Newbill v. Berryhill

Filing 32

Order re: 1 Complaint filed by George A. Newbill stating that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for supplemental security income is hereby REVERSED and REMANDED for furtherproceedings not inconsistent with this decision. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 3/29/19. (mpp) Copies to counsel

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
GEORGE ADAM NEWBILL,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY BERRYHILL,
Deputy Commissioner for
Operations of the Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-00410-B

ORDER
Plaintiff George Adam Newbill (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) seeks
judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying his claim for supplemental security income under
Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq.
On August 16, 2018, the parties consented to have the undersigned
conduct any and all proceedings in this case.
the

action

was

referred

to

the

undersigned

(Doc. 23).
to

Thus,

conduct

all

proceedings and order the entry of judgment in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala.
GenLR

73.

(Doc.

24).

Upon

careful

consideration

of

the

administrative record and the memoranda of the parties, it is
hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be REVERSED
and REMANDED.

Procedural History1

I.

Plaintiff protectively filed his application for supplemental
security income on June 16, 2014, alleging disability beginning
December 1, 2013, based on hepatitis C, tonsillitis, stomach acid,
weight loss, stomach ulcers, and seizures.
167).

(Doc. 12 at 137, 139,

Plaintiff’s application was denied and upon timely request,

he was granted an administrative hearing before Administrative Law
Judge Laura Robinson (hereinafter “ALJ”) on February 29, 2016.
(Id. at 52, 84).

Plaintiff attended the hearing with his counsel

and provided testimony related to his claims.
vocational
testimony.

expert

also

appeared

(Id. at 64-66).

at

the

(Id. at 54-63).

hearing

and

provided

On May 26, 2016, the ALJ issued an

unfavorable decision finding that Plaintiff is not disabled.
at 18-35).

A

(Id.

A second decision unfavorable to Plaintiff was issued

by the ALJ on August 24, 2016. 2

The Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff’s request for review on July 15, 2017.

(Id. at 5).

Therefore, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner.

(Id.).

1

The Court’s citations to the transcript in this order refer to
the pagination assigned in CM/ECF.
2

The second unfavorable decision is not in the transcript, but it
is referenced in the Appeals Council’s denial dated July 15, 2017,
and in Plaintiff’s brief. Plaintiff’s assignments of error and
the parties’ arguments in the present action pertain to the ALJ’s
May 26, 2016 decision, which Plaintiff classifies as the final
decision of the Commissioner. (See Doc. 13 at 1).

2

Having

exhausted

his

administrative

timely filed the present civil action.

remedies,

(Doc. 1).

Plaintiff

The parties

agree that this case is now ripe for judicial review and is
properly before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3).
II.

Issues on Appeal
1. Whether substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff had a medically
determinable impairment of substance abuse
disorder?
2. Whether substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s substance
abuse
disorder
was
material
to
the
determination of disability?
3. Whether the ALJ reversibly erred by giving
little weight to the opinions of Plaintiff’s
treating physician, Edith Gubler McCreadie,
M.D.,
regarding
the
side
effects
of
Plaintiff’s prescribed medications?

III. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born on September 5, 1981 and was thirty-four
years of age at the time of his administrative hearing on February
29, 2016.

(Doc. 12 at 55).

Plaintiff attended special education

classes while in school, has an eighth or ninth-grade education,
and is able to read and speak English.

(Id. at 57, 159, 354).

Plaintiff

and

has

a

limited

work

construction worker in 2010.

history,

last

(Id. at 169, 355).

worked

as

a

At the hearing,

Plaintiff testified that he is unable to work because he has no
energy or strength and that he can hardly pick anything up because

3

it “pulls to [his] stomach and [his] back.” (Id. at 58). Plaintiff
is 5’11 and weighted 140 pounds at the time of his hearing and
testified that he had lost approximately twenty pounds in the
previous two years due to his diet, ulcers, a liver problem, and
“blood disease.”

