Anderson v. Berryhill

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER entered that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff benefits be AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge P. Bradley Murray on 5/16/2018. (eec)

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IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  COURT   FOR  THE  SOUTHERN  DISTRICT  OF  ALABAMA   SOUTHERN  DIVISION     KRISTI  J.  ANDERSON,                   Plaintiff,                 v.                     NANCY  A.  BERRYHILL,     Acting  Commissioner  of  Social   Security,                       Defendant.                             )   )   )   )   )        CIVIL  ACTION  NO.  17-­0339-­MU     )   )   )   )     )   )       MEMORANDUM  OPINION  AND  ORDER     Plaintiff  Kristi  J.  Anderson  brings  this  action,  pursuant  to  42  U.S.C.  §§   405(g)  and  1383(c)(3),  seeking  judicial  review  of  a  final  decision  of  the   Commissioner  of  Social  Security  (“the  Commissioner”)  denying  her  claim  for   Disability  Insurance  Benefits  (“DIB”)  under  Title  II  of  the  Social  Security  Act  (“the   Act”)  and  for  Supplemental  Security  Income  (“SSI”),  based  on  disability,  under   Title  XVI  of  the  Act.  The  parties  have  consented  to  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  by   the  Magistrate  Judge,  pursuant  to  28  U.S.C.  §  636(c),  for  all  proceedings  in  this   Court.  (Doc.  21  (“In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  28  U.S.C.  636(c)  and  Fed.   R.  Civ.  P.  73,  the  parties  in  this  case  consent  to  have  a  United  States  Magistrate   Judge  conduct  any  and  all  proceedings  in  this  case,  …  order  the  entry  of  a  final   judgment,  and  conduct  all  post-­judgment  proceedings.”)).  See  also  Doc.  23.   Upon  consideration  of  the  administrative  record,  Anderson’s  brief,  the   Commissioner’s  brief,  and  the  arguments  made  at  the  hearing  on  May  9,  2018     1   before  the  undersigned  Magistrate  Judge,  it  is  determined  that  the   Commissioner’s  decision  denying  benefits  should  be  affirmed.1         I.    PROCEDURAL  HISTORY   Anderson  applied  for  DIB,  under  Title  II  of  the  Act,  42  U.S.C.  §§  423-­425,   and  for  SSI,  based  on  disability,  under  Title  XVI  of  the  Act,  42  U.S.C.  §§  1381-­ 1383d,  on  August  12,  2014,  alleging  disability  beginning  on  April  25,  2014.  (Tr.   200,  207).  Her  application  was  denied  at  the  initial  level  of  administrative  review   on  December  18,  2014.  (Tr.  135-­39).  On  December  29,  2014,  Anderson   requested  a  hearing  by  an  Administrative  Law  Judge  (ALJ).  (Tr.  144).  After  a   hearing  was  held  on  June  15,  2016,  the  ALJ  issued  an  unfavorable  decision   finding  that  Anderson  was  not  under  a  disability  from  the  date  the  application  was   filed  through  the  date  of  the  decision,  September  2,  2016.  (Tr.  17-­33).  Anderson   appealed  the  ALJ’s  decision  to  the  Appeals  Council,  and,  on  June  21,  2017,  the   Appeals  Council  denied  her  request  for  review  of  the  ALJ’s  decision,  thereby   making  the  ALJ’s  decision  the  final  decision  of  the  Commissioner.  (Tr.  1-­6).     After  exhausting  her  administrative  remedies,  Anderson  sought  judicial   review  in  this  Court,  pursuant  to  42  U.S.C.  §§  405(g)  and  1383(c).  (Doc.  1).  The   Commissioner  filed  an  answer  and  the  social  security  transcript  on  November  2,   2017.  (Docs.  12,  13).  Both  parties  filed  briefs  setting  forth  their  respective                                                                                                               1  Any  appeal  taken  from  this  Order  and  Judgment  shall  be  made  to  the  Eleventh   Circuit  Court  of  Appeals.  