Mahan v. Colvin

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER entered that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff David Allen Mahan, Jr., benefits be AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge P. Bradley Murray on 8/24/2017. (eec)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DAVID ALLEN MAHAN, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,1
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-0483-MU

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff David Allen Mahan, Jr., brings this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying his claim for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the
Act”) and for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), based on disability, under Title
XVI of the Act. The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for all proceedings in this Court.
(Doc. 21 (“In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ.
P. 73, the parties in this case consent to have a United States Magistrate Judge
conduct any and all proceedings in this case, … order the entry of a final judgment,
and conduct all post-judgment proceedings.”)). Upon consideration of the
administrative record, Mahan’s brief, the Commissioner’s brief, and oral argument

1
Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on
January 23, 2017. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Nancy A. Berryhill is substituted for former Acting
Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant in this action.

presented at the August 15, 2017 hearing before the undersigned Magistrate
Judge, it is determined that the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits should
be affirmed.2
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mahan applied for DIB, under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 423-425, and
for SSI, based on disability, under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d,
on April 24, 2013, alleging disability beginning on March 15, 2013. (Tr.142-51). His
application was denied at the initial level of administrative review on September 17,
2013. (Tr. 98). On November 15, 2013, Mahan requested a hearing by an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. 99-100). After a hearing was held on
September 24, 2014, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that Mahan
was not under a disability from the date the application was filed through the date
of the decision, February 13, 2015. (Tr.15-27). Mahan appealed the ALJ’s decision
to the Appeals Council, and, on July 27, 2016, the Appeals Council denied his
request for review of the ALJ’s decision, thereby making the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-3).
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Mahan sought judicial review
in this Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). (Doc. 1). The
Commissioner filed an answer and the social security transcript on December 15,
2016. (Docs. 10, 12). Both parties filed briefs setting forth their respective

2
Any appeal taken from this Order and Judgment shall be made to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. See Doc. 30. (“An appeal from a judgment entered by a
Magistrate Judge shall be taken directly to the United States Court of Appeals for
the judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of
this district court.”).

2

positions. (Docs. 14, 18). Oral argument was held before the undersigned
Magistrate Judge on August 15, 2017. The case is now ripe for decision.
II. CLAIMS ON APPEAL
Mahan alleges that the ALJ’s decision to deny him benefits is in error for the
following reasons:
1. The ALJ erroneously failed to assess all of Mahan’s mental impairments when
formulating his residual functional capacity (RFC); and
2. The ALJ erroneously failed to fulfill the duty to develop the record by not
ordering an updated consultative psychological examination.
(Doc. 14 at pp. 1-2).
III. BACKGROUND FACTS
Mahan was born on August 26, 1978, and was 34 years old at the time he
filed his claim for benefits. (Tr. 142). He alleged disability due to a learning
disability (not being able to read), a left shoulder injury, and depression. (Tr. 43-45,
177, 203). He graduated from high school, but was in special education classes.
(Tr. 38, 178). He can read very little, but can do simple math and knows how to
use a calculator. (Tr. 39-40). He is not able to pay bills, count change, handle a
savings account, or use a checkbook because he “can’t read.” (Tr. 39-40, 186). He
participated in job training in maintenance through Job Corps in 2000. (Tr. 39,
178). He has worked as a custodian, a crane company helper, a manual laborer, a
groundskeeper/maintenance man, and a satellite installer. (Tr. 40-41, 178). Mahan
last worked on March 15, 2013. (Tr. 177). He testified that he has had job
opportunities, but has not been able to pass the tests required for the jobs. (Tr. 42).

3

At the time of the hearing before the ALJ on September 24, 2014, Mahan
lived with his wife and thirteen month old child. (Tr. 38). During the relevant time
period, he engaged in normal life activities; such as, handling his personal care,
taking care of his son while his wife was at work, feeding and bathing the family
dogs, helping clean the house by sweeping and mopping, mowing the yard with a
riding lawn mower, making minor repairs to the house, running errands, grocery
shopping, and running the sound equipment at church on Sunday. (Tr. 45-49, 18386). He enjoys fishing, taking care of his dogs, watching television, and handy man
activities that he can perform with his limitation of not being able to lift over 30
pounds. (Tr. 187).
After conducting a hearing, the ALJ made a determination that Mahan had
not been under a disability during the relevant time period, and thus, was not
entitled to benefits. (Tr.16-41).
IV. ALJ’S DECISION
After considering all of the evidence, the ALJ made the following findings
that are relevant to the issues presented in her February 13, 2015 decision:
3.
The claimant has the following severe
impairments: history of left shoulder injury, mild
anxiety and depression, and reading disorder (20 CFR
404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1(20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and
416.926).
***

