Dade v. Berryhill

Filing 24

Order re: 1 Complaint filed by Sybil Jones Dade stating that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 6/27/18. (mpp) Copies to counsel

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SYBIL JONES DADE,

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*
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*
*
*
*
*
*
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Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-00343-B

ORDER
Plaintiff Sybil Jones Dade (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), seeks
judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying her claim for a period of disability, disability
insurance benefits, and supplemental security income under Titles
II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq.,
and 1381, et seq.

On April 12, 2018, the parties consented to have

the undersigned conduct any and all proceedings in this case. (Doc.
21).

Thus, the action was referred to the undersigned to conduct

all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73.
careful

consideration

of

the

administrative

record

and

Upon
the

memoranda of the parties, it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of
the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.

I.

Procedural History1
Plaintiff filed her application for benefits on July 21, 2014,

alleging disability beginning December 31, 2012, based on “back,
pinch[ed] nerve, blurred vision, vertigo, and diabetes.”
at 182, 211, 217).

(Doc. 15

Plaintiff’s application was denied and upon

timely request, she was granted an administrative hearing before
Administrative Law Judge Laura Robinson (hereinafter “ALJ”) on
April 27, 2016.

(Id. at 69).

Plaintiff attended the hearing with

her counsel and provided testimony related to her claims.

(Id.).

A vocational expert (“VE”) also appeared at the hearing and provided
testimony.

(Id. at 81).

On June 24, 2016, the ALJ issued an

unfavorable decision finding that Plaintiff is not disabled.
at 43).

(Id.

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review

on June 2, 2017.

(Id. at 5).

Therefore, the ALJ’s decision dated

June 24, 2016, became the final decision of the Commissioner.
Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Plaintiff timely
filed the present civil action.
argument on April 12, 2018.

(Doc. 1).

(Doc. 20).

The parties waived oral

This case is now ripe for

judicial review and is properly before this Court pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
II.

Issues on Appeal
1. Whether substantial evidence supports the
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) for a
1

The Court’s citations to the transcript in this order refer
to the pagination assigned in CM/ECF.

2

full range of light work given the ALJ’s
failure to order a second consultative
medical examination?
2. Whether the ALJ erred in relying on the
GRIDS to find Plaintiff not disabled?
3. Whether
the
ALJ
erred
Plaintiff’s credibility?

in

assessing

III. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born on January 2, 1963, and was fifty-three
years of age at the time of her administrative hearing on April 27,
2016.

(Doc. 15 at 211).

Plaintiff completed the tenth grade in

high school and is able to read.

(Id. at 73-74).

Plaintiff last worked from 2013 to 2014 as a house cleaner and
a private sitter.

(Id. at 74, 80-81).

part-time as a cashier.

Prior to that, she worked

(Id.).

Plaintiff testified that she can no longer work due to back
pain, swelling in her feet, and carpal tunnel syndrome.
74).

(Id. at

According to Plaintiff, she takes Lasix for diabetes, which

is now under control, and Mobic and Lyrica for back and neck pain.
(Id.

at

75).

dizziness.

Some

of

her

medications

cause

drowsiness

and

(Id. at 76, 81).

IV. Standard of Review
In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s role
is a limited one.

The Court’s review is limited to determining 1)

whether the decision of the Secretary is supported by substantial

3

evidence and 2) whether the correct legal standards were applied.2
Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).

A court

may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute
its judgment for that of the Commissioner.
F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986).

Sewell v. Bowen, 792

The Commissioner’s findings of

fact must be affirmed if they are based upon substantial evidence.
Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth
v.

Heckler,

703

F.2d

1233,

1239

(11th

Cir.

1983)

(holding

substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla, but less
than a preponderance” and consists of “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable

person

conclusion.”).

would

accept

as

adequate

to

support

a

In determining whether substantial evidence exists,

a court must view the record as a whole, taking into account
evidence favorable, as well as unfavorable, to the Commissioner’s
decision.

