Atchison v. Colvin

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER entered that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff benefits be AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge P. Bradley Murray on 10/27/2017. (eec)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CLIFFORD EARL ATCHISON, SR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security, 1
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-0611-MU

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Cliffford Earl Atchison, Sr., brings this action, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying his claim for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the
Act”) and for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), based on disability, under
Title XVI of the Act. The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by
the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for all proceedings in this
Court. (Doc. 20 (“In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(c) and Fed.
R. Civ. P. 73, the parties in this case consent to have a United States Magistrate
Judge conduct any and all proceedings in this case, … order the entry of a final
judgment, and conduct all post-judgment proceedings.”)). See also Doc. 22.
Upon consideration of the administrative record, Atchison’s filings, the

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Nancy A. Berryhill is the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to
Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
Nancy A. Berryhill is substituted as the Acting Commissioner in lieu of Acting
Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant in this action.

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Commissioner’s brief, and the argument presented at the hearing conducted on
September 14, 2017, it is determined that the Commissioner’s decision denying
benefits should be affirmed.2
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Atchison applied for DIB, under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 - 425,
and for SSI, based on disability, under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13811383d, in October of 2014, alleging disability beginning on December 31, 2013.
(Tr. 179-187). At the hearing before the ALJ, he amended the onset date to
March 31, 2015. (Tr. 37). His application was denied at the initial level of
administrative review on April 13, 2015. (Tr. 82). On May 1, 2015, Atchison
requested a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. 94-95). After an
initial hearing on January 14, 2016, and a supplemental hearing on July 7, 2016,
the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that Atchison was not under a
disability from the date the application was filed through the date of the decision,
August 2, 2016. (Tr. 29-33, 34-61, 11-23). Atchison appealed the ALJ’s decision
to the Appeals Council, and, on October 6, 2016, the Appeals Council denied his
request for review of the ALJ’s decision, thereby making the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-3).
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Atchison sought judicial
review in this Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). (Doc. 1). The

2
Any appeal taken from this Order and Judgment shall be made to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. See Doc. 20. (“An appeal from a judgment entered by a
Magistrate Judge shall be taken directly to the United States Court of Appeals for
the judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of
this district court.”).

2

Commissioner filed an answer and the social security transcript on March 15,
2017. (Docs. 13, 14). Both parties filed briefs setting forth their respective
positions, and oral argument was held on September 14, 2017. (Docs. 16, 17,
21). The case is now ripe for decision.
II. CLAIM ON APPEAL
Although Atchison, who was proceeding pro se before this Court, did not
clearly enunciate the grounds for his appeal, the Court gleans from his filings and
argument at the hearing that his claim on appeal is that the ALJ’s decision that
he was not disabled was not based on substantial evidence because the ALJ did
not properly consider the medical evidence supporting his claim that he is
physically and mentally unable to work. (Doc. 16 at p. 1; Doc. 21).
III. BACKGROUND FACTS
Atchison was born on March 31,1965, and was 49 years old at the time he
filed his claim for benefits. (Tr. 179). Atchison alleged disability due to severe
gastrointestinal issues and an anxiety disorder. (Tr. 180). He graduated from high
school, and after high school, he received training in pipefitting and welding. (Tr.
40). He worked as a pipefitter for approximately 15 to 20 years. (Tr. 40-41).
Atchison last worked in the beginning of 2014. (Tr. 38). During the relevant time
period, Atchison lived with his uncle and his parents, he handled his own
personal care, made simple meals, went out for walks, performed household
chores, helped his elderly parents and uncle, went grocery shopping, to church,
and to doctor’s appointments, enjoyed reading and watching TV, and was able to
pay bills, count change, handle a savings account, and use a checkbook/money

