M. Burrell’s affidavit
should be stricken because it contains inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is
defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Hearsay is only admissible if “the
statement is not hearsay as provided by Rule 801(d) or falls into one of the
hearsay exceptions enumerated in Rules 803, 804, and 807.” United States v.
Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1203 (11th Cir. 2005). “The general rule is that
inadmissible hearsay cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment where
there is no indication that it is reducible to a form that would be admissible
at trial.” Riley v. Univ. of Alabama Health Serv. Found., 990 F.Supp.2d 1177,
1188 (N.D. Ala. 2014); See Pritchard v. Southern Co. Services, 102 F.3d 1118
(11th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). “An affidavit submitted in connection
with a motion for summary judgment may contain hearsay statements that
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would be admissible at the trial under exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Riley,
990 F.Supp.2d at 1188 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (quoting H. Sand & Co. v. Airtemp
Corp., 934 F.2d 450, 454–55 (2nd Cir.1991).
Decedent’s statements assuring M. Burrell “numerous times, both
before 2003 and after 2003, that [she] was the beneficiary of the life
insurance policy” are out-of-court statements. (Doc. 68-7, ¶ 3). The gist
asserted in the statement – “that I was a beneficiary of the life insurance
policy” – is being offered for its truth: that M. Burrell is indeed a beneficiary
of the policy. Accordingly, the statement is hearsay.
The Burrells argue the statement is an exception to the hearsay rule
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) (“Rule 803(3)”). FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
Rule 803(3) establishes an exception to hearsay whenever the declarant’s
statement is “a statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such
as motive, intent, or plan) or emotion, sensory, or physical condition (such as
mental feeling, pain, or bodily health.” Id. The Burrells assert the statement
shows Decedent’s then-existing state of mind conveying his intent to never
designate Jackson as the sole beneficiary. (Doc. 81, p. 2). The Court finds that
the statement properly falls within this exception to the hearsay rule, and it
could be reduced to admissible form at trial.
The Burrells also contend the statements in paragraph 3 qualify under
the residual hearsay exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 807 (“Rule
807”). In relevant part, Rule 807 reads:
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Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement
is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the
statement is not specifically covered by a hearsay
exception in Rule 803 or 804:
(a) the statement has equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness;
(b) it is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(c) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain
through reasonable efforts; and
(d) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules
and the interests of justice.
FED. R. EVID. 807. The Burrells presented an argument for each requirement
under Rule 807.
The Burrells contend Decedent’s statement has equivalent guarantees
of trustworthiness because Decedent made similar statements to S. Burrell
and Brooks, as confirmed in their affidavits. (See Doc.68-6; Doc. 68-8).
Furthermore, the Burrells assert the statements are clear evidence that
Decedent did not effectuate the beneficiary change, which is a material fact
in this case. (Doc. 81, p. 3). Additionally, the Burrells argue Decedent’s
statements are more probative than any other evidence because he is now
deceased so there is simply no other evidence available. (Doc. 81, p. 3). The
Burrells also argue admitting Decedent’s statements will serve the best
interest of justice because Decedent’s intent was to have the Burrells benefit
from the policy, and the beneficiary change was done via telephone which
directly conflicts with the Plan requirements. (Doc. 81, p. 3).
The purpose of Rule 807, “the residual hearsay exception,” is “to be
used very rarely, and only in exception circumstances.” Rivers v. U.S., 777
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F.3d 1306, 1312 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556
F.3d 1260, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). The primary question
under a Rule 807 analysis revolves around the trustworthiness “of the
declarant who originally made the statements.” Rivers, 777 F.3d at 1314.
“The rule asks not simply for circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,
but for guarantees that are equivalent in significance to the specific hearsay
exceptions enumerated in [Rules 803 and 804].” Id. The guarantees of
trustworthiness must be “equivalent to cross-examined former testimony,
statements under a belief of impending death, statements against interest,
and statements of personal or family history.” United States v. Fernandez,
892 F. 2d 976, 980 (11th Cir. 1989). Those exceptions to the rule against
hearsay “have attributes of trustworthiness not possessed by the general run
of hearsay statements that tip the balance in favor of introducing the
information if the declarant is unavailable to testify.” Id. The Eleventh
Circuit noted in the Rivers case:
[A] dying declaration is trustworthy enough to admit
as evidence in certain types of cases because at the
time the declaration is made, the declarant believes
that she is about to die and the statement concerns the
cause of her death – in other words, because of the
particular circumstances surrounding the original
utterance of the statement. By requiring hearsay
admitted under the residual exception to have
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that are
like the guarantees of the specific exceptions, Rule 807
is clearly concerned, first and foremost, about whether
the declarant originally made the statements under
circumstances that render the statements more
trustworthy.
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Rivers, 777 F.3d at 1314-15.