Chester v. Bowen, 792 F. 2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986);

Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163, *4 (S.D. Ala. June 14,
1999).
V.

Statutory and Regulatory Framework
An

individual

who

applies

for

Social

benefits must prove his or her disability.
416.912.

Security

disability

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512,

Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any

2

This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of
legal principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999
(11th Cir. 1987).

4

substantial

gainful

activity

by

reason

of

any

medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”

42 U.S.C. §§

423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a).
Social

Security

regulations

provide

a

five-step

The

sequential

evaluation process for determining if a claimant has proven his
disability.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

The claimant must first prove that he or she has not engaged
in substantial gainful activity.

The second step requires the

claimant to prove that he or she has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments.

If, at the third step, the claimant

proves that the impairment or combination of impairments meets or
equals a listed impairment, then the claimant is automatically found
disabled regardless of age, education, or work experience.

If the

claimant cannot prevail at the third step, he or she must proceed
to the fourth step where the claimant must prove an inability to
perform their past relevant work.
1005 (11th Cir. 1986).

Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001,

At the fourth step, the ALJ must make an

assessment of the claimant’s RFC.
3d 1232, 1238 (llth Cir. 2004).

See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.

The RFC is an assessment, based on

all relevant medical and other evidence, of a claimant’s remaining
ability to work despite his impairment.
F.3d 1436, 1440 (llth Cir. 1997).

5

See Lewis v. Callahan, 125

If a claimant meets his or her burden at the fourth step, it
then becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove at the fifth step
that

the

claimant

is

capable

of

engaging

in

another

kind

of

substantial gainful employment which exists in significant numbers
in the national economy, given the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work history.

Sryock v. Heckler, 764

F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). If the Commissioner can demonstrate
that there are such jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant
must prove inability to perform those jobs in order to be found
disabled.

Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999).

See also Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing
Francis v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).
VI.

Discussion
A. Substantial
evidence
supports
the
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) for
a full range of light work and the ALJ’s
decision not to order an additional
consultative medical examination.
In her brief, Plaintiff argues that the RFC for a full range

of light work is not supported by substantial evidence, particularly
given the ALJ’s failure to order a second consultative examination
in order to obtain an expert opinion on her limitations with respect
to standing and walking caused by the swelling and pain in her legs
from diabetes.

(Doc. 16 at 4, 8).

The Government counters that

the RFC is fully supported by the substantial evidence and that the
ALJ was not required to order an additional consultative examination

6

given that the record contained substantial evidence to allow the
ALJ

to

make

an

informed

decision

on

Plaintiff’s

capabilities and, thus, the issue of disability.
Having

reviewed

the

record

at

length,

the

physical

(Doc. 17 at 3).

Court

finds

that

Plaintiff’s claim is without merit.
Residual functional capacity is a measure of what Plaintiff
can do despite his or her credible limitations.
404.1545.

See 20 C.F.R. §

Determinations of a claimant’s RFC are reserved for the

ALJ, and the assessment is to be based upon all the relevant
evidence of a claimant’s remaining ability to work despite his or
her impairments and must be supported by substantial evidence.

See

Beech v. Apfel, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1331 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (citing
20 C.F.R. § 404.1546 and Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440
(11th Cir. 1997)); Saunders v. Astrue, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39571,
*10, 2012 WL 997222, *4 (M.D. Ala. March 23, 2012).

Once the ALJ

has determined the claimant’s RFC, the claimant bears the burden of
demonstrating

that

the

substantial evidence.
(11th Cir. 1985).

ALJ’s

decision

is

not

supported

by

See Flynn v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 1273, 1274

Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in this

case.
In the instant case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the
severe

impairments

of

diabetes

mellitus,

diabetic

hypertensive cardiovascular disease, and obesity.

neuropathy,

(Doc. 15 at 46).

The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform the

7

full range of light work but is unable to perform her past relevant
work.3

(Id. at 48, 53).