4

The evidence does not demonstrate that the claimant has valid
IQ scores of 70 or below or mental impairments that cause
marked restriction of [his] activities of daily living, marked
difficulties in maintaining social functioning, marked difficulties
maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, or repeated
episodes of decompensation of extended duration, as required
by Sections 12.02, 12.04 and 12.05 of the Listings (Exhibit 7F).
The severity of the claimant's mental impairments, considered
singly and in combination, do not meet or medically equal the
criteria of Medical Listings 12.04 and 12.06. In making this
finding, the undersigned has considered whether the "paragraph
B" criteria are satisfied. To satisfy the "paragraph B" criteria, the
mental impairments must result in at least two of the following:
marked restriction of activities of daily living; marked difficulties in
maintaining social functioning; marked difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace ; or repeated episodes of
decompensation, each of extended duration. A marked limitation
means more than moderate but less than extreme. Repeated
episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration, means
three episodes within 1 year, or an average of once every 4
months, each lasting for at least 2 weeks.
In activities of daily living, the claimant has none restriction. The
claimant is capable of initiating and participating in activities such
as cleaning, shopping, and maintaining a residence independent
of supervision or direction. While the claimant's impairment may
interfere with complex activities, the performance of a simple
routine is appropriate, effective and sustainable (Exhibits 4F, 5F,
and 7F).
In social functioning, the claimant has mild difficulties. The
claimant is able to initiate social contacts, communicate clearly,
participate in group activities and demonstrate cooperative
behaviors. Medical evaluations, discussed below, contain
indication of at least some difficulty. Nonetheless, the evidence
does not suggest greater than moderate limitation in this domain
(Exhibits 4F, 5F, 7F).
With regard to concentration, persistence, or pace, the claimant
has moderate difficulties. The claimant can sustain the focused
attention and concentration necessary to permit the timely and
appropriate completion of tasks commonly found in routine and

5

repetitive, not detailed or complex, work settings (Exhibits 4F,
5F, and 7F).
As for episodes of decompensation, the claimant has
experienced no episodes of decompensation, which have been
of extended duration. The record does not indicate a significant
sustained loss of adaptive functioning.
The record evidences that the claimant has been treated for
anxiety and depression. There is no history of psychiatric
hospitalization. The claimant received treatment for dysthymic
disorder and anxiety disorder at the Mobile County Health
Department from August 13, 2013 through April 15, 2014.
Reported symptoms of depression included loss of interest in
activities, low self-esteem, little interest or pleasure in doing
things, feeling down, and trouble concentrating. Reported
symptoms of anxiety included feeling nervous, anxious, or on
edge; worrying, and having trouble relaxing (Exhibit 5F). The
claimant's symptoms have been medically managed with Celexa
and Effexor (Exhibits 5F, 8F). The treatment records state that
the claimant's response to treatment was fair (Exhibit 5F, 7) and
on April 15, 2014, it was noted that the claimant's the medication
(Effexor) was working (Exhibit 5F, 6).
In a psychological consultative examination on September 3,
2013, the claimant's mood seemed mildly depressed. His affect
was appropriate, he did not appear anxious, thought processes
were grossly intact, and insight, understanding, and judgment
were fair. He was assessed as having dysthymic disorder and
anxiety disorder, NOS. No limitations or restrictions were
indicated. Psychologist Lucille T. Williams said it was likely that, in
the next 6 to 12 months, the claimant would have a favorable
response to treatment, including psychotherapy (Exhibit 4F).
The undersigned notes that the consulting psychologist, Dr. Lucille
T. Williams, submitted a detailed report, which included
psychological testing, a clinical interview, and observations. The
undersigned finds that the examination was thorough and
consistent with the evidence of record and has given Dr.
Williams's findings considerable weight.
I have also taken into consideration the May 20, 2010 vocational
rehabilitation findings of psychologist Thomas S. Bennett. The
claimant was administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale