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order. (Tr. 45-48, 276-282). After conducting a hearing, the ALJ made a
determination that Atchison had not been under a disability during the relevant
time period, and thus, was not entitled to benefits. (Tr.11-23).
IV. ALJ’S DECISION
After considering all of the evidence, the ALJ made the following findings
that are relevant to the issues presented in her August 2, 2016 decision:
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments:
irritable bowel syndrome/gastro esophageal reflux
disease, abdominal pain, and anxiety (20 CFR
404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
During the period of adjudication, the claimant has received
diagnosis and treatment for the aforementioned impairments
(See Exhibits 2F, 3F, 4F, 5F, 6F, 7F, 8F, and 9F). These
impairments are severe because they cause more than
minimal limitations in the claimant's ability to perform a variety
of basic work activities for the required durational period.
The undersigned has considered and gives partial weight to the
respective January and April 2015 DDS opinions of Russell
March, M.D., and Harold Veits, M.D., who reviewed the
evidence of record and respectively indicated that the
claimant's physical and mental impairments were not severe in
nature (Exhibits 3A and 4A). Although these opinions are
generally consistent with the overall evidence of record, the
undersigned views the evidence of record in a light most
favorable to the claimant and determines that the
aforementioned impairments are severe.
The evidence of record from the relevant period also documents
the claimant's complaints, diagnoses, and/or treatment for heart
problems and hypertension (See Hearing Testimony and
Exhibits 5E, 6F, 7F, 8F, and 9F). However, a thorough review of
the overall evidence reveals that the record does not establish
that these impairments have placed more than a minimal
limitation on his ability to perform basic work activities for the
required durational period. The claimant testified to ongoing
heart-related problems, as well as elevated blood pressure
readings, and the record includes evidence of elevated blood

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pressure readings (Hearing Testimony and Exhibits 6F, 7F, 8F,
and 9F). The record also includes, however, normal findings
with regard to the claimant's heart and lungs on multiple
occasions, including normal blood pressure readings, lungs
that were clear to auscultation, and his heart with a regular rate
and rhythm (Exhibits 2F, 4F, 7F, 8F, and 9F). Additionally , a
September 2015 x-ray of the claimant's chest revealed
completely normal findings (Exhibit 7F).
The undersigned has considered the aforementioned
impairments singly and in combination and determines that the
overall evidence fails to prove that they have placed more than
a minimal limitation on his ability to perform basic work
activities for the required durational period. As a result, they
are not severe impairments (20 CFR 404.1509, 404.1520(c),
416.909, and 416.921).
Although the aforementioned impairments are not severe, under
20 CFR 404.1523 and 20 CFR 416.923, the undersigned must
consider the combined effect of all the claimant's impairments
on his ability to function without regard to whether any such
impairment, if considered separately, would be of sufficient
severity. The undersigned has done so and, although the
aforementioned impairments are not severe, the limitations in
the residual functional capacity in Finding 5, below, consider
any functional limitations resulting from the claimant's
nonsevere impairments or the combination thereof.
Any other diagnosis, ailment, or condition not specifically set out
herein is both not severe and acute in nature or otherwise
quickly resolved and is not expected to lead to any work
restrictions that satisfy the required durational period.
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in
20 CFR Part 404, Subpart 1P, Appendix 1(20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925
and 416.926).
All listings were analyzed. The claimant's severe impairments
have been considered individually and in combination, and these
impairments do not meet or equal any of the medical listings.