The ALJ concluded that, based upon the

RFC for a full range of light work, Plaintiff’s age, education, and
work experience,

a

finding

of

“not

disabled”

Medical-Vocational Rules 202.18 and 202.11.

was

directed

(Id. at 54).

by

Having

reviewed the evidence at length, the Court is satisfied that the
RFC is supported by substantial evidence.
As the ALJ found, Plaintiff’s treatment records show that she
received treatment from January 2012 to April 2016 for various
ailments

including

diabetes,

diabetic

neuropathy,

hypertensive

cardiovascular disease, back, neck, arm, leg, and foot pain, and
obesity.

(Id. at 288-631).

The record shows that Plaintiff’s

primary treating physician was Dr. Herbert Kinsey, M.D., and that
she frequently presented to hospital emergency rooms for routine
medical treatment as well.4
As

the

ALJ

found,

(Id.).

Plaintiff’s

treatment

records

reflect

recurrent reports of back and neck pain, as well as swelling, pain,

3

Relying on the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s past relevant work was medium, which exceeds the RFC.
(Id. at 52-53).
4

Plaintiff’s treatment records reflect that she presented to
hospital emergency rooms approximately thirteen times between
February 2014 and April 2016 for complaints of
back pain,
dizziness, arm pain, chest pain, swelling in her extremities, body
aches, and shortness of breath and was generally treated with
medication and discharged the same day. (Doc. 15 at 288-388, 454636).

8

burning,

tingling,

and

numbness

in

her

arms,

legs,

and

feet

associated with diabetes, diabetic neuropathy, and obesity.

(Id.

at 351, 411, 429-430, 436-37, 444-49, 451, 453, 502, 587, 589, 615).
Plaintiff

also

complained

of

back

pain,

which

her

treatment

providers associated with lumbar strain and muscle spasms.
346, 437, 446).
swelling,

(Id. at

Despite these recurring reports of pain and

Plaintiff’s

treatment

records

likewise

repeatedly

document “mild” symptoms, unremarkable spine, “mild” degenerative
change in thoracic spine, full range of motion in back and upper
extremities bilaterally, negative straight leg raise, normal muscle
strength, normal reflexes, normal sensation, no muscle weakness,
and normal gait.

(Id. at 300-01, 351, 396, 410, 420-21, 430-32,

460-65, 491, 499, 507-09, 512, 531, 552, 556, 597-98, 604, 613-28).
Likewise, CT scans of Plaintiff’s head and chest reflect normal
findings, with the singular exception of a small, benign nodule on
Plaintiff’s left lung, and multiple x-rays of Plaintiff’s lumbar
spine5 and chest, EKGs, and an ultrasound of Plaintiff’s left arm
were consistently normal.6

(Id. at 427, 462, 465, 483, 493-94, 509,

512, 522, 531, 577, 587, 593, 600, 602, 625, 628).
The

record

shows

that

Plaintiff’s

medical

treatment

was

5

X-rays of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine on February 11, 2014,
showed “minimal” degenerative changes. (Doc. 15 at 346).
6

A radiology report dated January 7, 2012, also confirmed no
deep vein thrombosis in Plaintiff’s left upper extremity. (Doc. 15
at 406).

9

conservative,

consisting

largely

of

medication

to

treat

her

diabetes, pain medication, and instructions to change her diet and
lose weight.
15).

(Id. at 355, 409, 432-33, 485, 531-32, 589-90, 614-

In addition, Plaintiff’s treatment notes reflect that, when

taken, her medications resulted in improvement and stabilization of
symptoms.

(Id. at 445, 461, 464, 485, 614-15).

In addition, consultative physician, Dr. Regan M. Andrade,
M.D., examined Plaintiff on September 30, 2014, and noted her
complaints of low back pain, poor vision, and vertigo.
420).

Dr.