6

Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV), which revealed a Full Scale IQ Score of
74. The claimant's reading score within the deficient range overall;
his reading recognition skills, reading comprehension skills, and
phonetic skills were all at the primary school level. His written
spelling skills and skills and written expression work also
extremely poor. He was assessed as having a reading disorder,
disorder of written expression, with consideration to borderline
intellectual functioning (Exhibit 7F).
The claimant was assigned a Global Assessment Functioning
(GAF) score of 65, which is indicative of an individual who has
some mild symptoms or some difficulty in social, occupational, or
school functioning, but generally functioning pretty well. Dr.
Bennett concluded that the claimant could do adequate work in the
hands portion of HVAC classes, but it was unlikely that he would
be able to read technical materials of any sort (Exhibit 7F).
Although this report is well before the claimant's alleged onset
date, I have taken Dr. Bennett's findings into consideration in
limiting the claimant to simple, repetitive, and routine tasks.
***
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform light work as defined in
20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) as follows: the
claimant can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10
pounds frequently; and can sit, stand, and walk 6 hours
in an 8 hour day. The claimant can push and pull as
much as he can lift and carry. The claimant can
occasionally reach overhead with the left arm. The
claimant would be limited to simple, repetitive, and
routine tasks.
In making this finding, the undersigned has considered all
symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can
reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical
evidence and other evidence, based on the requirements of 20
CFR 404.1529 and 416.929 and SSRs 96-4p and 96-7p. The
undersigned has also considered opinion evidence in
accordance with the requirements of 20 CFR 404.1527 and
416.927 and SSRs 96-2p, 96-5p, 96-6p and 06-3p.

7

In considering the claimant's symptoms, the undersigned must
follow a two-step process in which it must first be determined
whether there is an underlying medically determinable physical or
mental impairment(s)--i.e., an impairment(s) that can be shown
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques--that could reasonably be expected to produce the
claimant's pain or other symptoms.
Second, once an underlying physical or mental impairment(s) that
could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's pain or
other symptoms has been shown, the undersigned must evaluate
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant's
symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the
claimant's functioning. For this purpose, whenever statements
about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of
pain or other symptoms are not substantiated by objective
medical evidence, the undersigned must make a finding on the
credibility of the statements based on a consideration of the entire
case record.
The claimant alleges disability due to residuals from a left shoulder injury,
depression, anxiety, and inability to read well. At the hearing, the claimant
testified that he has pain in his left arm, it is difficult to move his arm, and
sometimes his hand goes numb on the left side. He said he has a hard
time lifting anything with his left shoulder over a certain amount of weight.
He said he is able to walk 8-10 hours, and has no problems walking or
standing.
The claimant also said he has depression and anxiety, and he has a hard
time concentrating. He said he can read some, but very little. He said he
graduated with a high school diploma, and can only read simple words.
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the
claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this
decision.
***
Finally, while the record references instances of depression, and a reading
disorder, anxiety, there is no evidence to show that this condition would
preclude the claimant from performing simple, repetitive, and routine tasks
within the parameters set out above.

8

(Tr. 20-25).
V. DISCUSSION
Eligibility for DIB and SSI benefits requires that the claimant be disabled. 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E), 1382(a)(1)-(2). A claimant is disabled if the claimant is
unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The impairment
must be severe, making the claimant unable to do the claimant’s previous work or
any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505-11. “Substantial gainful activity means work
that … [i]nvolves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties [that]
[i]s done (or intended) for pay or profit.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1510.
In all Social Security cases, an ALJ utilizes a five-step sequential evaluation
in determining whether the claimant is disabled:
(1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether the severe
impairment meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairment in
the regulations; (4) if not, whether the claimant has the RFC to perform her
past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether, in light of the claimant’s RFC,
age, education and work experience, there are other jobs the claimant can
perform.
Watkins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 457 F. App’x 868, 870 (11th Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), (c)-(f), 416.920(a)(4), (c)-(f); Phillips v.
Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004)) (footnote omitted). The claimant

