Campbell v. Berryhill

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff benefits is AFFIRMED under sentence four of 42:405(g). Signed by Magistrate Judge Katherine P. Nelson on 2/14/18. (srr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOHNQUAYE D. CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-CV-00199-N

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Johnquaye D. Campbell brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant
Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying his application for a
period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs
(Docs. 10, 13) and those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 8) (hereinafter
cited as “(Tr. [page number(s) in lower-right corner of transcript])”) relevant to the
issues raised, and with the benefit of oral argument held January 4, 2018, the Court
finds that the Commissioner’s final decision is due to be AFFIRMED under sentence
four of § 405(g).1

With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to
conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this civil action, in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Docs. 17 ,18).
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I.

Background

On April 25, 2016, Campbell filed a Title II application for a period of disability,
with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), alleging disability beginning
October 3, 2012.2 After his application was initially denied, Campbell requested a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) with the SSA’s Office of
Disability Adjudication and Review. A hearing was held October 19, 2016, and on
December 28, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Campbell’s
application, finding him “not disabled” under the Social Security Act and thus not
entitled to benefits. (See Tr. 16-35).
On March 28, 2017, the Commissioner’s decision on Campbell’s application
became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and
Review denied Campbell’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 1 – 6).
Campbell subsequently filed this action under § 405(g) for judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision.

See (Doc. 1); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (“The final

determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI
benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title
to the same extent as the Commissioner’s final determinations under section 405 of
this title.”); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party,
irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a

“For DIB claims, a claimant is eligible for benefits where she demonstrates disability on or before the
last date for which she were insured. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A) (2005). For SSI claims, a claimant
becomes eligible in the first month where she is both disabled and has an SSI application on file. 20
C.F.R. § 416.202–03 (2005).” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
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civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such
decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may
allow.”); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007)
(“The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of
section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.”).
II.

Standards of Review

“In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the
Commissioner’s decision is ‘ “supported by substantial evidence and based on proper
legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” ’
” Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir.
1997))). However, the Court “ ‘may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence,
or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].’ ” Id. (quoting Phillips v.
Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting
Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). “‘Even if the evidence
preponderates against the [Commissioner]’s factual findings, [the Court] must affirm
if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Ingram, 496 F.3d at
1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
“Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as
automatons. [The Court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the

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decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]”
Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v.
Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“We are neither to conduct
a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come
before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a
reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light
of all the relevant facts.”).3 “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a
court] must…tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the
[Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).
However, the “substantial evidence” “standard of review applies only to
findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]’s
conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in
reviewing claims.”

MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986)

(quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th

Nevertheless, “ ‘[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that
could be made based on the materials before it…’ ” Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1239
(11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th
Cir. 1995) (en banc)) (ellipsis added). Generally, claims of error not raised in the district court are
deemed waived. See Stewart v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 115, 115 – 16 (11th Cir. 1994)
(“As a general principle, [the court of appeals] will not address an argument that has not been raised
in the district court…Because Stewart did not present any of his assertions in the district court, we
decline to consider them on appeal.” (applying rule in appeal of judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g), 1383(c)(3)); Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 651 F. App'x 958, 962 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (same); Cooley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 671 F. App'x 767, 769 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (“As a general rule, we do not consider arguments that have not been fairly presented
to a respective agency or to the district court. See Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999)
(treating as waived a challenge to the administrative law judge’s reliance on the testimony of a
vocational expert that was ‘not raise[d] . . . before the administrative agency or the district court’).”);
In re Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., Maternity Leave Practices & Flight Attendant Weight Program
Litig., 905 F.2d 1457, 1462 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f a party hopes to preserve a claim, argument, theory,
or defense for appeal, she must first clearly present it to the district court, that is, in such a way as to
afford the district court an opportunity to recognize and rule on it.”); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224,
1228 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying In re Pan American World Airways in Social Security appeal).
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Cir. 1982) (“Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of
Social Security benefits dictates that ‘(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....’ 42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) … As
is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable
only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no
similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary’s conclusions of law,
including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims.”
(some quotation marks omitted)). This Court “conduct[s] ‘an exacting examination’
of these factors.” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

“‘The

[Commissioner]’s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court
with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been
conducted mandates reversal.’” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v.
Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).
In sum, courts “review the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference and
the Commissioner’s legal conclusions with close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d
1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal
principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792
F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to

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determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004).”).
Eligibility for DIB and SSI requires that the claimant be disabled. 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E), 1382(a)(1)-(2). A claimant is disabled if she is
unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment ... which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A).
Thornton v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App’x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam) (unpublished).4
The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential
evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled: (1)
whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or
equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of
Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past
relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are
significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant
can perform given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work
experience.
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).5
“These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate
both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore,
405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)).