Andrade’s

physical

examination

findings

(Id. at
likewise

document normal muscles in neck, full range of motion in neck,
nontender neck, unremarkable spine, normal appearance of spine,
thoracic

and

lumbosacral

tenderness,

no

cervical

or

SI

joint

tenderness, no spasm, full range of motion without pain, negative
straight leg raise, normal strength, normal sensation, normal deep
tendon reflex, full range of motion in upper extremity joints
bilaterally, normal range of motion in cervical spine, normal range
of motion in lumbar spine, full range of motion in lower extremity
joints bilaterally, no tremors in extremities, no varicosities, no
edema/swelling, no clubbing, no cyanosis, normal sensation, normal
motor

strength

bilaterally,

5/5

strength

in

upper

and

lower

extremities, normal grip strength bilaterally, normal gait, and no
assistive
Plaintiff

devices.
with

back

(Id.

at

pain,

420-21).
vertigo,

10

Dr.

Andrade

diabetes

diagnosed

(controlled),

hypertension (benign), and hyperlipidemia.

(Id. at 421).

Dr.

Andrade offered no opinion on whether Plaintiff had any limitations
from any of these conditions.
While there is no question that Plaintiff has been diagnosed
with diabetes, diabetic neuropathy, hypertensive cardiovascular
disease, and obesity and has experienced pain in her neck and back,
as well as pain and swelling in her extremities and feet as a result
of these medical conditions, Plaintiff’s treatment records, on the
whole, reflect routine, conservative treatment resulting in largely
normal examination findings.
In addition, the evidence of Plaintiff’s activities of daily
living reflects that she takes care of her own personal needs,7
that she lives with and takes care of her disabled adult sister,
that she cooks, cleans, does laundry, sweeps, vacuums, makes the
beds, goes to church, goes to the movies, shops, and handles her
own finances.

(Id. at 79-80, 250-54).

Despite the foregoing substantial evidence, Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ erred in failing to fulfill her duty to develop the
record by ordering a second consultative examination to obtain an
expert opinion on whether Plaintiff’s medical conditions would
prevent her from standing/walking six hours a day as required for
performance of light work.

(Doc. 16 at 5).

7

Having reviewed the

Plaintiff testified that she sometimes has trouble using a
“flat iron” on her hair. (Doc. 15 at 79).

11

record at length, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is without
merit.
It is well established that a hearing before an ALJ in social
security cases is inquisitorial and not adversarial.

A claimant

bears the burden of proving disability and of producing evidence in
support of his claim, while the ALJ has “a basic duty to develop a
full and fair record.”

Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276

(11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); see also Ingram v. Commissioner of
Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007).
In fulfilling the duty to conduct a full and fair inquiry, the
ALJ has the discretion to order a consultative examination where
the record establishes that such is necessary to enable the ALJ to
render a decision.
Cir. 1988).
consultative

Holladay v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1206, 1210 (11th

However, the ALJ is not required to order an additional
examination

where

the

record

contains

evidence to permit the ALJ’s RFC determination.

sufficient

Good v. Astrue,

240 Fed. Appx. 399, 404 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“the ALJ
need not order an additional consultative examination where the
record was sufficient for a decision.”); see also Ingram, 496 F.3d
at 1269 (“The administrative law judge has a duty to develop the
record where appropriate but is not required to order a consultative
examination as long as the record contains sufficient evidence for
the administrative law judge to make an informed decision.”).
Further, “there must be a showing of prejudice before [the court]

12

will find that the claimant’s right to due process has been violated
to such a degree that the case must be remanded to the Secretary
for further development of the record.”
931, 935 (11th Cir. 1995).
remand,

the

Court

is

Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d

In evaluating the necessity for a

guided

by

“whether

the

record

reveals

evidentiary gaps which result in unfairness or ‘clear prejudice.’”
Id. (citations omitted).
In the instant case, the record before the ALJ contained the
medical records from the physicians and hospitals that treated
Plaintiff

for

her

severe

diabetes,

diabetic

neuropathy,

hypertensive cardiovascular disease, and obesity, and the record
contains

no

discernible

evidentiary

gaps

related

to

those

impairments.