In the Rivers case, defendant Marcus Rivers’ claimed ineffective
assistance of counsel and filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. Id. at 1307. Rivers’ attorney, Brian McComb (McComb”), died
before Rivers filed the motion. Id. Rivers’ co-defendant’s attorney, Valentin
Rodriguez (“Rodriguez’), testified at an evidentiary hearing about the
conversations Rodriguez had with McComb. Id. Though Rivers objected to
Rodriguez’s testimony, the district court permitted it under Rule 807. Id. The
district court determined trustworthiness was established under Rule 807
because “[McComb’s] statements [to Rodriguez] were being made to counsel
for one of [Rivers’] co-defendants” and “such statements are trustworthy
because [f]rank and forthright communication between counsel for codefendants is expected when they are planning pretrial strategy, which was
the case here.” Id. at 1315. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that it was
error to admit Rodriguez’s testimony under Rule 807 because it lacked the
“circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” required by the rule. Id. at
1308. Besides Rodriguez’s testimony, the only other corroborating evidence
offered was an email from McComb to the government stating McComb was
“trying to get [Rivers] to accept a plea in this matter.” Id.at 1316. The
Eleventh Circuit noted, “The existence of corroborating evidence does not
necessarily make hearsay evidence admissible under Rule 807. Rather,
‘corroborating evidence must be extraordinarily strong before it will render
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the hearsay evidence sufficiently trustworthy to justify its admission.’” Id. at
1316 (quoting United States v. Lang, 904 F.2d 618, 624 (11th Cir. 1990).
“[F]rank and forthright communication,” without more, “is insufficient to
establish the equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that
Rule 807 requires.” Id. at 1315.
The Burrells argue Decedent’s statements to M. Burrell are
trustworthy because Decedent made similar statements to S. Burrell and
Brooks, as confirmed in their affidavits. (Doc. 81, p. 3). The question is not
whether S. Burrell and Brooks are telling the truth in their affidavits, but
whether the hearsay statements made by Decedent contained circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness. See Rivers, 777 F.3d at 1315. While evidence
of Decedent’s similar conversations is corroborating, it is not extraordinarily
strong to constitute sufficient trustworthiness under Rule 807. If Decedent’s
intention were to designate the Burrells as his beneficiary, Decedent would
have had every incentive to tell that to the Burrells and Brooks. However, if
Decedent’s intentions were to name Jackson the beneficiary, as Jackson
alleges, Decedent would have every incentive to dissimulate. Under the facts
present in this case, this Court will not assume one way or the other.
Accordingly, the Burrells have failed to show Decedent’s statements are
equivalent to the amount of trustworthiness required under Rule 807.
Accordingly, the Court finds paragraph 3 of M. Burrell’s affidavit
should be stricken, in part. The first statement, “My father did not change
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the beneficiary of his Chrysler life insurance policy in 2003 to Stormey D.
Burroughs Jackson.” should be stricken. (Doc. 68-7, ¶ 3). The truth asserted
in the second statement, “[M]y father assured me numerous times, both
before 2003 and after 2003, that I was a beneficiary of the life insurance
policy.” should not be stricken because it is an exception to the hearsay rule
under Rule 803(3). (Doc. 68-7, ¶ 3).
Jackson also moves to strike M. Burrell’s statement, “My father never
spoke to me about the alleged change to his Chrysler life insurance policy
because he did not know it had been changed.” (Doc. 68-7 ¶ 4). Jackson
argues the statement is an unsupported, conclusory allegation. In their
response to Jackson’s motion to strike, the Burrells do not proffer any
additional evidence to support M. Burrell’s statement. (Doc. 81, p. 2). In fact,
the Burrells simply restate M. Burrell’s assertion, “The Decedent told Marcia
Burrell that she was a beneficiary because he was unaware that a beneficiary
change had been made in 2003.” (Doc. 81, p. 2). Personal knowledge goes
beyond a party’s beliefs or speculations. Riley v. Univ. of Alabama Health
Serv. Found., 990 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1187 (N.D. Ala. 2014); Gen. Longshore v.
Pate Stevedore, 41 F.3d 668 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a party’s belief does
not satisfy the personal knowledge requirement because “[b]elief, no matter
how sincere, is not equivalent to personal knowledge”) (citing Jameson v.
Jameson, 176 F.2d 58, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1949)). M. Burrell’s assertion that
Decedent “did not know [the policy] had been changed” is insufficient to
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support a finding that she has personal knowledge about the matter. M.
Burrell attempts to draw a conclusion regarding what Decedent knew. The
statement is nothing more than a belief about Decedent’s state of mind, and
such a belief, no matter how sincere, does not equate to M. Burrell’s personal
knowledge. Accordingly, the Court finds the paragraph 4 of M. Burrell’s
affidavit should be stricken.