9

bears the burden of proving the first four steps, and if the claimant does so, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove the fifth step. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d
1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999).
If the claimant appeals an unfavorable ALJ decision, the reviewing court
must determine whether the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits was
“supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.”
Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citations omitted). “In
determining whether substantial evidence exists, [the reviewing court] must view
the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as
unfavorable to the [Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129,
131 (11th Cir. 1986). The reviewing court “may not decide the facts anew, reweigh
the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Id. When
a decision is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court must affirm
“[e]ven if [the court] find[s] that the evidence preponderates against the Secretary’s
decision.” MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986).
As set forth above, Mahan has asserted two grounds in support of his
argument that the Commissioner’s decision to deny him benefits is in error. The
Court will address Mahan’s contentions in the order presented.
A. ALJ’s Assessment of Mental Limitations

10

Mahan asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to assess mental limitations
when formulating Mahan’s RFC even though the ALJ had found his reading
disorder and mild depression and anxiety to be severe impairments. (Doc. 14 at p.
2). Mahan relies upon three separate arguments in support of this contention.
First, Mahan argues that the ALJ should have included his moderate
difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace in the hypothetical
question posed to the VE. The only evidence of any difficulties in these arenas
were Mahan’s reports to the social worker and doctors who treated or examined
him on several occasions between August of 2013 and April of 2014 that he had
some trouble concentrating (Tr. 274-75, 279-303) and his testimony at the hearing
that he has trouble concentrating (Tr. 45). On September 3, 2013, Mahan was
examined by Dr. Lucile T. Williams, a clinical psychologist, for a disability
evaluation. (Tr. 274). Dr. Williams noted that he did not appear anxious, but his
mood seemed mildly depressed. (Tr. 275). Based on her examination, she opined
that his estimated intelligence was low average. (Id.). He reported to her that he
was experiencing low self esteem, difficulty concentrating, and decreased energy.
(Tr. 274). She diagnosed him with Dysthymic Disorder (chronic mild depression)
and Anxiety Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified, and opined that he would likely
have a favorable response to treatment within the next six to twelve months. (Tr.
275).
He was also examined and treated at the Mobile County Health Department
from August 13, 2013 to April 15, 2014. He was seen there by social worker Emma
Harris for therapy for his mild depression and anxiety. (Tr. 279-303). When he saw

11

her on August 13, 2013, he reported that he was having a decreased ability to
concentrate and was feeling anxious due to the recent birth of his son and his
worries about being unable to find work because of his reading disorder and left
shoulder pain. (Tr. 301). She assessed him with Anxiety disorder NOS with
Learning Disability and depression features. (Id.). He continued with therapy with
Harris on a regular basis. He saw Dr. Gregory Evans at the Health Department on
April 15, 2014 for a follow-up visit. Dr. Evans noted that he was “[n]ot feeling tired
or poorly” and had “no depression.” (Tr. 279). He also saw Harris for a follow-up
visit that day and she assessing him with Anxiety disorder NOS and noted that he
was “making fair progress as evidence[d] by patient reporting ‘feeling a little better’
and scores decreasing 5 points from March 2014.” (Tr. 282). Mahan testified that
when he took the medication prescribed by the doctors that it helped with his
depression. (Tr. 44).
After noting that she assessed Mahan with moderate difficulties with regard
to concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ found that he could “sustain the
focused attention and concentration necessary to permit the timely and appropriate
completion of tasks commonly found in routine and repetitive, not detailed or
complex, work settings.” (Tr. 21). Therefore, in the hypothetical given to the VE,
the ALJ limited Mahan to “simple, repetitive and routine tasks.” Based on the
medical evidence submitted and Mahan’s testimony, the Court finds that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that this limitation accounted
for Mahan’s limits in concentration.

