U S Incorporated v. TUG SEGUIN et al

Filing 36

ORDER granting 32 Motion for Entry of Default; granting 35 Motion to Supplement; the Clerk is directed to enter default against the Vessel; it is ORDERED that by 7/17/17 Plaintiff is to file a request or motion for default judgment against the Vessel or show cause why it is unable to do so. Signed by Magistrate Judge Katherine P. Nelson on 6/23/2017. (srr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
U S INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
v.
)
)
TUG SEGUIN, in rem, and
)
HARTLEY MARINE SERVICES, INC. )
and CLEARVIEW MARINE, INC.,
)
in personam,
)
Defendants.
)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-00530-N

ORDER
This action is again before the Court on the Plaintiff’s motion for entry of
default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) against Defendant TUG
SEGUIN, in rem (“the Vessel”) (Doc. 32).1

Previously, the Court found that the

Plaintiff, U S Incorporated, had complied with the requirements of S.D. Ala. CivLR
102(d)(1), (3), and (4) for seeking entry of default in an in rem action under Rule C of
the Federal Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset for
Forfeiture Actions, but directed the Plaintiff to supplement its motion to show
compliance with S.D. Ala. CivLR 102(d)(2). (See Doc. 33). The Plaintiff has timely
complied. (See Doc. 35).
Upon review of the Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 32) and supplement (Doc. 35), the
Court finds that the Plaintiffs have complied with all requirements of S.D. Ala.
CivLR 102(d) and that entry of default against the Vessel under Rule 55(a) is
appropriate. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default under Federal
The Court previously granted the motion for entry of default as to Defendant
Hartley Marine Services, Inc. (See Docs. 33, 34).

1

Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) against the Vessel (Doc. 32) is GRANTED, and the
Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter default against the Vessel.
The Plaintiff’s supplement further represents that, “[t]o expedite disposition
of its in rem claims against the vessel, [the Plaintiff] has decided to abandon its in
personam claims against defendants, Hartley Marine Services, Inc. and Clearview
Marine, Inc.”

(Doc. 35 at 2).

Upon consideration, it is ORDERED that, no later

than Monday, July 17, 2017, the Plaintiff must file a request or motion for default
judgment against the Vessel under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) and S.D.
Ala. CivLR 104(c), or show cause why it is unable to do so.

The Plaintiff’s failure to

comply with this order will be deemed a failure to prosecute and/or to obey a Court
order and may result in dismissal of this action.2
DONE and ORDERED this the 23rd day of June 2017.
/s/ Katherine P. Nelson
KATHERINE P. NELSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Under S.D. Ala. GenLR 73(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this case has been randomly assigned
to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all purposes, including entry of a final judgment, as
set out in the Notice of Assignment to United States Magistrate Judge for Trial entered
December 20, 2016. (Doc. 13). The Notice of Assignment informs the parties that they
“have the right to have this action reassigned to a United States District Judge for trial and
disposition,” and makes clear that “[a]ny party may request reassignment by” confidentially
emailing the Clerk of Court a “Request for Reassignment to a United States District Judge.”
Inasmuch as no party, to date, has returned to the Clerk of Court a Request for
Reassignment, there presently exists implicit consent to the undersigned conducting all
proceedings in this case. See Chambless v. Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 481 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th
Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court held in Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 123 S. Ct. 1696,
155 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2003), that consent to a magistrate judge's jurisdiction can be inferred
from a party’s conduct during litigation. Id. at 582, 123 S. Ct. 1696. The Court refused to
adopt a bright-line rule requiring express consent, instead accepting implied consent ‘where
... the litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it,
and still voluntarily appeared to try the case before the Magistrate Judge.’ Id. at 589–90,
123 S. Ct. 1696.”).

2