(Id. at 55-56, 63).

Plaintiff reported stomach

ulcers, liver problems, seizures, nerve problems, and depression.
(Id. at 58).

Plaintiff’s gastric ulcers, gastroesophageal reflux

disease, and abdominal pain have been treated with a number of
medications,

including

Prilosec, and Nexium.

the

proton

pump

inhibitors

(Id. at 45, 264, 267).

Protonix,

Plaintiff reported

that he has prescriptions for the opioid pain medications Dilaudid
and Oxycodone and is prescribed the benzodiazepine Xanax for
anxiety.

(Id. at 45, 47, 49, 207).

Plaintiff also testified that

he had not used drugs or alcohol for two years.
IV.

(Id. at 61).

Standard of Review
In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s role

is a limited one.

The Court’s review is limited to determining

(1) whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by
substantial evidence and (2) whether the correct legal standards
were applied.3
1990).

Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir.

A court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the

3

This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal
principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th
Cir. 1987).

4

evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986).

The

Commissioner’s findings of fact must be affirmed if they are based
upon substantial evidence.
(11th Cir. 1991).

Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla,

but less than a preponderance” and consists of “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.”
Cir. 1983).

Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th

In determining whether substantial evidence exists,

a reviewing court must consider the record as a whole, taking into
account

evidence

both

favorable

and

unfavorable

to

the

Commissioner’s decision. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th
Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10163, at *4 (S.D. Ala. June 14, 1999).
V.

Statutory and Regulatory Framework
An individual who applies for Social Security disability

benefits must prove his or her disability.
Disability
substantial

is

defined

gainful

as

the

“inability

activity

by

reason

20 C.F.R. § 416.912.
to
of

engage
any

in

any

medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]”
§ 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a).

42 U.S.C.
The Social

Security regulations provide a five-step sequential evaluation

5

process for determining whether a claimant has proven his or her
disability.

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.

The claimant must first prove that he or she is not engaged
in substantial gainful activity. Carpenter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
614 F. App’x 482, 486 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).

The second

step requires the claimant to prove that he or she has a severe
impairment or combination of impairments.

Id.

If, at the third

step, the claimant proves that the impairment or combination of
impairments meets or equals a listed impairment, then the claimant
is automatically found disabled regardless of age, education, or
work experience.

Id.

If the claimant cannot prevail at the third

step, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to step four. Id. A claimant’s
RFC is an assessment, based on all relevant medical and other
evidence, of a claimant’s remaining ability to work despite his or
her impairments.
Cir. 1997).

Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (llth

Once a claimant’s RFC is determined, the evaluation

proceeds to the fourth step, where the claimant must prove an
inability to perform his or her past relevant work.

Carpenter,

614 F. App’x at 486.
If a claimant meets his or her burden at the fourth step, it
then becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove at the fifth step
that the claimant is capable of engaging in another kind of
substantial gainful employment which exists in significant numbers

6

in the national economy, given the claimant’s RFC, age, education,
and work history.

Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir.

1985) (per curiam). If the Commissioner can demonstrate that there
are such jobs the claimant can perform, the burden then shifts
back to the claimant to prove his or her inability to perform those
jobs in order to be found disabled.

Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007,

1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562,
1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).
In addition to the foregoing, the Contract with America
Advancement Act of 1996 (“CAAA”), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(C) and 1382c(a)(3)(J), “amended the Social Security
Act to preclude the award of benefits when alcoholism or drug
addiction is determined to be a contributing factor material to
the determination that a claimant is disabled.”4

Doughty v. Apfel,

4

The Commissioner’s regulations provide the following framework
for determining a claimant’s disability status in light of the
CAAA:
(a) General. If we find that you are disabled and have
medical evidence of your drug addiction or alcoholism,
we must determine whether your drug addiction or
alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the
determination of disability, unless we find that you are
eligible for benefits because of your age or blindness.
(b) Process we will follow when we have medical evidence
of your drug addiction or alcoholism. (1) The key factor
we will examine in determining whether drug addiction or
alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the
determination of disability is whether we would still
find you disabled if you stopped using drugs or alcohol.

