McBride v. Colvin

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: 27 Motion - The Court ORDERS that Plaintiff be awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $1,554.72 under the Equal Access to Justice Act, representing compensation for 8 hours of service by Laura E. Holland, Esquire, at the cost-of-living-adjusted rate of $194.34. Signed by Magistrate Judge P. Bradley Murray on 4/30/18. (mpp) Copies to counsel

Download PDF
IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  COURT   FOR  THE  SOUTHERN  DISTRICT  OF  ALABAMA   SOUTHERN  DIVISION       CATHY  M.  MCBRIDE,     :           Plaintiff,         :                 vs.             :   CA  17-­0036-­MU                 NANCY  A.  BERRYHILL,       :   Deputy  Commissioner  for  Operations,     performing  the  duties  and  functions  not   :   reserved  to  the  Commissioner  of   Social  Security,1         :                       Defendant.                               MEMORANDUM  OPINION  AND  ORDER           This   cause   is   before   the   Court,   pursuant   to   28   U.S.C.   §   636(c)   and   Rule   54(d)(2)(A)  of  the  Federal  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure,  on  Plaintiff’s  motion  for  an  award  of   attorney’s  fees  under  the  Equal  Access  to  Justice  Act  (“EAJA”),  28  U.S.C.  §  2412.  (Doc.   27;;  see  also  Doc.  28.)  Upon  consideration  of  all  pertinent  materials  contained  in  this  file,   it  is  determined  that  Plaintiff  should  receive  a  reasonable  attorney’s  fee  in  the  amount  of   $1,554.72  under  the  EAJA  for  legal  services  rendered  by  her  attorney  in  this  Court,  see   Astrue   v.   Ratliff,   560   U.S.   586,   592   &   593,   130   S.Ct.   2521,   2526   &   2526-­2527,   177   L.Ed.2d  91  (2010)  (“Ratliff  []  asserts  that  subsection  (d)(1)(A)’s  use  of  the  verb  ‘award’   renders   §   2412(d)   fees   payable   directly   to   a   prevailing   party’s   attorney[.]   .   .   .   We   disagree.  .  .  .  The  plain  meaning  of  the  word  ‘award’  in  subsection  (d)(1)(A)  is  []  that  the   1     8:53  a.m.)   See   https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html   (last   visited,   April   17,   2018,   court   shall   ‘give   or   assign   by   .   .   .   judicial   determination’   to   the   ‘prevailing   party’   (here,   Ratliff’s  client  Kills  Ree)  attorney’s  fees  in  the  amount  sought  and  substantiated  under,   inter   alia,   subsection   (d)(1)(B).   .   .   .   The   fact   that   the   statute   awards   to   the   prevailing   party   fees   in   which   her   attorney   may   have   a   beneficial   interest   or   a   contractual   right   does   not   establish   that   the   statute   ‘awards’   the   fees   directly   to   the   attorney.   For   the   reasons   we   have   explained,   the   statute’s   plain   text   does   the   opposite-­it   ‘awards’   the   fees   to   the   litigant[.]”);;   Brown   v.   Astrue,   271   Fed.Appx.   741,   743   (10th   Cir.   Mar.   27,   2008)  (“The  district  court  correctly  held  that  Mr.  Brown’s  assignment  of  his  right  in  the   fees  award  to  counsel  does  not  overcome  the  clear  EAJA  mandate  that  the  award  is  to   him  as  the  prevailing  party,  and  the  fees  belong  to  him.  Thus,  the  district  court  correctly   declined  to  award  the  fees  directly  to  counsel.”)2.3   FINDINGS  OF  FACT     On   January   24,   2018,   this   Court   entered   a   Rule   58   judgment   reversing   and   remanding  this  cause  to  the  Commissioner  of  Social  Security  pursuant  to  sentence  four   of  42  U.S.C.  §  405(g)  for  further  proceedings.  (Doc.  26;;  see  also  Doc.  25.)  The  motion   for  an  award  of  attorney’s  fees  under  the  EAJA  was  filed  on  April  6,  2018  (Doc.  27;;  see   also  Doc.  28),  seventy-­two  (72)  days  after  entry  of  final  judgment  (compare  id.  with  Doc.   2     As   explained   above,   the   attorney   fees   awarded   herein   are   awarded   to   the   Plaintiff.  