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Further, there are no acceptable medical sources that treated
him, examined him, or examined his records who have opined
that his impairments meet or medically equal a listing.
Although gastro-esophageal reflux disease/abdominal pain are
not specifically listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1, these impairments affect the claimant's digestive system and
a thorough review of the evidence of record establishes that
the claimant's gastro esophageal reflux disease does not meet
any of the criteria of Medical Listing 5.00, et al., for the adult
digestive system. Therefore, the claimant's abdominal pain/
gastro esophageal reflux disease fail to meet or equal a listed
impairment.
***
The severity of the claimant's mental impairment does not meet
or medically equal the criteria of listing 12.06. In making this
finding, the undersigned has considered whether the "paragraph
B" criteria are satisfied. To satisfy the "paragraph B" criteria, the
mental impairment must result in at least two of the following :
marked restriction of activities of daily living; marked difficulties in
maintaining social functioning; marked difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace; or repeated episodes of
decompensation, each of extended duration. A marked limitation
means more than moderate but less than extreme. Repeated
episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration, means
three episodes within 1 year, or an average of once every 4
months, each lasting for at least 2 weeks.
In activities of daily living, the claimant has mild restriction. The
claimant notes that he is generally able to perform his personal
care and has appeared properly groomed and dressed on
occasion (See Exhibits 9E and 3F). He watches television,
prepares meals, performs household chores, and helps care for
his family members (Hearing Testimony and Exhibits 9E, 3F, and
8F). He shops, attends church, and handles his own finances
(Exhibits 9E, 3F, and 8F). In April 2015, Harold Veits, M.D.,
performed a State-sponsored review of the evidence of record
and rendered a psychiatric review technique (PRT) in which he
indicated that the claimant's impairments cause mild limitation in
his activities of daily living (Exhibits 3A and 4A). Dr. Veits is
familiar with Social Security law and regulations and his opinion
regarding the claimant's activities of daily living is consistent with

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the overall evidence, including the claimant's admitted and
indicated activities and abilities, so it is afforded great weight.
Thus, the claimant's admitted activities and demonstrated
abilities indicate that his mental impairments impose no more
than mild difficulties on his activities of daily living.
In social functioning, the claimant has moderate difficulties. The
claimant notes on various occasions that he operates in a fairly
isolated manner and has problems interacting with others
(Hearing Testimony and Exhibits 9E and 13E). He also
indicates, however, that he lives with his parents and takes care
of his uncle, shops, and attends church, and notes no specific
probl ems with these interactions (Hearing Testimony and
Exhibits 9E and 3F). Additionally, he notes no problems getting
along with others, no problems getting along with authority
figures, and notes he has never been fired or laid off for an
inability to get along with others (Exhibit 9E). In his April 2015
PRT, Dr. Veits indicated that the claimant's impairments cause
mild limitation in his social functioning (Exhibits 3A and 4A). As
noted above, Dr. Veits is familiar with Social Security law and
regulations and his opinion regarding the claimant's social
functioning is consistent with the overall record, including the
aforementioned admitted and indicated activities and abilities,
so it is afforded great weight. However, the undersigned views
the evidence of record in a light most favorable to the claimant,
and determines that the claimant's mental impairments cause
moderate impact in his social functioning. Accordingly, the
claimant's admitted activities and demonstrated abilities are
significant and, while his mental impairments may impose some
difficulties on his social functioning, they are no more than
moderate difficulties.
With regard to concentration, persistence or pace, the claimant
has mild difficulties. The claimant' s admitted and indicated
activities and abilities include a wide range of concentrationintensive activities, which include performing household chores,
performing yard work, caring for his parents and uncle, and
watching television (Hearing Testimony and Exhibits 9E and 3F).
Additionally, the claimant has testified and indicated that he is
able to drive, shop, and handle his own finances (Hearing
Testimony and Exhibits 9E, 3F, and 8F). At the March 2015
consultative psychological examination performed by Thomas
Bennett, Ph.D., the claimant performed concentration-intensive
activities that included serial sevens, performing mathematical