7

245 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th Cir. 2001).

Therefore, in those cases

where the Commissioner “determines a claimant to be disabled and
finds

medical

evidence

of

drug

addiction

or

alcoholism,

the

Commissioner then ‘must determine whether . . . drug addiction or
alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination
of disability.’”

Id. at 1279 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535).5

(2) In making this determination, we will evaluate which
of your current physical and mental limitations, upon
which we based our current disability determination,
would remain if you stopped using drugs or alcohol and
then determine whether any or all of your remaining
limitations would be disabling.
(i) If we determine that your remaining limitations
would not be disabling, we will find that your drug
addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor
material to the determination of disability.
(ii) If we determine that your remaining limitations are
disabling, you are disabled independent of your drug
addiction or alcoholism and we will find that your drug
addiction or alcoholism is not a contributing factor
material to the determination of disability.
20 C.F.R. § 416.935.
5

Drug addiction and alcoholism “cases require an additional layer
of consideration.
The ‘ALJ must first conduct the five-step
inquiry without separating out the impact of alcoholism or drug
addiction.
If the ALJ finds that the claimant is not disabled
under the five-step inquiry, then the claimant is not entitled to
benefits and there is no need to proceed with the analysis under
[20 CFR] §§ 404.1535 or 416.935. If the ALJ finds that the claimant
is disabled and there is medical evidence of his or her drug
addiction or alcoholism, then the ALJ should proceed under §§
404.1535 or 416.935 to determine if the claimant would still be
found disabled if he or she stopped using alcohol or drugs.’”
Green v. Colvin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48625, at *7-8, 2014 WL
1379969, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 2014) (quoting Price v. Colvin,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39989, at *15-16, 2014 WL 1246762, at *5 (D.
8

Social Security regulations make clear that the “key factor in
determining whether drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing
factor material to the determination of disability . . . is whether
the claimant would still be found disabled if he stopped using
drugs or alcohol.”

Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)(1)).

In

such materiality determinations, it is the claimant who “bears the
burden of proving that his alcoholism or drug addiction is not a
contributing factor material to his disability determination.”
Id. at 1280.
VI.

The ALJ’s Findings
In the instant case, at step one of the five step inquiry,

the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
activity since his application date.

(Doc. 12 at 23).

At step

two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of
hepatitis

C,

gastric

ulcers,

lumbar

disorder, and substance abuse disorder.
the

ALJ

found

that

Plaintiff’s

disc

disease,

(Id.).

impairments,

anxiety

At step three,
when

considered

individually and in combination, do not meet or medically equal
any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d)).

(Id. at 24).

The ALJ then

Kan. Mar. 26, 2014)), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 72721, 2014 WL 2322822 (S.D. Ga. May 28, 2014).

9

determined

“based

on

all

of

the

impairments,

including

the

substance use disorder, the claimant has the residual functional
capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b)
except the claimant can perform simple, routine, and repetitive
tasks; can make simple, work-related decisions; and is unable, on
a sustained basis, to respond appropriately to supervisors and
coworkers or deal with changes in routine work setting.”
25-26).

(Id. at

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff cannot perform

any of his past relevant work and, at the fifth step, the ALJ
concluded that “based on all of the impairments, including the
substance use disorder, there are no jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform[.]”
(Id. at 30-31).
The ALJ then performed a second sequential evaluation and
made findings premised upon “[i]f the claimant [had] stopped the
substance use[.]”

(Id. at 31).

In this second analysis, the ALJ

found at step two that “the remaining limitations would cause more
than a minimal impact on the claimant’s ability to perform basic
work activities; therefore, the claimant would continue to have a
severe impairment or combination of impairments.”