However,  following  entry  of  this  fee  award,  the  government  certainly  can  evaluate  the   propriety  of  directing  payment  to  Ms.  Holland  should  the  circumstances  so  warrant.  See  Ratliff,   supra,   560   U.S.   at   597,   130   S.Ct.   at   2529   (“[T]he   Government   has   since   continued   the   direct   payment  practice  only  in  cases  where  ‘the  plaintiff  does  not  owe  a  debt  to  the  government  and   assigns  the  right  to  receive  fees  to  the  attorney.’”).   3     Any  appeal  taken  from  this  memorandum  opinion  and  order  and  judgment  shall   be   made   to   the   Eleventh   Circuit   Court   of   Appeals.   (See   Docs.   21   &   22   (“An   appeal   from   a   judgment   entered   by   a   magistrate   judge   shall   be   taken   directly   to   the   United   States   court   of   appeals  for  this  judicial  circuit  in  the  same  manner  as  an  appeal  from  any  other  judgment  of  this   district  court.”)).   2 26).   In   her   motion,   Plaintiff   requests   attorney’s   fees   in   the   amount   of   $1,554.72   to   compensate  her  attorney  for  the  time  (8  hours)  spent  representing  her  before  this  Court   as   of   the   date   of   the   filing   of   the   fee   application   (see   Doc.   27,   Time   Itemization).   The   Defendant  did  not  file  a  response  to  Plaintiff’s  motion,  though  extended  the  opportunity   to  file  a  response.  (Compare  Doc.  29  with  Docket  Sheet.)     CONCLUSIONS  OF  LAW     The  Equal  Access  to  Justice  Act  requires  a  district  court  to  “award  to  a  prevailing   party   .   .   .   fees   and   other   expenses   .   .   .   incurred   by   that   party   in   any   civil   action   .   .   .,   including   proceedings   for   judicial   review   of   agency   action,   brought   by   or   against   the   United   States   .   .   .,   unless   the   court   finds   that   the   position   of   the   United   States   was   substantially  justified  or  that  special  circumstances  make  an  award  unjust.”    28  U.S.C.   §  2412(d)(1)(A).  It  is  imminently  clear  in  this  case  that  Plaintiff  is  a  prevailing  party  under   the  EAJA4  and  that  the  position  of  the  United  States  in  this  case  was  not  substantially   justified,  as  the  government  has  not  filed  a  response  arguing  otherwise.     The   EAJA   requires   a   prevailing   party   to   file   an   application   for   attorney’s   fees   within   thirty   (30)   days   of   final   judgment   in   the   action.   28   U.S.C.   §   2412(d)(1)(B).   The   thirty-­day  clock  did  not  begin  to  run  in  this  case  until  this  Court’s  reversal  and  remand   order  of  January  24,  2018  became  final,  which  occurred  at  the  end  of  the  sixty  (60)  days   for  appeal  provided  under  Rule  4(a)(1)  of  the  Federal  Rules  of  Appellate  Procedure,  see   Shalala  v.  Schaefer,  509  U.S.  292,  302,  113  S.Ct.  2625,  2632,  125  L.Ed.2d  239  (1993),   4     “[A]  party  who  wins  a  sentence-­four  remand  order  is  a  prevailing  party.”    Shalala   v.  Schaefer,  509  U.S.  292,  302,  113  S.Ct.  2625,  2632,  125  L.Ed.2d  239  (1993).     3 that  is,  March  25,  2018.  The  motion  filed  in  this  case  (Doc.  27),  bearing  a  date  of  April  6,   2018,  is  timely  since  it  was  filed  within  thirty  (30)  days  of  March  25,  2018.     The   EAJA,   like   42   U.S.C.   §   1988,   is   a   fee-­shifting   statute.   The   Supreme   Court   has   indicated   that   “‘the   most   useful   starting   point   for   determining   the   amount   of   a   reasonable  fee  is  the  number  of  hours  reasonably  expended  on  the  litigation  multiplied   by  a  reasonable  hourly  rate.’”  Watford  v.  Heckler,  765  F.2d  1562,  1568  (11th  Cir.  1985)   (EAJA),   quoting   Hensley   v.   Eckerhart,   461   U.S.   424,   433,   103   S.Ct.   1933,   1939,   76   L.Ed.2d  40  (1983)  (§  1988);;  see  Jean  v.  