D. Affidavit of Sherita Burrell (Doc. 68-7)
Jackson argues paragraph 2 of S. Burrell’s affidavit should be stricken
because the statement contains conclusory allegations, speculation,
conjecture that lack any evidentiary foundation, and hearsay. (Doc. 68-6 ¶ 2).
This assertion in paragraph 2 of S. Burrell’s affidavit is the same assertion in
paragraph 3 of M. Burrell’s affidavit. (See Doc. 68-7 ¶ 3). The statement in M.
Burrell’s affidavit was stricken, in part, as conclusory and speculative.
Accordingly, the Court finds the statement in paragraph 2 of S. Burrell’s
affidavit should be stricken, in part, for the same reasons as the statement in
paragraph 3 of M. Burrell’s affidavit.
Jackson also contends paragraph 3 of S. Burrell’s affidavit should be
stricken because it contains conclusory allegations, speculation, and
conjecture that lack any evidentiary foundation declaration. (Doc. 68-6 ¶ 3).
This assertion in paragraph 3 of S. Burrell’s affidavit is the same assertion in
paragraph 4 of M. Burrell’s affidavit. (See Doc. 68-7 ¶ 4). The statement in M.
Burrell’s affidavit was stricken as conclusory, speculative, and lacking any
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foundational support. Accordingly, the Court finds the statement in
paragraph 3 of S. Burrell’s affidavit should be stricken for the same reasons
as the statement in paragraph 4 of M. Burrell’s affidavit.
E. Affidavit of Shirley Ross Brooks (Doc. 68-8)
Jackson contends that portions of Brooks’ affidavit should be stricken
because they contain conclusory allegations, speculation, and conjecture that
lack any evidentiary foundation, and they are hearsay.
Specifically, Jackson argues paragraph 5 of Brooks’ affidavit is a
conclusory and unsupported allegation. Brooks states, “In 2003 Stormey D.
Burroughs Jackson lived with Edward L. Burrell. Stormey D. Burroughs
Jackson always referred to Edward L. Burrell as ‘Burrell.’ During 2003,
Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson had access to Edward L. Burrell’s personal
and financial information.” Jackson argues this allegation “lacks evidentiary
support and is based entirely on personal, unsupported statements.” (Doc. 72,
p. 8 ¶ 1). The Burrells argue in response that the evidentiary support for
Brooks’ argument is Brooks’ assertion in paragraph 6:
I know Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson had access to
Edward L. Burrell’s personal and financial information in
2003 because she called me in August 2003. During that
conversation, she said she was reviewing Edward L.
Burrell’s financial business and she wanted to know why
he was paying me $215.00 per month. I informed her that
those payments were for child support arrearages. (Doc.
68-8, p. 2 ¶ 6).
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The information Brooks provides in paragraph 6 transforms the allegation in
paragraph 5 from conclusory to an assertion with evidentiary support.
Accordingly, this Court finds that paragraph 5 should not be stricken.
Additionally, Jackson argues that Brooks’ assertion in paragraph 9 is
unsupported and conclusory. In support of her conclusory argument, Jackson
contends Brooks’ allegation – that Decedent “was very disturbed that
[Jackson] had access to his personal information” (Doc. 68-8, ¶ 9) – is not
supported by any record evidence. In response, the Burrells note that Brooks’
affidavit is record evidence. (Doc. 81, p. 5). Affidavits are considered part of
the record evidence, and the admissible portions of Brooks’ affidavit,
discussed infra, are evidentiary support for her assertion in paragraph 9.
Jackson also argues Brooks’ assertions in paragraph 3 of her affidavit
are hearsay. (Doc. 72, p. 10 ¶ 1). Brooks states:
During many of these conversations, Edward L. Burrell
informed me that he had not changed his beneficiary of
his Chrysler life insurance policy since our divorce. He
told me that he had not changed the beneficiary on his
Chrysler life insurance policy because he wanted those
benefits to go to his girls. Edward L. Burrell told me these
things many times, both before 2003 and after 2003. (Doc.
68-8 ¶ 3).
Jackson argues the statements are inadmissible hearsay. (Doc. 72, p. 10 ¶ 1).
The Burrells argue in response that Brooks’ statements qualify as a hearsay
exception under Rule 803(3) because they establish the Declarant’s thenexisting motive or intent. (Doc. 81, p. 6). The Burrells contend, “By assuring
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Shirley Ross Brooks that the Burrells would benefit from the life insurance
policy, the Decedent was conveying his intent to never designate Jackson as
the sole beneficiary.” (Doc. 81, p. 6). The statements in paragraph 3 of Brooks’
affidavit properly fall within this exception to the hearsay rule, and they
could be reduced to admissible form at trial. Furthermore, the following
portions of Brooks’ affidavit are also an exception to hearsay under Rule
803(3):
He asked me to keep the access information secret so
that no one could ever change his benefits. I kept the
access information secret and never accessed the
account after 2001. (Doc. 68-8 ¶ 4).
After Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson called me the
second time in 2003, I informed Edward L. Burrell about
my conversations with her. He was very disturbed that
Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson had access to his
personal information and was inquiring about his
financial affairs. He told me that she did not have his
permission to do that. (Doc. 68-8 ¶ 9).
[M]y numerous conversations with him over the years,
which affirmed that the policy would benefit his girls.
(Doc. 68-8 ¶ 10).
The Burrells also argue that paragraphs 3, 4, 9, and 10 qualify as
residual hearsay exceptions under Rule 807. In support of their Rule 807
argument, the Burrells present essentially the same supporting assertions for
Brooks’ affidavit they presented for M. Burrell’s affidavit. Supra p. 12-13.
The Court incorporates its reasoning from the Rule 807 argument in M.
Burrell’s affidavit to the Rule 807 argument in Brooks’ affidavit. Supra p. 1216. Accordingly, the Burrells have failed to show Decedent’s statements are
20
equivalent to the amount of trustworthiness required under Rule 807.
Accordingly, although the statements in paragraphs 3, 4, 9, and 10 do not
qualify as residual hearsay exceptions, they should not be stricken because
they are exceptions to the rule against hearsay under Rule 803(3).
Jackson also argues paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 11 are due to be stricken
because they contain inadmissible hearsay. (Doc. 72, p. 10 ¶¶ 3-5, 8). The
statements Jackson objects to are:
Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson always referred to
Edward L. Burrell as “Burrell.” (Doc. 68-8 ¶ 5).
During that conversation, she said she was reviewing
Edward L. Burrell’s financial business and she wanted to
know why he was paying me $215.00 per month. (Doc. 688 ¶ 6).
During that second conversation, she asked me for a copy
of the divorce decree for me and Edward L. Burrell. (Doc.
68-8 ¶ 7).
When Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson was in her 20s, she
told me that she would spit on Edward L. Burrell’s grave
because she was jealous of his relationship with Marcia L.
Burrell and Sherita N. Burrell. (Doc. 68-8 ¶ 11).
The Burrells argue paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 11 are not hearsay because
they are statements made by an opposing party under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2). FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). An opposing party is “an
adversary in a legal proceeding.” Party Opponent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014). Jackson is undeniably the Burrells’ adversary in this
proceeding, and as such, her statements are those of an opposing party.
21
Accordingly, paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 11 of Brooks’ affidavit should not be
stricken because they are not hearsay.
Additionally, Jackson argues paragraph 10 of Brooks’ affidavit should
be stricken as an unsupported, conclusory allegation. (Doc. 72, p.8-9 ¶ 3).
This assertion in paragraph 10 of S. Burrell’s affidavit is essentially the same
assertion in paragraph 3 of M. Burrell’s affidavit and paragraph 2 of S.
Burrell’s affidavit. (See Doc. 68-7 ¶ 3; Doc. 68-6 ¶ 2). Those statements in M.
Burrell’s affidavit and S. Burrell’s affidavit were stricken, in part, as
conclusory and speculative. Supra p. 17. Accordingly, the Court finds
paragraph 10 of Brooks’ affidavit should be stricken in part. The first
statement, “Edward L. Burrell never would have made Stormey D.
Burroughs Jackson the sole beneficiary of his Chrysler life insurance policy.”
should be stricken as conclusory and speculative. (Doc. 68-8, ¶ 10) The truth
asserted in the second statement, “[M]y numerous conversations with him
over the years which affirmed that the policy would benefit his girls.” should
not be stricken because it is an exception to the rule against hearsay under
Rule 803(3). (Doc. 68-7, ¶ 3).
Furthermore, Jackson argues paragraph 12 in Brooks’ affidavit is due
to be stricken because it is a conclusory and speculative allegation. (Doc. 72,
p. 9 ¶ 4). Brooks asserts that “the only way Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson
could have been named as the sole beneficiary of the Chrysler life insurance
policy in 2003 is if she utilized her access to Edward L. Burrell’s personal and
22
financial information to make the change without Edward L. Burrell’s
knowledge or consent.” (Doc. 68-8 ¶ 12). The Burrells argue, “The Decedent
told Shirley Ross Brooks that the Burrells were beneficiaries because he was
unaware that a beneficiary designation had been made in 2003.” (Doc. 81, p.
6). Brooks’ statement and the Burrells’ assertion in their response are too
speculative. Brooks’ argument is based upon a belief about what Jackson did,
and the Burrells’ argument is a belief about what Decedent knew. Those
beliefs, no matter how sincere, do not equate to personal knowledge.
Accordingly, the Court finds the paragraph 12 of Brooks’ affidavit should be
stricken.