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calculations, repeating digits forward and backward, recalling
objects after 5 minutes, and counting and spelling backward
(Exhibit 3F). In his April 2015 PRT, Dr. Veits indicated that the
claimant's impairments cause mild limitation in his concentration,
persistence, and pace (Exhibits 3A and 4A). Again, Dr. Veits is
familiar with Social Security law and regulations, and his opinion
regarding the claimant's concentration, persistence, or pace is
consistent with the overall record, including the claimant's
aforementioned activities and abilities, so it is afforded great
weight. Thus, the claimant's admitted activities and
demonstrated abilities indicate that his mental impairments
impose no more than mild difficulties on his concentration,
persistence, and pace.
As for episodes of decompensation, the claimant has
experienced no episodes of decompensation, which have been
of extended duration. Although the record does document
mental impairment diagnoses, a thorough review of the record
reveals that it is devoid of ongoing mental health treatment,
hospitalizations, or episodes of decompensation that have been
of extended duration, and the claimant indicated to Dr. Bennett
that he had not received mental health treatment (See Exhibits
3F, 4F, 5F, 6F, 7F, 8F, and 9F). In his April 2015 PRT, Dr. Veits
indicated that the claimant has not experienced episodes of
decompensation that have been of extended duration (Exhibits
3A and 4A). Again, Dr. Veits is familiar with Social Security law
and regulations and his opinion regarding episodes of
decompensation of extended duration is consistent with the
overall record, so it is given great weight.
Because the claimant's mental impairment does not cause at
least two "marked" limitations or one "marked" limitation and
"repeated" episodes of decompensation , each of extended
duration, the "paragraph B" criteria are not satisfied.
The undersigned has also considered whether the "paragraph
C" criteria are satisfied. In this case, the evidence fails to
establish the presence of the "paragraph C" criteria. There is no
evidence that the claimant has experienced an extended
episode of decompensation since the alleged onset date, that a
minimal increase in mental demands or change in the
environment would cause him to decompensate, or that the
claimant is unable to function outside of a highly supportive
living arrangement (See Exhibits 9E and 3F). Dr. Veits indicated

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that the "paragraph C" criteria were not satisfied, and his opinion
has been given great weight because it is consistent with the
overall evidence of record (Exhibits 3A and 4A).
The limitations identified in the "paragraph B" criteria are not a
residual functional capacity assessment but are used to rate
the severity of mental impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the
sequential evaluation process. The mental residual functional
capacity assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential
evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment by
itemizing various functions contained in the broad categories
found in paragraph B of the adult mental disorders listings in
12.00 of the Listing of lmpairments (SSR 96-8p). Therefore,
the following residual functional capacity assessment reflects
the degree of limitation the undersigned has found in the
"paragraph B" mental function analysis.
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform light work as defined in
20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except he is limited
to occasional contact with the public, coworkers, and
supervisors.
In making this finding, the undersigned has considered all
symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can
reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical
evidence and other evidence, based on the requirements of 20
CFR 404.1529 and 416.929 and SSR 96-4p. The undersigned
has also considered opinion evidence in accordance with the
requirements of 20 CFR 404.1527 and 416.927 and SSRs 962p, 96-5p, 96-6p and 06-3p.
***
The claimant alleges he is unable to work due to an anxiety
disorder, acid reflux, and irritable bowel syndrome (Exhibits 4E
and 5E). He notes body aches, problems overheating, and notes
that his heart races when he has build-ups (Exhibit 5E). He also
has body pain, bloating, gas build-up, and occasional vomiting,
which preclude him from performing his normal activities (Exhibit
8E). He indicates that his impairments affect his ability to sleep,
perform personal care, prepare meals, perform household
chores, perform yard work, drive, perform hobbies, and socialize,