See  Doc.  21  (“An  appeal  from  a  judgment  entered  by  a   Magistrate  Judge  shall  be  taken  directly  to  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for   the  judicial  circuit  in  the  same  manner  as  an  appeal  from  any  other  judgment  of   this  district  court.”).             2   positions.  (Docs.  15,  16).  Oral  argument  was  held  on  May  9,  2018.  (Doc.  22).   The  case  is  now  ripe  for  decision.   II.    CLAIM  ON  APPEAL   Anderson  alleges  that  the  ALJ’s  decision  to  deny  her  benefits  is  in  error  for   the  following  reason:   1.  The  ALJ  erred  by  failing  to  properly  evaluate  whether  her  impairment  is  of  a   severity  to  meet  or  equal  Listing  12.05B.  (Doc.  15  at  p.  1).   III.  BACKGROUND  FACTS   Anderson  was  born  on  May  3,  1967,  and  was  47  years  old  at  the  time  she   filed  her  claim  for  benefits.  (Tr.  200).  Anderson  initially  alleged  disability  due  to   back  problems,  hearing  loss  in  her  left  ear,  hand  problems,  depression,   insomnia,  and  restless  leg  syndrome.  (Tr.  235).  At  the  hearing,  in  addition  to   these  limitations,  she  also  alleged  that  tendonitis  in  her  hip  and  being  slow,   mentally  and  physically,  keep  her  from  being  able  to  work.  (Tr.  52).  Anderson   graduated  from  high  school  with  a  regular  diploma  in  1985,  but  was  in  special   education  classes  in  some  subjects.  (Tr.  44,  236).  At  the  time  she  filed  her   application,  she  was  working  part-­time  at  a  fast  food  restaurant  as  a  cook,  but   she  was  terminated  from  that  employment  between  the  date  of  filing  her   application  and  testifying  at  the  hearing  before  the  ALJ.  (Tr.  45-­46,  236-­37).  She   has  previously  worked  at  fast  food  restaurants  as  a  cook  and  stocker,  at   carnivals  as  a  game  booth  and  ride  attendant,  and  at  Dollar  Tree  as  a  stocker.   (Tr.  46-­52).  At  the  time  of  the  hearing,  Anderson  was  living  with  and  taking  care   of  her  husband  who  had  stage  four  cancer.  (Tr.  40-­42).    Anderson  handles  her     3   own  personal  care,  she  cooks  several  times  per  week  for  herself  and  her   husband,  she  does  household  chores,  she  helps  her  husband  get  up  and  assists   him  walking,  she  walks  to  the  grocery  story  about  two  miles  from  her  apartment   and  back  with  her  husband  just  about  every  morning,  and  she  pays  bills  with  her   husband.  (Tr.  41-­43,  67-­69).  She  does  not  have  a  driver’s  license  because  no   one  has  ever  taught  her  to  drive  and  she  doesn’t  have  a  car.  (Tr.  42-­43).  She   enjoys  seek  and  find  books,  reading  her  Bible,  and  attending  and  volunteering  at   her  church.  (Tr.  69,  71).  She  testified  that  the  only  problem  she  has  getting  along   with  people  is  when  they  nag  her  and  that  she  has  no  problems  maintaining   attention  or  following  directions.  (Tr.  70-­71).  She  further  testified  that  other  than   getting  irritated  with  people  who  nag,  there  are  no  other  ways  her  mental  issues   keep  her  from  being  able  to  work.  (Tr.  71).    After  conducting  the  hearing,  the  ALJ   made  a  determination  that  Anderson  had  not  been  under  a  disability  during  the   relevant  time  period,  and  thus,  was  not  entitled  to  benefits.  (Tr.  17-­31).     IV.  ALJ’S  DECISION   After  considering  all  of  the  evidence,  the  ALJ  made  the  following  findings   that  are  relevant  to  the  issues  presented  in  his  November  2,  2016  decision:   3.    The  claimant  has  the  following  severe  impairments:  borderline   intellectual   functioning,  affective  disorder,  back  pain,  chronic   pain  syndrome,  and  hearing  loss  in  the  left  ear   (20  CFR   414.1520(c)  and  416.920(c)).     *  *  *     4.    