(Id.).

At the

third step, the ALJ determined that in the absence of substance
use, Plaintiff would still not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that meets or medically equals any of the listed
impairments. (Id.). The ALJ then determined that absent substance

10

use, Plaintiff “would have the residual functional capacity to
perform light work . . . except the claimant is limited to simple,
routine, and repetitive tasks; simple, work-related decisions;
occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers; no direct
interaction with the general public; and occasional change in
routine work setting.”
that

Plaintiff

would

relevant work[.]”

(Id. at 33).
“continue

(Id. at 34).

to

At step four, the ALJ found
be

unable

to

perform

past

At step five, the ALJ determined

that in light of the vocational expert’s testimony, “there would
be a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the
claimant could perform” should he stop the substance use, including
the occupations of traffic checker, marker, and mail clerk (nonpostal). (Id. at 34-35). Because the ALJ concluded that substance
use

disorder

was

a

contributing

factor

material

to

the

determination of disability, she concluded that Plaintiff was not
under a disability from the date his application was filed through
the date of the decision.

(Id. at 35).

VII. Discussion
A.

The ALJ failed to state adequate grounds
for her determination that Plaintiff had
a medically determinable impairment of
substance abuse disorder.

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in finding that he
had, as one of his severe impairments, substance abuse disorder.
(Doc. 13 at 6-14).

Plaintiff asserts that the record lacks the

11

evidence necessary to support a finding of substance abuse or a
maladaptive pattern of substance use.
Commissioner
clinical

counters

signs,

that

laboratory

(Id. at 11-14).

substantial
studies

evidence,

revealing

the

The

including

presence

of

illegal drugs, and the medical opinion of an examining psychologist
that Plaintiff suffered from multiple substance use disorders,
supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff had a medically
determinable impairment of substance abuse disorder.
8-11).

(Doc. 19 at

Having carefully reviewed the record in this case, the

Court finds that the ALJ has failed to provide adequate support
for

her

finding

that

Plaintiff

has

a

medically

determinable

substance abuse disorder.
Social Security Ruling 13-2p (“SSR 13-2p”) was issued to
explain the policies of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)
for how it considers whether drug addiction or alcoholism (“DAA”)6

6

The SSA has noted that “[a]lthough the terms ‘drug addiction’
and ‘alcoholism’ are medically outdated, [it] continue[s] to use
the terms because they are used in the [Social Security] Act.”
SSR 13-2p, 2013 SSR LEXIS 2, at *5, 2013 WL 621536, at *3 (S.S.A.
Feb. 20, 2013).
Drug addiction or alcoholism (“DAA”) is a
medically determinable impairment, defined by the Social Security
Administration as “Substance Use Disorders; that is, Substance
Dependence or Substance Abuse as defined in the latest edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)
published by the American Psychiatric Association.” SSR 13-2p,
2013 SSR LEXIS 2, at *5-6, 2013 WL 621536, at *3. “In general,
the DSM defines Substance Use Disorders as maladaptive patterns of
substance use that lead to clinically significant impairment or
distress.” SSR 13-2p, 2013 SSR LEXIS 2, at *6, 2013 WL 621536, at
*3.
12

is material to its determination of disability.

SSR 13-2p, 2013

SSR LEXIS 2, at *1, 2013 WL 621536, at *1 (S.S.A. Feb. 20, 2013).
SSR 13-2p “establishes a six step procedure for determining whether
a claimant has [DAA], the extent to which the DAA affects the
disability determination, and the acceptable evidence to be used
in assessing the interaction between the DAA and disability.”
Wilson v. Colvin, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10679, at *12, 2016 WL
362407, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 2016).

Relevant to the issue at

bar, the ALJ must determine at the first step of the procedure
whether the claimant has DAA.