IV. Jackson’s Motion for Summary Judgment and the Burrells’
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment
A. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears “the
initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that
there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial.”
Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the
moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.
“If the nonmoving party fails to make ‘a sufficient showing on an essential
element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,’ the
23
moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (footnote omitted)). “In reviewing whether the
nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing
the evidence and making credibility determination of the truth of the matter.
Instead, evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen,
965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). The mere existence, however, of any factual dispute will not
necessarily compel denial of a motion for summary judgment; rather, only
material factual disputes preclude entry of summary judgment. Lofton v.
Secretary of Dep‘t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir.
2004).
B. Analysis of Jackson’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Jackson moves for summary judgment on the basis that the Burrells
have failed to produce evidence to undermine Jackson as the sole beneficiary
under the Plan. She first argues that the Plan must be strictly enforced.
Additionally, Jackson alleges the Burrells have failed to produce any
evidence that Jackson fraudulently procured her designation as the sole
primary beneficiary.
1. Strict Enforcement of ERISA Plans
“ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests
of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.” Shaw v.
24
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2896, 77 L.Ed.2d 490
(1983) (citations omitted). Employee benefit plans under ERISA must be
“established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument.” 29. U.S.C. §
1102(a)(1). The written instrument must “provide for one or more named
fiduciaries who […] have authority to control and manage the operation and
administration of the plan.” Id. The fiduciary is responsible for “providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.” 29. U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i).
The Burrells do not dispute that the Plan is an ERISA-regulated
employee benefit plan funded by a life insurance policy issued by MetLife.
(Doc. 68, p. 6). Additionally, the Burrells agree that MetLife, as claim
fiduciary, must administer claims in accordance with ERISA and the
documents and instruments governing the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
ERISA requires plan administrators to follow strictly the amendment
procedures outlined in the plan’s documents. 29. U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). One
of the Plan’s documents is The Summary Plan Description (“SPD”). “As the
term ‘summary plan description’ suggests, the SPD is a document that
describes, in summary fashion, the relevant features of an employee benefit
plan.” Heffner v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 443 F.3d 1330, 1341
(11th Cir. 2006).
The SPD of Decedent’s Plan contains a “Beneficiary Provisions”
section. The section in the SPD provides:
You may designate or change your beneficiary at any time
by calling Benefit Express at 1-888-456-7800 to request a
25
form or go to http://resources.hewitt.com/daimlerchrysler
to designate or change them online. Any change of
beneficiary becomes effective the date you sign the form
or your online change has been confirmed, unless the
Insurance Carrier has paid a benefit before it receives the
signed form.” (Doc. 63-1, p. 2).
However, the amendment procedures outlined in the SPD do not contain the
same information as the amendment procedures outlined in the Plan.
The amendment procedures in the Plan are located in the “Beneficiary”
section under the Plan’s “General Provisions.” The section in the Plan
provides:
You may designate a beneficiary in Your application or
enrollment form. You may change Your Beneficiary at any
time. To do so, You must send a Signed and dated,
Written request to the Policyholder using a form
satisfactory to Us. Your Written request to change the
Beneficiary must be sent to the Policyholder within 30
days of the date You sign such request. You do not need
your Beneficiary’s consent to make a change. When We
receive the change, it will take effect as of the date You
Signed it. The change will not apply to any payment made
in good faith by Us before the change request was
recorded.
(Doc. 63-1, p. 60). The SPD and the Plan include different provisions with
respect to changing beneficiaries. While the SPD incorporates two ways in
which to effectuate a beneficiary change, the Plan includes succinct
guidelines employees must follow. Compare Liberty Life Ins. Co. of Boston v.
Kennedy, 358 F.3d 1295, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 2004).
26
An SPD must “be written in a manner calculated to be understood by
the average plan participant” and “reasonably apprise such participants and
beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan.” 29. U.S.C. §
1022(a). “Under well-established ERISA law, language contained in a plan
insurance policy may be questioned only if a ‘direct conflict’ exists with
affirmative language appearing in a valid summary plan description.” Liberty
Life Assur. Co. of Boston v. Kennedy, 228 F.Supp.2d 1367, 1377 (N.D. Ga
2002) (quoting Mers v. Marriott Int’l Group, 144 F.3d 1014, 1023 (7th Cir.
1998)). “In the context of an employee benefit plan, a conflict would exist if
the employee were somehow misled by the Summary Plan Description, which
is a document intended to be accurate and comprehensive and which
reasonably apprises an employee of his or her rights under the Plan.” Liberty
Life Assur. Co. of Boston v. Kennedy, 358 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citing McKnight v. S. Life & Health Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1566, 1570 (11th
Cir.1985)).
