Walker v. The City of Mobile et al

Filing 15

Order granting 11 MOTION to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint filed by The City of Mobile, Mobile Police Department. This action is dismissed without prejudice as set out. Signed by District Judge William H. Steele on 6/13/2017. Copy mailed to Plaintiff. (nah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BRANDON J. WALKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
MOBILE POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION 17-0117-WS-M

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint (doc. 11). The Motion has been briefed and is now ripe for disposition.
Plaintiff, Brandon J. Walker, who is proceeding pro se, has filed three successive
iterations of a Complaint purporting to assert § 1983 claims against the Mobile Police
Department and the City of Mobile for Fourth Amendment violations. Unfortunately, Walker’s
pleadings have been, and still remain, incomprehensible. In an eight-page Order (doc. 8) dated
April 18, 2017, the Court granted defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (doc. 2) Walker’s First
Amended Complaint on that ground.
In deference to Walker’s pro se status, the Court’s previous ruling took pains to identify
the applicable legal standards and authorities and to explain in detail why the First Amended
Complaint was inadequate to satisfy those standards and authorities. Among other things, the
April 18 Order observed that: (i) “it is impossible to discern from the factual allegations what
Walker says the defendants did to infringe upon his Fourth Amendment right” (doc. 8, at 5); (ii)
“[n]one of these allegations appear to have anything to do with the Fourth Amendment” because
they identify “no facts suggesting that Walker was ever subject to a search or a seizure by a MPD
officer” (id.); (iii) Walker’s false arrest claims lacked plausibility because he identified no facts
“suggesting that defendants ever arrested Walker or caused Walker to be arrested during the
incidents in question” (id. at 6); and (iv) plaintiff relied solely “on vague and often incoherent
factual allegations tethered to conclusory legal statements that defendants violated the Fourth

Amendment or otherwise harmed him” (id.). In light of these shortcomings, the April 18 Order
concluded that Walker’s First Amended Complaint failed to satisfy minimum pleading standards
as set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Twombly / Iqbal line of
authorities.
Rather than dismissing this action outright because of the insufficient First Amended
Complaint, the Court elected to allow Walker one more opportunity to amend his pleading and
correct those defects. Thus, the April 18 Order directed Walker to file a Second Amended
Complaint “that conforms to applicable pleading standards, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and substantive law.” (Id. at 8.) The April 18 Order strongly encouraged Walker to consult with
legal counsel, and cautioned him that if his new amended complaint “remains defective, then this
action may be summarily dismissed.” (Id.)
On April 28, 2017, Walker filed his Second Amended Complaint (doc. 10). Not only did
this pleading fail to address the defects enumerated in the April 18 Order, it was even less
coherent and more impenetrable than its predecessor. Even after careful review of the Second
Amended Complaint, the undersigned cannot perceive what claims Walker is bringing, how he
contends defendants wronged him, or what the facts or legal theories underlying those claims
might be. In his one-and-a-half-page Second Amended Complaint, Walker references
“deformation and infringement,” expresses dismay “why the defendants or court needs any
information about the horrific continuous harassment and terrorism from the defendants,”
demands $1 million, and states that defendants wronged him by “starting an illusion and not
letting me out of if it and slavery,” “[w]ith concepts of Freddy Cougar films,” “infringing a story
on my true life character,” and “infringing on my companies IP Lillie productions, sales and
services.” (Doc. 10, at 1-2.) Walker concludes his Second Amended Complaint by reiterating
his demand for $1 million “for continuous faking and acting while wasting 24 hrs. of plaintiffs
time.” (Id. at 2.)
None of this makes any sense, much less conforms to the baseline pleading requirements
delineated in the April 18 Order. The Second Amended Complaint does not give defendants fair
notice of what Walker’s claims are or the factual grounds upon which they rest. Plaintiff has not
pleaded enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Even taking into account Walker’s pro
se status, his Second Amended Complaint falls far short of minimum legal standards for
acceptable pleadings in federal court. This Court cannot overlook or excuse these glaring

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deficiencies merely because Walker does not have a lawyer. Nor can this Court rewrite Walker’s
Second Amended Complaint for him or act as his de facto legal counsel to correct the defects in
that pleading. Moreover, the undersigned is convinced that granting plaintiff a third opportunity
to amend his Complaint would be a futile and unproductive endeavor; after all, even after
receiving detailed guidance in the April 18 Order about what the law requires and why the First
Amended Complaint was unacceptable, Walker regressed. Far from taking any tangible steps to
fix the problems highlighted in the April 18 Order, Walker’s Second Amended Complaint is
even more muddled and further removed from compliance with minimum pleading standards
than its predecessor.
In light of the foregoing, and for the reasons and authorities set forth at length in the April
18 Order, the Court finds that dismissal of this action for failure to plead plausible claims for
relief in accordance with Rule 8 and Twombly / Iqbal is the only appropriate course of action.
Accordingly, defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (doc. 11) is granted. This action is dismissed
without prejudice because, even after multiple amendments, plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state
a claim for relief that is plausible on its face, or that otherwise complies with the minimum
requirements for pleadings in federal court.
DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of June, 2017.
s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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