In addition, the record shows that the ALJ ordered a

consultative

physical

examination,

Andrade on September 30, 2014.

which

was

performed

(Doc. 15 at 420).

by

Dr.

While Dr. Andrade

did not offer an opinion on Plaintiff’s functional limitations, he
did

document

findings,

all

a

vast
of

number

which

of

support

“normal”
the

physical

ALJ’s

examination

determination

that

Plaintiff can perform light work, including the standing/walking
requirement.
Moreover, as Defendant points out, Plaintiff was represented
by an attorney and bore the burden of presenting evidence to support
her claim of disability.

Plaintiff’s attorney represented to the

ALJ at the hearing that he had reviewed the record (which contained

13

treatment records spanning a three-year period) and that he had no
objections to the evidence, nothing additional to submit, and
nothing further that he wished to be added to the file.

(Doc. 15

at 71, 83).
Based on the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that the record
was sufficient to enable the ALJ to determine Plaintiff’s RFC and,
further,

that

substantial

evidence

supports

the

ALJ’s

RFC

determination that Plaintiff can perform the full range of light
work.

Indeed, there is nothing in the record which indicates that

Plaintiff’s

limitations

exceed

those

in

the

RFC.

Therefore,

Plaintiff’s claim must fail.8
B. The ALJ did not err in relying on the
vocational GRIDS to find that Plaintiff
is not disabled.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the

8

Although Plaintiff has cited evidence in the record which she
claims supports a finding that she is disabled, that is, at best,
a contention that the record evidence supports a different finding.
That is not the standard on review. The issue is not whether there
is evidence in the record that would support a different finding,
but whether the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.
See Figueroa v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
181734, *15-16, 2017 WL 4992021, *6-7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2017)
(“Although Plaintiff cites to certain test results, notes, and
physical therapy findings as support for her contention that ‘there
were objective medical findings that support the doctor’s opinions
about [her] limitations’ . . ., this is, at best, a contention that
the record could support a different finding. This is not the
standard on review. The issue is not whether a different finding
could be supported by substantial evidence, but whether this finding
is.”).

14

Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“Grids”)9 to make a determination
that she is not disabled.

(Doc. 16 at 12).

Specifically, Plaintiff

argues that she has significant nonexertional limitations caused by
pain and swelling from her diabetes and other medical conditions,
which

precluded

the

disability.

(Id.

substantial

record

ALJ
at

from

12).

evidence

using
The

the

Grids

to

Commissioner

supports

the

determine

counters

finding

that

that

neither

Plaintiff’s pain nor swelling significantly limits her basic work
skills.

Therefore,

the

disability was appropriate.

ALJ’s

use

of

the

(Doc. 17 at 8).

Grids

to

determine

The Court has reviewed

the record at length and finds Plaintiff’s claim to be without
merit.
As stated, in the instant case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
has

the

severe

impairments

of

diabetes

mellitus,

diabetic

neuropathy, hypertensive cardiovascular disease, and obesity, and
that, even with these medical conditions, Plaintiff has the RFC to
perform the full range of light work.

(Id. at 46).

The ALJ further

found that, based on Plaintiff’s RFC, as well as her age, education,
and work experience, a finding of “not disabled” is directed by

9

“The Grids are a series of matrices which correlate to a set
of variables — the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age,
education, background, and previous work experience — and can be
used, at step five, to determine whether claimant has the ability
to adjust to other work in the national economy.”
Heatly v.
Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 382 Fed. Appx. 823, 825 n.4 (11th Cir.
2010). “On entry of these variables into their appropriate matrix,
a determination of disabled or not disabled is rendered.” Id.

15

Medical-Vocational Rules 202.18 and 202.11.

(Id. at 46, 54).

It is clear in this Circuit that the Commissioner of Social
Security

must

vocational

develop

“a

opportunities

full

and

available

fair
to

a

record

regarding

claimant.”

Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir. 1989).

the

Allen

v.