12

Next, Mahan asserts that the ALJ did not assign any mental limitations in
her RFC finding that accounted for Mahan’s reading disorder, which the ALJ had
found to be a severe impairment. (Doc. 14 at p. 4). This assertion, however, is
factually inaccurate because the ALJ specifically limited Mahan to light work with
the additional limitation of simple, repetitive, and routine tasks. (Tr. 23). In her
Decision, the ALJ recognized that Mahan had been tested and examined by
psychologist Thomas S. Bennett and had been assessed with a 70 IQ score and
deficient performance in reading skills. (Tr. 22-23). She stated that she had “taken
Dr. Bennett’s findings into consideration in limiting the claimant to simple,
repetitive, and routine tasks.” (Tr. 23). In determining Mahan’s RFC, she
specifically considered his testimony at the hearing that he could “read some, but
very little” and “can only read simple words.” (Tr. 24). Finally, the ALJ concluded
that there was no evidence to show that Mahan’s reading disorder “would preclude
[him] from performing simple, repetitive, and routine tasks within the parameters”
included in his RFC. (Tr. 25). The Court also finds that substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s conclusion that this limitation accounted for Mahan’s reading
disorder.
Last, Mahan asserts that the ALJ erred in her RFC assessment because
she did not take into account any inability to interact with co-workers, supervisors,
or the public, or any inability to adapt to work place changes. In his brief, Mahan
argues, without any support, that his anxiety and depression would affect these
abilities. However, he presented no evidence of any such affect. In fact, the record
shows that Mahan attends church every Sunday and helps with the sound system,

13

that he goes grocery shopping, and that he enjoys socializing with family. (Tr. 4549, 183-86). The Court finds that the ALJ did not err in this regard.
B. ALJ’s Failure to Order Updated Consultative Psychological Examination
Mahan claims that the ALJ erred by not obtaining “an updated consultative
psychological examination.” (Doc. 14 at p. 5). Mahan, through his attorney,
requested both on orthopedic examination and a psychological examination with
IQ testing one week prior to the hearing before the ALJ. (Tr. 226). At the hearing,
the ALJ discussed the requested orthopedic evaluation (“I also note that you sent a
request for an orthopedic evaluation.”), but did not mention a request for a
psychological examination and Mahan’s attorney did not correct the ALJ’s
statement or request such an examination. (Tr. 37). At the conclusion of the
hearing, the following discussion ensued:
ALJ: Anything in close, before we close out?
ATTY: No, Your Honor. Just the note that I requested the orthopedic
CE. Looks like the internal medicine said that he should do an ortho
CE as well.
ALJ: I was trying to scan through the notes, the records that you had
sent in. I didn’t get very far. So I'm going to look through the records
and then I'll -- you‘ ll get something in the mail -ATTY: Okay.
ALJ: -- one way or the other -ATTY: All right.
ALJ: letting you know what our decision is. I had hoped to be able to at
least scan through the records before the end of the hearing. But I didn‘ t get
through them.
ATTY: I mean I went through them obviously this morning, after I got
them. And it looks like all the treatment for the Mobile County Health
Department is all psychiatric treatment.
ALJ: That's -- actually what I was trying to look at. But I'll let both -- you'll
get something in the mail.
ATTY: Okay.
ALJ: And if there is nothing further, the hearing in this matter is closed.
ATTY: Thank you, Your Honor.

14

(Tr. 62-63).
“The administrative law judge has a duty to develop the record where appropriate
but is not required to order a consultative examination as long as the record contains
sufficient evidence for the administrative law judge to make an informed decision.”
Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F. 3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2001). In this case, with regard to
Mahan’s mental impairments, the ALJ had Dr. Bennett’s comprehensive medical
examination, which included IQ testing, Dr. Williams’s report from her consultative
examination during the relevant period, and the records from Mahan’s treatment at the
Mobile County Health Department, which showed that he was slowly improving and had
responded favorably to medication. Based on these records, the ALJ assessed some
limitations in Mahan’s ability to perform some work and included those in her RFC. Based
on the fact that the record contains sufficient evidence of Mahan’s mental impairment and
the fact that Mahan’s attorney did not discuss a consultative psychological evaluation at
the hearing when that very subject was discussed, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err
by not ordering another consultative psychological examination.
CONCLUSION
As noted above, it is not this Court’s place to reweigh the evidence or
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. It is well-established that this
Court is limited to a determination of whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. The Court finds that the
ALJ’s Decision that Mahan is not entitled to benefits is supported by substantial
evidence and based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that

15

the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff David Allen
Mahan, Jr., benefits be AFFIRMED.
DONE and ORDERED this the 24th day of August, 2017.
s/P. BRADLEY MURRAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16