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as well as lift, squat, bend, stand, reach, and walk (Exhibit 9E).
He is limited in his ability to walk prior to resting and has
problems handling stress and changes in routine (Exhibit 9E).
On appeal, the claimant noted that his anxiety attacks were
becoming stronger and more frequent, and his abdominal pain
had worsened (Exhibit 13E).
At the July 2016 hearing, the claimant testified that he stopped
working because of constant stomach problems and anxiety,
which prevented him from maintaining production levels at the
shipyard (Hearing Testimony). He takes mental health
medications, but his anxiety causes him isolation, thus he avoids
parties. He has tried to work but repeated illnesses have caused
him to miss work. He notes symptoms that include a fever,
constant stomach pain, and vomiting and nausea, which cause
him to pass out once per week. He can stand 10 to 15 minutes,
walk 5 minutes, and lift very little weight for one-third of the
workday. He suffers from weakness, fear of others,
hallucinations , and panic attacks 2 to 3 times per day. He lies
down 2 to 3 hours per day and sleeps about half of that time
(Hearing Testimony).
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned
finds that the claimant's medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause some of her [sic] alleged
symptoms; however, the claimant's statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are
not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.
A review of the evidence of record includes treatment notes that
predate the relevant period of adjudication and document the
claimant's complaints of abdominal pain, fever, weight loss,
vomiting, flank pain, and reflux, and resulted in diagnoses of
gastro esophageal reflux disease, nausea, and abdominal pain
(Exhibits 1F and 2F). These records also include, however,
examination findings with regard to the claimant's heart, lungs,
and extremities, as well as normal behavior, affect, and mood
(Exhibits 1F and 2F).
As for those records within the proper period, the record
includes multiple complaints of abdominal pain, reflux,
epigastric pain, flank pain, fever, weight loss, fatigue, dizziness,
restlessness , and syncopal episodes (Exhibits 2F, 4F, 5F, 6F,

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7F, 8F, and 9F). These records include examination findings of
abdominal tenderness to palpitation, which has led to diagnoses
of gastro esophageal reflux disease, abdominal pain, epigastric
pain, and syncope (Exhibits 2F, 4F, 5F, 6F, 7F, 8F, and 9F).
Records also note the claimant's physical abilities despite
these complaints and diagnoses, which includes performing
activities of daily living, household chores, and performing yard
work, as well as shopping and attending church (See Exhibit
3F). Additionally, the record includes a wealth of normal
examination findings, including evidence that the claimant was
not in acute distress, had normal lungs and a normal heart with
regular rate and rhythm, normal musculoskeletal system
findings, and no edema (Exhibits 2F, 7F, 8F, and 9F).
Specifically, consultative examination findings note that the
claimant was able to sit comfortably, get on and off the
examination table without difficulty, tie and untie his shoes, and
had negative straight leg raise tests, normal senses and
reflexes, and normal grip strength (Exhibit 8F).
The aforementioned objective findings and the claimant's
admissions and activities establish that the overall evidence of
record is inconsistent with his allegations and undermine any
alleged disabling limitation resulting from his irritable bowel
syndrome/gastro esophageal reflux disease, and abdominal
pain. Although the aforementioned records document the
claimant's complaints, diagnoses, and treatment of these
impairments, a careful review of the overall evidence of record
also reveals a wealth of relatively normal physical examination
findings that are simply inconsistent with a determination that the
claimant is unable to work. Additionally, the claimant's admitted
and indicated activities and abilities are also inconsistent with
his allegations of completely disabling symptomology. He notes
on various occasions, including at the hearing, that he is able to
care for his parents and his uncle, which entails preparing
meals, driving, and shopping, as well as more vigorous activities
such as performing household chores including laundry, and
performing yard work (Hearing Testimony and Exhibits 9E, 3F,
and 8F).
Thus, the undersigned determines that the overall evidence of
record is inconsistent with the claimant's allegations regarding
the intensity, duration, and persistence of his symptomology.
Accordingly, the aforementioned objective findings, including the