In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited
as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2. See also Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267
n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Cases printed in the Federal Appendix are cited as persuasive
authority.”).
5 The Court will hereinafter use “Step One,” “Step Two,” etc. when referencing individual steps of this
five-step sequential evaluation.
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“In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner
must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the
diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age,
education, and work history.” Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam)).

“These factors must be considered both singly and in combination.

Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive.” Bloodsworth, 703
F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).
If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves
that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work,
it then becomes the Commissioner’s burden, at Step Five, to prove that the claimant
is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another
kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v.
Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th
Cir. 1985). Finally, although the “claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the
inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social
Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record.” Shnorr v. Bowen, 816
F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276
(11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to
develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving
that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in
support of his claim.” (citations omitted)). “This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must

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scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant
facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the
evidence as a whole.” Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir.
2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).
Where, as here, the ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Council denied review
of that decision, the Court “review[s] the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final
decision.” Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. “[W]hen the [Appeals Council] has denied
review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in
determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Falge
v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998). If the applicant attacks only the ALJ’s
decision, the Court may not consider evidence that was presented to the Appeals
Council but not to the ALJ. See id. at 1324.
III.

Analysis

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Campbell met the applicable status
requirements through December 31, 2015, and that he had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date, October 3, 2012, through his
date last insured of December 31, 2015. (Tr. 18). At Step Two, the ALJ determined
that Campbell had the following severe impairments: post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), depression, history of traumatic brain injury (TBI) with cognitive deficits,
cognitive communicative deficits, headaches, anxiety, and history of Cannabis abuse.
(Tr. At 18). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Camphell did not have an impairment

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or combination of impairments that met or equaled the severity of one of the specified
impairments in the relevant listing of impairments. (Tr. 19-20).
At Step Four,
the ALJ must assess: (1) the claimant's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”); and (2) the claimant's ability to return to her past relevant
work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). As for the claimant's RFC, the
regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do
despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a). Moreover, the ALJ will “assess and make a finding about
[the claimant's] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant
medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
Furthermore, the RFC determination is used both to determine whether
the claimant: (1) can return to her past relevant work under the fourth
step; and (2) can adjust to other work under the fifth step…20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(e).
If the claimant can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ will
conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)
& (f). If the claimant cannot return to her past relevant work, the ALJ
moves on to step five.
In determining whether [a claimant] can return to her past relevant
work, the ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC using all relevant
medical and other evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). That is,
the ALJ must determine if the claimant is limited to a particular work
level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Once the ALJ assesses the claimant’s
RFC and determines that the claimant cannot return to her prior
relevant work, the ALJ moves on to the fifth, and final, step.
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).
The ALJ determined that Campbell had the RFC “to perform a full range of
work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: He is
unable to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He is unable to work in sunlight or in an
environment with bright light above customary office lighting level. He is unable to
work around extreme heat or very loud noise. He should never operate hazardous

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moving equipment. He should never work at heights or drive. He can perform simple,
routine tasks with only occasional changes in the work setting. He should not have
to interact with the public. He should not be required to coordinate with coworkers to
complete his own tasks. He is expected to be absent from work approximately one day
a month due to symptoms associated with his impairments and/or treatments.” (Tr.
At 20-21). Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined that Campbell was unable to
perform any past relevant work but that there were a significant number of other
jobs in the national economy which he was able to perform (Tr. at 34). As a result,
the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.
A claimant’s RFC is “an assessment of an individual's ability to do sustained
work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and
continuing basis.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1. It is an “administrative
assessment of the extent to which an individual's medically determinable
impairment(s), including any related symptoms, such as pain, may cause physical or
mental limitations or restrictions that may affect his or her capacity to do workrelated physical and mental activities.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2. It
represents the most, not the least, a claimant can still do despite his or her
limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545; SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (emphasis
added). The RFC assessment is based on “all of the relevant medical and other
evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). In assessing a claimant's RFC, the ALJ must
consider only limitations and restrictions attributable to medically determinable
impairments, i.e., those which are demonstrable by objective medical evidence. SSR