See SSR 13-2p, 2013 SSR LEXIS 2, at

*12, 2013 WL 621536, at *5.
To establish the existence of DAA, there must be:
objective medical evidence – that is, signs, symptoms,
and laboratory findings – from an acceptable medical
source that supports a finding that a claimant has DAA.
This requirement can be satisfied when there are no overt
physical signs or laboratory findings with clinical
findings reported by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or
other appropriate acceptable medical source based on
examination of the claimant.
The acceptable medical
source may also consider any records or other
information (for example, from a third party) he or she
has available, but [the ALJ] must still have the source’s
own clinical or laboratory findings.
SSR 13-2p, 2013 SSR LEXIS 2, at *29, 2013 WL 621536, at *10.
Importantly, “[e]vidence that shows only that the claimant
uses drugs or alcohol” such as self-reported drug or alcohol use,

13

a DUI arrest, or a third-party report “does not in itself establish
the existence of a medically determinable Substance Use Disorder”
because

it

is

not

objective

acceptable medical source.
2013 WL 621536, at *10.

medical

evidence

provided

by

an

SSR 13-2p, 2013 SSR LEXIS 2, at *30,
Further, even when the ALJ has such

objective medical evidence, he or she “must also have evidence
that establishes a maladaptive pattern of substance use and the
other requirements for a diagnosis of a Substance Use Disorder(s)
in the DSM[,]” which must come from an acceptable medical source.
Id.

“A claimant’s occasional maladaptive use or a history of

occasional prior maladaptive use of alcohol or illegal drugs does
not establish that the claimant has a medically determinable
Substance Use Disorder.”

SSR 13-2p, 2013 SSR LEXIS 2, at *7-8,

2013 WL 621536, at *3.

Because substance use disorders are

diagnosed in part by the presence of maladaptive substance use,
DAA does not include “[a]ddiction to, or use of, prescription
medications taken as prescribed, including methadone and narcotic
pain medications.”

SSR 13-2p, 2013 SSR LEXIS 2, at *7, 2013 WL

621536, at *3.
The undersigned notes at the onset that while Plaintiff often
self-reported a history of drug and alcohol abuse, self-reports
are not sufficient to establish the existence of a medically
determinable substance abuse disorder.

A close review of the

record evidence reveals two laboratory results reflecting positive

14

tests for drugs.

Plaintiff was treated at a local hospital for

abdominal pain in July 2013, and the treating doctor, Prince C.
Uzoije,

M.D.

noted

polysubstance

abuse

that

“[t]here

is

a

known

to

include

cocaine,

history

marijuana

of
and

benzodiazepines.

This admission his urine drug screen is positive

for marijuana.”

(Id. at 266).

After Plaintiff’s alleged onset

date of December 2013, he was treated again at a local hospital,
in May 2014, for abdominal pain.

(Id. at 232). Plaintiff reported

to George Ngando, M.D. “that he uses illicit drugs (Marijuana)”
and that he “does not drink alcohol.”

(Id. at 233).

urine drug screen tested positive for cannabinoids.

Plaintiff’s
(Id. at 236).

Dr. Ngando diagnosed Plaintiff with marijuana abuse. (Id. at 234).
In his disability report dated July 14, 2014, Plaintiff
reported that he was on five medications, which included Dilaudid,
Oxycodone, and Xanax, and that his medications were all prescribed
by his primary care physician, Dr. Edith Gubler McCreadie, M.D.
(Id. at 170).

Also, on September 18, 2014, Dr. Kenneth R. Starkey,

Psy.D., a clinical psychologist, conducted a consultative mental
examination of Plaintiff.

(Id. at 353).

During the consultative

examination, Plaintiff “reported having a history of past cannabis
and alcohol use problems, and what is suspected to be an 8 year
history

of

problems.”

polysubstance
(Id. at 354).

(opioid

and

benzodiazepine)

use

Plaintiff reported that he had not used

marijuana or alcohol since May 2014.

15

(Id.).