The ALJ must

articulate specific jobs that the claimant is able to perform given
his or her age, education, and work history, if any, “and this
finding

must

be

supported

intuition or conjecture.”

by

substantial

evidence,

not

mere

Id.

One means by which the Commissioner meets this burden is by
reliance on the Grids.

Id.

However, exclusive reliance upon the

Grids is inappropriate “‘either when the claimant is unable to
perform a full range of work at a given residual functional level
or

when

a

claimant

has

a

non-exertional

significantly limits basic work skills.’”10

impairment

that

Id. at 1202.

Where nonexertional impairments are present, “[t]he ALJ must
‘make a specific finding as to whether the nonexertional limitations
are severe enough to preclude a wide range of employment at the

10

Nonexertional limitations are those limitations that
“‘affect an individual’s ability to meet the nonstrength demands of
jobs’ and include mental limitations and restrictions, pain
limitations, and all physical limitations and restrictions that are
not reflected in the seven strength demands.” Callens v. Astrue,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115043, *18, 2012 WL 3542200, *7 (N.D. Ala.
Aug. 15, 2012) (quoting S.S.R. 96–4p).
“Exertional limitations
‘affect your ability to meet the strength demands of jobs,’ and
include ‘sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing,
and pulling.’” Id. at *6 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569(a)).

16

given

work

limitations.’”
1995).

capacity

level

indicated

by

the

exertional

Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir.

Normally, when nonexertional limitations are alleged, “the

preferred method of demonstrating that the claimant can perform
specific jobs is through the testimony of a vocational expert.”
MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1054 (11th Cir. 1986).

“‘It is

only when the claimant can clearly do unlimited types of [work at
a given level] that it is unnecessary to call a vocational expert
to establish whether the claimant can perform work which exists in
the national economy.’”

Allen, 880 F.2d at 1202 (emphasis in

original) (citations omitted); see also Garred v. Astrue, 383 Fed.
Appx. 820, 824 (11th Cir. 2010) (“When a claimant has non-exertional
impairments that significantly limit her ability to work, the ALJ
may use the Guidelines as a framework, but should also consult with
a VE to determine how the claimant’s impairments affect her ability
to perform other jobs that exist in the national economy.”) (citing
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002)).
In the instant case, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in
not making a “specific finding” that her alleged nonexertional
limitations (i.e., pain and swelling) do not significantly limit
her basic work skills.
the

ALJ

discussed,

at

However, in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC,
length,

Plaintiff’s

treatment

records

regarding her symptoms caused by her medical conditions, including
pain and swelling, particularly in her extremities.

17

As the ALJ

pointed out, Plaintiff’s treatment records document that, despite
the pain and swelling, she regularly and repeatedly had full range
of motion in all extremities, normal reflexes, normal sensation, no
muscle weakness, negative straight leg raise, normal deep tendon
reflex, no tremors in extremities, no varicosities, no clubbing, no
cyanosis, normal motor strength bilaterally, 5/5 strength in upper
and lower extremities, normal grip strength bilaterally, normal
gait, and requires no assistive devices (id. at 300-01, 351, 396,
410, 420-21, 430-32, 460-65, 491, 499, 507-09, 512, 531, 552, 556,
597-98, 604, 613-28); “minimal” degenerative changes in her spine
(id. at 346); and improvement and stabilization of symptoms with
conservative treatment (i.e., medication).
485, 614-15).

(Id. at 445, 461, 464,

The ALJ also considered the evidence of Plaintiff’s

wide range of activities of daily living (i.e., living with and
taking care of her disabled adult sister, cooking, cleaning, doing
laundry, sweeping, vacuuming, making beds, going to church and the
movies, shopping, and handling her own finances) (id. at 79-80,
250-54), all of which he found undermined her assertion that pain
and

swelling,

particularly

limited her ability to work.

in

her

extremities,

significantly

Based on this evidence, the ALJ

concluded that, despite Plaintiff’s pain and swelling, she still
was capable of performing the full range of light work.