The  claimant  does  not  have  an  impairment  or  combination  of   impairments  that  meets   or  medically  equals  the  severity  of  one  of   the  listed  impairments  in  20  CFR  Part  404,  Subpart  P,  Appendix   1(20  CFR  404.1520(d),  404.1525,  404.1526,  416.920(d),  416.925  and     4   416.926).     *  *  *       Listing  12.05  is  not  met.  While  a  full  scale  IQ  of  57  was  assessed  by  a   psychological  evaluation  performed  in  2012,  there  is  no  indication  in  the   document  it  was  deemed  a  valid  score.  1F.  Importantly,  that  examiner  opined   the  claimant  could  do  simple  type  work  like  “restaurant  work”  or  “cleaning  and   laundry.”  1F.  Another  psychological  evaluation  was  performed  in  2013  and   found  a  full  scale  IQ  of  64.  13F.  The  provider  noted  that  the  claimant  reported  a   history  of  special  education  classes.    However,  the  claimant  testified  she   graduated  with  a  regular  diploma.  While  the  claimant  has  an  IQ  between  60  and   70,  she  has  not  established  deficits  in  adaptive  functioning  sufficient  to  meet   listing  12.05.  She  reportedly  doesn't  drive,  but  can  handle  finances,  worked,   takes  care  of  her  husband  who  has  cancer  and  is  on  disability,  cleans  the   house,  and  reads.  She  walks  four  miles  to  the  store,  picks  her  husband  up  and   carries  him  around,  and  volunteers  at  her  church.  She  has  worked  with  money  at   her  previous  jobs  with  the  carnival.  She  lived  by  herself  before  she  was  married,   can  use  public  transportation,  and  is  going  to  attempt  to  learn  to  drive  when  her   and  her  husband  get  a  vehicle.  The  evidence  supports  a  finding  that  listing  12.05   has  not  been  met.     (Tr.  23).     V.  DISCUSSION   Eligibility  for  DIB  and  SSI  benefits  requires  that  the  claimant  be  disabled.   42  U.S.C.  §§  423(a)(1)(E),  1382(a)(1)-­(2).  A  claimant  is  disabled  if  the  claimant  is   unable  “to  engage  in  any  substantial  gainful  activity  by  reason  of  any  medically   determinable  physical  or  mental  impairment  which  can  be  expected  to  result  in   death  or  which  has  lasted  or  can  be  expected  to  last  for  a  continuous  period  of   not  less  than  12  months.”  42  U.S.C.  §  1382c(a)(3)(A).  The  impairment  must  be   severe,  making  the  claimant  unable  to  do  the  claimant’s  previous  work  or  any   other  substantial  gainful  activity  that  exists  in  the  national  economy.  42  U.S.C.  §   423(d)(2);;  20  C.F.R.  §§  404.1505-­11.  “Substantial  gainful  activity  means  work     5   that  …  [i]nvolves  doing  significant  and  productive  physical  or  mental  duties  [that]   [i]s  done  (or  intended)  for  pay  or  profit.”  20  C.F.R.  §  404.1510.   In  evaluating  whether  a  claimant  is  disabled,  the  ALJ  utilizes  a  five-­step   sequential  evaluation:     (1)  whether  the  claimant  is  engaged  in  substantial  gainful  activity;;   (2)  if  not,  whether  the  claimant  has  a  severe  impairment;;  (3)  if  so,   whether  the  severe  impairment  meets  or  equals  an  impairment  in   the  Listing  of  Impairment  in  the  regulations;;  (4)  if  not,  whether  the   claimant  has  the  RFC  to  perform  her  past  relevant  work;;  and  (5)  if   not,  whether,  in  light  of  the  claimant’s  RFC,  age,  education  and   work  experience,  there  are  other  jobs  the  claimant  can  perform.           Watkins  v.  Comm’r  of  Soc.  Sec.,  457  F.  App’x  868,  870  (11th  Cir.  2012)  (per   curiam)  (citing  20  C.F.R.  §§  404.1520(a)(4),  (c)-­(f),  416.920(a)(4),  (c)(f);;  Phillips   v.  Barnhart,  357  F.3d  1232,  1237  (11th  Cir.  2004))  (footnote  omitted).  The   claimant  bears  the  burden  of  proving  the  first  four  steps,  and  if  the  claimant  does   so,  the  burden  shifts  to  the  Commissioner  to  prove  the  fifth  step.  