U S Incorporated v. TUG SEGUIN et al

Filing 31

Order that by 6/19/2017 plaintiff is to file a request for entry of default against defendants Hartley and TUG SUGUIN or show cause for its inability to do so. Signed by Magistrate Judge Katherine P. Nelson on 6/9/2017. (srr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
U S INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
v.
)
)
TUG SEGUIN, in rem, and
)
HARTLEY MARINE SERVICES, INC. )
and CLEARVIEW MARINE, INC.,
)
in personam,
)
Defendants.
)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-00530-N

ORDER
This action is before the Court sua sponte on review of the record.

The

Plaintiff, U S Incorporated, has brought a Verified Complaint (Doc. 5) against the
Defendants under Rules B, C, and E of the Federal Supplemental Rules for
Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset for Forfeiture Actions. On January 13,
2017, the United States Marshal served Defendant Hartley Marine Services, Inc.
(“Hartley”) with a writ of foreign attachment issued under Supplemental Rule B.
(See Doc. 25 at 2). Accordingly, Hartley was required to serve answer within 30
days (i.e., no later than February 13, 2017). See Supp. R. B(3)(b); Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(a)(1). To date, Hartley has not done so, nor has it otherwise appeared in this
action.
On January 13, 2017, the Marshal also arrested the Defendant TUG SEGUIN
pursuant to a warrant issued under Supplemental Rule C. (See Doc. 25 at 1). The
Plaintiff subsequently gave notice of its intent to published public notice as required
by Supplemental Rule C(4), which specified that the time for interested parties to

file verified statements of right or interest under Rule C(6) was April 26, 2017. (See
Doc. 29).1

To date, no interested party has done so or otherwise appeared.

Upon consideration, no later than June 19, 2017, the Plaintiff is ORDERED
to file a request for an entry of default against Defendants Hartley and TUG
SEGUIN under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) and S.D. Ala. Civil Local Rule
104(d) (setting forth additional requirements for seeking entry of default and default
judgment in in rem cases), or to show cause in writing for its inability to do so.2
DONE and ORDERED this the 9th day of June 2017.
/s/ Katherine P. Nelson
KATHERINE P. NELSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1

The Plaintiff has not file proof of such publication, however.

Under S.D. Ala. GenLR 73(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this case has been randomly
assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all purposes, including entry of a
final judgment, as set out in the Notice of Assignment to United States Magistrate
Judge for Trial entered December 20, 2016. (Doc. 13). The Notice of Assignment
informs the parties that they “have the right to have this action reassigned to a
United States District Judge for trial and disposition,” and makes clear that “[a]ny
party may request reassignment by” confidentially emailing the Clerk of Court a
“Request for Reassignment to a United States District Judge.” Inasmuch as no
party, to date, has returned to the Clerk of Court a Request for Reassignment, there
presently exists implicit consent to the undersigned conducting all proceedings in
this case. See Chambless v. Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 481 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir.
2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court held in Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 123 S. Ct. 1696,
155 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2003), that consent to a magistrate judge's jurisdiction can be
inferred from a party’s conduct during litigation. Id. at 582, 123 S. Ct. 1696. The
Court refused to adopt a bright-line rule requiring express consent, instead
accepting implied consent ‘where ... the litigant or counsel was made aware of the
need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try the
case before the Magistrate Judge.’ Id. at 589–90, 123 S. Ct. 1696.”).

2