Dr. Starkey noted

that Plaintiff’s current medications included Xanax, Dilaudid,
Oxycodone, Zantac, and Hydromorphine, and that Plaintiff reported
that he had taken his medications prior to the examination. (Id.).
Dr. Starkey observed that Plaintiff’s
cognitive

processing

speed

appeared

“eyes appeared glassy and
slow

(as

though

he

were

experiencing the detrimental influence of too much psychoactive
substances/medications).”

(Id. at 355).

Dr. Starkey’s diagnostic impression included the following:
995.20
Adverse Affects of Medications
304.30
Cannabis Use Disorder – Early Remission (per
claimants [sic] report)
305.00 Alcohol Use Disorder – Early Remission (per
claimant’s report)
Rule Out 300.00 Opioid Use Disorder
Rule Out 304.10 Benzodiazepine Use Disorder
(Id. at 356).
Dr. Starkey opined that Plaintiff’s ability to carry out
simple/concrete instructions appeared adequate, that his ability
to work with supervisors, coworkers and the general public appeared
marginal, and his ability to deal with work pressures appered
marginal to poor.

(Id. at 357).

Dr. Starkey further opined that

“improvement of existing functional limitations might occur with
total abstinence from all addictive opioid and benzodiazepine
medications.”
Against

(Id.).
this

backdrop

of

evidence,

the

ALJ

found

that

Plaintiff has a substance abuse disorder, and that the substance
abuse

disorder

is

a

contributioning

16

factor

material

to

the

determination

of

disability

because

Plaintiff

disabled if he stopped the substance use.

would

not

(Id. at 23, 35).

be

As an

initial matter, the Court notes that there is undoubtedly some
evidence that Plaintiff used marijuana during the relevant period.
However, the ALJ’s decision does not specify whether it attributes
Plaintiff’s substance abuse disorder to marijuana use, opioid and
benzodiazepine use, alcohol use, or a combination thereof.

The

record establishes that Plaintiff was prescribed addictive opioid
and benzodiazepine medications, but it is devoid of any evidence
reflecting

that

prescribed. 7
existing

Plaintiff

Moreover,

functional

abstinence

from

medications.”

was

Dr.

not

Starkey

limitations

all

This

the

opined

might

addictive

(Id. at 357).

taking

that

improve

opioid

medication

and

as

Plaintiff’s
with

“total

benzodiazepine

opinion clearly suggests that

it was the addictive prescription drugs, as opposed to marijuana,
that was contributing to the limitations identified by Dr. Starkey.
Further,

there

is

precious

little

in

the

record

concerning

Plaintiff’s alcohol use, certainly not enough to establish a
substance

use

disorder

based

on

alcohol

use.

Based

on

the

foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is insufficient

7

As noted supra, DAA does not include “[a]ddiction to, or use
of, prescription medications taken as prescribed, including
methadone and narcotic pain medications.”
SSR 13-2p, 2013 SSR
LEXIS 2, at *7, 2013 WL 621536, at *3.

17

because it fails to state adequate grounds for her determination
that Plaintiff has a substance abuse disorder as defined in SSR
13-2p and to “clearly disclose” the grounds upon which she based
said determination.

See Wilson v. Colvin, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

10679, at *14, 2016 WL 362407, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 2016)
(remanding case because “there [was] a substantial likelihood that
the evidence relied on by the ALJ would not establish DAA” as
defined in SSR 13-2p).

Because of these errors, this case is

remanded to the ALJ to conduct the substance use disorder analysis
in accordance with SSR 13-2p.8
VIII.

Conclusion
For

the

reasons

set

forth

herein,

and

upon

careful

consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the
parties, it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for supplemental
security

income

is

hereby

REVERSED

and

REMANDED

for

further

proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.
DONE this 29th day of March, 2019.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

8

Because this case is being reversed and remanded, the
undersigned has not addressed the remaining issues raised in
Plaintiff’s brief.

18