Jones  v.  Apfel,   190  F.3d  1224,  1228  (11th  Cir.  1999).  The  steps  are  to  be  followed  in  order,  and  if   it  is  determined  that  the  claimant  is  disabled  at  a  step  of  the  evaluation  process,   the  evaluation  does  not  proceed  to  the  next  step.   If  the  claimant  appeals  an  unfavorable  ALJ  decision,  the  reviewing  court   has  a  narrow  scope  of  review.  That  court  must  determine  whether  the   Commissioner’s  decision  to  deny  benefits  was  “supported  by  substantial   evidence  and  based  on  proper  legal  standards.”  Winschel  v.  Comm’r  of  Soc.   Sec.,  631  F.3d  1176,  1178  (11th  Cir.  2011)  (citations  omitted);;  see  42  U.S.C.  §   405(g).  “Substantial  evidence  is  more  than  a  scintilla  and  is  such  relevant   evidence  as  a  reasonable  person  would  accept  as  adequate  to  support  a     6   conclusion.”  Winschel,  631  F.3d  at  1178  (citations  omitted).    “In  determining   whether  substantial  evidence  exists,  [the  reviewing  court]  must  view  the  record   as  a  whole,  taking  into  account  evidence  favorable  as  well  as  unfavorable  to  the   [Commissioner’s]  decision.”  Chester  v.  Bowen,  792  F.2d  129,  131  (11th  Cir.   1986).  The  reviewing  court  “may  not  decide  the  facts  anew,  reweigh  the   evidence,  or  substitute  [its]  judgment  for  that  of  the  [Commissioner].”  Id.  When  a   decision  is  supported  by  substantial  evidence,  the  reviewing  court  must  affirm   “[e]ven  if  [the  court]  find[s]  that  the  evidence  preponderates  against  the   Secretary’s  decision.”  MacGregor  v.  Bowen,  786  F.2d  1050,  1053  (11th  Cir.   1986).   Anderson  asserts  that  the  ALJ’s  summary  dismissal  of  her  documented   full-­scale  IQ  score  of  57  because  “there  is  no  indication  in  the  document  that  it   was  deemed  a  valid  score,”  Tr.  23,  was  reversible  error.  (Doc.  15  at  p.  2).  The   Commissioner  argues  that  the  ALJ  did  not  err  because  Anderson  did  not   establish  that  she  met  all  of  the  criteria  required  by  Listing  12.05B.  (Doc.  16  at   pp.  3-­4).  Specifically,  the  Commissioner  contends  that  the  ALJ  did  not  err   because  he  correctly  found  that  Anderson  did  not  establish  deficits  in  adaptive   functioning  sufficient  to  meet  Listing  12.05.  (Id.).       The  Listings  describe  certain  medical  findings  and  other  criteria  that  are   considered  so  extreme  as  to  be  presumptively  disabling.  See  20  C.F.R  §§   404.1525,  416.925.  To  establish  disability  under  a  Listing,  a  claimant  must  have   a  diagnosis  included  in  the  Listing  and  must  provide  medical  reports   documenting  that  her  condition  satisfies  the  specific  criteria  of  the  listed     7   impairment.  See  Wilson  v.  Barnhart,  284  F.3d  1219,  1224  (11th  Cir.  2002);;  20   C.F.R.  §§  404.1525(a-­d),  416.925(a-­d).  “For  a  claimant  to  show  that  his   impairment  matches  a  listing,  it  must  meet  all  of  the  specified  medical  criteria.  An   impairment  that  manifests  only  some  of  those  criteria,  no  matter  how  severely,   does  not  qualify.”  Sullivan  v.  Zebley,  493  U.S.  521,  530  (1990).     To  “meet”  Listing  12.05,  the  claimant  must  satisfy  the  diagnostic   description  in  the  introductory  paragraph  and  one  of  four  sets  of  diagnostic   criteria  found  in  paragraphs  A,  B,  C,  or  D.  20  C.F.R.  pt.  404,  subpt.  P,  app.  1,  §   12.00(A).  Listing  12.05's  introductory  paragraph  requires  the  claimant  to  have:  (1)   significantly  subaverage  general  intellectual  functioning;;  (2)  deficits  in  adaptive   functioning;;  and  (3)  an  onset  of  impairment  before  age  22.  Id.  at  §  12.05.     