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96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2. Similarly, if the evidence does not show a limitation
or restriction of a specific functional capacity, the ALJ should consider the claimant
to have no limitation with respect to that functional capacity. Id. at *3. The ALJ is
exclusively responsible for determining an individual’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c).
Campbell’s lone claim is that “[t]he ALJ reversibly erred in giving little weight
to examining evaluator, Joseph Law, Ph.D., in favor of giving great weight to nonexamining, non-treating reviewing psychologist Harold Veits, Ph.D.” (Doc. 10 at 1).
In support, Campbell cites the Court of Appeals’ Lamb v. Bowen decision, which
states:
Absent a showing of good cause to the contrary, the opinions of treating
physicians must be accorded substantial or considerable weight by the
Secretary. The reports of reviewing nonexamining physicians do not
constitute substantial evidence on which to base an administrative
decision. The good cause required before the treating physicians'
opinions may be accorded little weight is not provided by the report of a
nonexamining physician where it contradicts the report of the treating
physician. The opinions of nonexamining, reviewing physicians, ... when
contrary to those of examining physicians are entitled to little weight in
a disability case, and standing alone do not constitute substantial
evidence.
847 F.2d 698, 703 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
However, the ALJ did not rely solely on the opinion of non-examining
psychologist Dr. Veits in formulating the RFC. The ALJ also relied on the findings of
Campbell’s doctors at the Veterans Administration, his treatment records, and
Campbell’s own hearing testimony. After extensively quoting and examining Dr.
Law’s opinion (Tr. at 30-31), the ALJ explained:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that
the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s
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statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence
and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this
decision.
The undersigned concludes that no credible treating or consultative
physician has opined that the claimant was disabled because of any
physical and/or mental condition or from any resulting symptoms.
The undersigned gives great weight to the findings, reports, and
opinions set out in the ongoing treatment records from physicians,
psychiatrists, psychologists, and speech pathologists who treated the
claimant at the Veterans Administration clinics and medical centers
(Exhibits 2F, 3F, and 4F). The Veterans Administration doctors felt that
the claimant’s psychological/traumatic brain injury symptoms would not
preclude employment. The undersigned has accounted for deficits in
executive functioning, memory, concentration, and social by limiting the
claimant to simple, routine tasks with only occasional changes, no
interaction with the public, and no coordinated tasks with coworkers.
The undersigned has also limited work around very loud noise to
account for exaggerated startled response. The undersigned further
limited work with moving machinery, heights, and driving due to
symptoms of anxiety.
The undersigned gives little weight to the opinion of Joseph Law, M.D.,
because it is a one-time evaluation and inconsistent with treatment
records. (Exhibit 5F).
…
The undersigned gives significant weight to the opinions of state agency
psychologist Harold R. Veits, M.D., because they are consistent with the
ongoing treatment records from the Veterans Administration (Exhibits
3F, 4F, and 5F). On January 29, 2016, and June 17, 2016, Dr. Veits
completed psychiatric review technique forms, finding the claimant to
have a mild restriction of activities of daily living, moderate difficulties
in maintaining social function; moderate difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace; and no repeated episodes of
decompensation, each of extended duration. (Exhibits 3A and 5A).
On June 17, 2016, Dr. Veits completed a mental residual functional
capacity assessment, finding the claimant able to concentrate and
attend for reasonable periods. Contact with the general publics needs to
be causal and not a usual job duty (Exhibit 5A).

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The undersigned acknowledges that the claimant has described daily
activities consisting of attending school and continuing to look for “every
[truck driving] job in Mobile: indicating that he believes that he is
capable of work. While it is clear that he has significant mental/cognitive
limitations, they are not severe enough to preclude all work. The
undersigned finds it significant that the claimant cares for his ill father,
performs household chores, prepares simple meals, shops, and takes his
father and self to medical appointments. His hobbies include
photography, drawing, and playing video games. He was primary care
giver for his minor son while the mother was in the military. He
continues to care for his minor son when he comes from Texas to spend
the summer with him (Exhibits 5E, 2F-4F, and Hearing Testimony). The
undersigned concludes that the claimant’s ability to engage in a wide
array of activities of daily living is persuasive evidence that the
claimant’s alleged symptoms resulting from physical and/or mental
impairments are not totally disabling.
The undersigned further notes that the claimant’s clinical examining
findings have often been found to be normal or minimally abnormal, and
the objective diagnostic evidence of record has been sparse.
(Tr. at 30-32).
As quoted above, the ALJ explained why certain weights were attributed to
both Dr. Law and Dr. Veits’ opinions, and provided support from the record for his
findings. The question before this Court is not whether an alternative determination
may be supported by the record, but whether the decision reached was supported by
substantial evidence. See Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260. “‘Even if the evidence
preponderates against the [Commissioner]’s factual findings, we must affirm if the
decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.’” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260
(quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). Even if the
evidence may support an alternative determination, there remains substantial
evidence within the record on which the ALJ’s determination was based. See Dyer v.

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Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir.2005) (a reviewing court “may not decide
facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the
Commissioner.”). Further, the ALJ specifically articulated the rationale behind his
determination. Additionally, to the extent that Campbell disagrees with the ALJ’s
evaluation of Dr. Law’s, such disagreement does not persuade the court that the RFC
determination lacked substantial evidence. As a result, Campbell’s claim of error is
without merit.
IV.

Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner’s
December 28, 2016 final decision denying Campbell’s application for a period of disability
and DIB is AFFIRMED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Final judgment shall
issue separately in accordance with this Order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
DONE and ORDERED this the 14th day of February 2018.
/s/ Katherine P. Nelson
KATHERINE P. NELSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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