The SPD at issue in this litigation apprises the average plan
participant of two ways in which a beneficiary change may become effective:
(1) as of the date the plan participant signs the form, or (2) as of the date the
online change has been confirmed. The affirmative language in the SPD –
effectuating a beneficiary change as of the date an online change has been
confirmed – directly conflicts with the language contained in the Plan, which
27
only allows beneficiary changes to take place as of the date the participant
signed the written form.
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that the Summary Plan Description
should be the controlling document if the SPD and the Plan conflict. Liberty
Life, 228 F.Supp.2d at 1377 (citing McKnight v. Southern Life & Health Ins.
Co., 758 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1985)). In McKnight, the Court noted, “It is of
no effect to publish and distribute a plan summary booklet designed to
simplify and explain a voluminous and complex document, and then proclaim
that any inconsistencies will be governed by the plan. Unfairness will flow to
the employee for reasonably relying on the summary booklet.” McKnight, 758
F.2d at 1570. “[W]here a plan participant or beneficiary relies on a provision
in the SPD that conflicts with the plan, he or she may enforce the terms of
the SPD over the terms of the plan.” Heffner, 443 F.3d at 1341-42.
The SPD clearly states a plan participant could change his/her
beneficiary by requesting a form via telephone or by changing the beneficiary
online. MetLife, as plan administrator, must strictly follow those amendment
procedures. 29. U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). Jackson provided a computer
screenshot showing Decedent’s amendment to his beneficiary designation.
(Doc. 63-4). The screenshot lists Jackson as the beneficiary of the policy;
October 3, 2003 as the effective date of the policy; and the relation of Jackson
to Decedent as “Child Beneficiary.” (Doc. 63-4). The Burrells do not dispute
28
the identifying information included on the screenshot; the Burrells dispute
the validity of the designation. (Doc. 68, p. 2 ¶ 4).
In response to Jackson’s contentions, the Burrells provided email
communications certified by MetLife’s Custodian of Records. (Doc. 68-2). In
the communications, MetLife revealed that Decedent designated his
beneficiary via telephone. (Doc. 68-2, p. 2). Additionally, MetLife disclosed
that it did not maintain an account history for beneficiary designations. (Doc.
68-2, p. 2).
In reviewing the materials on file with this Court, the undersigned
finds the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in regard to Decedent’s
beneficiary designation. As the moving party, Jackson has met her initial
burden of showing, by reference to the materials on file, that there are no
genuine issues of material fact. Jackson has presented a computer
screenshot, which may be considered conclusive evidence Decedent
effectuated a valid beneficiary designation online in accordance with the
terms of the SPD. Jackson satisfied her responsibility as the moving party,
but the Burrells have sufficiently shown the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact. The Burrells have produced disputing evidence that Decedent’s
designation was made by telephone. Evidence of the non-movant, the
Burrells, is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are drawn in their
favor. In doing so, this Court recognizes the presence of a material factual
dispute regarding the validity of the means by which the beneficiary
29
designation was made in accordance with strict enforcement of the Plan.
Accordingly, the dispute presented here precludes the entry of summary
judgment on the “strict enforcement” argument.
2. Jackson Fraudulently Procured Her Designation as
Beneficiary
Jackson contests the Burrells’ position that Jackson fraudulently
procured her designation as Decedent’s sole primary Beneficiary. (Doc. 62, p.
10). In their response to Jackson’s argument of fraudulent procurement, the
Burrells primarily rely on assertions made in their affidavits as well as the
statements in Brooks’ affidavit. (Doc. 68, p.8-9).
Fraudulent procurement of insurance “is provable as a defense in an
action upon [an insurance] policy.” American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S.
203, 212 (1937) (citations omitted). Fraudulent procurement stems from
fraudulent misrepresentations made to insurance companies. See American
United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1052 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The
ultimate goal of this enterprise was to induce insurers to pay benefits on
policies that never should have issued, owing to fraudulent
misrepresentations during the application process.”). Accordingly, a party
must show the presence of fraudulent misrepresentation(s) to prove
fraudulent procurement.
The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are: “(1) a
misrepresentation of material fact, (2) made willfully to deceive, recklessly,
without knowledge, or mistakenly, (3) which was justifiably relied on by the
30
plaintiff under the circumstances, and (4) which caused damage as a
proximate consequence.” Mosley v. Wyeth, Inc., 719 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1346
(S.D. Ala. 2010) (citations omitted).
Jackson contends the Burrells “have absolutely zero supported,
legitimate evidence to claim that the beneficiary designation is fraudulent.”
(Doc. 62, p. 11). Jackson argues that evidence of Decedent’s substance abuse,
the fact that he was not technologically savvy, Decedent’s promises to take
care of the Burrells, and statements about “who [Jackson] is as a person” are
not valid evidence to show Jackson fraudulently procured the beneficiary
designation. (Doc. 62, p. 11-12). This evidence does not prove Jackson
misrepresented information in order to fraudulently procure the beneficiary
designation. As the movant, Jackson has met her initial burden of showing
that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding Jackson’s
fraudulent procurement of the beneficiary designation.