(Id. at

53).
While the ALJ could have made her findings clearer regarding

18

the

effects,

or

lack

thereof,

of

Plaintiff’s

nonexertional

impairments on her ability to work, based on the record evidence
detailed by the ALJ, the decision is not one which leaves with Court
with insufficient information to evaluate the decision. See Dankert
v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10646, *16,
2008 WL 423497, *6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2008).

Indeed, the Court is

satisfied that the substantial evidence detailed above supports the
finding

that

any

alleged

nonexertional

limitations

caused

by

Plaintiff’s pain and swelling did not have a significant impact on
her ability to perform light work and, thus, that the ALJ’s use of
the Grids to determine whether she was disabled was appropriate.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim must fail.
C.

The ALJ did not err in the assessment of
Plaintiff’s credibility.

Last, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating the
credibility of her testimony related to her pain.
18).
any

(Doc. 16 at 17-

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to cite
specific

examples

in

the

record”

to

illustrate

how

her

allegations of pain were inconsistent with the evidentiary record
and, thus, that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her
symptoms were inconsistent with the record evidence was merely
conclusory.

(Id. at 17).

The Government counters that the ALJ

carefully considered Plaintiff’s testimony related to her symptoms
(including pain) and evaluated her testimony in relation to her
19

treatment

records

performed

a

and

proper

activities

assessment

substantial evidence.

of

daily

that

was

(Doc. 17 at 7).

living
fully

and,

thus,

supported

by

Having reviewed the record

at length, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is without merit.
When
symptoms,

evaluating
the

ALJ

a

claim

considers

based

on

medical

disabling

findings,

a

subjective
claimant’s

statements, statements by the treating physician or other persons,
and evidence of how the subjective symptoms affect the claimant’s
daily activities and ability to work.

20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a).

In

a case where a claimant attempts to establish disability through
his

or her

own

testimony

concerning

pain

symptoms, a three-part standard applies.

or

other

subjective

That standard requires:

“(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2)
objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged
pain [or other subjective symptoms] arising from that condition or
(3) that the objectively determined medical condition is of such a
severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the
alleged

pain

[or

other

subjective

symptoms].”

Hubbard

v.

Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 348 Fed. Appx. 551, 554 (11th Cir. 2009)
(unpublished) (quoting Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th
Cir. 1991)).

The Social Security regulations provide:

[S]tatements about your pain or other symptoms
will not alone establish that you are disabled;
there must be medical signs and laboratory
findings which show that you have a medical
impairment(s)
which
could
reasonably
be
expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
20

alleged and which, when considered with all of
the other evidence (including statements about
the intensity and persistence of your pain or
other symptoms which may reasonably be accepted
as consistent with the medical signs and
laboratory
findings),
would
lead
to
a
conclusion that you are disabled.
20 C.F.R. 404.1529(a) (2013).

“A claimant’s subjective testimony

supported by medical evidence that satisfies the . . . standard is
itself sufficient to support a finding of disability.”

Foote v.

Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995).
Also, when evaluating a claim based on disabling subjective
symptoms, the ALJ must consider all of the claimant’s statements
about his or her symptoms and must determine the extent to which
the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the
objective medical evidence.11

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528.

If an ALJ

decides not to credit a claimant’s testimony about his or her
subjective symptoms, “the ALJ must articulate explicit and adequate
reasons for doing so or the record must be obvious” as to the
finding.

Strickland v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 516 Fed. Appx.

829, 832 (11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (citing Foote, 67 F.3d at

11

SSR 16-3p, which replaced SSR 96-7p, eliminates the use of
the term “credibility” in the sub-regulatory policy and stresses
that, when evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, the adjudicator will
“not assess an individual’s overall character or truthfulness” but
will consider whether the “individual’s statements about the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are
consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence
of record.” Hargress v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 883 F.3d 1302,
1308 (11th Cir. 2018)(citing SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 42016, WL
1119029, *1).
21

1562). Failure to articulate the reasons for discrediting testimony
related to pain or other subjective symptoms requires, as a matter
of law, that the testimony be accepted as true.