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relatively normal physical examination findings from the
February 2016 consultative examination, as well as the
claimant's admitted activities and abilities, including performing
household chores and yard work, all indicate that the claimant's
symptomology resulting from his irritable bowel syndrome/gastro
esophageal reflux disease, and abdominal pain are not
completely disabling. However, the undersigned notes that the
claimant's occasional symptomology can reasonably be
expected to cause some limitations to his ability to function, and
has accordingly limited him to a light exertional level. This
limitation properly accommodates his irritable bowel
syndrome/gastro esophageal reflux disease, and abdominal
pain.
Turning to physical opinion evidence, the undersigned has
considered and gives considerable weight to the February 2016
consultative opinion of Elmo Ozment, M.D., who performed a
state-sponsored examination of the claimant and indicates that
the claimant can perform a wide range of work at the medium
exertional level (Exhibit 8F). The undersigned notes that Dr.
Ozment's opinion is generally consistent with the relatively
normal findings from his examination of the claimant, which
included the ability to mount and dismount the examination table
without difficulty, put on and remove his shoes, and ambulate
without problems or hand-held devices. Again, however, the
undersigned views the overall evidence in a light most favorable
to the claimant, thus, the limitations in Finding 5, above, are
more restrictive than those given by Dr. Ozment and restrict the
claimant to the light exertional level.
Turning to the claimant's anxiety, the objective medical findings
and admitted activities and abilities support the limitation in 5,
above, that the claimant is limited to occasional contact with the
public, coworkers, and supervisors.
The evidence of record includes diagnoses of anxiety, which
were based on the claimant's multiple complaints of anxiety, as
well as reports of difficulty functioning due to anxious/ fearful
thoughts, compulsive thoughts, a depressed mood, difficulty
concentrating, difficulty falling asleep, difficulty staying asleep,
easy startling, excessive worry, fatigue, poor judgment, racing
thoughts, and restlessness, all of which he notes were
exacerbated with conflict or stress, lack of sleep, social
interactions, and traumatic memories (See Exhibits 4F, 5F, 6F,

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7F, and 9F). On other occasions, the claimant has noted that his
panic attacks might be the source of his stomach problems
(Exhibits 8F and 9F). A review of the record reveals examination
findings that have included moderate dysphoria, fidgeting,
anxiety, and an inappropriate mood and affect (Exhibits 3F, 8F,
and 9F).
Records also note, however, that the claimant denied treatment
from a mental health professional , lived with his parents, had
contact with his children, denied paranoia and hallucinations,
and indicated he was able to perform a wide range of activities,
including activities of daily living, household chores, yard work,
and laundry, as well as preparing meals, shopping, watching
television, driving, and attending church (Exhibits 3F and 8F).
Additionally , examination findings from the relevant period of
adjudication note repeatedly normal examination findings,
including proper orientation, cooperation, an appropriate mood
and affect, normal judgment and insight, neat grooming and
dress, good hygiene, and the ability to perform various
concentration intensive activities, including serial sevens,
mathematical calculations, count and spell backward, repeat 6
digits forward and 4 digits backward, and recall 3 of 3 objects
after 5 minutes (Exhibits 2F, 3F, 4F, 7F, 8F, and 9F).
The aforementioned objective findings do not support a
determination that the claimant is disabled by his anxiety.
Although the evidence of record includes complaints, diagnoses,
and treatment for anxiety, as noted above, the record also
includes a litany of essentially normal mental status examination
findings, including proper orientation, cooperation, an appropriate
mood and affect, normal judgment and insight, neat grooming
and dress, and good hygiene, as well as the ability to perform
activities that demonstrate intact memory and concentration.
Additionally, the claimant's admitted and indicated activities and
abilities are inconsistent with his allegations of disabling
symptomology. The claimant notes that he is generally able to
perform his personal care and has appeared properly groomed
and dressed on occasion (See Exhibits 9E and 3F). He watches
television, prepares meals, performs household chores, and
helps care for his family members (Hearing Testimony and
Exhibits 9E, 3F, and 8F). He lives with his parents and takes
care of his uncle, shops, and attends church, and notes no
specific problems with these interactions (Hearing Testimony