The Burrells’ argue in response, “As established herein, it was
Decedent’s intent that the Burrells receive the Plan benefits. The beneficiary
identified by MetLife’s computer screenshot is inconsistent with such intent.”
(Doc. 68, p. 8). In support of their argument, the Burrells rely on the
following assertions: paragraphs 2 and 3 of S. Burrell’s affidavit; paragraphs
3 and 4 of M. Burrell’s affidavit; and paragraphs 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 12 of
Brooks’ affidavit as support for their argument. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of S.
Burrell’s affidavit, paragraphs 3 and 4 of M. Burrell’s affidavit, and
31
paragraph 12 of Brooks’ affidavit were stricken in whole or in part. As such,
this portion of the Burrell’s response relying on those assertions is also
stricken. Because Jackson’s motion to strike was granted in part, this Court
will only consider the following affidavit assertions referenced in the Burrells
response:
[M]y father assured my numerous times, both before 2003
and after 2003, that I was a beneficiary of the life
insurance policy. (Doc. 68-6 ¶ 2; Doc. 68-7, ¶ 3).
Edward L. Burrell and I were divorced in 1996. After our
divorce, we remained in close contact and we spoke at
length approximately 3-4 times per year until his death in
2015. (Doc. 68-8 ¶ 2).
During many of those conversations, Edward L. Burrell
informed me that he had not changed the beneficiary of
his Chrysler life insurance policy because he wanted those
benefits to go to his girls. Edward L. Burrell told me these
things many times, both before 2003 and after 2003. (Doc.
68-8 ¶ 3).
I know Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson had access to
Edward L. Burrell’s financial information in 2003 because
she called me in August 2003. During that conversation,
she said she was reviewing Edward L. Burrell’s financial
business and she wanted to know why he was paying me
$215.00 per month. I informed her that those payments
were for child support arrearages. (Doc. 68-8 ¶ 6).
Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson called me again between
August 2003 and October 2003. During that second
conversation, she asked me for a copy of the divorce
decree for me and Edward L. Burrell. I became irate
during that call because I know Edward L. Burrell would
not want Stormey D. Jackson inquiring into his personal
or financial affairs. (Doc. 68-8 ¶ 7).
I knew Edward L. Burrell from 1979 until his death in
2015. Despite his problems with addiction, Edward L.
32
Burrell never relied on anyone for help and he never
would have allowed someone else to handle his financial
affairs. (Doc. 68-8 ¶ 8).
After Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson called the second
time in 2003, I informed Edward L. Burrell about my
conversations with her. He was very disturbed Stormey D.
Burroughs Jackson had access to his personal information
and was inquiring about his financial affairs. He told me
that she did not have his permission to do that. (Doc. 68-8
¶ 9).
The Burrells also note that Jackson was living with Decedent at the same
time of the alleged beneficiary change. (Doc. 68, p. 8).
In order to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the
Burrells must make a sufficient showing on an essential element of their
case. Clark, 929 F. 2d at 608. The Burrells must make a sufficient showing
that: (1) Jackson misrepresented a material fact to the plaintiff, MetLife, (2)
Jackson’s misrepresentation was made willfully to deceive, recklessly,
without knowledge, or mistakenly, (3) MetLife justifiably relied on Jackson’s
misrepresentations under the circumstances, and (4) MetLife’s reliance on
Jackson’s misrepresentations caused damage as a proximate consequence.”
See Mosley, 719 F.Supp.2d at 1346.
The crux of the Burrells’ response is based on representations
Decedent made to the Burrells and their mother, not representations Jackson
made to MetLife. The other relevant evidence the Burrells have presented to
show Jackson fraudulently misrepresented a material fact to MetLife is the
email correspondence from MetLife’s custodian of records. (Doc. 68-2). The
33
correspondence notes that Decedent’s beneficiary designation was made via
telephone. (Doc. 68-2, p. 2). The Burrells argue the Plan does not allow for
beneficiary changes via telephone because it “is intended to prevent fraud on
the Plan and to prevent beneficiary changes which are inconsistent with
Decedent’s wishes.” (Doc. 68, p. 7). However, the Burrells have not presented
sufficient evidence to connect Jackson to the phone call. While evidence that
Jackson lived with Decedent in 2003 and inquired about Decedent’s personal
and financial affairs may be suspicious behavior, it is not proof that satisfies
the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation. While crediting the evidence of
the non-movant, the Burrells, this Court finds their evidence is insufficient to
show Jackson misrepresented a material fact to MetLife. Furthermore, a
justifiable inference drawn in the Burrells’ favor does not lead this Court to
conclude that Jackson fraudulently procured the beneficiary designation.