Holt, 921 F.2d at

1223.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that the determination of whether
objective

medical

impairments

could

reasonably

be

expected

to

produce subjective symptoms is a factual question to be made by the
Secretary and, therefore, “subject only to limited review in the
courts to ensure that the finding is supported by substantial
evidence.”

Hand v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1985),

vacated on other grounds and reinstated sub nom., Hand v. Bowen,
793 F.2d 275 (11th Cir. 1986).

A reviewing court will not disturb

a clearly articulated finding related to a claimant’s claims of
disabling subjective symptoms, with substantial supporting evidence
in the record.

See Nye v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 524 Fed.

Appx. 538, 543 (11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).
In the instant case, the record shows that Plaintiff testified
(and reported to the Agency) that she has diabetes, a pinched nerve,
blurred vision, and vertigo; that she takes medication for these
conditions; that her medications make her drowsy; that she has back
pain every day; that she does not use a cane, brace, or a TENS unit;
that her back pain prevents her from sleeping; that she can walk
for about five minutes and stand for about twenty minutes; that her
arms and feet swell; that she has burning and tingling in her feet

22

and numbness in her hands; that she gets dizzy and unbalanced; that
she lives with her daughter, her two grandchildren, and her sister
and takes care of her sister who has an intellectual disability;
that she cooks, plays with her grandchildren, does laundry, sweeps,
vacuums, and makes the bed; that she has no problems with personal
care and does not need reminders to do things; that she occasionally
has trouble straightening her hair; that she goes out daily alone
and shops, goes to the movies and to church; and that she handles
money and her own finances.

(Doc. 15 at 49-50, 73-81, 217, 250-

61).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ failed to consider
this evidence, the record shows that the ALJ discussed this very
evidence and found her statements about the limitations caused by
her pain and other symptoms to be inconsistent with the substantial
medical evidence in the case.
that

Plaintiff’s

medically

(Doc. 15 at 49-53).
determinable

The ALJ found

impairments

could

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms but that her
statements

concerning

the

intensity,

persistence,

and

limiting

effects of these symptoms were “not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence and other evidence in the record. . . .”

(Id. at

50). The ALJ stated: “the objective medical record does not support
the claimant’s allegations of disability.”

(Id.).

Indeed, as the ALJ pointed out, and as has been detailed
herein, the record reflects that Plaintiff’s treating physicians

23

regularly recorded normal musculoskeletal examination findings, as
did consultative examiner, Dr. Andrade, including full range of
motion in all extremities, negative straight leg raise, normal
sensation,

normal

muscle

tone,

normal

reflexes,

normal

coordination, unimpaired gait, “minimal” degenerative changes in
her back, normal EKGs, normal CT scan of her head, and improvement
in swelling and pain with medication.

(Id. at 79-80, 250-54, 300-

01, 346, 351, 396, 410, 420-21, 430-32, 445, 460-65, 485, 491, 499,
507-09, 512, 531, 552, 556, 597-98, 604, 613-28).
Based on the foregoing substantial record evidence and a
careful review of the ALJ’s decision, the Court is satisfied that
the ALJ offered adequate explanations for discounting Plaintiff’s
testimony related to her pain, specifically including the ALJ’s
discussion of the objective medical evidence that was inconsistent
with Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of her alleged
pain and other symptoms.
Plaintiff’s

credibility

Thus, the ALJ did not err in assessing
or

applying

the

pain

standard,

and

Plaintiff’s claim must fail.
VII.

Conclusion
For

the

reasons

set

forth

herein,

and

upon

careful

consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the
parties, it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner
of

Social

disability,

Security

denying

disability

Plaintiff’s

insurance

24

claim

benefits,

for

a

period

of

and

supplemental

security income be AFFIRMED.
DONE this 27th day of June, 2018.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

25