Although  adaptive  functioning  is  not  defined  in  the  regulations,  the  Eleventh   Circuit  has  favorably  cited  the  description  of  adaptive  functioning  in  the  Social   Security  Administration's  Program  Operations  Manual  System  (“POMS”)  as  “‘the   individual's  progress  in  acquiring  mental,  academic,  social  and  personal  skills  as   compared  with  other  unimpaired  individuals  of  his/her  same  age,’”  as  well  as  the   statement  in  the  American  Psychiatric  Association,  Diagnostic  and  Statistical   Manual  of  Mental  Disorders  that  adaptive  functioning  means  “‘how  well  a  person   meets  standards  of  personal  independence  and  social  responsibility,  in   comparison  to  others  of  similar  age  and  sociocultural  background.  Adaptive   functioning  involves  adaptive  reasoning  in  three  domains:  conceptual,  social,  and   practical.’”  Schrader  v.  Acting  Comm'r  of  the  Soc.  Sec.  Admin.,  632  F.  App’x  572,     8   576  &  n.  3-­4  (11th  Cir.  2015)  (quoting  Soc.  Sec.  Admin.,  Program  Operations   Manual  System,  DI  24515.056(D)(2)  (2012)  and  DSM-­V  37  (5th  ed.  2013)).     If  the  claimant  satisfies  the  three  requirements  in  the  introductory   paragraph,  the  claimant  must  then  satisfy  one  of  the  four  criteria  listed  in  12.05A   through  12.05D.  The  Listing  relevant  here  is  12.05B.  Under  Listing  12.05B,  the   claimant  must  present  evidence  of  a  “valid  verbal,  performance,  or  full  scale  IQ  of   59  or  less.”  Jackson  v.  Astrue,  Civ.  A.  No.  11-­0121-­M,  2011  WL  3757894,  at  *4   (S.D.  Ala.  Aug.  25,  2011)  (quoting  20  C.F.R.  Part  404,  Subpart  P,  Appendix  1,   Listing  12.05B  (2010)).  “The  Social  Security  Administration  has  noted  that   standardized  intelligence  tests  can  assist  in  verifying  the  presence  of  intellectual   disability,  but  form  only  part  of  the  overall  assessment  and  should  be  considered   in  conjunction  with  developmental  history  and  functional  limitations.”    Nichols  v.   Comm’r,  Soc.  Sec.  Admin.,  679  F.  App’x  792,  795-­96  (11th  Cir.  2017)  (citing  §   12.05(D)(6)(a)).  “[A]n  ALJ  may  find,  for  purposes  of  Listing  12.05,  that  the  results   of  an  IQ  test  are  incredible  where  the  test  results  are  inconsistent  with  the   medical  record  or  the  claimant’s  daily  activities  and  behavior.”  Id.  at  796  (citing   Popp  v.  Heckler,  779  F.2d  1497,  1499-­1500  (11th  Cir.  1986)).  Even  a  valid  IQ   score  is  not  necessarily  conclusive  of  intellectual  disability  “‘where  the  IQ  score  is   inconsistent  with  other  evidence  in  the  record  on  the  claimant’s  daily  living   activities  and  behavior.’”  Nichols,  679  F.  App’x  at  796  (quoting  Lowery  v.   Sullivan,  979  F.2d  835,  837  (11th  Cir.  1992)).  In  Nichols,  the  Eleventh  Circuit   concluded  that  the  ALJ  did  not  err  in  finding  claimant’s  IQ  score  of  59  invalid   where  her  range  of  activities  and  accomplishments,  including  reading  and     9   understanding  English,  having  a  driver’s  license,  completing  high  school  with  a   certificate,  having  a  history  of  some  unskilled  work,  raising  two  children,  and   handling  money,  were  inconsistent  with  the  IQ  results.  679  F.  App’x  at  796-­97;;   see  also  Branch  v.  Berryhill,  Civ.  A.  No.  16-­0499-­N,  2017  WL  1483534,  at  *4-­6   (S.D.  Ala.  Apr.  25  2017)  (finding  that  the  ALJ  did  not  err  in  finding  that  claimant’s   IQ  score  of  60  was  invalid  where,  even  though  she  was  in  special  education   classes  through  eighth  grade  (the  highest  grade  completed)  and  could  not   functionally  read,  she  could  feed  and  take  care  of  her  pets,  manage  her  own   personal  care,  help  her  husband  cook,  watch  television,  wash  clothes,  go  to  the   grocery  store  with  her  husband,  talk  to  her  daughter  on  the  phone,  and  spend   time  on  the  computer).             