Accordingly, Jackson’s request for summary judgment is due to be
granted.
B. Analysis of the Burrells’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment
In their partial motion for summary judgment, the Burrells present
the issue of Jackson’s paternity. Though the motion seeks to narrow issues at
trial, this issue of paternity will not become ripe for review until (and if) a
determination is made regarding the validity of the beneficiary designation.
The ripeness doctrine “keeps federal courts from deciding cases
prematurely.” Meza v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 693 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2012)
34
(quoting United States v. Rivera, 613 F.3d 1046, 1049 (11th Cir. 2010)).
Ripeness “protects courts from engaging in speculation or wasting their
resources through the review of potential or abstract disputes.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). An issue is not ripe for adjudication if it “rests
upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed
may not occur at all.” Meza v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 693 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir.
2012) (quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)).
The Burrells argue their motion for partial summary judgment is due
to be granted because “the undisputed facts establish that Richard Burroughs
is the presumed father of Jackson, and Jackson has failed to produce
adequate evidence to rebut that presumption.” (Doc. 65, p. 4). However,
deciding whether or not Jackson is the biological child of Decedent would be
premature at this stage of the litigation. This Court will not engage in
speculation or waste resources through review of the issue of Jackson’s
paternity when the determination is contingent upon a conclusive factual
finding regarding the validity of Decedent’s beneficiary designation.
Jackson argues this Court “should disregard the paternity issue”
because “a familial relationship is not a requirement for naming a beneficiary
under an ERISA-regulated plan.” (Doc. 69, p. 10). While this Court recognizes
Jackson’s contention that the relationship between Decedent and Jackson is
irrelevant (Doc. 69, p. 9), the undersigned is inclined to disagree with
Jackson’s assertion that “Paternity has no bearing on the contractual
35
analysis of the [Plan] […].” (Doc. 69, p. 7). If a factual determination is made
finding Decedent’s beneficiary designation to Jackson as invalid, paternity
would affect MetLife’s determination of payment. The Plan provides:
If there is no Beneficiary designated or no surviving
Beneficiary at Your death, We will determine the
Beneficiary according to the following order:
1. Your spouse, if alive;
2. Your child(ren), if there is no Surviving Spouse;
3. Your parent, if there is no surviving child;
4. Your sibling, if there is no surviving parent; […]
(Doc. 63-1, p. 60). If Decedent’s beneficiary designation to Jackson were
deemed invalid, MetLife would determine the proper beneficiary in the
aforementioned order. As such, the issue of paternity is relevant to the
contractual analysis of the Plan, but such relevancy is not ripe for review at
this stage of the litigation.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the motion of Stormey D. Burroughs
Jackson to strike the affidavits of Marcia Burrell, Sherita Burrell, and
Shirley Ross Brooks (Doc. 72) is GRANTED IN PART, as follows:
1) The Court hereby STRIKES the following portions of the affidavit
of Marcia Burrell:
My father did not change the beneficiary of his Chrysler life
insurance policy in 2003 to Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson. I
know this because […]. (Doc. 68-7 ¶ 3).
My father never spoke to me about the alleged change to his
Chrysler life insurance policy because he did not know it had
been changed. (Doc. 68-7 ¶ 4).
36
2) The Court hereby STRIKES the following portions of the affidavit
of Sherita Burrell:
My father did not change the beneficiary of his Chrysler life
insurance policy in 2003 to Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson. I
know this because […]. (Doc. 68-6 ¶ 2).
My father never spoke to me about the alleged change to his
Chrysler life insurance policy because he did not know it had
been changed. (Doc. 68-6 ¶ 3).
3) The Court hereby STRIKES the following portions of the affidavit of
Shirley Ross Brooks:
Edward L. Burrell never would have made Stormey D.
Burroughs Jackson the sole beneficiary of his Chrysler life
insurance policy. (Doc. 68-8 ¶ 10).
“[T]he only way Stormey D. Burroughs Jackson could have been
named as the sole beneficiary of the Chrysler life insurance
policy in 2003 is if she utilized her access to Edward L. Burrell’s
personal and financial information to make the change without
Edward L. Burrell’s knowledge or consent.” (Doc. 68-8 ¶ 12).
In all other respects, Jackson’s motion to strike is DENIED.
Moreover, the Court hereby GRANTS Jackson’s motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 64). All parties agree that the MetLife records show that
Jackson was the named beneficiary of the policy regardless of the method
used to change beneficiary, and because the Burrells are unable to
demonstrate that the change in beneficiary was fraudulently procured, the
designation of Jackson as the beneficiary prevails.
37
Finally, the Court DENIES the Burrells’ motion for partial summary
judgment (Doc. 65).
Designation of the distribution of the interpleaded funds, and
Judgment will be entered by separate order.
DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of May, 2018.
/s/ Callie V. S. Granade
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
38
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