Nelson,  863  F.2d  759,  772-­773  (11th  Cir.  1988)   (discussing  the  reasonableness  of  the  hours  expended  in  the  context  of  contentions  by   the   government   that   the   fee   requests   were   not   supported   by   sufficient   documentation   and  often  involved  a  duplication  of  effort),  aff'd  sub  nom.  Commissioner,  I.N.S.  v.  Jean,   496  U.S.  154,  110  S.Ct.  2316,  110  L.Ed.2d  134  (1990).   This   calculation   provides   an   objective   basis   on   which   to   make   an   initial   estimate  of  the  value  of  a  lawyer’s  services.  The  party  seeking  an  award   of  fees  should  submit  evidence  supporting  the  hours  worked  and  the  rates   claimed.   Where   the   documentation   of   hours   is   inadequate,   the   district   court   may   reduce   the   award   accordingly.   The   district   court   also   should   exclude   from   this   initial   fee   calculation   hours   that   were   not   “reasonably   expended.”  .  .  .  Cases  may  be  overstaffed,  and  the  skill  and  experience  of   lawyers  vary  widely.  Counsel  for  the  prevailing  party  should  make  a  good   faith   effort   to   exclude   from   a   fee   request   hours   that   are   excessive,   redundant,  or  otherwise  unnecessary,  just  as  a  lawyer  in  private  practice   ethically   is   obligated   to   exclude   such   hours   from   his   fee   submission.     “In   the   private   sector,   ‘billing   judgment’   is   an   important   component   in   fee   setting.    It  is  no  less  important  here.  Hours  that  are  not  properly  billed  to   one’s   client   also   are   not   properly   billed   to   one’s   adversary   pursuant   to   statutory  authority.”     Hensley,   supra,   461   U.S.   at   433-­434,   103   S.Ct.   at   1939-­1940   (emphasis   in   original;;   citations  omitted);;    see  also  id.,  at  437,  103  S.Ct.  at  1941  (“[T]he  fee  applicant  bears  the   burden  of  establishing  entitlement  to  an  award  and  documenting  the  appropriate  hours   4 expended  and  hourly  rates.”);;  ACLU  of  Georgia  v.  Barnes,  168  F.3d  423,  428  (11th  Cir.   1999)  (“If  fee  applicants  do  not  exercise  billing  judgment,  courts  are  obligated  to  do  it  for   them,   to   cut   the   amount   of   hours   for   which   payment   is   sought,   pruning   out   those   that   are  ‘excessive,  redundant,  or  otherwise  unnecessary.’  Courts  are  not  authorized  to  be   generous   with   the   money   of   others,   and   it   is   as   much   the   duty   of   courts   to   see   that   excessive  fees  and  expenses  are  not  awarded  as  it  is  to  see  that  an  adequate  amount   is  awarded.”);;  Norman  v.  Housing  Authority  of  City  of  Montgomery,  836  F.2d  1292,  1301   (11th  Cir.  1988)  (“Excluding  excessive  or  otherwise  unnecessary  hours  under  the  rubric   of   ‘billing   judgment’   means   that   a   lawyer   may   not   be   compensated   for   hours   spent   on   activities   for   which   he   would   not   bill   a   client   of   means   who   was   seriously   intent   on   vindicating  similar  rights,  recognizing  that  in  the  private  sector  the  economically  rational   person  engages  in  some  cost  benefit  analysis.”).       In  Norman,  supra,  the  Eleventh  Circuit  indicated  that  “the  measure  of  reasonable   hours  is  determined  by  the  profession’s  judgment  of  the  time  that  may  be  conscionably   billed  and  not  the  least  time  in  which  it  might  theoretically  have  been  done.”  836  F.2d  at   1306.   Because   the   Defendant   has   interposed   no   objection   whatsoever   to   Plaintiff’s   EAJA  motion,  the  Court  finds  that  Plaintiff’s  counsel  reasonably  spent  8  hours  on  legal   tasks  in  this  case.         