Anderson  was  evaluated  by  psychologist  Thomas  S.  Bennett,  Ph.  D.  on   November  14,  2012,  at  which  time  he  administered  the  Weschler  Adult   Intelligence  Scale,  Fourth  Edition  (WAIS-­IV).  (Tr.  300-­02).  That  test  reflected  that   Anderson  had  a  full-­scale  IQ  score  of  57,  which  placed  her  in  the  range  of  mild   mental  retardation.  (Tr.  302).  Dr.  Bennett  did  not  indicate  in  his  report  whether  he   found  this  to  be  a  valid  score.  He  did  opine,  after  evaluating  Anderson,  as  well  as   administering  the  testing,  that  she  could  “probably  do  some  simple  restaurant   work”  and  “could  probably  do  cleaning  or  laundry.”  (Tr.  301).  Anderson  was   subsequently  evaluated  by  psychologist  Lucile  T.  Williams,  Psy.D.,  on  November   7,  2013.  (Doc.  356-­59).  She  administered  the  WAIS-­IV  to  Anderson  which   revealed  a  full-­scale  IQ  score  of  64,  and  she  assigned  a  diagnostic  impression  of   mild  mental  retardation.  (Tr.  359).  Dr.  Williams  noted  that  she  believed  her     10   observations  of  Anderson  to  be  “a  valid  estimate  of  her  current  level  of   intellectual  functioning.”     Based  on  the  foregoing  medical  evidence,  the  ALJ  rejected  the  IQ  score  of   57  because  Anderson  did  not  meet  her  burden  of  proving  that  it  was  a  valid   score  and  found  that  she  had  a  valid  IQ  score  between  60  and  70.  (Tr.  23).  Even   assuming  that  the  ALJ  erred  in  rejecting  the  lower  IQ  score,  the  outcome  of  the   case  would  be  the  same  because  the  ALJ  found  that  Anderson  failed  to   “establish[]  deficits  in  adaptive  functioning  sufficient  to  meet  listing  12.05,”  which   is  a  requirement  under  both  12.05B  and  12.05C.  The  ALJ  concluded  that  the   record  did  not  support  a  finding  that  Anderson  has  deficits  in  adaptive   functioning  sufficient  to  meet  Listing  12.05.  (Tr.  23).  The  ALJ  noted  that  the   record  reflects  that  Anderson  “doesn't  drive,  but  can  handle  finances,  worked,   takes  care  of  her  husband  who  has  cancer  and  is  on  disability,  cleans  the   house,  and  reads.  She  walks  four  miles  to  the  store,  picks  her  husband  up  and   carries  him  around,  and  volunteers  at  her  church.  She  has  worked  with  money  at   her  previous  jobs  with  the  carnival.  She  lived  by  herself  before  she  was  married,   can  use  public  transportation,  and  is  going  to  attempt  to  learn  to  drive  when  her   and  her  husband  get  a  vehicle.”  (Tr.  23).  Anderson’s  testimony  at  the  hearing   before  the  ALJ  supported  these  findings.  (Tr.  39-­76).  This  Court  finds  that  this   evidence  constitutes  substantial  evidence  in  support  of  the  ALJ’s  determination   that  Anderson  did  not  establish  that  she  has  deficits  in  adaptive  functioning   sufficient  to  meet  Listing  12.05B.           11   CONCLUSION   It  is  well-­established  that  it  is  not  this  Court’s  place  to  reweigh  the   evidence  or  substitute  its  judgment  for  that  of  the  Commissioner.  This  Court  is   limited  to  a  determination  of  whether  the  ALJ’s  decision  is  supported  by   substantial  evidence  and  based  on  proper  legal  standards.  The  Court  finds  that   the  ALJ’s  Decision  that  Anderson  is  not  entitled  to  benefits  is  supported  by   substantial  evidence  and  based  on  proper  legal  standards.  Accordingly,  it  is   ORDERED  that  the  decision  of  the  Commissioner  of  Social  Security  denying   Plaintiff  benefits  be  AFFIRMED.   DONE  and  ORDERED  this  the  16th  day  of  May,  2018.                     s/P.  BRADLEY  MURRAY         UNITED  STATES  MAGISTRATE  JUDGE                         12    

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