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and Exhibits 9E and 3F). Additionally, he notes no problems
getting along with others, no problems getting along with
authority figures, notes he has never been fired or laid off for an
inability to get along with others, and his uncle indicates that he
sometimes attends a local community center (Exhibits 6E and
9E). The claimant is able to perform concentration-intensive
activities that include performing household chores, performing
yard work, caring for his parents and uncle, attending church
and the community center, and watching television, driving,
shopping, and handling his own finances (Hearing Testimony
and Exhibits 9E, 3F, and 8F).
The aforementioned objective findings and admitted and
indicated activities and abilities do not support a determination
that the claimant is completely disabled by his mental
impairments. Instead, the relatively normal examination findings
from Dr. Bennett, as well as the indications and admissions that
the claimant lives with his parents, cares for his uncle, and
drives, performs household chores, and performs yard work all
support a determination that the claimant can perform jobs
consistent with the limitations in Finding 5, above. The limitation
to occasional contact with the public, coworkers, and supervisors
accommodates the moderate impact the claimant's anxiety has
on his social functioning. The relatively minimal evidence of
record simply does not support additional limitations.
As for the mental opinion evidence, the undersigned has
considered the March 2015 opinion of Thomas Bennett, Ph.D.,
who notes that the claimant's abilities to relate to others, function
independently, understand and carry out instructions, and
respond appropriately to supervisors and coworkers are all
average (Exhibit 3F). Although this opinion does not couch the
claimant's abilities to perform the mental requirements of work in
the commonly used terms of a function by function mental
residual functional capacity, the undersigned notes that this
description of "average" does not indicate that the claimant has
limitations in any of these areas, which is generally consistent
with the normal findings from Dr. Bennett's psychological
examination of the claimant, the other relatively normal mental
status findings in the record, and the claimant's relatively normal
admitted and indicated activities and abilities. Again, however,
the undersigned views the evidence of record in a light most
favorable to the claimant, which includes the claimant's
allegations of operating in a fairly isolated manner. Accordingly,

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the undersigned gives Dr. Bennett's opinion considerable
weight, but again views the evidence in a light most favorable to
the claimant.
Finally, the undersigned also notes the third party observations
provided by the claimant's uncle (Exhibit 6E). The claimant's
uncle is not a medically acceptable treating source and any
opinion regarding the claimant's ability to work full-time in a
competitive environment is an opinion reserved to the
Commissioner (20 CFR 404.1513, 404.1527, 416.913, and
416.927). His observations, which often echo the claimant's
allegations of disabling symptomology such as problems driving,
completing tasks, and concentrating, also indicate that the
claimant has abilities inconsistent with disabling impairments,
such performing household repairs and chores, performing
yard work, shopping, and attending church and the local
community center (See Exhibits 6E and 9E). Thus, any
observations indicating the claimant is disabled are inconsistent
with the overall record evidence. Accordingly, the undersigned
has considered the observations of the claimant's uncle but
gives them little weight.
In sum, based upon a review of the medical evidence and the
claimants admitted activities and abilities, the undersigned
finds the overall evidence of record is inconsistent with the
claimant's allegations of totally incapacitating symptomatology.
The record fails to document persistent, disabling loss of
functional capacity resulting from the claimant's severe
impairments. The above residual functional capacity
assessment is supported by the overall evidence of record,
including objective evidence, opinion evidence, and the
claimant's indications and admissions as to activities and
abilities. After considering the entirety of the record, the
undersigned conclude s that the claimant can perform a range
of work consistent with that set forth in Finding 5, above.
(Tr. 13-22).
V. DISCUSSION
Eligibility for DIB and SSI benefits requires that the claimant be disabled.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E), 1382(a)(1)-(2). A claimant is disabled if the claimant is

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unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The
impairment must be severe, making the claimant unable to do the claimant’s
previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national
economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505-11. “Substantial gainful
activity means work that … [i]nvolves doing significant and productive physical or
mental duties [that] [i]s done (or intended) for pay or profit.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1510.
In all Social Security cases, an ALJ utilizes a five-step sequential
evaluation in determining whether the claimant is disabled:
(1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if
not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether the
severe impairment meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of
Impairment in the regulations; (4) if not, whether the claimant has the RFC
to perform her past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether, in light of the
claimant’s RFC, age, education and work experience, there are other jobs
the claimant can perform.
Watkins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 457 F. App’x 868, 870 (11th Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), (c)-(f), 416.920(a)(4), (c)-(f); Phillips
v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004)) (footnote omitted). The
claimant bears the burden of proving the first four steps, and if the claimant does
so, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove the fifth step. Jones v. Apfel,
190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999).