With  respect  to  a  determination  of  the  hourly  rate  to  apply  in  a  given  EAJA  case,   for   services   performed   by   attorneys,   the   express   language   of   the   Act,   as   amended   by   the   Contract   with   America   Advancement   Act   of   1996,   provides   in   pertinent   part   as   follows:     The   amount   of   fees   awarded   under   this   subsection   shall   be   based   upon   prevailing   market   rates   for   the   kind   and   quality   of   the   services   furnished,   5 except   that   .   .   .   attorney   fees   shall   not   be   awarded   in   excess   of   $125.00   per  hour  unless  the  court  determines  that  an  increase  in  the  cost  of  living   or  a  special  factor,  such  as  the  limited  availability  of  qualified  attorneys  for   the  proceedings  involved,  justifies  a  higher  fee.     28  U.S.C.  §  2412(d)(2)(A)  (Cum.Supp.  1997).         In  Meyer  v.  Sullivan,  958  F.2d  1029  (1992),  the  Eleventh  Circuit  determined  that   the  EAJA  establishes  a  two-­step  analysis  for  determining  the  appropriate  hourly  rate  to   be  applied  in  calculating  attorney's  fees  under  the  Act.     The   first   step   in   the   analysis,   .   .   .   is   to   determine   the   market   rate   for   “similar   services   [provided]   by   lawyers   of   reasonably   comparable   skills,   experience,  and  reputation.”  .  .  .  The  second  step,  which  is  needed  only  if   the   market   rate   is   greater   than   $[125]   per   hour,   is   to   determine   whether   the   court   should   adjust   the   hourly   fee   upward   from   $[125]   to   take   into   account  an  increase  in  the  cost  of  living,  or  a  special  factor.     Id.  at  1033-­1034  (citations  and  footnote  omitted).         For   years,   the   prevailing   market   rate   in   the   Southern   District   of   Alabama   was   $125.00   per   hour.   See,   e.g.,   Willits   v.   Massanari,   CA   00-­0530-­RV-­C;;   Boggs   v.   Massanari,   00-­0408-­P-­C;;   Boone   v.   Apfel,   CA   99-­0965-­CB-­L.   However,   this   Court   has   adjusted  that  rate  to  account  for  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living.  Lucy  v.  Barnhart,  CA   06-­0147-­C,   Doc.   32.   More   specifically,   the   Court   has   adopted   the   following   formula   to   be  used  in  calculating  all  future  awards  of  attorney’s  fees  under  the  EAJA:  “‘($125/hour)   x   (CPI-­U   Annual   Average   “All   Items   Index”,   South   Urban,   for   month   and   year   of   temporal   midpoint   )/   152.4,   where   152.4   equals   the   CPI-­U   of   March   1996,   the   month   and  year  in  which  the  $125  cap  was  enacted.’”  (Id.  at  11,  quoting  Doc.  31,  at  2)           The  temporal  midpoint  in  this  case  was  July  23,  2017,  the  complaint  having  been   prepared  and  filed  on  January  18,  2017  (compare  Doc.  27,  Time  Itemization  with  Doc.   1)  and  the  Court  having  entered  its  order  and  judgment  on  January  24,  2018  (Docs.  25-­ 6 26).   The   CPI-­U   for   July   of   2017   was   236.942.   Plugging   the   relevant   numbers   into   the   foregoing   formula   renders   the   following   equation:   $125x236.942/152.4.   Completion   of   this  equation  renders  an  hourly  rate  of  $194.34.       In  consideration  of  the  foregoing,  the  Plaintiff  is  to  be  awarded  an  attorney’s  fee   in   the   amount   of   $1,554.72   under   the   EAJA   for   the   8   hours   her   attorney   spent   performing  work  traditionally  performed  by  attorneys  in  social  security  cases.   CONCLUSION     The   Court   ORDERS   that   Plaintiff   be   awarded   attorney’s   fees   in   the   amount   of   $1,554.72   under   the   Equal   Access   to   Justice   Act,   representing   compensation   for   8   hours   of   service   by   Laura   E.   Holland,   Esquire,   at   the   cost-­of-­living-­adjusted   rate   of   $194.34.             DONE  and  ORDERED  this  the  30th  day  of  April,  2018.                     s/P.  BRADLEY  MURRAY         UNITED  STATES  MAGISTRATE  JUDGE   7  

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?