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If the claimant appeals an unfavorable ALJ decision, the reviewing court
must determine whether the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits was
“supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.”
Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla
and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citations omitted). “In
determining whether substantial evidence exists, [the reviewing court] must view
the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as
unfavorable to the [Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129,
131 (11th Cir. 1986). The reviewing court “may not decide the facts anew,
reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].”
Id. When a decision is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court
must affirm “[e]ven if [the court] find[s] that the evidence preponderates against
the Secretary’s decision.” MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir.
1986).
Atchison asserts that the ALJ erred in making her assessment that he was
not disabled because she did not clearly comprehend his mental and physical
conditions. (Doc. 16 at p.1). He seems to argue that, because he has been under
a doctor’s care for his gastrointestinal issues and his anxiety issues and has
taken medication for these conditions for many years, the ALJ’s finding could not
have been based on the proper law or on substantial evidence. The
Commissioner, on the other hand asserts that the ALJ provided valid reasons for

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her findings, that those findings are supported by the applicable law and by
substantial evidence, and that the ALJ’s conclusion that Atchison was not
disabled was not in error. (Doc. 17 at pp. 6-10).
After reviewing the medical records submitted, the opinions of examining
and consultative physicians, function reports, and other forms/questionnaires
completed by or on behalf of Atchison and considering the testimony given by
Atchison and a vocational expert at the hearing, the ALJ applied the five-step
sequential evaluation to determine whether Atchison was disabled, as defined by
the Act, during the relevant time period. The ALJ concluded that: (1) Atchison
was not engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) he did have several severe
impairments; (3) his severe impairments, singularly or in combination with each
other and/or with his non-severe impairments, did not meet or equal an
impairment in the Listing of Impairment in the regulations; (4) he did not have the
RFC to perform his past relevant work; but (5) in light of his RFC, age, education
and work experience, there are other jobs that Atchison could perform.
The primary question presented by Atchison seems to be whether the
ALJ’s assessment of his medical condition in formulating his RFC was based on
substantial evidence. “In assessing whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must
consider the medical opinions in a case record together with the rest of the
relevant evidence received.” Chambers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 662 F. App’x
869, 870 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b)). In addition to the
medical evidence, the ALJ is to consider the claimant’s daily activities when
evaluating the symptoms and severity of an impairment. Id. at 871 (citing 20

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C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)). A thorough review of the ALJ’s decision reveals that
the ALJ in this case did take into consideration, not only medical opinion
evidence, but the totality of the medical evidence, as well as Atchison’s written
and oral accounts of his daily activities. Atchison attached a medical record to his
filing in support of his claim in this Court that he indicated had not been
presented to the ALJ; however, this Court’s review of the transcript reveals that
the medical report at issue was in the record and considered by the ALJ. (Tr.
407-09). The ALJ here actually included more stringent restrictions in his RFC
than those placed by the medical doctors, restricting Atchison to light work with a
further restriction to only occasional contact with the public, coworkers, and
supervisors.
It is well-established that it is not this Court’s place to reweigh the
evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Chester,
792 F.2d at 131. This Court is limited to a determination of whether the ALJ’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal
standards. Having reviewed the ALJ’s decision and the transcript and considered
the arguments made by Atchison, the Court finds that the ALJ’s determination
that Atchison was not disabled during the relevant time period is supported by
substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the decision of the

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Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff benefits be AFFIRMED.
DONE and ORDERED this the 27th day of October, 2017.
s/P. BRADLEY MURRAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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